Spatial voting in non-partisan cities: A case study

In spatial voting theory, voters choose the candidate whose policy preferences are most like their own. This requires that (a) voters and candidates have policy preferences that can be meaningfully summarized in terms of low-dimensional “ideal points” on a left-right scale; (b) voters are able to discern, either directly or through relevant cues, the ideal points of the candidates who are running for office; and (c) voters incorporate this information into the choices they make at the ballot box. Perhaps more than in any other elections, it is not clear that any of these requirements are met in non-partisan municipal elections: policy preferences may not be ideologically structured, information may be inadequate, and voters may choose candidates for reasons other than ideology. This makes non-partisan municipal elections an especially hard test for spatial voting theory. Using novel data from both municipal candidates and eligible voters in a major non-partisan municipal election in Canada, we show that municipal policy attitudes are ideologically structured and that these municipal policy ideal points are strongly related to mayoral and council vote choice. Thus, despite the institutional and informational obstacles, spatial voting can play an important role in non-partisan municipal elections.     

Politician preferences, law-abiding lobbyists and caps on political contributions

The effect of a contribution cap is analyzed in a political lobbying game where the politician has a policy preference. In contrast to the previous literature without politician policy preferences, more restrictive binding caps always reduce expected aggregate contributions. However the initial imposition of a cap increases contributions if the politician mildly favors the low-valuation lobbyist’s policy. The introduction of policy preferences permits analysis of monied interests’ policy influence. A more restrictive cap makes it more likely that the politician enacts the policy he would have enacted in the absence of lobbying, even in cases where expected aggregate contributions increase.     

Direct Democracy Paradox: State Fiscal Policies in the United States and the Threat of Direct Initiatives

Many studies have argued that the initiative process in U.S. state governments strengthened the proximity between the citizens' preferences and policy output. In contrast, this study hypothesizes that the direct initiative process weakens, rather than strengthens, the link between citizen preferences and state fiscal policy. Governments respond to the threat of initiatives but only those of conservative agendas. The results show that while the level and the progressivity of tax rates in the states without direct initiatives are influenced by citizen preferences, those in states with direct initiatives are more conservative than those without direct initiatives and the former are insulated from the influence of the citizen preferences.     

Instrumental political support: bringing policy preferences back into explanations of EU support

There is a joint development towards Europeanisation of public policies and an increasing visibility and politicisation of European issues in EU member states. In this context, the degree of fit between individuals’ policy preferences and European norms could be expected to influence support for the EU: this support might increase when Europeanisation makes the desired policies more likely, and decrease when it hinders these policies. Multilevel analyses of the 2014 wave of the European Election Study confirms the existence of such instrumental support for the EU. The findings demonstrate that this support is shaped by policy preferences on state intervention, immigration, moral issues and environmental protection. The results also show that the impact of these policy preferences is modulated by the level of integration of the designated policy, by the weight of the policy issue in the country and, in some cases, by the level of individual political knowledge.     

Global Britain and the Narrative of Empire

Since 2016, the UK government has outlined plans for ‘Global Britain’ as a framework for post‐Brexit foreign policy. Some criticise the idea as a vision of ‘Empire 2.0’, but it is rarely made clear exactly what form it takes or what its wider political implications are. This article argues that Global Britain constitutes not just an idea or a slogan, but a foreign policy narrative and, more specifically, the narrative of empire. Indeed, to appear reasonable its grand ambitions require pre‐existing knowledges of past imperial ‘successes’ and accepting images of empire among the British public. Yet Global Britain lacks efficacy: as a domestic rather than an international narrative, by being inherently regressive in its worldview, and for contradicting the preferences of international partners on which the UK heavily relies. These narrative flaws, it is argued, make Global Britain an actively problematic, rather than merely ineffective, component of UK foreign policy.     

