试论我国反垄断法的域外适用——以"两拓"合并案为视角

反垄断法的城外适用是有其理论基础的,"两拓"并购案促使我们有必要分析我国反垄断法域外适用的依据及可行性,从而对我国适用反垄断法以规制跨国公司并购对我国产生的负面影响进行探讨,进而督促我们更好地反思和完善我国反垄断法的域外适用机制.     

Antitrust Law and Distributive Politics in the American States

State enforcement by state attorneys general (AGs) has become a major component of American antitrust law. Much has been written about state antitrust enforcement, but existing accounts of AG incentives and behavior are incomplete. As elected officials in forty‐three states, AGs must represent their constituents and, therefore, will be drawn to cases that maximize the level of settlement reward—cases with large, wealthy defendants. I hypothesize and find that state AGs represent their constituents along ideological lines, but this relationship is conditioned by case characteristics that involve the potential settlement reward. Moreover, incentives to participate are likely to be higher when there are clear violations of the law, as in price‐fixing cases, rather than in merger cases, where no wrongdoing has necessarily been established. The study adds to our understanding of antitrust law but also has implications for how distributive politics shapes political responsiveness to the electorate.     

“油价问题”的法律规制——以产业法与竞争法的功能组合为核心

＂油价问题＂并非简单的价格管制,牵涉到产业、竞争等诸多体制性因素,其背后折射出产业法与竞争法之间的断裂。以产业法与竞争法的功能组合为核心规制油价,一方面应侧重于竞争法的角度推进《反垄断法》配套规范的制定和实施,并从公共政策的高度、超越具体执法机关以有效规制垄断性油企的限制竞争行为;另一方面应侧重于产业法角度打破既有垄断结构以实现局部充分竞争,并辅之以金融市场的基础建设及垄断性油企的公司治理,从而构建由石油储备机制、市场化的企业竞争机制和石油期货机制构成的油价形成系统。     

Why don't courts treat hospitals like tanks for liquefied gases? Some reflections on health care antitrust enforcement

In this article, I use the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice 2004 report Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition as an occasion to comment on two specific issues that have arisen in health care antitrust: the recent string of losses by the enforcement agencies in hospital merger cases and an antitrust exemption for physicians to bargain collectively with health insurers. One of the more salient facts about health care antitrust enforcement is the notable recent lack of success of the enforcement agencies in hospital merger cases. This may be due to judges and juries holding views of hospital markets as being different from markets for other goods and services. My conclusion is that hospitals are an industry with unique attributes, but nothing about the specifics of the health care industry suggests that the unregulated use of market power in this industry is socially beneficial. As a consequence, the antitrust laws should be enforced here as in any other industry. Countervailing power is an issue that has come to the fore in health care antitrust. Physicians have explicitly asked for legislative exemption from the antitrust laws in order to bargain collectively with insurance companies, as a means of counteracting insurers' monopsony power. It is not clear that health insurers possess significant monopsony power. Even if they do, bestowing monopoly power on physicians will not necessarily improve matters. Active antitrust enforcement in insurance markets is the correct response, not blanket exemptions for providers.     

SHOULD ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES REGULATE POST-MERGER PRICING?

Competitors proposing to merge sometimes propose price regulationin a consent decree as a condition of receiving merger approval.Antitrust enforcement agencies in the United States have beenreluctant to use such price-regulating decrees, as they sufferfrom practical problems in implementation. It is less recognized,however, that the use of consent decrees to regulate post-mergerprices may be unlawful. Such decrees exceed the scope of antitrustlaw and blur the distinction between the legislative power toregulate prices and the executive power to enforce the antitrustlaws. Despite the willingness of merging parties to accept priceregulation in consent decrees, economic and constitutional considerationscounsel against antitrust enforcement agencies adopting thispractice.     

关于美国横向并购反垄断审查政策最新发展的述评

2010《横向并购指南》体现了美国政府关于横向并购反垄断审查政策最新发展。一方面,2010《指南》维持了1992《指南》中一些重要的方面,同时,2010《指南》也对1992《指南》作出了较大的修改。2010《指南》所体现的横向并购反垄断审查政策和以前相比,审查重点有所变化,审查过程更灵活,分析工具更多元化,审查中考虑更多的因素,审查范围会更广,而审查的门槛也有所提高。     

Applying antitrust law to nonprofit healthcare entities: arguments for a greater attention to detail

This Article begins with an antitrust primer, then analyzes the appropriate application of antitrust principles to nonprofit healthcare providers. In light of the inherent charitable character of nonprofit healthcare providers, the author contends that the government and the courts should accord some deference to nonprofit hospitals when they are seeking approval of mergers. To date, this has not generally been the case, although a few recent court decisions have rested their approval of mergers, in part, upon the nonprofit character of the merging entities. The author, in particular, believes the paradigmatic local nonprofit hospital with a community board is less likely than a for-profit hospital to abuse any market power that it may obtain through a merger; consequently, any such merger should not be analyzed solely under the traditional presumptions of antitrust jurisprudence. Rather, the premerger analysis should involve meaningful consideration of the hospital's charitable character.     

