Federalism and Social Policy: The Case of Domestic Violence

This paper challenges long standing critiques of federalism that suggest it stymies the development of progressive social policies. Through a case study of national domestic violence policies in Australia, this paper argues that not only can the curses of federalism – especially conservatism, duplication and overlap – be surmounted, but even more positively, under the right condition, federalism can enhance opportunities for the development of progressive social policy. While the Howard government has adopted a conservative approach to domestic violence, federal structures have made it possible to maintain an alternative discourse at the state level. Moreover, national policy coordination machinery has opened the path for policy learning and innovation between governments in this social policy area.     

Testing Riker's Party-Based Theory of Federalism: The Argentine Case

This study seeks to advance our understanding of the institutionalunderpinnings of federalism by evaluating William H. Riker'sstudy of party causality. Using data from federal funds transfersin Argentina, a federation exhibiting high levels of fiscaldecentralization despite its centralized party system, it isshown that when governorships are held by opposition parties,the overall amount of federal funds transferred to provincesincreases considerably. In addition, changes in the partisancomposition of the national government are also associated withsteep increases in the share of provincial federal funds, whereas,more controversially and challenging prominent recent studiesof decentralization in Latin America, divided government atthe national level leads to centralization of intergovernmentalfunds. These findings support Riker's contention that politicalparties exercise a decisive influence over the distributionof fiscal powers between states and the national government.     

Try Federalism

The present article follows up a previous study (Anckar 1998) which showed a strong association between size and party system fragmentation. The aim of the article is to see whether the explanatory power of size can, in fact, be attributed to a federal form of government. 77 countries with free party systems constitute the research population. The dependent variable has three components: number of parties, electoral support for the leading party, and the 'effective number of parties' calculated according to the Laakso-Taagepera formula. Preliminary tests reveal that federal states have a more fragmented party system than unitary states. However, when controlling for size, electoral system, the 'effective threshold,' and presidentialism, the results clearly show that federalism is overshadowed by size and also, to a lesser extent, by the effective threshold.     

German Federalism in Historical Perspective: Federalism as a Substitute for a National State

A German national state was founded comparatively late in themodern era. In 1871 the German princes formed the German Empire.Unde Prussian hegemony, the Empire remained dependent on itsmember states. The constitution of the Weimer Republic of 1919turned the relations between the federation and the states upsidedown. The Länder, as the constituent states close to beinga decentralized unitary state. The Nazi regime centralizd it.After World War II, the West Germans and the Western Alliesagreed on forming a federal type of government. There was, however,controversy about the kind of federalism to be established.The West German Basic Law retained the tradition of a secondfederal parliamentary chamber in which the Land governmentsare represented. Sovereignty is shared and exercised jointlyby the federation and the Länder in most domestic policyfields.     

Collaborative Federalism

Famously, federalism combines self-rule with shared rule or unity with diversity. Typically, the mix is achieved by creating or preserving two levels of government, each with a direct relationship with the people, and by dividing power between them. Traditionally, unity is achieved through the exercise of power by the central government, in relation to the polity as a whole. Diversity is the consequence of the exercise of power by sub-national governments over a portion of the population, generally territorially identified. The boundaries of power between the two spheres are secured by entrenching them in a written Constitution established as fundamental law, which is interpreted and applied by a court or courts.     

Pragmatic Federalism: Australian Federalism from Hawke to Howard

The article explores the nature of Australian federalism by examining four major themes in the period from Hawke to Howard. The investigation of these themes – Australian conceptions of federalism; the role of party in shaping federalism; the way problems and politics have influenced policy‐making and thereby federalism; and the nature of federal judicial review – suggests that Australian federalism can most accurately be characterised as pragmatic. It appears as a federalism shaped by pressing problems, specific policy agendas and the prevailing political dynamic, rather than by overarching conceptions of federalism derived from political theory or articulated in party ideology. This pragmatic federalism explains important aspects of Australian federalism, especially the trend towards centralisation of authority.     

Sense on Federalism

Debate on the relevance (or otherwise) of federalism to the development of the European Union is often characterised by mutual incomprehension on either side. Close inspection, however, reveals that the high temperature of argument may not be solely due to differing visions of the finalite politique. For the precise meaning of the federal concept in political science remains unsettled. This article looks back to the earliest origins of federalism, in order to establish a firm basis for suggesting improvements. The idea of divided sovereignty, ‘invented’ in America and now thought to lie at the heart of the federal concept, is identified to be a false construction. On these grounds, it is proposed that the definition of federalism be clarified today as not ‘a division of sovereignty between two levels of government’, but instead ‘a division of the powers flowing from sovereignty between two levels of government of equal status’.     

Canadian Federalism Revisited

The crisis in Canadian federalism is examined in its historicalcontext, with particular emphasis on regionalism, provincialand national assertions of power, the institutional framework,and intergovernmental consultation. Current problems are consideredin relation to the new Constitution.     

