Are the similarities between a woman's right to choose an abortion and the alleged right to assisted suicide really compelling?

In this Article, Marc Spindelman examines the relationship between abortion and assisted suicide. He begins his discussion with the constitutional framework within which courts should consider the assertion that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual's decision to commit assisted suicide. The Author then considers and, based on relevant Supreme Court doctrine, rejects the conception of personal autonomy that undergirds the claimed constitutional right to assisted suicide. Finally, the Author points out some legal and cultural distinctions between abortion and assisted suicide, arguing that these distinctions offer courts good reasons for holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's promise of liberty does not include the liberty to commit assisted suicide. In addition, the Author makes a few observations about recent assisted-suicide cases decided by the Ninth and Second Circuits.     

Criminal liability of physicians: an encroachment on the abortion right?

The Supreme Court in 1973 in Roe v. Wade established that decision of first trimester abortion is left to the physician, exercising his best medical judgment, in consultation with the patient. During this period the state may not regulate abortion determination since there is no compelling state interest; therefore a physician performing abortion will be precluded from civil or criminal liability. In second trimester abortion the state has a compelling interest in the health of the mother and may regulate the procedure to protect maternal health; although a previable fetus may be able to survive the abortion, Roe v. Danforth definitively places the woman's right to an abortion above the life of the fetus during the previable stage; therefore the state cannot seek to safeguard the life or health of the fetus during the abortion. Third trimester abortion implies a viable fetus; thus, a compelling state interest in the potential life arises and the state may regulate and proscribe abortion except when necessary for the life and health of the mother. The determination of when viability has been achieved is a matter of judgment resting with the physician who has the choice of techniques and operating procedures which may or may not be fatal to the unborn. It is a question of either termination of pregnancy or destruction of the fetus. In this last case the legal responsibility placed upon the physician is very serious, and involving a risk of civil and criminal liability. Uncertainties as to the boundaries of legal abortion and the threat of criminal liability can only result in a reluctance among physicians to perform second and third trimester abortions, which is against the fundamental right to abortion guaranteed by the Constitution. The Supreme Court will have to elaborate upon the scope of the abortion right, whether it encompasses fetal destruction or only termination of pregnancy, because it directly affects the extent and quality of maternal and fetal care that must be rendered by a physician. If only termination of pregnancy is included the Court must resolve whether the woman's health interests predominate, or whether the physician can be required to enhance fetal survival. Physicians have a right to know the full extent of legal ramifications and implications of legally induced abortion.     

Bracket creep in Australian abortion indications: when did rubella arrive?

This article highlights a common misconception about abortion law that is apparent from reading Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 CLR 52; namely, that fetal abnormality forms a prima facie case for lawful abortion across Australia. This fallacy stems from the legacy of British law drafted in the aftermath of the thalidomide crisis of the early 1960s, and continues to shape beliefs about Australian abortion law in society and within the judiciary. The article notes the fundamental contradictions between British-style law that provides for abortion on the ground of fetal abnormality and New South Wales case law that provides for lawful abortion in regard to the health and wellbeing of the woman. The author concludes that it is misguided and erroneous to configure abortion law in terms of the fetus inconsistent with the tradition of abortion law, and New South Wales authority.