The new world [dis] order in the complexity of multi‐polarity: United States of America's hegemonic decline and the configuration of new power patterns

History tells us that the United States of America (US)'s hegemonic predomination materialized from a very long‐ideological battle and/ Cold War, sometimes referred to as the war of words lasted for about five decades from the mid‐1940s to 1989, and consequently stopped after the fragmentation of the Soviet Union Empire. Thus, in contemporary times, it is lamentably regrettable that USA has come to face oligopolistic challenge in the context of both political and economic dominion. The international system is slowly but surely experiencing the emergence of brand new political and economic power patterns vis‐à‐vis China, European Union (EU) and Brazil, Russian, India, China, South Africa (BRICS). In light of the aforementioned, this article assesses the symptoms of US hegemonic decline and how this helps shape the current global academic and/ scholarly debates on the strategic environment. Equally important is the adoption and application of Afrocentricity as the theoretical framework in the quest for ”relocation from the knowledge production margins” and the spirit of the anticipation of the DE‐colonial Political contemplation in South Africa's life‐time. As a theory, it is employed to answer the central question: Is it a reality or a myth that USA's dominion over the international system is coming to an end? Methodologically, this article relied on interdisciplinary discourse analysis and thematic content prevailing documents.     

Chinese capital flows and offshore financial centers

Abstract

Why is the British Virgin Islands a bigger source of foreign direct investment into China than the USA, the European Union and Japan combined? Why is there 10 times more investment from China in the Caymans Islands than there is in the USA? This paper argues that these flows represent the efforts of Chinese and foreign investors to reduce governance and measurement transaction costs. Investors avail themselves of efficient institutions in offshore centers that are absent locally. These institutional attractions include the ease of raising capital on foreign stock markets, access to reliable courts, and more flexible and sophisticated financial products. Existing explanations of these capital movements, characterizing them as criminal money or tax arbitrage, are insufficient. Evidence is drawn from government statistics, private legal advice and interviews in offshore financial centers.     

Book Reviews

Abstract

This paper posits four ranked, generic goals of state foreign policy, maps them against the American ‘pivot,’ and concludes with possible handicaps of that shift. Drawn broadly from realism and liberalism, those abstract goals are as follows: national security, economic growth, prestige among the community of states, and the promotion of cherished national values. Applying this framework specifically to Northeast Asia, the USA, regarding security, is likely to increasingly ‘hedge’ China, and its North Korean client, with regional allies, off-shore balancing, and a shift toward AirSea Battle. On trade, the USA will continue its decades-long effort to reduce Asian mercantilism by tying Asian traders into multilateral, neoliberal rule sets. Regarding prestige, the ‘Beijing Consensus’ is a growing challenge to US soft power which the pivot seeks to refute. In addition, on values, the USA will continue to nag especially China to conform to US standards of law and human rights. The USA will continue to push the broad liberalization of Asian polities and economies. The democratic peace and liberal trade are the ideological frame and motivation of the pivot. Nevertheless, significant US handicaps may slow the pivot: American cultural distance from Asia means little public support and understanding of its necessity; strong regional allies will tempt the USA toward offshore balancing on the cheap; and the dire US budget shortfall will reduce the resources necessary to fund it.     

Prosecutorial regulation in the Global South: Environmental civil litigation by prosecutors in China compared to Brazil

Brazil's successful prosecutorial civil action against polluters could be a regulatory example for the Global South. This paper analyses whether such regulation could also develop without the major political, institutional, and legal reforms that spurred it in Brazil. To do so, it analyzes China, where similar reforms have so far not occurred, but where prosecutors have recently started to initiate civil litigation against polluters. It finds that prosecutorial civil litigation in China has only a limited regulatory effect or potential. Prosecutors in China are influenced by conflicting incentive structures that reward one‐off lower level test cases with an innovation bonus, while structurally stimulating a focus on general crime fighting. Ironically, as a result of such incentives, the recent legal reform, toward providing standing for prosecutors in public interest litigation, will, in contrast to Brazil, decrease rather than increase the regulatory effect of these cases. These findings have implications for understanding how the interaction between regulatory independence, legal reform, and regime type shapes possibilities for regulatory innovation in the Global South.     

