中央对地方财政转移支付影响因素研究——基于中国县级数据的实证检验

县级政府承担了我国绝大部分基本公共服务的供给责任,县级也是我国政府间转移支付的最终落脚点。本文运用1994—2009年中国县级社会经济数据,建立计量经济模型对我国转移支付制度的影响因素进行实证检验。研究发现:1994年分税制改革以来,那些财政自给能力弱、财政努力程度低的县级地区获得更多的财政转移支付,表明促进财政均等化是中央向地方财政转移支付的基本目标;2002—2009年期间,那些教育供给水平低的县级地区获得了更多的财政转移支付,表明相比于分税制初期,近年来中央政府开始关注基本公共服务均等化因素。研究还发现,县级经济发展水平、政府人员规模与财政转移支付正相关,表明"经济效率"和维持地方政府的正常运转也是中央政府在转移支付分配过程考虑的因素。本文的发现对推进我国转移支付制度顶层设计具有重要的启示意义,未来的改革应强化转移支付的积极效应,同时降低其可能带来的负面影响。     

适应公共财政体制的政府间转移支付制度的分析与设计

中央政府与地方政府之间的转移支付是公共财政体制下政府间财政关系的一个重要课题 ,在公共财政体制下 ,通过正确度量地方的财政收入能力和标准支出需求 ,以确定科学合理的中央与地方之间的转移支付办法是各级财政充分发挥其公共服务职能的重要基础 ,这对于各级财政收支平衡、地区间经济的协调发展、宏观经济的稳定、公共服务体系的有效运作及整个财政机制的公平高效运行都具有决定性的影响     

完善转移支付，均衡全国基本公共服务

1994年实行的分税制改革，理顺了中央与地方政府间的分配关系，促进了各级财政收入的稳定增长。同时中央为了均衡地区间财力差距，促进各地基本公共服务均等化，建立和完善了财政转移支付制度。目前中央对地方的转移支付主要分为一般性转移支付和专项转移支付两类。     

省直管县改革与县级政府财政解困——基于6省面板数据的实证研究

在全国各地普遍试点并推广的省直管县改革被认为是实现县域经济盘活和县级政府财政解困的重要手段,但关于该问题的大样本实证证据却尚未发现。基于6省2004-2009年的面板数据,采用基于自然实验的倍差法模型估计,本文实证分析了省直管县改革对县级政府财政自给能力的实际影响。研究发现省直管县改革的财政政策效应明显,显著提高了县级政府的财政自给率,但其政策效应呈现出边际效益递减的趋势。研究还发现省直管县改革对县级市、富裕县和规模较大的县的政策效应最明显。本文对上述发现进行了讨论,并据此提出省直管县改革通过提高财政自给率而对县级政府财政解困产生积极作用,但在稳步推进省直管县改革的同时需要采取配套措施;省直管县改革在不同规模、经济发展水平和行政单位性质的县产生的政策效应不尽相同,各地在推行省直管县改革时应因地制宜,结合县域经济和财力情况,制定适宜的政策并采取合适的策略。     

完善地方政府间财政转移支付制度的思考

地方政府财政转移支付制度是各国财政体制的重要组成部分，是协调各级地方政府利益分配关系的重要手段。目前地方政府间财政转移支付制度存在支付制度不完善、支付结构不合理等问题。完善地方政府财政转移支付制度应从以下几方面着手：一是要明晰各级地方政府事权与支出责任；二是要在收支计算方面用“因素法”替代“基数法”；三是优化各级地方政府财政转移支付结构；四是强化地方政府财政转移支付法制化建设。     

地方官员对县级转移支付分配的影响研究——以G省86个县为例

关于政府间的财政转移支付的影响因素,传统观点认为,主要是由效率和公平因素来决定的,但仅仅用地方财力、经济发展的差异来解释转移支付的影响因素是不够的。财政资源分配者与被分配者的政治联系这一非正式制度在政府间转移支付治理中发挥了重要作用。县委书记的教育程度、年龄、任职经历、挂点联系的高级官员的政治影响会影响专项转移支付的分配。此外,是否属于财政省直管县、是否是民族地区、是否是贫困县及贫困程度高低也对争取专项转移支付有影响。     

民族地区财政转移支付制度的回顾及效应评价

民族地区财政转移支付政策具有的特殊性,对不同时期的政策及效应进行评述,透过其发展及演变历程,提供政策建议:明确民族地区财政转移支付政策的目标,加大对民族地区财政转移支付力度;进行民族地区财政转移支付制度的创新,提高转移支付的有效性;体现民族地区财政转移支付政策的特殊性,确保政策的相对独立。     

