Donation of 'spare' fresh or frozen embryos to research: who decides that an embryo is 'spare' and how can we enhance the quality and protect the validity of consent?

This paper analyses elements of the legal process of consent to the donation of 'spare' embryos to research, including stem-cell research, and makes a recommendation intended to enhance the quality of that process, including on occasion by guarding against the invalidity of such consent. This is important in its own right and also so as to maximise the reproductive treatment options of couples engaged in in vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment and to avoid possible harms to them. In Part 1, with reference to qualitative data from three UK IVF clinics, we explore the often delicate and contingent nature of what comes to be, for legal purposes, a 'spare' embryo. The way in which an embryo becomes 'spare', with its implications for the process of consent to donation to research, is not addressed in the relevant reports relating to or codes of practice governing the donation of embryos to research, which assume an unproblematic notion of the 'spare' embryo. Significantly, our analysis demonstrates that there is an important and previously unrecognised first stage in the donation of a 'spare' embryo to research, namely: consent to an embryo being 'spare' and so, at the same time, to its disuse in treatment. This is not explicitly covered by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) Act 1990, as amended by the HFE Act 2008. Having identified this important initial stage in the process of consent to the donation of a 'spare' embryo to research in conclusion to Part 1, in Part 2 we analyse the idea of consent to an embryo's disuse in treatment on the basis that it is 'spare' with reference to the legal elements of consent, namely information as to nature and purpose, capacity, and voluntariness. We argue that there are in fact three related consent processes in play, of which the principal one concerns consent to an embryo's disuse in treatment. If the quality of this first consent is compromised, in turn this will impact on the quality of the consent to the donation of that 'spare' embryo to research, followed by the quality of consent to future cycles of assisted reproduction treatment in the event that these are needed as a result of a donation decision. The analysis overall is of central relevance to the debate as to whether, and if so when, it should be permissible to request the donation of fresh embryos for research, as opposed to those that have been frozen and, for instance, have reached the end of their statutory storage term. This has a particular bearing on the donation of embryos to stem-cell research since there is a debate as to whether fresh embryos are most useful for this.     

The jurisdictional bar provision: who is an appropriate relator?

After explaining the role of the qui tam litigation and demonstrating its importance to fighting Medicare fraud and abuse, this article provides a detailed explanation of various court interpretations of the jurisdictional bar provision of the False Claims Act, a common and contentious statutory pitfall for qui tam litigators. The author provides a thorough evaluation of the law among different circuits to assist litigators in choosing favorable jurisdictions to increase their likelihood of success.     

Adolescents and mental disorder: who consents to treatment?

Although English law recognises that developing adolescents may acquire the capacity to make decisions about medical treatment themselves it does not address the problem of mentally disturbed or disordered adolescents. This article examines the nature of adolescent refusal of treatment and suggests that a line be drawn between three categories of adolescent disturbance--the competent young person who refuses treatment that an adult too may refuse, the rebellious teenager whose refusal is triggered by simple teenage angst, and the mentally ill teenager whose refusal is triggered by mental illness. It suggests that adolescent autonomy needs to be more fully understood and the Mental Health Act more readily used in treating young people.     

Strasbourg,the House of Lords or Elected Politicians: Who decides about rights after Re P?

In Re P , the House of Lords decided that art 14 of the Adoption (Northern Ireland) Order 1987 which prohibited unmarried couples from being eligible to adopt, violated articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Apart from its significance for adoption law and anti-discrimination law, Re P is also important in understanding the constitutional role of the courts under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). Re P recognizes that if Strasbourg has determined that an issue falls within states' margin of appreciation, this does not prevent municipal courts from enforcing those rights. This comment will discuss the meaning and scope of the courts' obligation under section 2 of the HRA, the status of the rights protected by the HRA and the appropriate role of the courts in a rights dispute which is subject to moral, social, religious or political controversy.     

Russia and Ukraine: Transition or tragedy?

Conclusion The political-criminal nexus that emerged in the post-Soviet period represents a transformation of the relationships which existed in the Soviet period. The division of the property of the Soviet state gave ample possibilities for the political-criminal nexus to obtain significant political assets. They were able to transform their power from one that was rooted in the managerial apparatus of the Soviet state and the consumer economy into one with international dimensions and control of very large shares of the domestic economy. The rise of the political-criminal nexus, while hardly surprising in light of the structure of power relations in the final decades of the Soviet period, precludes full democratization or the rise of a real market economy. In the initial years of the transformation process from a socialist to a post-socialist economy, insufficient attention was paid to the containment of the political-criminal nexus in both Russia and Ukraine. Most Western politicians and international organizations focused on the collapse of communism rather than the rise of these pernicious alternative power relationships. The prognosis for the containment of the political-criminal nexus in either country is rather limited at the moment. Ukraine, however, is at a comparative disadvantage because it has failed to sufficiently acknowledge the high costs of organized crime and its political links. This has been done at the highest levels of Russian government although precious little has been done to address the problem. The Ukraine situation is more difficult because its institutional resources are much more limited than Russia which inherited a disproportionate share of the Soviet Union's financial and institutional resources. With limited civil society and the economic precariousness of much of the population, little can be done to control the problem at its roots. The political-criminal nexus in Russia and Ukraine will remain a serious problem in coming decades. It cannot be ignored in appraising the development of the domestic political situation in either country or determining foreign policy in relation to these two newly independent states.     

Reducing Homelessness or Re‐ordering the Deckchairs?

The Homelessness Reduction Act 2017 has come into force trumpeting nothing less than the need for a ‘culture change’ among local housing authorities implementing it. Although it aims to reduce homelessness, it is more likely to hide long‐term systemic issues in the housing system. It is argued that the 2017 Act's significant alterations are likely to result in a re‐ordering of the deckchairs on the Titanic of housing policy. Following a biography and critique of the homelessness legislation as being out of time and place, as well as a discussion of the 2017 Act itself, three central points are made: the 2017 Act has ushered in a form of neo‐liberal government of the homeless; the understanding of the household seeking assistance has fundamentally altered, from passive applicant to active citizen; the private rented market provides the sole mechanism for performing the duties but remains problematic.     

Union Citizenship—Metaphor or Source of Rights?

After nearly ten years of introducing Union Citizenship as a concept into Community law it seems time to draw a preliminary evaluation of its importance in reshaping the legal and social positions of citizens living in the EU, more precisely in its Member States. The balance sheet is however mixed: On the one hand, the prevalent position in legal doctrine seems to be that Union citizenship is merely a derived condition of nationality, while on the other side certain fundamental rights are based on criteria other than citizenship/nationality alone. The European Charter on Fundamental Rights will not overcome this dilemma. This can be shown in conflictual areas which are in the centre of discusion in the paper, namely the (limited!) use of the concept of citizenship to extend existing free movement rights in the new case law of the Court of Justice, the resistance towards granting 'quasi-citizenship' rights to third country nationals lawfully resident in the Union for a longer period of time, and the yet unsolved problem of imposing 'implied duties' based on a doctrine of ' abus de droit ' upon citizens paralleling the rights granted to them. As a conclusion the author is of the opinion that the question asked for in the title can be answered in the positive only to a limited extent. Citizenship appears to be a sleeping fairy princess still be be kissed awake by the direct effect of Community law.