Is there an export‐ or import‐led growth in emerging countries? A case of BRICS countries

The BRICS economies could be considered a world number one trading group in one respect and emerging economies in another. The study applied both Johansen cointegration methodology for the long‐run relationship and Granger causality test for the direction of causality for the period of 1979–2018. The study findings confirmed that the growth‐led exports (GLE) hypothesis model is relevant for India, South Africa, and China, while exports‐led growth (ELG) hypothesis model is relevant for both Brazil and Russia. The growth‐led imports (GLI) hypothesis model is relevant for Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, while import‐led growth (ILG) hypothesis model is relevant for Russia. Hence, based on the findings, we confirmed that trade‐led growth hypothesis is valid. Finally, the results show that domestic and global demand contributes to a larger trade; countries that are labor‐abundant generate employment and foster economic growth.     

When trade liberalization turns into regulatory reform: The impact on business–government relations in international trade politics

Business–government relations on trade issues are generally characterized as protectionist lobbying or – less often – lobbying for the liberalization of markets. However, with the evolution of the trading system, negotiations today concern not just market opening, but also the regulatory frameworks that structure international trade. This transformation has important consequences for the ways in which private interests can contribute to trade negotiations. Instead of simply trying to exert pressure, businesses and other private actors now form working relationships with governments based on expertise, learning, and information exchange. This article illustrates these new forms of public–private interactions with examples from the USA, the European Union, and Brazil.     

The Chinese in space: the third man in the fourth battlefield?

This commentary piece explores the several ramifications of China's October 2003 successful manned space mission, when the People's Republic of China became the third nation, following the lead of the USA and the Soviet Union, to independently launch a manned space mission. While the achievement resulted in prestige and justifiable pride in China, the potential ‘dual use’ of space for military purposes remains speculative, and is of concern to Washington's ‘Blue Team’, suspicious of China's possible aggressive intentions. While China's space efforts include militarisation, it remains an open question as to whether it intends to fully develop space weapons against a background of its belief that the USA already has ‘abundant power’, especially in space. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

Ma Ying-jeou's re-election: implications for Taiwan and East Asia

Abstract

Ma Ying-jeou's re-election means that there will not be a leadership change in Taiwan, but it still has significant implications. It forces the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to work out a succession for itself and confront the political reality that it must now persuade voters in Taiwan that it can manage relations with mainland China effectively in order to win the presidency again. It also requires Ma to define clearly the limits of his mainland policy in order to minimize Beijing's expectations of his second term, as no president of Taiwan can agree to move towards political integration without a popular mandate. On its part, Beijing has taken on board the significance of Taiwan's electoral cycle for managing cross-Strait ties and will put pressure on Ma to move forward over political integration and thus reduce the scope for a future DPP administration to reverse course. This notwithstanding, Beijing's Taiwan policy will ultimately be determined more by the result of the leadership succession in mainland China itself in the autumn of 2012. For USA and East Asia, Ma's re-election is a positive development as it minimizes the risk of a confrontation or a crisis across the Taiwan Strait. But it will not remove the main problems they have with China that are Taiwan related. For USA, arms sales to Taiwan will still be needed and will remain a source of tension with Beijing. For Southeast Asia, stability across the Taiwan Strait implies that Beijing can devote more attention and resources to the South China Sea territorial disputes and that it is likely to behave in a more assertive way.     

The Politics of Latin America’s Investment and Other Links with China: Contextualizing the Region’s Cash Chasing while Racking Richer Research Rewards

There are three positions about the impact of outward foreign direct investment (FDI) from China on the policies of Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries: the “Wealth is Power” camp, which associates political power with Chinese economic lures; the “Conditionalist” camp, which contends the international and domestic economic and political context determines the specific political effect of Chinese outward FDI (OFDI); and the “Politics is Power” camp, which believes no dramatic political changes have resulted from the economic stimuli of Chinese OFDI (COFDI) and associated economic lures. Case studies herein on Brazil and China, Argentina and China, Ecuador and China, and the Caribbean and China support the Conditionalist camp, albeit to differing degrees and for different reasons. Case studies herein on COFDI in Argentina and in Colombia also deepen our knowledge about the drivers of COFDI. They challenge those asserting that COFDI in LAC is driven purely by political motives. This piece also reviews and critiques the state of the literature on COFDI in LAC and suggests a pathway for moving to the next level. It specifically recommends researchers work to cumulate knowledge by asking similar kinds of questions across cases, exploit theory, and work on variable conceptualization and operationalization.

