Relationships between government size and economic growth: Japan's government reforms and evidence from OECD

This paper examines the relationship between government size and economic growth of 21 industrialized countries. Government size is measured by government final consumption expenditures and transfer payments. The relationship between government consumption is expected to increase GDP growth for developing countries, and reduce it for industrialized countries. Government consumption can contribute to increased economic growth. However, government consumption is likely to expand beyond an efficient level in industrialized countries. In contrast, transfer payments, and social welfare programs are likely to reduce economic growth for most countries. These programs reduce work incentives and encourage tax avoidance activities. Work disincentives and tax avoidance reduce economic growth. These expected relationships are consistent with economic performance and government size for the countries considered here. Inefficiency and excessive government growth are checked by voter feedback as tax burdens exceed the associated benefits. Unfortunately, government program costs and benefits are asymmetrically distributed. The resulting tendency is to expand government programs, particularly programs that benefit a majority of voters at the expense of a minority. This tendency becomes even more acute as the tax system becomes more progressive (i.e., tax burdens become concentrated. Reductions in government size are more likely with stagnant or declining economic growth, and in government programs whose costs are widely shared, compared to programs with widely shared benefits and narrowly shared costs.     

How Pollution Taxes may Increase Pollution and Reduce Net Revenues

This paper develops a positive theory of pollution taxation by a federal authority when pollution abatement subsidies are used by local governments. Environmental and industry lobby groups influence governments with campaign contributions. First, pollution may increase in the pollution tax because the abatement subsidy increases (decreases) with the tax, and pollution increases (decreases) in the abatement subsidy. This occurs because the lobbying incentives change at a pollution tax reform. Second, pollution taxes may reduce net revenues because subsidy expenditures rise. Third, pollution may increase simultaneously as net revenues fall. Finally, the welfare effect of a pollution tax may be negative.     

Analyzing welfare effort: An appraisal of comparative methods

How do we measure and rate the social welfare efforts of nations? Most people consider the U.S. and Japan welfare laggards when compared with European countries. This view derives from a widely used measure of “welfare effort”—direct government outlays for social programs as the percentage of a nation's gross domestic product (GDP). This article challenges several assumptions implicit in the conventional measure and suggests an alternative approach in assessing “welfare effort.” By incorporating indirect tax expenditures and controlling for the differences in tax burdens and social need for welfare spending among countries, the alternative measure (the NET index) not only broadens the conceptual boundaries of welfare effort, but also affords a more meaningful standard for comparative analysis. To illustrate, this study compares the welfare effort levels of ten developed nations measured under several versions of the NET index.     

Tax Expenditure Budgets, Budget Policy, and Tax Policy: Confusion in the States

A tax expenditure budget should contribute to efficient and effective public decisions by quantifying the division in the tax structure between provisions that represent revenue policy (distribute the cost of government according to the legislated tax base) and parts that represent budget policy (substitute for direct spending). For this transparency to have the desired impact, however, the tax expenditure budget process and the direct expenditure process must be properly integrated and the tax expenditure budget must make an accurate division between the parts of the tax structure. A review of the 33 states with tax expenditure systems shows many weaknesses in application of the concept and poor linkage to the direct spending budget system. Their most significant flaw is in dividing the tax structure into normal and preference elements; states need greater attention to defining their basic tax structure if they are to have a meaningful tax expenditure budget.     

Constitutional background to the Social Security Act of 1935

In June 1937, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported unfavorably on Roosevelt's Court-packing plan and the bill was effectively killed. In the same month, Justice Van Devanter retired and gave Roosevelt his first opportunity to make an appointment to the Supreme Court. Over the following 6 years, Roosevelt made seven more appointments to the Court, and in the years that followed the Court continued in the direction boldly advanced in the spring of 1937. A residual effect of the taxing-spending construction of the old-age insurance provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935 has been the Court's continued adherence to the view that social security programs consist of separate taxing and spending provisions and are not, constitutionally speaking, social insurance programs. The issue has arisen in both a due process context and an equal protection context. But it is unlikely that the decisions reached in these contexts would have been different had the old-age insurance program been drafted as an earned-benefits program pursuant to the commerce power. Of course, the Court's decisions in the social security cases represented a significant constitutional development in establishing the breadth of Congress' powers to tax and spend for the general welfare. The decisions not only cleared the way for other general welfare programs, but more fundamentally provided the Federal Government with the substantive power and institutional flexibility to respond to the changing needs of the Nation.     

