Terrorism

Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, War Without End: The Terrorists ‐ an Intelligence Dossier (London: Harrap, 1986). Pp.279. £9.95.

James Adams, The Financing of Terror (London: New English Library, 1986). Pp.293. £12.95.

Benjamin Netanyahu (ed.) Terrorism: How the West Can Win (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1986). Pp.254. $18.95.     

Risk Sensitivity and Terrorism

One enduring question about terrorism is why individuals choose to join terrorist groups. Past studies have shown that terrorists are not always poor, and they can in fact come from more privileged groups in society. Risk sensitivity and prospect theory are approaches that can help explain some of the anomalies. They suggest that two types of group are likely to supply members for terrorist organizations in disproportionate numbers. One group consists of those who face a loss of status or position due to ongoing changes in society. A second group consists of those who have an opportunity to gain a major advance in status or position. Both groups are thus more likely or more willing to take risks such as joining dissident terrorists – either to maintain their position or to improve it. An analysis of the situation of Palestinian nationalists, nationalists in Northern Ireland and the Tamils in Sri Lanka provides support for the idea that sensitivity to risk can be an important factor in explaining the willingness of individuals to join terrorist groups.     

Highway Security and Terrorism

This article presents an overview of highway transportation security before and after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in the context of hazardous materials (hazmat) transportation. It is primarily focused on the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) regulation of motor carrier transportation of hazmat and post-9/11 efforts to prevent acquisition by terrorists of certain classes of hazmat. In the context of homeland security, motor carrier transportation of hazmat is receiving heightened attention. It should be cautioned, the article highlights a limited number of activities at the federal level only to provide the reader with a sense of ongoing government and industry activities to improve transportation security.     

Terrorism and systems terror

In this paper we discuss the censorship of political statements sympathetic to terrorism as an instance of what Lyotard calls ‘terror’. Our claim is that the traditional approach to questions of censorship of ‘subversive’ politics only captures part of the story; what is at stake is not merely the censorship but at a deeper level, the withdrawal of the possibility to challenge the censorship. This two-tier logic of silencing is what we explore with the help of Lyotard's earlier and later work, first by relying on his analysis of ‘terror’ in the framework of ‘agonistics’, then of ‘terror’ as différend'.     

How Terrorism Upsets Liberty

As terrorism increasingly penetrates Western democracies, liberals and libertarians are obliged to ask themselves whether contending with it justifies restricting civil liberty and, if so, to what extent. Neither personal security nor individual liberty is ever fully realised – both are a matter of degree – and they are often perceived as being at odds with each other. Hence it has been suggested that we reconsider the existing trade-off between them, or reassess their 'rate of exchange'. While such questions are sometimes raised by left-leaning liberals, they are in fact particularly acute for liberals on the right, or libertarians, who would normally resist any increase in government intervention. Right-wingers who advocate 'hands off' policies on all other occasions now call for an increase in government intervention as regards security measures. Many left-liberals, on the other hand, are reluctant to concede any further power to the state in order to combat terrorism.     

Terrorism and pork-barrel spending

The horrifying, tragic events of 9/11 made Americans aware of their vulnerability to terrorist attacks and triggered the creation of the Department of Homeland Security along with a substantial increase in federal spending to both thwart terrorist attacks and to increase our ability to respond to such emergencies. Much of this large increase in spending was in the form of direct transfers to states and cities through several grant programs. Homeland Security grants may be used for protection against terrorist activities, thereby enhancing public interests, or as wealth transfers to state and local governments, enhancing the reelection efforts of incumbents, and thus, private interests. Using 2004 per capita Homeland Security grant funding to states and their cities, we find that the funding formula used for some of the grant programs, which allocates almost 40% of the funds in some grant programs through a minimum percent to each state with the rest allocated based on population, means that per capita funding is related to electoral votes per capita, i.e., to the politics of Presidential re-election. However, the funding in other grant programs is also related to some of the dangers and vulnerabilities faced by states and their cities. Some of the variation in per capita grant allocations is also explained by the amount of airport traffic in the state and the state's population density, which are variables closely linked to the state's vulnerability to attack. Per capita Homeland Security grant allocations, however, do not seem to be related to the closeness of the 2000 presidential race.     

恐怖主义发展的新趋势

20世纪90年代以来,恐怖主义发展出现了一些新趋势案件迅速向世界各地扩散;文化方面的恐怖分子日趋五花八门;在经济领域制造恐怖者层出不穷;专以美国为敌者与日俱增;作案者纷纷化整为零;一些未成年人居然也成了恐怖分子;作案之后隐身遁形;施袭手段异常残酷;充当"击键杀手";使用生化武器;试图得到原子弹.     

How the Public Defines Terrorism

Every time a major violent act takes place in the United States, a public debate erupts as to whether it should be considered terrorism. Political scientists have offered a variety of conceptual frameworks, but have neglected to explore how ordinary citizens understand terrorism, despite the central role the public plays in our understanding of the relationship between terrorism and government action in the wake of violence. We synthesize components of both scholarly definitions and public debates to formulate predictions for how various attributes of incidents affect the likelihood they are perceived as terrorism. Combining a conjoint experiment with machine learning techniques and automated content analysis of media coverage, we show the importance not only of the type and severity of violence, but also the attributed motivation for the incident and social categorization of the actor. The findings demonstrate how the language used to describe violent incidents, for which the media has considerable latitude, affects the likelihood the public classifies incidents as terrorism.     

The Intelligence War on Terrorism

From 1941 to 1944, MI5 faced determined attempts to penetrate Allied Air Forces using trained pilot agents recruited by German Military Intelligence (Abwehr). The mission of these pilot agents was to gather military intelligence and to return to German held territory. This pattern of targeting Allied Air Forces has not been recognized by historians. This article examines MI5's responses to the threat using recently released files in the National Archives.     

论恐怖主义犯罪

恐怖主义犯罪是全人类文明社会的共同敌人。面对恐怖主义的全球危害 ,如何科学而全面地认识恐怖主义犯罪 ,探索其发生发展的规律 ,寻求更加有效地防范与打击恐怖主义犯罪的对策 ,是理论界一个重要的研究课题。本文在界定恐怖主义犯罪的基础上 ,对恐怖主义犯罪的特征进行概括 ,对恐怖主义犯罪原因进行了分析 ,进而提出了反恐怖主义犯罪的对策。     

Organizing the War on Terrorism

The network of public agencies, private firms, nonprofit organizations, ad hoc groups, and individual volunteers that deals with natural and technological hazards and disasters did a remarkable job of responding to and helping us recover from the September 11th attacks. That national emergency management network, along with the national security and law enforcement networks, provides a foundation for our war on terrorism, helps us mitigate the hazard of terrorism, and improves our preparedness for future violence. However, coordinating the efforts of the networks will be a real challenge for the director of homeland security and his or her state and local counterparts. Coordination will necessitate using legal authority to assure compliance, economic and other incentives to encourage compliance, formal partnerships to encourage collaboration, informal understandings to encourage cooperation, and personal encouragement to influence appropriate action. A top–down, command–and–control approach to the war on terrorism, such as the proposed Department of Homeland Security is intended to provide, may be counterproductive.