The decision to lobby bureaucrats

Despite a good deal of interest in lobbyists?? tactics, virtually no research has been published examining the conditions under which interest groups lobby the bureaucracy rather than or in addition to the legislature. Using two comprehensive datasets, I show that lobbying increases in both branches when conflict is higher and when the lobbyist has professional or political connections to that venue. In addition, certain conditions cause lobbyists to specialize in one branch or a particular branch only, depending on the issue area being lobbied, the interest group type being represented, the lobbyist??s resources, and other factors.     

Buying supermajorities in a stochastic environment

This paper considers a model in which two opposing lobbyists compete for the votes of legislators, but the precise preferences of the legislators are not known. I show that, in contrast to the normally predicted effect of uncertainty on the formation of supermajorities, in the presence of competing lobbyists, increased risk that members of a lobbyist’s coalition will not vote for the proposal may decrease the number of legislators a lobbyist includes in her coalition.     

A theoretical analysis of the case for a balanced budget amendment

A balanced federal budget is not a best outcome for all situations, and a constitutional amendment to require annually balanced budgets is not well defended on grounds that it is. However, the case for a balanced budget amendment may have some merit on other, subtler grounds. This article outlines a set of such grounds.Specifically, if it can be shown that the political process systematically undervalues a desirable relationship between revenues and expenditures, a balanced budget requirement might be defensible. The grounds would be that annually balanced budgets are a second best solution, given an argument that the unconstrained political process produces even less desirable outcomes. However, existing knowledge does not make an adequate case that such a rule is needed.I would like to acknowledge the support of National Science Foundation Grant #SES-8218421, and the comments of the following persons on an earlier version: Arthur Benavie, J. Budziszewski, Henry Chappell, Richard Froyen, Paul (Kress, Peter Lange, Jeffrey Obler, Donald Searing, Kenneth Shepsle and the late Clement Vose. Of course, none of the above bears any responsibility for the content.     

On the pricing and benefit structure of a private club or public utility

In this study the structure-induced equilibrium approach for modeling democratic institutions is extended to allow for the added structural features of executive veto and legislative override. A multidimensional model is presented for a budgetary process involving three actors — a legislature, an appropriations committee, and an executive. In order to focus attention on the role of the veto and override possibilities, simplifying assumptions are made with regard to other aspects of the agenda formation process. In particular, the committee has monopoly agenda power, a closed amendment control rule is operative, and perfect-foresight expectations are held by the committee and the executive. Given these assumptions, utility maximization by the several actors generates a budget outcome characterized as a structure-induced equilibrium. The general model is illustrated geometrically with a two-dimensional example, permitting budget outcomes to be analyzed for various combinations of veto rules and override provisions. The analysis demonstrates that budget outcomes are sensitive to alternative specifications of veto rules and override provisions. In the illustration, executive veto power is shown to vary directly with both the permissiveness of the veto rule and the stringency of the override provision. Similar relationships, however, are not found to exist for total budget expenditures.     

The Iroquois Confederation Constitution: An Analysis

The Iroquois Confederation was not an influence on the U.S.Constitution, but it is worthy of study as an independentlydeveloped political system with the oldest surviving constitutionin North America. A systematic institutional analysis of theGreat Binding Law, the orally transmitted constitution of theConfederation, reveals, among other things: tribal inequalitydespite their formal equality under a unanimity rule; a highlevel of responsiveness despite a nondemocratic, elitist methodfor selecting leaders; many ancillary institutions for achievinga traditional form of consensus rather than simple majorityrule; two means of elevating men to the Confederation Council,each a paradoxical blend of the pre political and the post-traditional;the first use of a formal amendment process in constitutionalhistory; and an underlying "code of imperialism" that, togetherwith the second method of selecting Confederation Council members,transformed a defensive alliance into a potent actor in NorthAmerican history. Overall, the Confederation institutionallyapproximated an Aristotelian "mixed regime" which, despite itscreation under circumstances the Iroquois describe in Hobbesianterms, was quite libertarian.     

When do politicians listen to lobbyists (and who benefits when they do)?

This article provides an empirical test of an informational model of lobbying. The model predicts when lobbyists provide useful information to policy makers and when policy makers follow lobbyists' advice. The predictions are assessed against data on the policy positions and lobbying activities of firms and other organised groups in the context of 28 policy proposals advanced by United Kingdom governments between 2001 and 2007. The results suggest that the interactions between policy makers and lobbyists are driven mainly by the expected policy costs for policy makers, providing lobbyists with strong incentives to provide correct advice to policy makers. There is little support for the expectation that lobbyists can successfully persuade policy makers to take a course of action that is beneficial to the lobbyist at the expense of wider constituencies.     