Federal Government Leasing: Costs, Incentives, and Effects

This article examines the lease or borrow decision from the perspective of the United States federal government as the lessee. It argues that there are several sources of friction in the leasing market that will make leasing more costly than buying for the federal government. Nevertheless, the budget process contains powerful incentives for federal government agencies to lease even though leasing is the most costly alternative.     

Budgeting Rules and Program Outcomes

It is not efficient for a budget system either to enable excessively frequent changes in programs and tax policies or to be rigid and unresponsive. Program durability is one measure of how a budget system weighs the competing goals of resoluteness and responsiveness. The federal budget has different processes—mandatory and discretionary spending and tax expenditures—each based in separate congressional committees and relying on separate procedures. This article examines the budget systems' durability. One finding is that mandatory spending programs and tax expenditures are more durable than programs backed by discretionary spending. However, while programs targeted to vulnerable populations and supporting long‐term planning, such as in income support and health, might benefit from durability, these programs display shorter durability, not longer. While displaying greater durability, tax expenditures do respond to changes in different economic sectors, based on the changes in spending of other budget systems.     

The Monster that Ate the United States Senate

Under this allegorical title the article addresses the lawmaking process that has led to the acceptance of three major laws: the 1996 welfare law, the 1997 tax law, and the 1997 balanced budget law. The article presents the author's critical views regarding the budget reconciliation process that underlies the acceptance of these laws.     

Social Citizenship in China: Continuity and Change

A fundamental feature of Chinese social citizenship is the demarcation between the rural population and the urban population. Entitlement to income security and welfare provision has been exclusively a right of city dwellers. However, as economic reform progresses, the socialist welfare system has become unable to provide adequate protection. Welfare reform intends to widen the social security net, yet it has inadvertently exacerbated social inequality. In the meantime, the inferior social position of the peasantry has worsened as an effect of continued state bias, heightened tax and fee burdens, and the expropriation of farmland for development. In light of the intrusion on their rights and interests, more and more Chinese citizens have taken to protesting to voice their discontent.     

Local Government and Welfare Generosity: Municipality Spending on Social Welfare

Although it is difficult for local governments to give support for social welfare recipients top political priority, there are huge variations in the support recipients actually receive among Norwegian municipalities. However, local governments representing different party ideologies may prefer to support different dimensions of generosity. Some municipalities could have a liberal attitude to eligibility rules but be strict on time limits and the amount of money provided. Others may be generous regarding time limits or amounts received once one is accepted as a welfare client. Data from the mid 1990s indicate the variation in support is related to different generosity dimensions for different party groups. While the total number of clients seems unrelated to politics and basically correlates with local social problems, the duration and amount of support are related to the political composition of the municipality assembly. Devoid of any large variation, both time limits and the amount of support increase in accordance with socialist leanings, and the total budget used for social welfare support also increases with the proportion of women in the municipality assembly.     

Budget Deficits in the States: Massachusetts

Massachusetts entered the current recession carrying a structural deficit counterbalanced by a healthy, $2.1 billion stabilization fund, equal to 10 percent of total tax revenue. Like most states, Massachusetts only dimly realized the depth of the current recession in October 2008 when revenue collections began to slip and welfare caseloads began to increase. By May of 2009, a total FY2009 budget gap of $4 billion had been identified, the combined effect of plummeting revenues and increased costs for welfare and medical assistance. The Commonwealth closed the FY2009 budget gap through a combination of budget cuts, stabilization fund transfers, and federal stimulus funds. The Commonwealth faced an even larger $4.8 billion budget gap in FY2010. With the stabilization fund severely depleted, the FY2010 budget gap was closed primarily by budget cuts, federal stimulus money, and a sales and use tax increase. Because of the Commonwealth's reliance on one-time money to close current budget gaps, a significant budget gap of at least $2.8 billion for FY2011 was identified soon after passage of the budget. In this paper we discuss the political and historic context in which the budget gaps occurred, outline the causes of the budget gaps, and evaluate the strategies employed to close them.     