Parties and Policymaking in Multiparty Governments: The Legislative Median,Ministerial Autonomy,and the Coalition Compromise

In parliamentary democracies, governments are typically composed of multiple political parties working together in a coalition. Such governments must confront a fundamental challenge in policymaking—the preferences of coalition parties often diverge significantly, but the government can adopt only one common policy on any specific issue. This fact raises a critical question that has far‐reaching implications for the quality of democratic representation: Whose preferences are ultimately reflected in coalition policy choices? In this study, we explore three competing answers to this question derived from the theoretical literature on multiparty governance and parliamentary institutions. Our findings, based on an analysis of the legislative history of more than 1,000 government bills from three parliamentary democracies, strongly suggest that coalition policies reflect a compromise between government parties rather than the preferences of the ministers proposing them or the preferences of the median party in the legislature.     

The electoral roots of unequal representation. A spatial modelling approach to party systems and voting in Western Europe

For a number of Western democracies, it has been observed that the preferences of poor and rich citizens are unequally represented in political institutions and outcomes. Yet, the causes of this phenomenon are still under debate. We focus on the role of elections in this process, by disentangling biases towards different income groups that stem from the party system and from voters’ behaviour. Our aim is to uncover whether elections as selection mechanisms contribute to unequal representation by analysing factors of the supply and demand sides of the electoral process. On the supply side, we focus on the congruence of parties’ policy offers and voters’ preference distributions. This shapes citizens’ possibilities to express their policy preferences. On the demand side, we are interested in the extent to which citizens from different income groups base their vote decisions on their policy preferences. The empirical analysis relies on the European Social Survey and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and covers 13 Western European countries. Our results indicate, first, that the economic and cultural preferences of poor and rich citizens differ significantly, and second, that party systems in the countries under investigation represent the lowest income groups the worst, and the middle income groups the best. This makes it difficult for citizens at both the lower and the higher end of the income distribution to voice their preferences in elections. Additionally, we show that low income citizens tend to take policy less into consideration when making an electoral choice than richer citizens. Thus, while the rich make up for their representation bias by taking policy more into account in their voting behaviour, the electoral stage poses another obstacle for the poor to overcome the representation bias. In summary it can be said that already on the supply side there is an unbalanced disadvantage in terms of representation for the very poor and the very rich, but the pattern leads to an even more asymmetrical misrepresentation of the poor due to the election act.     

Social Protest and Policy Attitudes: The Case of the 2006 Immigrant Rallies

Do protests sway public opinion? If so, why and how? To address these questions, we examine the impact of the 2006 immigration protests on immigration policy preferences. We use the 2006 Latino National Survey coupled with protest data to examine whether temporal and spatial exposure to the protests are associated with policy preferences. Our findings lend evidence that protest activity influences Latinos’ immigration policy preferences. However, the findings suggest the effect of protest on immigration policy preferences is not uniform across the population, but rather contingent on generational status and the intensity of protest activity at the local level.     

Intense Preferences, Strong Beliefs and Democratic Decision-making

Some decisions require individuals to make judgements rather than to express preferences. Some conflicts of preference arise from different beliefs about the efficacy or propriety of a policy rather than from different wants. Should the 'intensity' with which a judgement is made, or a belief is held, figure in decision-making in the way that it should ideally influence decisions concerning wants? This article questions the relevance of intensity to matters of judgement and examines how far decision processes that are sensitive to different intensities of preference, such as pressure group activity, vote trading and point voting, are o pen to criticism for failing to discriminate between intense wants and strong beliefs.     

The Power of Money: Global Capital and Policy Choices in Developing Countries

Extant studies of the impact that international phenomena have on policy choices, and those focused on the political economy of exchange-rate regimes in particular, are incomplete because they do not consider the effect that reliance on global capital has on the policy preferences of domestic groups. Consequently, they cannot explain why some newly emerging market countries pursue fixed exchange regimes under political and economic conditions—such as recently completed elections, uncompetitive export sectors, and poor national economic performance—in which others have altered their policies. I argue that reliance on different types of foreign capital generates distinct capital-specific policy preferences. Furthermore, rather than simply mimicking the preferences of foreign investors, domestic groups are likely to promote policies that reduce their capital-specific risks and vulnerabilities. Panel logit models of exchange-rate regimes in emerging market countries from 1973 through 2000 demonstrate that higher levels of democracy bolster these effects .     