Lobbying when the decisionmaker can acquire independent information

Politicians trade off the cost of acquiring and processing information against the benefit of being re-elected. Lobbyists may possess private information upon which politicians would like to rely without the effort of verification. If the politician does not try to verify, however, the lobbyist has no incentive to be truthful. This is modelled as a game in which the lobbyist lobbies to show his conviction that the electorate is on his side. In equilibrium, sometimes the politician investigates, and sometimes the information is false. The lobbyists and the electorate benefit from the possibility of lobbying when the politician would otherwise vote in ignorance, but not when he would otherwise acquire his own information. The politician benefits in either case. Lobbying is most socially useful when the politician's investigation costs are high, when he is more certain of the electorate's views, and when the issue is less important.     

Common law environmentalism

The necessity to control environmental externalities is almost invariably given as justification for command-and-control regulation and other forms of state intervention in related markets. When even mentioned, common law remedies that protected environmental rights for centuries are quickly dismissed as either being unworkable or ineffective. A review of the common law experience indicates that the rule of law can be effective in protecting environmental rights. Indeed, it is quite possible that common law was too effective, which led to special interest demand for statute law. The rule of politics may be more attractive to rent seekers than the rule of law and markets.     

Executive budget proposal,executive veto,legislative override,and uncertainty: A comparative analysis of the budgetary process

This study examines the roles of the executive budgetary proposal, the executive veto, the legislative override, and legislative uncertainty about the executive's preferences in determining the outcome of a budgetary process. A sequential model of the budgetary process with three institutional agents — a legislature, an appropriations committee, and an executive — is presented. To focus attention on the executive proposal, the veto, the override provision, and uncertainty, simplifying assumptions are made: (1) the appropriations committee has monopoly agenda power, and (2) there is a closed amendment control rule. In order to characterize sequential equilibria of various combinations of veto rules and override provisions, we examine a particular arrangement of agents' preferences and a two item budget. The results demonstrate that the final budget depends critically on the executive proposal, the executive veto rule, the override provision, and the uncertainty. We achieve three striking results. First, the executive proposal may be effective in reducing the frequency of the exercised veto. Second, for a given override provision, a movement from the item veto to the item reduction veto leaves the executive worse off in some cases. Third, with the same change in institutions, the government budget may increase.     

The lobbyist with ‘balls of iron and a spine of steel’: why Ireland needs lobbying reform

• In common with most other nations, Ireland currently has no statutory regulation of lobbying activities. Equally, and also in common with many countries, lobbying regulation is becoming a more prominent subject of political debate. This paper considers the pervasive context of political corruption and scandal highlighted by one lobbyist now in jail, analyses various suggestions for lobbying regulation which have been proposed, and concludes with a potential reform agenda. The opportunity exists for Ireland to take a lead in producing a comprehensive and meaningful regulatory regime—genuine and principled reform, rather than a muddled compromise.

Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Politician preferences, law-abiding lobbyists and caps on political contributions

The effect of a contribution cap is analyzed in a political lobbying game where the politician has a policy preference. In contrast to the previous literature without politician policy preferences, more restrictive binding caps always reduce expected aggregate contributions. However the initial imposition of a cap increases contributions if the politician mildly favors the low-valuation lobbyist’s policy. The introduction of policy preferences permits analysis of monied interests’ policy influence. A more restrictive cap makes it more likely that the politician enacts the policy he would have enacted in the absence of lobbying, even in cases where expected aggregate contributions increase.     

Centripetal forces in spatial voting: On the size of the Yolk

The yolk, the smallest circle which intersects all median lines, has been shown to be an important tool in understanding the nature of majority voting in a spatial voting context. The center of the yolk is a natural ‘center’ of the set of voter ideal points. The radius of the yolk can be used to provide bounds on the size of the feasible set of outcomes of sophisticated voting under standard amendment procedure, and on the limits of agenda manipulation and cycling when voting is sincere. We show that under many plausible conditions the yolk can be expected to be small. Thus, majority rule processes in spatial voting games will be far better behaved than has commonly been supposed, and the possible outcomes of agenda manipulations will be generally constrained. This result was first conjectured by Tullock (1967).     

浅议《合同法》格式条款制度的缺陷

我国<合同法>格式条款制度,存在以下不足:在体制方面,将格式条款的订立、效力和解释同规定在合同订立一章中,有欠科学;在订立方面,格式条款订立中条款提供方需提请对方注意的范围过于狭隘,对条款的说明义务不具有普遍性,不利于相对人利益的保护;在效力方面,存在自相矛盾、自相重复的问题.同时,仅规定条款的无效,未规定条款的可变更、撤销,有悖于合同自由原则.     

