Backing Out or Backing In? Commitment and Consistency in Audience Costs Theory

Audience costs theory posits that domestic publics punish leaders for making an external threat and then backing down. One key mechanism driving this punishment involves the value the public places on consistency between their leaders’ statements and actions. If true, this mechanism should operate not only when leaders fail to implement threats, but also when they fail to honor promises to stay out of a conflict. We use a survey experiment to examine domestic responses to the president's decision to “back down” from public threats and “back into” foreign conflicts. We find the president loses support in both cases, but suffers more for “backing out” than “backing in.” These differential consequences are partially explained by asymmetries in the public's treatment of new information. Our findings strongly suggest that concerns over consistency undergird audience costs theory and that punishment for inconsistency will be incurred, regardless of the leader's initial policy course.     

Governance as a strategy in state-of-nature games

Public choice scholars routinely claim that coercion can be used to solve the social dilemma. However, while social contract theorists have frequently described state-of-nature societies using game theory, they have not used game theory to show how coercive action within such societies can improve outcomes. Here I operationalize the concepts of coercion and governance within a Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) framework; governance is operationalized as coercion to compliance, and to adopt a coercive strategy is to impose a strategy choice upon another player. I show that, under certain conditions, adding governance strategies to a noncoercive one-shot PD game can improve outcomes.     

National de-delegation in multi-level settings: Independent regulatory agencies in Europe

National politicians in Europe have created independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) with significant powers over markets such as communications and energy. After delegation, they have engaged in institutional politicization of IRAs and undertaken numerous attempted or actual de-delegations. Yet overall de-delegation over the period 2000–2020 has been limited, as many de-delegations have been abandoned, temporary or reversed, and also counterbalanced by extensions of IRA powers. The article examines different explanations for this pattern. It looks especially at Europeanization, which has operated through normative and particularly coercive mechanisms. EU coercion has involved threats of legal action, monitoring and enforcement of existing EU legal requirements, and EU legislation expanding IRA powers and protection. IRAs are more vulnerable to de-delegation than trustee non-majoritarian institutions because their position can be altered with simple legislative majorities. Yet even for such agents, the ability of national politicians to reverse delegation is constrained by multi-level institutional settings.     

The Perils of Public Health Regulation

Policies that are designed to promote public health should not use coercion to discourage unhealthy decision making. Though public health officials may be experts about medical regularities in a population, they are not experts about which dietary or lifestyle choices are best for particular indiviuals. Experts in regulatory agencies also face several political incentives that undermine their ability effectively to promote health at the population level. Furthermore, without consent, coercive public health policies are extremely difficult to justify to citizens. For these reasons, states should not enforce coercive public health policies, even if the state subsidizes citizens' healthcare. Many of the same reasons to reject coercive public health regulations are also reasons to reject other coercive paternalistic policies.     

Political Coercion and the Scope of Distributive Justice

A prominent position in the global justice literature holds that claims of distributive justice are only 'activated' by the densely coercive institutional apparatus of states. I dispute this view in three ways. First, I argue that coercion is either justified by its results and rationale or it cannot be justified at all; as a result, coercive institutions do not demand an independent justification via distributive justice. Second, I contend that because the shape of coercive institutions is the result of political choices that have distributive implications, one cannot make normative judgements without asking why coercive institutions have the shape that they do. Third, even accepting (for the sake of argument) the claim that coercive institutions must be justified by a special focus on distributive justice among those subject to them, I argue that the resulting position does not justify restricting distributive justice to state borders. If (any of) these arguments are correct, it is a mistake to think that a concern with the coercive nature of political institutions legitimates restricting claims of distributive justice to compatriots.     

Die Selbstbehauptung und Selbstgefährdung des Friedens als Herrschaft des Rechts

Peace is conceivable only as a legal order. According to Hans Kelsen, a legal order is by its very nature a ‘coercive order’. Thus, peace and coercion are not mutually exclusive, but refer to each other in the concept of law. In this contribution, we elaborate and problematize the paradoxical relationship between coercion and peace in theoretical and historical perspective. For this, we differentiate between arbitrary force and legal enforcement in the context of world-order politics. While we argue in favor of peace through law enforcement, we also emphasize the element of arbitrariness in the concept and historical formation of law. This is to say that the stabilization of peace through legal coercion goes hand in hand with its simultaneous destabilization. The text unfolds this dilemma with reference to the evolution of the theory and practice of legitimizing the use of force from past to present. We argue that the dilemma cannot be overcome, but it can be mitigated through the creation of a rule of law, which allows for a reflexive treatment of the tension between peace and coercion.     

