Does Control Make a Difference? The Moral Foundations of Shareholder Liability for Corporate Wrongs

The doctrine of limited liability, as traditionally understood, prevents shareholders from being held personally liable for corporate wrongs. Several authors have recently argued that the doctrine should be modified to make some or all shareholders individually liable for torts committed by corporations in which they hold shares. This article distinguishes three types of argument that might provide a moral basis for shareholder liability in such cases. I contend that while these arguments support holding at least some shareholders liable for corporate torts, they fail to justify a general regime of unlimited pro rata shareholder liability. The level of control shareholders exercise over a company makes an important difference to their moral duties to compensate victims of corporate wrongdoing.     

Restricting loans of money to Hong Kong civil servants: social censure or violation of human rights?

Obtaining a loan is an individual’s private business and such a right should be free from interference. However, if Government officers obtain a loan from undesirable persons, they may be lured into committing an act which they would not otherwise have done but for the favours having been shown by the lenders. Section 3 of Hong Kong’s Prevention of Bribery Ordinance attempts to limit such behaviour of Government officers. Since the power of this provision is draconian, it may possibly violate human rights. This paper attempts to use a Social Censure perspective to explain why this provision was put in place in the 1970s and why it was not repealed in the 1990s in line with the rise of human rights standards in Hong Kong. It argues that the then British colonial government used a high-hand legal code to fight against corruption in the civil service to win its legitimacy in face of the rise of Red China in the 1970s. A review of twenty-one Section 3 cases suggests that most of the loans were not distributed for mere friendship but involved a wide range of culpability. Thus the coercion generated by Section 3 was approved by the masses, resulting in the reinforcement of a draconian but efficient legal provision in the service of the colonial administration.     

Attribution and the Illegality Defence

In Jetivia SA v Bilta (UK) Ltd (in liquidation) all seven judges of the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal by holding that the illegality defence could not be raised as a defence against the claim made by the company because the wrongdoing of the directors and shareholder cannot be attributed to the company. Although all the judges unanimously agreed on the outcome of the case, their reasoning concerning the approach to attribution and the different circumstances under which attribution should or should not take place differed. Further, the Supreme Court was divided on the issue of the correct approach to the illegality defence.     

社员金融服务权保护与合作金融法律制度设计

低收入群体组建或者参加合作金融组织的目的,是为了获得便利的金融服务,而不是资本收益的最大化,这是合作金融组织与商业金融组织相区别的特质之一。因此,社员金融服务权利的保护成为合作金融立法的核心。合作金融组织为社员提供的存款、贷款、金融理财和教育培训等服务,构成了社员金融服务权利的基本内容。现代国际合作金融立法已经放宽了服务对象的范围,可以为非社员提供部分金融服务。但对于我国合作金融的发展趋势而言,合作金融组织可以为非社员提供存款服务,但不得为非社员提供信贷资金服务。     

论公司机关关系的异化与重构——兼对“三权分立”公司机关关系理论之质疑

在公司存在控制股东的情况下,股东大会决议实际上只能反映控制股东的意志,沦为控制股东利益的代言人,而由股东大会选举产生的董事会和监事会也就变相地沦为控制股东的＂傀儡＂,三者之间根本就不可能形成理论上所说的公司机关之间的分权制衡关系。只有将监事会独立于普通股东大会,改由类别股东大会选举产生,同时实行监事资格制度,才能真正发挥其对董事会的监督功能。     

大陆法系侵权法上救助义务研究

大陆法系的绝大多数国家在刑法上都完成了"恶撒玛利亚人法"的制定,确立了人们应对他人承担一般救助义务的立法模式。但由于"好撒玛利亚人法"的缺失,势必会使人们在施救时产生种种疑虑与担心,进而严重影响到救助义务规定的法律实效。尽管《法国民法典》也是如此,但法国人在司法实践中形成的一些著名判例,对欧洲大陆其他国家还是产生了积极的影响。     

Attribution in Company Law

In Bilta (UK) Ltd (in liquidation) v Nazir (No 2), the Court of Appeal held that the ex turpi causa defence was inapplicable by refusing to attribute the fraud of the directors and the sole shareholder to the company in connection with the company's claim against them and third party co‐conspirators. It is significant that the court has not only clarified the law in relation to attribution, but it did so by rejecting the majority's reasoning and endorsing the dissenting judgment in the House of Lords decision in Stone & Rolls (in liquidation) v Moore Stephens (a firm). This article evaluates the decision in Bilta by critically examining the fundamental principles and policies that apply to the three distinct circumstances under which corporate attribution should or should not take place.     

