“The ladder of the law has no top and no bottom”: How therapeutic jurisprudence can give life to international human rights

In the past two decades, therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) has become one of the most important theoretical approaches to the law. But, there has, as of yet, been puzzlingly little written about the relationship between TJ and international human rights law. To be sure, there has been some preliminary and exploratory work on the relationship between TJ and international law in general, but virtually nothing on its relationship to international human rights law in a mental disability law context. This paper seeks to focus on this lack of consideration, to speculate as to why that might be, and to offer some suggestions as to how to infuse some new vitality and vigor into this important area of law and social policy.     

Legislative genesis and judicial death of a directive: The European Court of Justice invalidated the data retention directive (2006/24/EC) thereby creating a sustained period of legal uncertainty about the validity of national laws which enacted it

The Grand Chamber has ruled that the data retention directive was invalid ex tunc since it seriously interfered with the fundamental rights to respect for private life and protection of personal data and exceeded the limits of the principle of proportionality which are provided for in the Charter. The scope and temporal effects of this ruling should be clarified, especially its legal impacts on national laws of Member States which enacted the directive. In addition, the findings of the Grand Chamber on geographical safeguards have far-reaching implications on the retention and storage of personal data in the EU.     

Confronting Religion: Veiled Witnesses,the Right to a Fair Trial and the Supreme Court of Canada's Judgment in R v N.S.

The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R v N.S. is significant because the majority seems to endorse an understanding of confrontation that assumes a defendant's right to a fair trial is imperilled by a witness who seeks to give evidence while wearing the niqab. The case is of interest because it permits reflection upon the interrelationship between the right to a fair trial and the right to confront witnesses enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Given that the European Court of Human Rights conceptualises confrontation in epistemic terms, it is argued that it would be unlikely to find that a conviction based upon evidence from a niqab‐wearing witness would infringe the right to a fair trial. This note examines the value of demeanour evidence and whether the majority in R v N.S. was correct that the abrogation of the ability to assess demeanour evidence necessarily undermines trial fairness.     

Rights,responsibilities and regulation – the three Rs of education: a consideration of the state's control over parental choice in education

Education is both a right and a responsibility. International instruments such as the International covenant on civil and political rights and the International convention on the rights of the child affirm the right of all children to education. This right is spelt out in the education legislation of all states and territories in Australia. Education is not only free but is compulsory for all children between certain ages. The obligation is imposed on parents (in accordance with definitions contained therein) to ensure that their children are both enrolled at and attend school. However, parental choice of education provider is allowed within each jurisdiction by way of state, private or church schools, all of which are registered and regulated to varying degrees by the state. The legislation of each jurisdiction also makes some degree of provision for parents who choose to opt out their children from any formal education setting and to educate them at home. Home education is also subject to state regulation. The assumption by the state of the responsibility for education guides this policy and legislation. The argument for state control of all education, no matter how and by whom it is provided, is that the state has an overriding interest in ensuring the economic well-being of its citizens and the growth of its intellectual capital. The state acknowledges that the responsibility for education is shared with parents, primarily by providing penalties for parents who fail to ensure enrolment and attendance of their children at a school. There is evidence that more and more parents in developed countries worldwide are choosing to educate their children at home, and anecdotal evidence suggests that Australia is part of this trend. To this end, this article critically examines the balance and relationship between the exercise of parental choice and responsibility in education, and state regulation and control. It does so by examining the means by which the legislation of different jurisdictions allows for choice in the exercise of the right to education, with particular reference to home education, places limitations on that choice and imposes control on the delivery of education outside state schools.     

基层法院审判委员会“放权”改革的过程研究——以对某法院法官的访谈为素材

从过程的角度来看,基层法院审判委员会的“放权”是法院内部各层次行动者以最高法院推行的审判委员会改革为契机,在审判委员会自身功能逐渐弱化、其他替代性机制功能逐渐强大的条件下,以法院的组织利益、中间组织的部门利益以及法官的个人利益为中心进行公共选择的结果。这样一种公共选择的逻辑,最终使得审判委员会的“放权”被异化“放权”不但没有减弱反而加强了法院对法官的控制,法官的独立审判在很大程度上演变成了一种“咨询型”审判。     

Text Matters: Some Reflections on the Forging of a New Constitutional Jurisprudence in South Africa

The South African Constitution establishes a constitutional democracy with a strong form of constitutional review. The Constitutional Court is required to declare invalid any legislation or conduct of the President which is inconsistent with the Constitution. The author, a former judge of the Constitutional Court, argues that the text of the Constitution has been an important determinant of the Court's jurisprudence, both in relation to the Court's jurisprudence concerning the institutional structures established by the Constitution and its Bill of Rights jurisprudence.     