财政分权对地方政府环境治理的影响

我国于1994年开始实行分税制改革,这对调动中央和地方的积极性,加强税收征管,保证财政收入和增强宏观调控能力,起到了积极作用。但是在分税制下,地方财政压力日益增大,使得地方政府更加关注经济发展,治理环境的动力不足,造成环境质量随着经济的飞速发展日益恶化。以我国财政分权实践为背景,探讨财政分权对地方政府环境治理的影响,提出相关政策建议:协调中央地方财权和事权的关系;进行官员晋升考核制度改革;转变政府发展理念;加强财政转移支付和完善生态补偿机制。     

进一步规范和完善我国财政转移支付制度探析

政府间财政转移支付制度对预算管理体制的公平性和运行效率有重要影响。我国财政转移支付制度存在着形式过多,不够规范,仍以“基数法”作为主要确定依据,有条件转移支付种类过多,均等化转移支付部分力度有限等问题。由于地区间经济发展水平差异较大、二元经济结构、地方既得利益刚性、政府间事权划分不够清晰等原因,我国政府间转移支付制度的规范和完善需要一个渐进的过程。     

中国地方财政稳定机制研究

传统财政理论认为,中央政府是稳定政策唯一合适的承担者,然而,Gramlich得出地方政府的财政政策至少在短期内是有效的结论,并提倡地方政府实施稳定的财政政策。本文利用1995—2008年中国30个省、市、自治区(西藏除外)的财政收支面板数据和GDP面板数据,运用固定效应模型和Prais-Winsten PCSE方法实证分析了地方财政收支行为与宏观经济波动的关系,得出在宏观经济处于繁荣阶段时,地方财政收支违反了"逆周期"操作规则,是"顺周期"的结论。认为,地方政府职能转变不到位,财政纪律松弛,财政约束缺失,以及《预算法》的缺陷是导致"顺周期"的原因。为此,本文最后提出了通过建立地方财政预算稳定基金和中期预算制度,修订预算法等相关措施来构建中国地方财政稳定机制的设想。     

How gubernatorial budgetary power and interest groups affect vertical fiscal imbalances in the US states: Focusing on fiscal centralization and decentralization

This study empirically examines the roles of gubernatorial budgetary power and interest groups in vertical fiscal imbalances across US states via a two-step generalized method of moments estimation during a 22-year period (1987–2008). States' share of intergovernmental transfers and the local share of intergovernmental transfers are often affected by interaction between governors and interest groups, as are expenditure centralization and revenue/expenditure centralization. Revenue decentralization and the local share of intergovernmental transfers are frequently influenced by cooperation between governors and interest groups via mutual support. Long-term cooperation and gridlock each influence expenditure centralization, revenue/expenditure centralization, and revenue decentralization. Long-term cooperation is not statistically significant in terms of the state and local shares of intergovernmental transfers; that is, governors and interest groups cooperate in pursuit of short-term benefits rather than long-term results. Long-term political influence also has no impact, affirming a short-term-oriented political viewpoint.     

Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Structure: Empirical Evidence from a Synthetic Control Model

An unfunded expenditure mandate occurs when governments are required to provide a good or service by a higher level of government without an accompanying revenue source. There are no empirical studies providing causal evidence on the fiscal influence of intergovernmental mandates. This article examines Florida's 1990 constitutional Amendment 3, which sought to limit unfunded state mandates on municipal and county governments. The synthetic control method, an empirical technique for drawing causal inferences from case studies, estimates the effect of Amendment 3 on state expenditures and total transfers to local governments. The results indicate that state expenditures increased by an annual average of 9.5 percent, while state transfers to all local governments were unaffected. However, the municipalities protected by Amendment 3 saw intergovernmental revenue from the state decrease by 10 percent annually, which suggests that remaining mandates likely targeted special districts, encouraging the fragmentation of local public service delivery.     

Intergovernmental transfers and fiscal equalization across the north-eastern states of India: Evidence from panel data

While numerous studies have tried to analyze the impact of intergovernmental transfers in fostering fiscal equalization in India, there need to be more studies in the context of north-eastern (NE) states. Situating in a geographically isolated and economically backward region, the states of NE India depend heavily on central fiscal transfers to meet expenditures and to promote various economic activities in the region. One of the essential objectives of these transfers is to achieve fiscal equity. Hence, the study attempts to analyze the fiscal equalizing nature of the intergovernmental transfers across NE India during 1991–2019. The coefficient of variation (CV) analysis results indicates that although fiscal transfers reduced the magnitude of disparity in the own-source revenue across the NE states, a significant amount of disparity still exists in the resource base across these states. The regression analysis findings suggest that the transfers across these states need to be more fiscal equalizing. The per capita gross state domestic product emerges as a positive and significant in predicting per capita transfers, and hence it questions the progressivity of central transfers. When assigning the interstate share of transfers, more weight should be placed on fiscal equalizing factors such as per capita income. The Finance Commission of India should emphasize fiscal equalizing criteria when allocating weights and recommending transfers to the NE States. Additionally, states with low incomes should be recognized in plan schemes.     