股东违反出资义务应向谁承担违约责任

关于公司成立之后,股东未履行出资义务的责任承担,我国《公司法》相关规定存在不明确之处,值得进一步探讨。《公司法》第28条、第31条和第84条、第94条的规定,均涉及股东违反出资义务的责任,但存在体系上不一致及逻辑上的不严密之处,其中股东违反出资义务应当向其他股东承担违约责任的规定殊值质疑。显然,股东出资义务之性质是股东因违反出资义务而承担违约责任的理论基础。从公司设立协议、公司章程、公司法人性等方面对股东出资义务的性质进行分析,可以得出股东违反出资义务应当向公司而非股东承担违约责任的结论。     

论有限公司股东的股权继承与股东资格继承

我国《公司法》第76条的规定应该解释为对死亡股东继承人股东资格的取得而设。可以认为,自然人股东死亡后,若公司章程没有相反的规定,其继承人或继承人的代理人可以马上向公司申请办理股东变更手续。为此,我国公司立法应该进一步明确公司有义务在合理的时间内办理股东变更手续,否则推定继承人取得股东资格。     

我国股东代表诉讼制度评判与适用——兼评《公司法解释(二)(征求意见稿)》的相关规定

为使我国2005年《公司法》及《公司法解释(二)(征求意见稿)》所确立的股东代表诉讼制度得到正确理解与适用,有必要对其作深入的理论研究与学理解释。在股东代表诉讼制度中,以下问题需要作深入的理论评判:股东代表诉讼的原告、股东代表诉讼的被告、公司在股东代表诉讼中的地位、其他股东在股东代表诉讼中的地位、股东代表诉讼的前置程序、股东代表诉讼的管辖、诉讼费用担保制度、对原告股东诉讼权利的限制、股东代表诉讼的法律后果、股东代表诉讼的案件性质与诉讼费用的缴纳、诉讼费用补偿制度。通过比较研究与学理解释,为上述问题提供了具体可行的解释与法律适用方案。     

The Mandatory Bid Rule: Efficient,After All?

The mandatory bid rule has its origins in the UK and now applies throughout the EU and in many other jurisdictions. Under a mandatory bid, an acquirer of a controlling stake in a listed company has to offer to the remaining shareholders a buy‐out of their minority stakes at a price equal to the consideration received by the incumbent controller. While the rule warrants that no value‐destroying control transfers take place, it is often criticised for preventing value‐increasing transactions. This paper challenges some of the claims made by critics of mandatory bids. Highlighting the effects of synergy gains in private sale‐of‐control transactions, it is shown that mandatory bids prevent inefficient control transfers, where minority shareholder protection rules provide inadequate protection. Furthermore, mandatory bids help facilitate transfers to the most efficient bidders in multi‐bidder settings. The mandatory bid is justifiable, on economic grounds, in wider circumstances than is commonly assumed by law and economics scholars.     

Introduction: Commentaries on Ensuring Corporate Misconduct by Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith

This essay reviews some of the more striking findings in Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith's Ensuring Corporate Misconduct: How Liability Insurance Undermines Shareholder Litigation (2010), particularly concerning the tension between two competing narratives of shareholder litigation—one stressing the important deterrent effect of such litigation, the other viewing such litigation as abusive plaintiff opportunism. The essay then introduces commentaries on the book by Carol Heimer and Jodi Short, which follow.     

论股东对公司对外诉讼裁判提起第三人撤销之诉——兼评最高人民法院指导案例148号

最高人民法院指导案例148号的裁判要点指出,对于公司与相对人之间的生效裁判,股东无权提起第三人撤销之诉。股东是否为公司对外诉讼的第三人,取决于股东就公司对外法律关系是否有一定的实体法地位。公司对外行为可能有越权、不当关联交易、恶意串通等瑕疵。只有在公司行为构成恶意串通无效时,股东在实体上才有权攻击公司与相对人之间的法律关系,相应地在程序上成为公司诉讼的有独立请求权第三人。若效力瑕疵在实体上仅能由公司主张,则股东因欠缺实体法权限而非为有独立请求权第三人,亦不能基于"代位"而成为无独立请求权第三人。承认股东的原告资格符合第三人撤销之诉的制度机理,且与公司的法人独立人格不矛盾,因为在恶意串通时不存在法人独立人格所保护的法益。股东第三人撤销之诉的效果亦非公司内部救济所能代替。未来应修正该指导案例的裁判规则,承认特定情形下股东的第三人撤销之诉原告资格。     