Reforming the French welfare state: Solidarity,social exclusion and the three crises of citizenship

The article explores recent debates about citizenship and social provision in France. It examines the essential concepts comparable to ‘social citizenship’, as understood in British debates, and the role that they have played in the development of the French welfare state. Its conclusions are threefold. First, social provision in France is founded on the principle of solidarité, which holds that all citizens face a series of social risks (unemployment and illness) that make them dependent on one another. Second, as the traditional insurance principle (the core of the French welfare state) is founded on socio‐economic conditions (concerning the nature of social interdependence and social risk) that no longer exist, the emergence of these social ills has led to not one but three crises of citizenship: a crisis of coverage, of legitimacy and of participation. Third, while it is too early to draw definitive conclusions, recent policy reforms suggest that the difficulties faced by French welfare are encouraging moves towards the British model of tax‐based (rather than insurance‐based) financing of social provision.     

Holes in the safety net,leaks in the roof: Changes in Canadian welfare policy and their implications for social housing programs 1

Abstract

This article surveys recent reforms to Canadian social policy at the national level and welfare programs at the provincial level to determine how social housing policy and programming are being affected. The survey considers Canada's Social Security Review consultation process, which played out over 1994 and 1995. The article outlines various concerns raised over the Canada Health and Social Transfer, a fundamental reform to intergovernmental fiscal and policy relations announced in the 1995 federal budget and elaborated on in the 1996 budget.

The transfer of administrative responsibility for federally funded social housing to provincial and territorial governments is discussed and recent developments in welfare programs across Canada are described, noting housing elements within these programs.     

Should Love Conquer Evidence in Policy‐Making? Challenges in Implementing Random Drug‐Testing of Welfare Recipients in Australia

The Australian Government announced in its 2017 budget that it would trial random drug‐testing of recipients of the Newstart Allowance and Youth Allowance in three locations from January 2018. The Prime Minister described it as a policy ‘based on love’, but that sentiment is hard to find in the policy rhetoric, which situates it in a suite of measures designed to ‘ensure taxpayers’ money is not being used to fund drug addictions which are creating significant barriers to employment'. The policy may make it harder for people to buy drugs with their welfare payments, through income management, but research suggests it will not help them overcome addiction and its costs will exceed any savings it generates in income support. Furthermore, the policy perpetuates ‘medicalisation’ of the problem of long‐term unemployment by suggesting it stems from deficiencies in individuals that can be ‘treated’, despite evidence to the contrary. Finally, the policy claims to close loopholes in enforcement of mutual obligation requirements without addressing structural weaknesses in the welfare‐to‐work model. Each of these issues will pose challenges for those charged with implementing the policy.     

Choosing the path of austerity: how parties and policy coalitions influence welfare state retrenchment in periods of fiscal consolidation

What are the conditions under which some austerity programmes rely on substantial cuts to social spending? More specifically, do the partisan complexion and the type of government condition the extent to which austerity policies imply welfare state retrenchment? This article demonstrates that large budget consolidations tend to be associated with welfare state retrenchment. The findings support a partisan and a politico-institutionalist argument: (i) in periods of fiscal consolidation, welfare state retrenchment tends to be more pronounced under left-wing governments; (ii) since welfare state retrenchment is electorally and politically risky, it also tends to be more pronounced when pursued by a broad pro-reform coalition government. Therefore, the article shows that during budget consolidations implemented by left-wing broad coalition governments, welfare state retrenchment is greatest. Using long-run multipliers from autoregressive distributed lag models on 17 OECD countries during the 1982–2009 period, substantial support is found for these expectations.     