Legitimacy and Coercion in Peacebuilding: A Balancing Act

ABSTRACT

Despite the tendency of the power literature to analyse legitimacy and coercion in isolation, both theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that coercion and legitimacy are not parallel lines but can interact in different ways, supporting or undermining each other. A methodical exploration of the relationship between legitimacy and coercion is important not only for improving the theoretical literatures on power and legitimacy but also in the light of the increasing interest in the power of legitimacy in statebuilding and peacebuilding. This article first analyses the overall interaction between coercion and legitimacy, and then explores the question that emerges from the interaction analysis; what level of coercion is permitted or required in order for a mission’s local legitimacy to be sustained? Finally, for the practice of peacebuilding, the article shows that an operation needs to understand its initial legitimacy standing with the local population, as this determines how much coercive force it can employ without undermining its overall legitimacy.     

Games borrower governments play: the implementation of economic adjustment programmes in Cyprus and Portugal

Research on the Economic Adjustment Programmes (EAPs) for Eurozone crisis countries has so far acknowledged the role of creditor countries and Troika institutions or has examined the economic effects or structural determinants of domestic implementation processes. The role of borrower governments as strategic actors within the ‘Troika complex’ has been neglected. Taking Cyprus and Portugal as cases in point, the article shows how reform-oriented borrower governments used the interaction with the Troika to overcome veto player opposition to programme implementation. Drawing on the two-level game and on negotiation theory, the study discusses borrower strategies in response to opposition from the court or parliament, and the costs of no agreement. Reform-oriented governments mostly used commitments to the international level or Troika pressure to pursue coercive strategies vis-à-vis domestic opponents. High costs of no agreement seem to be a necessary means to pass on political and market pressure through coercion.     

Coercion,Information, and the Success of Sanction Threats

This article explores when and why sanction threats succeed in extracting concessions from the targeted country. We focus on two different, albeit not mutually exclusive, mechanisms that can explain the success of sanction threats. The first mechanism relates to incomplete information regarding the sanctioner's determination to impose sanctions and suggests that threats help to extract concessions by revealing the sanctioner's resolve. The second mechanism underscores the direct impact of common interest between the two countries and explains the success of sanction threats by the targeted country's greater dependence on this link between the two countries and the sanctioner's ability to exploit this dependence. We test the hypotheses using a new strategic structural estimator. Our results provide no evidence in favor of the informational hypothesis, while lending robust support for the coercive hypothesis.     

Children,COVID, and confusion: How frontline workers cope with the challenges of vaccine mandates

With the emergence of COVID-19, many governments around the world co-oped non-health actors into enforcing comprehensive mandatory vaccination policies. Implementing these policies can be challenging, creating irreconcilable goals and problems with knowledge and understanding of areas outside the implementers’ direct field of expertise or scope of work. We know very little about how such frontline workers cope with these challenges associated with implementing policies whose goals lie well outside their remit (which we describe as generating exogenous policy pressures), and what this means for the operation of the policies. This article uses policies in place prior to the pandemic to fill this gap. It examines attitudes and experiences of frontline childcare educators who implement Australia's No Jab, No Play childhood vaccine mandate policies within the states of New South Wales, Queensland, and Victoria. Through qualitative analysis of interview and focus group data, we find that these frontline workers cope with moral conflict, confusion, and a lack of knowledge by moving against clients: they rigidly follow the rules beyond legislative requirements, and sometimes break them, generating a new coping category we call ‘rigid rule breaking’. However, their need to employ coping strategies is informed by the extent to which government has designed the policy to coerce the behaviour of the providers, families, or both. The implementation of more coercive variants of No Jab, No Play policies deviates more from what legislators intended, while providers given scope to make their own decisions about enrolling unvaccinated children report satisfaction in their decision-making.