从股东代表诉讼看股东代表仲裁

《公司法》明确引入了股东代表诉讼,使适格股东可以在公司受到损害时寻求司法的保护。而《民事案件案由规定》将股东代表诉讼列为专门的案由更是实现了该诉讼由纸面至实践的完美转身。但对股东代表仲裁,除了个别学者在公司法著作中轻描淡写带过之外,无论是司法机构还是仲裁机构均没有回应。本文从美国股东代表仲裁的演变出发,针对我国股东代表诉讼的现状,论述了我国股东代表仲裁的可行性,并进而引申出如何在公司经营中运用股东代表仲裁以及运用过程中应注意的问题。     

论一人公司关联担保的效力

一人公司与股东之间存在紧密的利益联系,无论是股东为公司担保还是公司为股东担保,都属于商业活动中的正常交易安排。一人公司为股东担保具有无可替代的融资价值,且在功能上并不等同于股东以股权作为债权的一般担保。若债权人的利益受到关联担保的损害,债权人可以通过法人人格否认等事后制度予以救济,故而一人公司的关联担保具有价值上的正当性。《公司法》第16条的适用对象并不包括一人公司,现行法也未限制一人公司的关联担保能力,因此一人公司为股东担保的效力应予肯定。至于公司债权人的利益,可以通过一人公司的法人人格否认制度予以保护。在实质一人公司为股东提供担保时,其效力在解释上亦应与形式一人公司保持一致。在具体诉讼中,则可以通过证明责任倒置解决实质一人公司认定困难的问题。     

股东代表诉讼的司法适用与立法完善——以《公司法》第152条的解释为中心

《公司法》确立的股东代表诉讼制度在法院的审判实践中将会遇诸多问题。关注司法判例和展开理论研讨对于股东代表诉讼制度在我国的成功适用至为重要。理论界和实务界不应拘泥于法条的诠释,而应当结合中国股东代表诉讼的实际状况不断反思制度架构和运作程序,惟其如此,方可使我国的股东代表诉讼制度兼具"适应性"和"适用性",既能满足社会发展需要,又能方便司法适用。     

Rethinking Power and Law: Foucault’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Society must be Defended</Emphasis>

Michel Foucault provides a radical challenge to the liberal approach to power and law, which is echoed by Jacques Derrida. Important differences exist between the analyses of Foucault and Derrida which should not be overlooked. This essay proceeds on the basis of an awareness of these differences, yet it at the same time attempts to bring these thinkers closer together, with reference specifically to the thinking of Freud. It is often said that Foucault does not offer an alternative to that which he criticises or that his analyses do not provide for a way in which to escape from the effects of power. By specifically focusing on Foucault’s reliance on the notion of ‘play’ in Society must be defended, it is submitted that an ‘escape’ is in fact provided for. The deconstructive reading of Foucault which is presented here attempts to ensure that Foucault does not remain trapped within metaphysics.     

公司的人权责任

除了履行对股东的法定义务外 ,现代公司还应承担相应的社会责任 ,其中首要的是人权责任。公司承担人权责任 ,具有法理上的依据 ,也符合公司的长远利益。应当通过官方立法、社会引导和公司自律等措施 ,促使公司积极承担起对其员工、消费者、驻地居民的权利和环境保护等公共利益的责任     

论联合抵制的法律规制

联合抵制表现形态众多,目的和后果复杂,是一种较为复杂的限制竞争行为。从反垄断实践情况看,各国关于联合抵制的立法规定通常较为原则和模糊,而执法和司法尺度则呈现出较大的弹性。联合抵制并非反垄断法上绝对禁止的违法行为,联合抵制的参与者可以以有助于提高经济效率等理由为其行为进行抗辩。近年来,联合抵制在我国经济生活中频频出现并受到社会的广泛关注。我国在反垄断执法和司法实践中应当根据联合抵制的不同情况合理把握规制标准。     

Director’s liability and investor protection: a law and finance perspective

This article conducts an analysis of director’s liability in listed firms using modern finance theory. The paper describes how the use of special general clauses in Danish law regulates director’s liability. It is shown how risk and return combinations may assist in determining whether management has violated the business judgment rule. The analysis shows that this legal doctrine is optimal from an economic perspective. The article introduces the concept of “temporal relatively of the shareholder equality principle” which can be used to determine whether the interests of minority shareholders have been set aside. It is shown that the principle of shareholder equality must be subjected to both an ex ante, as well as an ex post assessment. Moreover, courts should be reluctant to interfere in situations where there has been an unequal distribution of gain (or loss) ex post. The theoretical arguments are illustrated by analyzing a leading Danish court case that involved the squeeze out of minority shareholders in the Danish telecom company. The paper also analyzes the incentive effects of derivate suits and suits commenced by individual shareholders. It is shown that the former creates a free rider problem whereas in the latter situation, shareholders are not fully able to internalize their externalities.