Contesting anticompetitive actions taken in the name of the state: state action immunity and health care markets

The so-called state action doctrine is a judicially created formula for resolving conflicts between federal antitrust policy and state policies that seem to authorize conduct that antitrust law would prohibit. Against the background of recent commentaries by the federal antitrust agencies, this article reviews the doctrine and discusses its application in the health care sector, focusing on the ability of states to immunize anticompetitive actions by state licensing and regulatory boards, hospital medical staffs, and public hospitals, as well as anticompetitive mergers and agreements. Although states are free, as sovereign governments, to restrict competition, the state action doctrine requires that "the state itself" make the decision to do so. Partly on the basis of problems in the political environment, the article criticizes courts for using a mere "foreseeability" test to decide whether a state legislature sufficiently authorized competitors to act in contravention of clear federal policy: "Few things are more foreseeable than that a trade or profession empowered to regulate itself will produce anticompetitive regulations."     

Community control and pricing patterns of nonprofit hospitals: An antitrust analysis

Traditional control of nonprofit hospitals by the communities they serve has been offered as justification for restraining antitrust enforcement of mergers that involve nonprofit hospitals. The community is arguably a constraint on a nonprofit's inclination to exercise market power in the form of higher prices; however, community control is likely to be attenuated for hospitals that through merger or acquisition become members of hospital systems--particularly those that operate on a regional or multiregional basis. We report findings from a study in which we examined empirically the relationship between market concentration and pricing patterns for three types of nonprofit hospitals that are distinguishable based on degree of community control: an independent hospital, a member of a local hospital system, and a member of a nonlocal hospital system. Study results indicated that when conditions existed to create a more concentrated market, (1) all three types of nonprofit hospitals exercised market power in the form of higher prices, and (2) hospitals that were members of nonlocal systems were more aggressive in exercising market power than were either independent or local system hospitals. The results have important implications for antitrust enforcement policy.     

20世纪90年代以来的合并控制理论探析

为了适应 20世纪 90年代以来并购活动的日益增长,规制者运用“革新市场”和“单方效果”来支持积极的反托拉斯执法活动。“革新市场”理论通过对一个合并对相关市场上的研究和发展的影响来评估技术领先企业之间的合并。“单方效果”理论根据合并企业独自对相关市场上价格产生影响的能力来评估一个合并。     

Federal Trade Commission drops challenge to California hospital acquisition

The significance of patient outmigration patterns, third-party payor reaction, and post-merger cost savings have been regularly argued by defense counsel and hospitals as important consideration in the antitrust evaluation of hospital mergers. The reliance placed by the Commission on these factors in its Ukiah decision is a welcome confirmation that the antitrust agencies are increasingly sensitive to these aspects of hospital mergers, reflecting a more sophisticated understanding of the health care market than was suggested by the staff's more mechanical evaluative approach. Hospitals and their counsel should therefore prepare for and document these factors if they anticipate antitrust agency scrutiny of a proposed acquisition or merger.     

反垄断诉讼的价值定位与制度建构

反垄断诉讼是反垄断法实施的重要机制之一,是反垄断法理论研究和司法实践中的重要问题。对此问题有两种研究思路：一是以个人权利为中心,将诉讼看作争议解决机制;二是以秩序建构为中心,将诉讼看作建构理想秩序的重要机制。反垄断法的产生、发展与有机社会的生成同步。垄断行为属于风险行为,其造成的损害具有不确定性、延伸性、难以恢复性,因而反垄断法属于现代社会规制法。与此相应,反垄断诉讼应是秩序建构诉讼,在价值上注重竞争秩序的建构,在功能上主张司法能动、积极回应社会在竞争上形成的价值共识,在构造上主张放宽原告条件,建立多元参与的诉讼机制。     

美国反托拉斯法生成进路研究——以规制铁路公司垄断为线索

19世纪下半叶是美国反托拉斯法生成的重要时期。这一时期铁路公司垄断成为社会普遍关注的焦点。面对此,联邦和州采取了不同的措施,其中州承担了反铁路公司垄断的主要任务,初步形成了州反托拉斯法的制度框架,为联邦反托拉斯法的生成奠定了基础。在这一历史进程中,对公用事业垄断的规制、州反托拉斯法的建设以及《谢尔曼法》背后利益的关注,构成了解读反托拉斯法生成进路的三个结点。     

管制行业反垄断执法权配置分析——以管制度为视角

管制行业在不同程度上存在着反垄断执法问题,其执法权配置有多种模式可供选择,但从管制度的角度看,这一执法权配置应是从行业管制机构向反垄断专门执法机关逐步移转的过程,这也是大多数国家或地区立法与实践的发展趋向,因此,我国相关立法也应作相应完善.     