Reply to Miller on agendas and sincerity

Contrary to Miller, Farquharson’s agenda trees do omit real parliamentary information. And the assumptions he uses to justify Farquharson’s definition of sincere (or naive) voting justify too little (e.g., he drops maximax) and rule out too much (e.g., non-pre-set agendas and principled sincere voting).     

Completing the Constitution: The Fourteenth Amendment and Constitutional Rights

Although the Fourteenth Amendment has been the vehicle for anumber of transformations in the protection of rights, therehas been no consensus on what it means. The amendment is sometimesheld to have revolutionized the Constitution, in effect replacingthe traditional federal system with a more national system.It is also argued that the amendment essentially reaffirmedthe prewar Constitution. The truth appears to lie with neitherside: the drafters of the amendment attempted to "complete theConstitution," neither to reform it radically, nor to reaffirmit simply. In doing so, they unwittingly followed in the tracksof the original "father of the Constitution," James Madison,who believed the original Constitution to be defective in importantways. Proper attention to the context and the structure of thetext of the amendment reveals just how the amendment was to"complete the Constitution." So examined, the amendment revealsitself to be a precisely stated, clearly drafted text, containinga number of new constitutional principles. Properly understood,the amendment affords constitutional protection for rights alreadypossessed in some sense, but therefore unprotected in the oldConstitution.     

Research and Social Security policy in the United States

This article is adapted from a paper presented at a conference that investigated the role of policy research in shaping public policy. The conference focused on how studies of economic and social forces and their relationship with public problems and programs affect the decisions of public policymakers. The author contends that research has the potential to inform policy-making in any of its five stages: problem identification, option development, passage of new laws or development of new procedures, implementation, and evaluation. She notes that different players in the policy-making process use research differently, from the senior government official who needs a quick review of what is known relating to a "hot" issue to the interest group lobbyist who wants access to raw data. The article concludes that research can best achieve its potential when (1) it anticipates policymakers' information needs, (2) it is disseminated in an accessible form understandable to nonresearchers, and (3) the policy analyst is willing to engage in the policy process as an advocate for efficiency.     

Lobbying: An art and a science—Five golden rules for an evidence‐based lobbying strategy

In the battle for influence, public affairs professionals make crucial strategic decisions every single day. “Should we go public with this case?” “Who are we going to lobby, and how?” “Should we form a coalition with other organisations?” Public affairs professionals often make these decisions based on their experience or their gut feeling. In practice, lobbying is often more of an art than a science. It is an intuitive and creative process, rarely involving any insights rooted in science. And yet many public affairs professionals are faced with uncertainty about the added value of their activities. “Does what we do really matter?” “What kind of impact do we have?” “Are we making the right strategic decisions?” Some colleagues seek to compensate for these doubts with an overwhelming dose of self‐confidence. An experienced lobbyist recently said during a lecture: “The day I can measure my influence is the day I can double my rates.” Other public affairs professionals are a little more modest and try to assess their impact with key performance indicators. They systematically review the lobbying tactics used. This systematic approach has gained a lot of traction in recent years. The smoky back rooms, the cigars, and whisky of the past are now giving way to evidence‐based lobbying, based on facts, building a bridge between art and science of lobbying.     

William Talbott’s Which Rights Should be Universal?

In this review essay, I first set out and then subject to criticism the main claims advanced by William Talbott in his excellent recent book, “Which Rights Should be Universal?”. Talbott offers a conception of basic universal human rights as the minimally necessary and sufficient conditions to political legitimacy. I argue that his conception is at once too robustly liberal and democratic and too inattentive to key features of the rule of law to play this role. I suggest that John Rawls’s conception of human rights comes closer to hitting the mark Talbott sets for himself and that Talbott incorrectly rejects Rawls’s view. I conclude that what likely divides Talbott and Rawls is that Rawls, but not Talbott, explicitly frames the inquiry into the minimally necessary and sufficient conditions to political legitimacy in terms of a liberal democratic people attempting to determine, as a matter of its just foreign policy, whether or not to recognize other organized polities as independent and self-determining within the international order.     

Meritocracy revisited

Michael Young is author of The Rise of the Meritocracy,reissued in paperback by Transaction. Among his other books is Family and Kinship in East London (with Peter Willmott).He is founder and director of the Institute of Community Studies in London. He is a past chairman of the Social Science Research Council of the United Kingdom and founder of the Open University. He is a member of Parliament as Lord Young of Dartington.