SCIENTIFIC FACT AND VALUE IN U.S. OCEAN DUMPING POLICY

Controversy among scientists over appropriate use of the ocean for waste disposal impedes U.S. policy in this area. The problem arises in part because scientific uncertainty over the fate and effects of wastes released into the ocean requires a large element of judgment, and hence value, when the uncertain science is applied to policy. Scientists often supply that judgment and so impose their values, though seldom explicitly, on policy. Further, science often determines policy because many perceive it as an objective basis for decisionmaking and so less subject to the debate that arises from weighing public preferences in policymaking. Thus, scientists' values rather than the public's come to set policy. The resulting policy may elevate one expert's values over another's. Then as values and so interpretation of science shift, policy changes. Or, as in the case now with arguments over the ocean's ability to assimilate many anthropogenic wastes, conflicting science, really conflicting values, results in an agreement and policy inertia. These problems are partially circumvented when scientists make the nonscientific factors behind their reasoning clear. These factors may then be evaluated by the public along with the supporting scientific evidence. Thus, weighing the welfare of society rather than resolving conflicts among scientists becomes the focus of policy.     

Public Support for Climate Change Policy: Consistency in the Influence of Values and Attitudes Over Time and Across Specific Policy Alternatives

This study examines the factors that explain public preferences for a set of climate change policy alternatives. While scholarly work indicates a relationship between attitudes and values on views toward specific issues, the literature often examines general support for issues rather than specific policy proposals. Consequently, it is unclear the extent to which these attitudes and values affect specific policy considerations. This project examines public support for five climate change policy options in two national surveys taken three years apart. The empirical analysis reveals that time is a factor and that those who are liberal, have strong ecological values, report greater concern for climate change, and trust experts are consistently more supportive of the climate policy options considered here. The results shed new light on the nuanced views of the American public toward climate change.     

The proximity paradox: the legislative agenda and?the?electoral success of ideological extremists

This paper presents a new approach to spatial models of legislative elections in which voters have preferences over the bundles of roll call votes implied by candidate locations rather than over the locations themselves. With such preferences, voters with single-peaked, symmetric preferences and perfect information can sincerely prefer a distant candidate to a more proximate candidate. Moreover, negative agenda control in Congress makes such preference orderings inevitable, so party agenda control can allow majority party extremists to defeat more centrist minority party candidates. The model has implications for theories of parties in Congress, and spatial modeling more broadly.     

The New Urban Governance: Processes for Engaging Citizens and Stakeholders

The new urban governance requires not only tools (like tax incentives and contracts for privatizing government functions), but also new processes to carry the tools into effect, including deliberation and dialogue for making policy and dispute resolution (like negotiation, mediation, and voluntary monitoring) for implementing and enforcing it. The processes vary with their application in the policy process, from upstream identification of policy preferences to downstream enforcement. These processes share certain characteristics. All empower citizens and stakeholders to exercise their voice and become more engaged in their communities. All can substitute for or supplement traditional governance processes such as rulemaking or adjudication. They make it possible for leaders to collaborate with community stakeholders, and together to consider a broader and perhaps different set of ideas and proposals. These processes may permit participants to develop a consensus on priorities based on community values and interests rather than simply legal rights.     

If I'll win it,I want it: The role of instrumental considerations in explaining public support for referendums

Across established democracies, citizens express high levels of support for decision making via referendums. What drives these preferences remains yet unclear. In this article it is argued that, first, process preferences are less stable than previously assumed but vary substantially across policy proposals. Second, it is suggested that instrumental considerations play an important role in shaping citizens’ preferences for referendums. Specifically, citizens who favour the policy proposal or believe that they hold a majority opinion are expected to express more support for the use of referendums. An original survey was designed and conducted in the Netherlands (N = 1,289) that contains both between and within respondent variation across a range of policy proposals. The findings support these arguments: Both the desire for a specific policy change and the perception of being in the majority with one's policy preference relate to support for the use of referendums across policy proposals, levels of governance, and between and within respondents. This study contributes to a better understanding of process preferences by showing that these preferences have a non-stable component and that instrumental considerations play an important role in citizens’ support for referendums.     