Applying antitrust concepts to the acute care hospital industry: defining the relevant market for hospital services

In considering the possible antitrust implications of a merger of two or more competing hospitals, the courts have generally found that hospitals provide a cluster of services which have significant peculiar characteristics that allow them to be considered a single product market. Spurred by changes in their environments, hospitals during the last decade have become markedly less homogeneous in their range of products and geographic markets. As a result, the impact of hospital mergers in the future may need to be assessed in multiple, more narrowly defined relevant markets, for which several possible definitional bases are suggested in this paper. The increased precision associated with such multidimensional antitrust analysis should permit a more effective consideration of the trade-offs between increases in hospitals' market power and advances in their relative operating efficiency and/or quality of services.     

Merger simulations with observed diversion ratios

One approach to merger simulations used in antitrust cases is to calibrate demand from market shares and a few additional parameters. When the products involved in the merger case are differentiated along several dimensions, actual diversion ratios may be very different from those calculated from market shares. This again may affect the predicted post-merger price effects. This article shows how merger simulation can be performed using observed diversion ratios. To illustrate the potential effects of this approach we use diversion ratios from a local grocery market in Norway. In this case diversions from the acquired to the acquiring stores were considerably smaller than suggested by market shares, and the predicted average price increase from the acquisition was 40% lower using this model rather than a model based upon market shares. This analysis also suggests that even a subset of observed diversion ratios may significantly change the prediction from a merger simulation based upon market shares.     

THE CHURCH REPORT'S ANALYSIS OF VERTICAL AND CONGLOMERATE MERGERS: A REPLY TO COOPER, FROEB, O'BRIEN, AND VITA

I respond to concerns raised by James Cooper, Luke Froeb, DanO'Brien, and Michael Vita regarding the analysis of verticaland conglomerate mergers contained in my report to the EuropeanCommission. I address their arguments that the raising rivals'costs literature does not support an aggressive stance on verticalmergers; that market power is a necessary, but not a sufficient,condition for a non-horizontal merger to raise antitrust concerns;and that efficiencies intrinsic to a non-horizontal merger shouldbe treated in the second step of the proposed structured ruleof reason framework.     

Defending hospital mergers after the FTC's unorthodox challenge to the Evanston Northwestern--Highland Park transaction

Examining the Federal Trade Commission's retrospective challenge of a hospital merger in Illinois, the author provides an insightful analysis of one of the agency's major antitrust enforcement initiatives in health care in the last several years. Because the case produced several departures from antitrust orthodoxy, these departures may affect the trials of future hospital mergers that are challenged. The author reviews the methodology and evidence of the case, and he identifies theories and best practices that are important for administrators and legal practitioners to implement in future mergers.     

Antitrust and hospital mergers: does the nonprofit form affect competitive substance?

Following a string of government losses in cases challenging hospital mergers in federal court, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice issued their report on competition in health care seeking to set the record straight on a number of issues that underlie the judiciary's resolution of these cases. One such issue is the import of nonprofit status for applying antitrust law. This essay describes antitrust's role in addressing the consolidation in the hospital sector and the subtle influence that the social function of the nonprofit hospital has had in merger litigation. Noting that the political and social context in which these institutions operate is never far from the surface, it takes issue with the proposal to cabin merger doctrine so as to deny the significance of nonprofit status in merger analysis. Given the dynamic change in the regulatory climate and heterogeneity of local health care markets, it advises courts not to accept the FTC's preemptive standard regarding the significance of hospitals' nonprofit status and keep open the possibility of fashioning new presumptive rules tailored to more complete economic accounts of nonprofit firm behavior.     

Can Common Business Practices Ever Be Anticompetitive? Redefining Monopolization

For most of its modern history, antitrust law distinguished between normal competition and monopolization by looking for merit, legitimate business justifications, or efficiencies in the challenged business conduct. These proxies were seen as appropriate because they served antitrust law's welfare objectives well. However, the universal adoption of these proxies has overshadowed significant shortcomings, chief among them being that firms do not think in terms of legitimate business justifications or efficiencies, but rather in terms of long-term sustainability and appropriation of value. As a result, antitrust law becomes detached from the very subjects it purports to regulate. Against the backdrop of the recent resurgence of enforcement activity, particularly involving tech giants, this article attempts a conceptualization of monopolization that does not revolve around merit in any form or function. Instead it introduces the proxy of commonness of business practices to determine their legality. This helps highlight the importance of considering “how things are done” in the relevant market, and helps reground antitrust law in business realities, which can enhance the heuristic mechanism of distinguishing between normal and anticompetitive practices. To prove this point the article develops an error test framework, through which it compares current tests with the proposed test in terms of their error footprint and concludes that the integration of the commonness parameter delivers better results. Ultimately, the inquiry undertaken herein is not only about constructing a conception of normal competition different from the only standard we currently have, that is, variants of merit, but also about shifting the conversation from how to fine-tune existing standards to how to capture a more complete conception of competition.