Points for practitioners

• Australian state mandatory vaccination policies generally require childcare providers to exclude unvaccinated children.
• Street level bureaucrats face pressures when implementing coercive policies exogenous to their remit.
• They may simplify policy implementation in ways that counter governments’ goals.
• Actors given more discretion about passing on coercion to policy targets demonstrate better understanding and ownership of policies.

     

Religious extremism: The good, the bad, and the deadly

This paper challenges conventional views of violent religious extremism, particularly those that emphasize militant theology. We offer an alternative analysis that helps explain the persistent demand for religion, the different types of religions that naturally arise, and the special attributes of the “sectarian” type. Sects are adept at producing club goods – both spiritual and material. Where governments and economies function poorly, sects often become major suppliers of social services, political action, and coercive force. Their success as providers is much more due to the advantages of their organizational structure than it is to their theology. Religious militancy is most effectively controlled through a combination of policies that raise the direct costs of violence, foster religious competition, improve social services, and encourage private enterprise.     

Euvoluntariness and just market exchange: moral dilemmas from Locke’s Venditio

It is a maxim of Public Choice that voluntary exchanges should not be interfered with by the state. But what makes a voluntary market exchange truly voluntary? We suggest, contra much of the economics literature, that voluntary exchange requires consent uncoerced by threats of harm, but that this is not sufficient. In particular, a person pressured to exchange by the dire consequences of failing to exchange—e.g., dying of thirst or hunger—is still coerced, and coerced exchange cannot be voluntary. The weaker party’s desperation gives the other party unconscionable bargaining power. We argue for a distinction, based on a neologism: in the case of coercion by circumstance but not by threat, exchange is still voluntary in the conventional sense, but it is not euvoluntary (i.e., truly voluntary). We will argue that all euvoluntary exchanges are just, while non-euvoluntary exchanges may or may not be unjust; that in competitive markets all exchanges are just, even those that are not euvoluntary, while in bilateral monopolies some exchanges are neither euvoluntary nor just. We will propose a mental device, the “fictitious negotiation”, to determine the just price in non-euvoluntary market exchanges. A primitive version of these ideas can be found in a little known monograph by John Locke, which we will analyze in detail.     

When do people accept government paternalism? Theory and experimental evidence

Under what conditions are people willing to accept paternalistic government policies? The use of libertarian paternalism (“nudges”) has gained popularity and captured the attention of scholars and policy-makers alike. A central underlying assumption in advancing governmental nudges is that the public prefers them over classic paternalistic policies, which, unlike nudges, are coercive. This paper studies the extent and circumstances under which this assumption is justified, arguing that the claim for the preeminence of nudges is overstated. I develop a theoretical framework to account for the conditions under which people prefer coercive and non-coercive paternalism, and test it experimentally among a national U.S. sample. I find that in certain theoretically predictable contexts, individuals not only tolerate, but even prefer coercive paternalism over nudges. These attitudes are systematically explained through the interaction between the coercion level and policy domain in question.     

Coercion versus Choice: Citizen Evaluations of Public Service Quality across Methods of Consumption

Treating all respondents to citizen satisfaction surveys as "customers" risks misinterpreting the findings and misguiding managerial decision making. Citizen evaluations of the quality of public services are likely to vary based on whether citizens have a direct or indirect relationship to the service. Furthermore, citizens are likely to rate services differently based on whether they consume the services as a result of coercion or choice, although the quality of the interaction shapes the impact of the type of interaction. Based on a series of empirical analyses, this paper demonstrates that recipients who have superior-quality interactions with providers are likely to report high ratings for elective services, whereas citizens who have poor-quality interactions are likely to report low ratings for coercive services. In this way, the quality of the interaction influences citizens' predispositions to rate services high or low based on whether they consume the service by choice or coercion.     

Appropriation, violent enforcement, and transaction costs: a critical survey

This paper focuses on the extension of transaction costs to appropriative activity and coercive power in the property rights approach. It has been argued that including the costs of appropriation and violent enforcement in transaction costs is based on the assumption that Coaseian bargaining can be extended to any institutional scenario, i.e., voluntary as well as coercive exchange. However, voluntary transactions cannot capture the logic of coercive power. This means that the assumption of an efficient political market is not valid, and that the ??political Coase theorem?? lacks the logical consistency to provide a cornerstone for political theory.     