Roll Calls, Party Labels, and Elections

We develop a model of legislative policymaking in which individuallegislators are concerned with both policy and reelection. Legislators'preferences are private information, and they have two meansof communicating their preferences to voters. First, they eachhave a "party label" that credibly identifies an interval withinwhich their ideal points must lie. Second, their roll call votesmay convey additional information about their preferences. Eachlegislator must therefore tailor his or her votes to his orher district in order to forestall a reelection challenge fromthe opposing party. In equilibrium, nonsincere voting recordswill occur mostly in moderate districts, where extreme incumbentsare vulnerable to challenges from relatively centrist candidates.In those districts, the most extreme legislators may even chooseto vote sincerely and retire rather than compile a moderatevoting record. Thus, both roll call scores and candidate typeswill be responsive to district type. An empirical test of shiftsin roll call scores of retiring House members in moderate districtsconfirms these findings.     

Sachpolitik oder Parteipolitik?

The article analyzes the roll call voting behavior of German Länder governments in the Bundesrat from 1990 to 2005. We examine if, when, and to what extent the German Bundesrat is dominated by federal party politics rather than by an appropriate conflict of policy interest between states and state governments. We develop and apply a method to separate the effect of policy preferences and of parties’ politics on the voting behavior of Länder governments.     

Do parties matter in internationalised policy areas? The impact of political parties on environmental policy outputs in 18 OECD countries, 1970–2000

This article analyses the extent to which national policies in the highly internationalised environmental sector are influenced by the policy preferences of political parties. The focus is on policy outputs rather than environmental performance as the central indicator of policy change. Based on a discussion of the relevant theoretical literature competing hypotheses are presented. For an empirical test, a dataset is used that includes information on the number of environmental policies adopted in 18 OECD countries at four points in time between 1970 and 2000. The results show that not only international integration, economic development and problem pressure, but also aspects of party politics, influence the number of policies adopted. The number of environmental measures increases if the governmental parties adopt more pro‐environmentalist policy positions. This effect remains robust even when controlling for the institutional strength of governments, the left‐right position of parties in government, the inclusion of an ecological or left‐libertarian party inside the (coalition) government, and the presence of a portfolio that deals exclusively with environmental issues.     

A Decision Theoretic Model of Public Opinion: Guns, Butter, and European Common Defense

Why do individuals support the public policies they do? We argue that individuals can have quite sophisticated policy preferences and that not correctly modeling those preferences can lead to critically misspecified empirical models. To substantiate this position we derive and test a decision‐theoretic model that relies upon three critical assumptions: (1) policies affect the provision of multiple goods about which individuals care; (2) individuals have diminishing returns to scale in those goods; and (3) preferences over at least some subset of those goods are correlated. Using this model, we demonstrate that arbitrarily small secondary policy effects can confound predictions over primary policy effects. Thus, not considering even arbitrarily small policy effects can cause one to conclude that evidence is consistent with one's theory when in fact it is inconsistent or vice versa. Testing this theory on support for forming a European common defense, we find evidence consistent with our model.     

Authoritarian Attitudes, Democracy, and Policy Preferences among Latin American Elites

This article examines the prevalence and consequences of authoritarian attitudes among elites in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. We focus on the connection between antidemocratic elite attitudes and support for democracy; the causes and effects of authoritarian attitudes among elites and their implications for authoritarianism; and the impact of authoritarian attitudes beyond social policy preferences to other policy areas that have indirect implications for order. Contrary to some of the literature, we find that antidemocratic attitudes affect elites' support for democracy. Our analysis also speaks to the debate on the origins of authoritarianism. Much of the evidence supports Altemeyer's notion that perceived threat raises levels of authoritarianism, rather than Feldman's contention that threat strengthens the influence of authoritarian attitudes. Finally, we demonstrate that there is a broader influence of authoritarian attitudes on economic policy preferences, but only where those policies appear to have implications for social order.