The Federal Role in State Fiscal Stress

This article examines the extent to which the federal government'spolicies were responsible for the fiscal stress experiencedby most state governments in the early 1990s. Federal policieshave contributed considerably to recent state fiscal stress,particularly through the Medicaid program—the fastestgrowing part of state budgets—and the recession, whichdepressed revenue and increased welfare and Medicaid spending.Federal aid reductions have not been an important source ofrecent state fiscal stress. The real value of per capita federalaid other than for welfare programs fell considerably in the1980s, but the reductions were much greater for local governmentsthan for states. The largest reductions were in the early 1980s.Federal policies have affected state finances in several otherways—through tax policy, unfunded mandates, and the federalfailure to cope effectively with problems like health and poverty.Federal court rulings have also caused budget problems (as havestate court decisions). In some respects, state fiscal problemsare not a federal responsibility. Rising school enrollments,new corrections policies, and inelastic tax systems have createdfiscal stress for many states. Excessive state spending in the1980s has contributed to recent fiscal problems in some states,but not generally.     

Using the tax system to collect fines

In this article we consider the possibility that fines could be collected through the tax and social welfare systems in the same way as higher education contributions and child support payments are currently administered. We argue that the existing system of fine collection and enforcement leads to high default rates and reduces the usefulness of fines as a sanction. We consider a range of models for the implementation of an income-related fine collection system, and discuss their possible implications for issues including judicial independence, the time taken to repay fines and aggregate fine revenue.     

Pareto Efficiency and Majority Voting: Why High Taxes on the Middle Class may be Desirable

In this paper we use a simple median voter model to analyze the effects of tax systems with differing degrees of progressivity. We find that relatively high taxes on middle incomes have two important advantages: On the one hand, they help to ensure that all citizens are better off than they would be in a world without government, and on the other hand, they reduce the tax level chosen in the election. Therefore, the progression in the middle income range not only ensures that Wicksell's requirement of ex post efficiency of the tax system is achieved, it may also increase social welfare.     

The tax-welfare mix: explaining Japan's weak extractive capacity

Abstract

Despite having the highest level of public debt in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), higher than Greece or Italy, Japan has one of the lowest aggregate tax burdens of the advanced industrial democracies. This paper asks why Japan, once described as a strong developmental state, has had such a weak extractive capacity, an inability to raise revenues to confront deficits and public debt? In contrast to the existing explanations that focus on political institutions, partisan preferences, or economic globalization, this article argues that Japan's ‘tax–welfare mix’ – the combination of taxes and redistributive welfare polices – undermined the state's long-term capacity to secure adequate tax revenue. More than just a source of revenue, taxes can be used directly to achieve redistributive goals, such as targeting low taxes and exemptions to specific groups. This study shows how Japan's tax–welfare mix diminished its extractive capacity through three mechanisms: the political lock-in of a redistributive social bargain struck around low taxes, the timing and sequencing of its tax policy and welfare development, and the erosion of public trust, which undermined tax consent. Beyond offering a new theory of extractive capacity, the tax–welfare mix explains aspects of Japan's tax structure that defy existing explanations and contributes to our understanding of the capitalist development state by highlighting the redistributive political function of tax policy and its long-term impact on state capacity.     

马克思分配正义语境中的税收调节理论及其现实指导意义

按照马克思主义的分配正义理论，按劳分配中的不公平仍然需要政府进行调剂；一定的扣除和分配必须通过政府的权威性以及立法的形式来实施，而税收是唯一通过法的形式来筹集财政收入的渠道；“按劳分配”与“按需分配”的实现都需要发挥税收的调节作用，真正的按劳分配通过税收的调节和相应的社会保障、转移支付等措施必然会导致共同富裕；但税收的征收应体现公平，应采取量能负担的原则，收入多者多缴税，还应考虑家庭人口的多少，相比利润、公债等形式，税收在调节收入分配上具有不可替代的作用；税收调节的最终目标是社会公平，而其中，直接税比间接税对高收入者的调节作用更大等。这对税收政策的制定和新一轮税制改革具有重要的指导意义。税制改革的目标应由以往的效率激励向公平、正义、有序转变。加快推进以调节收入再分配为导向的直接税体系建设，构建以完善的个人所得税为主体，以财产税和社会保障税为两翼，其他税种相互协调配合的税制体系，完善鼓励公益捐赠的税收激励机制。