     

Representation and the democratic deficit

In the early years of the Community it was assumed that there was a widespread consensus about the future development of Europe, and that decisions by the Council of Ministers were broadly in line with public opinion. In recent years the growth in the powers and responsibilities of European institutions has been considerable, through the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. The Community is now the world's largest trading group, and one of the three most important players on the world economic scene alongside the USA and Japan. The EU has grown from six to fifteen member states, and further waves of enlargement are on the horizon. Yet many fear that processes of representation and accountability have not kept pace with this expansion, producing a legitimacy crisis (Anderson & Eliassen 1996; Hayward 1995). The key issue addressed throughout this Special Issue is the classic one of political representation: how the preferences of European citizens can be linked to decision making within the European Union.     

Representation and the democratic deficit

Abstract In the early years of the Community it was assumed that there was a widespread consensus about the future development of Europe, and that decisions by the Council of Ministers were broadly in line with public opinion. In recent years the growth in the powers and responsibilities of European institutions has been considerable, through the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. The Community is now the world's largest trading group, and one of the three most important players on the world economic scene alongside the USA and Japan. The EU has grown from six to fifteen member states, and further waves of enlargement are on the horizon. Yet many fear that processes of representation and accountability have not kept pace with this expansion, producing a legitimacy crisis (Anderson & Eliassen 1996; Hayward 1995). The key issue addressed throughout this Special Issue is the classic one of political representation: how the preferences of European citizens can be linked to decision making within the European Union.     

Governing Climate Change in China and Brazil: Mitigation Strategies

This article analyzes governmental responses for the climate change challenge in China and Brazil. Both countries have a central role in the climate change debate since they are major greenhouse gases emitters, thus contributing to the aggravation of the problem, each with differentiated participation. At the same time, policy measures aimed at climate issues in these countries may lead to the reconfiguration of international negotiations on the topic. The methodological aspects include three main points of analysis: the trajectory of greenhouse gas emissions in both countries; political and institutional structures mobilized to the climate issue and focusing on mitigation and policy responses related to climate change.     

Chinese Geopolitics: Space Program Cooperation among China,Brazil, and Russia

With the Obama Administration’s foreign policy pivot to Asia, the Chinese government is concerned about the possibility of new challenges in their foreign policy sphere of influence. Since the 1990s, many political and military analysts have explored the eventual rivalry between these two states. However, events in the Middle East preoccupy U.S. attention, leaving China moderately free in Southeast Asia, though it is uncertain for how long this will persist and if the United States will reallocate its attention to contain China. In this case, the Chinese government will need to develop countermeasures to sustain its geopolitical interests. There are two focuses in this analysis: (1) the Chinese geopolitical naval situation, exploring the problems in the geosphere surrounding China and the eventual competition with other regional powers and the United States in East Asia; and (2) the potential for space program cooperation with Russia and Brazil, which, in turn, dramatically changes the balance of power in outer space through positive aspects of Russian technical capabilities and strategic Brazilian geographic (Alcântara launch site).     

China’s Political Stability: Global Comparisons

Throughout most of the 20th Century, China had suffered tremendous economic and human losses due to political instability. It is in the most recent decades that the Chinese people have managed to live with political stability. The economic benefits of political stability can hardly be overstated. Yet, China’s political stability is by no means assured. Is China stable or unstable? Is the Chinese regime strong or fragile? To answer these questions, this study has selected a total of 12 sets of publically available indices to measure political instability and placed China on a global scale of comparisons with all the others, both advanced and developing, in the world. It also makes specific comparisons between China and the other four countries of the so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). The findings of our global comparisons give China no reasons for celebration. However, China has no reasons for paranoia either. China has indeed faced many threats or challenges to political stability, but, as our study demonstrates, China is no more politically unstable or fragile than many others. Ignoring or underestimating the ripple effect of any destabilizing world event will do China no good, but overreactions also serve China’s interests poorly as fear or paranoia can be highly contagious.     