论夫妻一方婚前借款购置不动产的利益归属——对“《婚姻法》司法解释(三)征求意见稿”第11条的商榷

近年以来,离婚时夫妻一方婚前借款购置的不动产之归属争议越来越多,法学研究中对此类问题的认识分歧较大,各地人民法院对此类争议的裁判结果也不一致。根据"《婚姻法》司法解释(三)征求意见稿"第11条的规定,应考虑离婚时不动产的市场价格及共同清偿借款等因素,要求"不动产权利人对另一方进行合理补偿",具有相当大的合理性。但该规定可能存在重财产利益"清算"而轻人身关系特殊性的嫌疑,它可能因为对女性的弱势地位重视不足而不利于妇女。夫妻既是两个各自独立的利益主体,又是彼此紧密结合的共同生活伴侣。区分婚姻当事人双方的财产利益,不应当脱离婚姻的特殊性。处理这类不动产归属争议的司法裁判规则,宜根据不动产用途、财产来源、当事人对财产的贡献等因素,予以公平合理对待。     

Out on a Limb: Appointing a Parenting Coordinator with Decision‐Making Authority in the Absence of a Statute or Rule

This Article addresses the issue of whether a court may appoint a Parenting Coordinator (PC) with decision‐making authority in the absence of a statute or court rule. The Article identifies possible sources of authority for the appointment of a PC with decision‐making authority in a state with no authorizing statute or court rule. It also provides a paradigm for constructing an appointment that allows for the benefits of Parenting Coordination but does not delegate decision‐making authority to an extent that it would constitute an impermissible delegation of judicial authority.

Key Points for the Family Court Community:
• Where a court seeks to appoint a PC with decision‐making authority in the absence of an authorizing statute or court rule, the court may find some authority allowing the appointment in (1) its equitable authority over child custody and visitation, (2) its authority to enforce its own orders, or (3) its authority to appoint other extrajudicial assistants such as a special master or mediator.
• Where a court seeks to appoint a PC with decision‐making authority in the absence of an authorizing statute or court rule, the court must craft an appointment that delegates enough decision‐making authority to the PC for parenting coordination to be effective yet, at the same time, not so much decision‐making authority as to render the appointment an impermissible delegation of a judicial function, specifically:
  • The PC's role should be limited to assisting the parties in implementing custody and visitation terms already decreed by the trial court.
  • A PC should be appointed only if the parties to the divorce consent to the appointment or if the trial court makes a finding that the case is a high‐conflict case.
  • The parties must have the opportunity for the trial court to meaningfully review any decision of the PC so that the trial court retains ultimate decision‐making authority.

     

论动物福利立法的限度及其定位——兼谈动物福利立法中动物的法律地位

从道德和道德法律化的角度看,给予动物福利其实就是科加人对动物的道德义务,而动物福利立法的实质便是把这种道德义务上升为法律义务,即实现动物道德的法律化。不过,动物并未就此获得法律主体地位,它只是一种"物格"弱于一般客体物的"准物"而已。由于道德法律化是有条件的,动物福利立法也应有限度,只有那些获得社会普遍认同和共同遵守的基本动物道德,才可通过立法程序上升为法律规范。对此,我们可用"利益关系分析法"和"利益层次分析法"来大致界定"基本动物道德"的范围;用自卫原则、对称原则、最少损害原则、分配正义原则以及补偿正义原则,来对动物福利立法进行较明确的定位,以妥善处理动物福利和人的利益的关系。     

论连带责任分摊请求权——兼论不具有分摊能力连带责任人份额的再分配方案

分摊请求权不同于追偿请求权,是与连带责任相对应的制度。大陆法系的分摊请求权较为体系化,英美法上的分摊请求权具有较强的衡平法色彩。对不具有分摊能力连带责压入份额的再分配方案,大陆法系采用“事后二次分担规则”,英美法系采用“事前二次分担规则”,《民法通则》未对该问题作出规定。分摊请求权的产生基础是矫正正义。我国侵权法上应采大陆法系“事后二次分担规则”。