What's so special aout coercion?

There is a certain form of libertarian argument accordingj to which there is something essentially uncoercive and therefore freedom-respecting about the ‘free market’. The most obvious way to counter this is to meet it head on, to try to show that the market is, on the contrafy, coercive.

But I do not think the obvious approach is the right approach here. The trouble with this particular libertarian view is that it expects the concept is loose enouth to permit a number of interpretations, and I concentrate mainly on Robert Nozick's article, ‘Coercion’, which is is unusual for being an attempt by a political philosopher to come to grips with the concept in detail. In the first section, I consider the broken-backed relationship between Nozick' main guiding assumptions, and the consequent possibility of pursing different ‘strategies ’ when trying to explicate coercion. In the second, I explore some of the implications of this for the libertarian view. In the third, I argue that the pursuit of a ‘baseline’ dividing cases of coercion from others is futile. In conclusion, I suggest that if we really want to understand the relation between capitalism and freedom (or its lack) it is a mistake to focus too closely on coercion alone.     

The Ideological Effects of Framing Threat on Immigration and Civil Liberties

Assuming that migration threat is multi-dimensional, this article seeks to investigate how various types of threats associated with immigration affect attitudes towards immigration and civil liberties. Through experimentation, the study unpacks the ??securitization of migration?? discourse by disaggregating the nature of immigration threat, and its impact on policy positions and ideological patterns at the individual level. Based on framing and attitudinal analysis, we argue that physical security in distinction from cultural insecurity is enough to generate important ideological variations stemming from strategic input (such as framing and issue-linkage). We expect then that as immigration shifts from a cultural to a physical threat, immigration issues may become more politically salient but less politicized and subject to consensus. Interestingly, however, the findings reveal that the effects of threat framing are not ubiquitous, and may be conditional upon ideology. Liberals were much more susceptible to the frames than were conservatives. Potential explanations for the ideological effects of framing, as well as their implications, are explored.     

If planning is everything,maybe it's nothing

Where planning does not measure up to expectations, which is almost everywhere, planners are handy targets. They have been too ambitious or they have not been ambitious enough. They have perverted their calling by entering into politics or they have been insensitive to the political dimensions of their task. They ignore national cultural mores at their peril or they capitulate to blind forces of irrationality. They pay too much attention to the relationship between one sector of the economy and another while ignoring analysis of individual projects, or they spend so much time on specific matters that they are unable to deal with movements of the economy as a whole. Planners can no longer define a role for themselves. From old American cities to British new towns, from the richest countries to the poorest, planners have difficulty in explaining who they are and what they should be expected to do. If they are supposed to doctor sick societies, the patient never seems to get well. Why can't the planners ever seem to do the right thing?     

Competency Costs in Foreign Affairs: Presidential Performance in International Conflicts and Domestic Legislative Success, 1953–2001

Numerous prominent theories have relied on the concept of “audience costs” as a central causal mechanism in their arguments about international conflict, but scholars have had greater difficulty in demonstrating the efficacy and even the existence of such costs outside the bounds of game theory and the political psychology laboratory. We suggest that the audience costs argument focuses too narrowly on the likelihood that leaders will be removed from office by domestic constituencies for failing to make good on threats. Instead, we argue that scholars should ground these arguments on Alastair Smith's ( 1998 ) broader concept of “competency costs.” Our analysis of presidential legislative success from 1953 to 2001 demonstrates the existence of foreign policy competency costs by showing that public disapproval of presidential handling of militarized interstate disputes has a significant and substantial negative impact on the president's ability to move legislation on domestic issues through Congress.     

Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?

Do economic sanctions destabilize the governments they target? A form of foreign pressure, sanctions are typically meant to alter the policies of other countries. There is much pessimism on whether they ever work. This article shows that economic pressure works in at least one respect: it destabilizes the leaders it targets. I present a theoretical argument that explains why destabilization is a necessary condition for successful coercion. I find evidence that pressure destabilizes in a large panel of cross‐country time‐series data. The destabilization finding indicates that sanctions may be more effective at altering policies than we think. I conclude by noting that greater optimism regarding the effectiveness of sanctions should be balanced by a careful consideration of the policy's real and sizeable costs for those caught in the middle.