The Civic,Economic, and Political Consequences of Pentecostalism in Russia and Ukraine

In contemporary Russia and Ukraine, Pentecostalism carries with it commitments to civic engagement and democracy, strong bonds of social capital, and the embracing of an entrepreneurial spirit. In this article, the authors analyze the origins of Pentecostalism in Russia, Soviet methods of repression, and Pentecostal survival strategies. Continuing, the authors examine the political efficacy of Pentecostals, their civic commitments, their embracing of the free market, and the strength and nature of social capital among them. While the authors conclude that it is too soon to conclude that Pentecostalism will bring about democracy, civil society, and free markets in Russia and Ukraine, they argue that Pentecostalism is proving itself a popular choice in the contemporary religious marketplace and that choice is not without significant civic, economic, and political consequences.     

Choosing mates—the American way

He has published numerous works on family sociology and contemporary Chinese social organization. He is currently involved in a comparative study of mate choice and marital relations in China and the United States. His latest book is Dating, Mating, and Marriage.     

Foreign Policy and Human Rights Advocacy: An Exercise in Measurement and Explanation

This article addresses three questions: How can we define and measure what constitutes a foreign policy in human rights? How is it possible to explain both the activism of a state and its ideological orientation in the international promotion of human rights? What is the empirical evidence found when we try to answer these questions in intermediate states? Research done on four cases (Argentina, Australia, Brazil and South Africa) suggests a correlation between domestic efforts in the promotion of human rights and international advocacy. It also shows that the greater the power of intermediate states, the greater their activism in human rights. Further, as development grows states show less support for economic, social and cultural rights. Last, the strategic relation with the USA shapes how states vote regarding human rights violators states.     

Policy conflicts in shale development in China and the United States

Policy conflicts are ubiquitous in many countries. Yet research on policy conflict is typically based on cases in western, democratic countries. As a result, little is known about the characteristics of policy conflicts in non-western countries, such as China, or how these characteristics compare to western contexts. The Policy Conflict Framework (PCF) was recently developed to help scholars identify, diagnose, and compare policy conflict characteristics. This research uses the PCF to guide a comparative analysis of the nature of policy conflicts in China and the United States. With interview data on policy actors from Chongqing, China and Colorado, USA, we present the findings by comparing the differences and similarities of policy conflicts in the two countries around shale oil and gas development. We conclude with the strengths and limitations of this comparative study of policy conflicts in China and other national contexts, along with recommendations for conducting PCF research in China.     

Command without control: The case of China's environmental target system

In the existing literature there is general agreement that the effectiveness and efficiency of command and control instruments versus market‐based instruments is highly context specific. A country's particular regulatory environment and state capacity, as well as the features of given environmental problems, play an important role in ascertaining what the “right” set of policy instruments for environmental management might be. This article examines how command and control instruments are used as an environmental enforcement mechanism in China's authoritarian state. Based on extensive fieldwork, this paper shows that the reliance on binding environmental targets as the main domestic policy instrument in China has generated numerous undesirable consequences. While China's target‐based approach to implementation has incentivized local officials to strictly enforce environmental mandates, there are numerous shortcomings in the system. In particular, target rigidity, cyclical behaviour, poor data quality, and the absence of an independent monitoring agency have generated adverse effects and contribute to a yawning gap between regulatory goals and outcomes. The paper concludes that binding environmental targets as the main command–control instrument in China can be more accurately described as “command without control” as the target‐setting central government does not exercise a high degree of control over implementation and monitoring processes. But command and control instruments can be suited for managing “first‐generation” environmental problems and addressing environmental issues that have easily identifiable pollution sources and which are easy to verify.     

论我国汇率制度及人民币国际化的抉择

近些年来先后有许多新兴市场国家爆发了金融危机，包括东南亚国家、韩国、俄罗斯、巴西和阿根廷等。这些国家爆发金融危机有一个根本性的标志，就是放弃了固定的或有限浮动的汇率制度。这说明实行固定的或有限浮动的汇率制度是导致新兴市场国家发生金融危机的根本原因之一。我国也属于新兴市场国家，也实行钉住美元的有管理的浮动汇率制度，是否也存在严重的汇率风险，这是值得关注的问题。不仅如此，新兴市场国家究竟应实行何种汇率制度才能确保金融秩序的长期稳定?相应地我国今后应选择何种汇率制度才能有效防范和化解金融风险?人民币是否要国际化?东亚国家是否应建立货币联盟，催生亚元?这些也是需要深入研究的重大现实问题。本就这类问题作出了系统分析和探讨，以求抛砖引玉。