The Fiscal Consequences of Changing Federal and State Revenue Policies: The Case of Small Oregon Cities

This article examines the fiscal consequences for twelve, smallOregon cities of recent changes in federal and state intergovernmentalrevenue policies. Many small local governments have experienceddouble revenue reverses in recent years—reductions inown-source revenues because of economic decline as well as decreasesin intergovernmental revenues, especially federal aid. The twelvesmall cities are compared with all 241 cities in Oregon andthe 136 Oregon cities in the 1,000 to 49,999 population range.Using aggregate and interview data, a major finding is thatalthough stabilization and/or decline in federal-state revenuesharing and entitlement program funds have accentuated difficultlocal revenue situations, economic decline has been the moreimportant contributor to the fiscal stress of the twelve smallmunicipalities. Most of the twelve cities had limited fiscalcapacity—as indicated by low assessed property valuations—makingit difficult to produce sufficient revenue to meet basic publicservice needs. These cities were also unable to get citizenapproval of increases in property taxes.     

Intergovernmental Structure and Fiscal Management Strategies: A Crossnational Analysis

Does intergovernmental structure have a systematic effect on the impacts of local governments' fiscal policy responses? Using empirical data from more than 800 local governments in five countries, the article concludes that intergovernmental structure is associated with the impact attributed to various fiscal management strategies. Such strategies have generally had greater impact in local governments in federal systems than those in unitary state systems. There are similarities between federal and unitary local governments regarding the fiscal management strategies that have least impact, and both types stress the importance of productivity gains via technology. But the differences in relative importance and level of impact are more striking than the similarities. In particular, fiscal management strategies involving the relations of the local government with other governments, such as obtaining intergovernmental revenue and shifting service provision to other governments, have greater impact in significantly more federal systems than in unitary state systems. These federal local governments also experience greater impacts from increasing user charges and raising local taxes. In contrast, local governments in unitary state systems place greater reliance on the more politically expeditious strategy of across–the–board expenditure reductions and on reductions of capital spending. These findings suggest that local governments in more decentralized systems have greater flexibility to manipulate relations with other governments in order to enhance their own fiscal situation. The data also suggest that the government's level of fiscal stress is not systematically associated with the level of impact from most fiscal management strategies, especially in the unitary state systems.     

Fiscal Decentralization in Comparative Perspective: Analysis of the Intergovernmental Grant Systems in Indonesia and Thailand

Decentralization can inadvertently lead to local fiscal disparity. One type of intergovernmental fiscal transfers, the general-purpose grant, can help equalize local fiscal imbalances. This article examines the extent to which the general-purpose grant systems in Indonesia and Thailand help mitigate local fiscal disparity. The findings show that the general-purpose grant system in Thailand does not effectively address disparities in local fiscal conditions. Localities with more own-source revenues and higher per capita income receive more general-purpose grants than those with weak fiscal capacity. In contrast, Indonesia’s general-purpose grant allocation system provides more resources for economically disadvantaged and conflict-ridden provinces.     

The robustness of quadratic voting

Combining local council election data with fiscal data on grant allocations in a German state, we study partisan favoritism in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers within a quasi-experimental framework. We hypothesize that state governments pursue two distinct goals when allocating grants to local governments: (1) helping aligned local parties win the next election and (2) buying off unaligned municipalities that may obstruct the state government’s policy agenda. We argue furthermore that the relative importance of these two goals depends on local political conditions. In line with this argument, we show empirically that the effect of political alignment on grant receipts varies depending on the degree of local support for the state government. While previous contributions find that aligned local governments always tend to receive larger transfers, our results imply that the political economy of intergovernmental transfers is more intricate.     

Extractive industries and regional development: Lessons from Peru on the limitations of revenue devolution to producing regions

ABSTRACT

The transfer of oil and mining revenues to the subnational governments of resource-rich jurisdictions is a common policy aimed at promoting development and reducing local opposition to extraction. In the early 2000s, Peru implemented a radical version of that policy. Peruvian mining regions received fiscal transfers many times greater than the national average during the last commodity boom. The strategy had mixed effects on well-being indicators. These transfers had statistically significant positive effects on economic growth and the rate of school attendance at different ages. In contrast, they did not have a significant impact on poverty reduction or the coverage of other basic services, while being positively correlated with an increase in the income gap between women and men. Overall, the results are not as positive as the promoters had expected. The transfers generated political incentives for local authorities to pursue short-term, clientelistic spending that has reduced their potential benefits.     

Potential impacts of Indonesia's fiscal decentralisation reform on urban and regional development: Towards a new pattern of spatial disparity

Indonesia has now entered a new phase of decentralisation. Two basic elements in the new policy are wider regional autonomy and fiscal decentralisation. The latter is essentially expenditure-based in character, rather than revenue-based, within which a different approach to intergovernmental transfers between local and central government is emerging. The new general allocation fund and revenue-sharing system may have reduced vertical fiscal disparities, but it has tended to increase intercity and interregional disparities.