The Federalism Debate

These papers examine current Australian federalism from the perspectives of an academic and a practitioner. Both acknowledge the opportunities arising from the current White Paper process, as well as challenges in the face of substantial cuts of proposed funding from the Commonwealth to the States. They insist upon the need for renewed commitment to the idea of federalism, and the importance of sustainable fiscal arrangements within the federation. Challenges in Reforming Australian federalism reminds us of the kind of federalism operative in Australia – concurrent, not coordinate – and develops reform proposals accordingly. Ten Steps to a Better Federation offers a range of ideas from a former state premier, drawing on his experience as both a participant at Council of Australian Government (COAG) and, later, Chair of the COAG Reform Council.     

The Council of Australian Governments and Intergovernmental Relations: A Case of Cooperative Federalism

A series of Special Premiers' Conferences begun in 1990, andthe establishment of the Council of Australian Governments in1992, signaled a phase of "cooperative federalism" in Australia.Joint schemes of policy and legislation and new national intergovernmentalbodies were made by a series of formal agreements. The conditionsand circumstances are appraised in a discussion of the natureof intergovernmental coordination and cooperation, and fromthe critical perspective of a model of competitive federalism.It is concluded that the initiatives, largely, did not representa centralizing process, nor did they override strongly articulatedclaims for diversity. This is made clear following an analysisof the processes occurring in the newly established federalinstitutions and from a series of brief case studies. They expressedthe continuing interdependency and underlying autonomy of stateand Commonwealth governments through schemes that promised tobring agreed, joint benefits through federal solutions.     

Federalism and Decentralization: Ownership Rights and the Superiority of Federalism

The benefits and costs usually ascribed to federalism are benefitsand costs of decentralization; they are, therefore, presentin unitary states that are in fact all decentralized. The benefitsand costs specific to federalism pertain to ownership rightsin constitutional powers. Federalism is superior to confederalismand unitarianism because the ownership rights peculiar to thatsystem of government are such that they ensure the perduranceof competition when one or more competitors are unsuccessful.They do so because under federalism, powers cannot be repossessedunilaterally. Ownership rights have to be enforced; as a consequence,there are also costs that are specific to federalism.     

Bureaucratic Neutrality among Competing Bureaucratic Values in an Ethnic Federalism: The Case of Ethiopia

This article uses Kaufman's theory of competing bureaucratic values as a foundation for studying bureaucratic values in a developing society. It discusses civil service reform within a socio-bureaucratic-political exchange, as well as characteristics associated with bureaucratic values and ethnic federalism. The inherent conflicts between a civil service grounded in the values of bureaucratic neutrality, representativeness, or executive leadership and practices within a government structured on the basis of ethnicity are explored. Factors related to Ethiopia's postconflict status, which further complicate the governance environment, are identified, and building blocks for postconflict governance are suggested.     

Australia's New Federalism: Recipes for Marble Cakes

In July of 1990, the prime minister of Australia announced aprogram to achieve a closer partnership between the three levelsof government. His concern was the degree of bureaucratic overlapin the Australian federation and the hindrances to mobility,portability, and uniformity which made the Australian economymore balkanized than Europe post-1992. The announcement capitalizedon dissatisfaction with Australian federalism that had beengrowing in the 1970s and 1980s, and its timing coincided witha range of catalysts making the current climate favorable forchange. The new federalism unleashed a process of review andreform across some forty program or subprogram areas over aneighteen-month period with a prime objective to attain roleclarification for the three levels of government in shared functionalareas, somewhat akin to the German horizontal model of federalrole allocation. The process survived a political challengethat toppled the prime minister, aspects of the new federalismforming a key element of that challenge. Constitutional changeis also part of the agenda and already the Australian experienceholds a number of lessons for other federal systems.     

Coercive Federalism and the Search for Constitutional Limits

This article explores several constitutional bases for questioningthe federal government's use of unfunded mandates and otherforms of coercive intergovernmental regulation. The "anti-coercion"and "anti-commandeering" principles of the Tenth Amendment areproposed as general arguments against these forms of regulation.The constitutional requirement of "uniformity" attached to indirecttaxation, the "anti-discrimination rule" in the area of intergovernmentaltax immunity, and the "equality rule", which stems from theunwritten tradition of maintaining equality among the states,are developed as additional bases for striking down federallaws that distribute mandate burdens disproportionately amongthe states.     

Recasting Federalism in Mexico

Decentralization of political power and administrative decision-makingduring the last three presidential administrations (1982–2000)has recast federalism in Mexico and sharply altered intergovernmentalrelations between the levels of government and between the principalbranches. Although decentralization cannot be equated conceptuallywith federalism, their relationship is extremely tight in Mexico.The shift toward a more decentralized regime is an outcome offederal government policies and political liberalization. Politicalpluralism and the demise of centralism were further intensifiedby the 1997 midterm elections. The rapidly changing politicalclimate in Mexico has increasingly demanded that the reallocationof power be genuine, that is, that power be shared not onlyvertically, with the various levels of government, but alsohorizontally, with the other branches as well.