Preferences,Partisanship, and Whip Activity in the U.S. House of Representatives

Using Democratic whip counts from the 92d House, we compare representatives' stated intentions to their actual roll‐call votes to detect evidence of party pressure. After arguing that this strategy understates real party influence, we nonetheless point to evidence of member conversion by party leaders. On 16 bills analyzed, two‐thirds of the switches between the count and the vote occur in the direction favored by party leaders. We examine one bill in depth, showing how the efforts of party leaders were consequential to the outcome. The pattern of movement on this bill, along with data from the larger set of bills, provides evidence that leaders act strategically, targeting the members whose persuasion requires the fewest resources.     

Representation,Competing Principals,and Waffling on Bills in US Legislatures

Legislators are often placed in the position of representing the interests of their constituents against the preferences of their own party leaders. We develop a theoretical framework indicating that these cross‐pressured legislators are more likely to initially support legislation and subsequently change their minds than are legislators whose constituents and leaders share similar preferences. Moreover, we expect this pattern to be most pronounced among members of majority parties than minority‐party members. We test our expectations using data on bill cosponsorship and final passage votes from 46 lower state legislative chambers and the US House, finding considerable support for our theory.     

Term Limits,Campaign Contributions,and the Distribution of Power in State Legislatures

Using campaign contributions to legislators as an indicator of member influence, we explore the impact of term limits on the distribution of power within state legislatures. Specifically, we perform a cross‐state comparison of the relative influence of party caucus leaders, committee chairs, and rank‐and‐file legislators before and after term limits. The results indicate that term limits diffuse power in state legislatures, both by decreasing average contributions to incumbents and by reducing the power of party caucus leaders relative to other members. The change in contribution levels across legislators in different chambers implies a shift in power to the upper chamber in states with term limits. Thus, the impact of term limits may be attenuated in a bicameral system.     

Who Benefits from the Party Organization? Evidence from Republican House Members' Attendance at Caucus Meetings

As the role of US congressional parties in the legislative process has increased, so has the importance of understanding the institutions within these organizations. In this article, we examine the weekly caucus meetings held by Republican House leaders with their rank‐and‐file. We consider how members’ characteristics relate to their decision to attend based on the collective and private benefits that caucus participation affords. Using interviews of members and staffers as well as members’ attendance records at these meetings from 2007 to 2013, we find, among other things, that members who vote less with their party or who have more seniority are less likely to attend while those in leadership positions or who are electorally vulnerable are more likely to do so. Together, these findings provide additional insights on the relationship between party leaders and their members and which members benefit from this central party‐building activity.     

Legislative Behavior in Romania: The Effect of the 2008 Romanian Electoral Reform

This article analyzes the impact of electoral rules on legislators’ rate of vote defection from their party position in legislatures while accounting for how party‐leadership strength mediates this impact. To this end it looks at the effect of the 2008 Romanian electoral reform. The reform shifted the electoral system from a closed‐list proportional representation to one in which all candidates run in single‐member districts. The analysis finds that because party leaders have maintained their leverage intact, the impact of the reform was minimal, with legislators being more likely to defect in less important votes only, in which party leaders allow defection. Also, after the reform legislators are more likely to use other means to impress their voters, such as legislative initiation and cabinet questioning. These forms of behavior are more accepted by party leaders.     

National Party Efforts to Recruit State Legislators to Run for the U.S. House

We explore factors that influence the chances that a state legislator will be the target of national party recruitment to run for the U.S. House. Using data from a sample of legislators in 200 U.S. House districts, we find that national party contact reflects strategic considerations of party interests. State legislators serving in professional institutions and in competitive districts are most likely to be contacted by national party leaders. In addition, the analysis suggests that national party leaders may be sensitive to the potential costs to the state legislative party: legislators in institutions that are closely balanced between the parties are slightly less likely to be contacted.     

Congressional Leadership 1965–96: A New Look at the Extremism versus Centrality Debate

Abstract An examination of the differences between the ideological positions of leaders and other members in the U.S. House of Representatives (1965–96) demonstrates that Republican leaders tend to be significantly to the right of the median Republican member and Democratic leaders tend to be significantly to the left of the median Democratic member. Furthermore, leaders from both parties tend to be ideologically located near the mode of their party's ideological distribution. These empirical results have implications for issues such as party polarization, conditional party government, and the possibility of separating out party and ideology.     

The electoral connection of ministerial selection in the UK

Many studies have examined the determinants of ministerial selection. However, the effect of electoral incentives on government post allocation has so far not been studied in the literature. Drawing on data from the United Kingdom over the period 1992–2015, this article investigates the relationship between the selection of ministers and the electoral interests of the actors in this selection process – party leaders and members of parliament (MPs). The findings demonstrate that the greater the electoral safety of constituencies, the more likely are MPs to have a higher office. The results reveal a broader conception of party strategy in government formation than previously documented. The paper thus suggests that electorates can affect the allocation of ministerial positions in the UK.     

The selection of committee leadership in the Brazilian chamber of deputies

This article contributes to the study of legislative organisation by contrasting the process of committee chair selection in two distinct institutional environments. The goal is to verify how party loyalty affects the distribution of committee chairmanship in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, focusing on two distinct historical periods. The main hypotheses are tested using a data set that contains information about federal deputies' career characteristics, both inside and outside the Chamber, measured on an annual basis, in two distinct democratic periods – 1946 to 1964 and 1989 to 1998. The article's main conclusions are: first, in a situation where parties are oriented by a factional logic and where power distribution between party leaders and committee chairs is more equal, party loyalty is a crucial factor in the allocation of committee chairmanships. Second, in a broader perspective, the interaction between committees and parties cannot only be explained by incentives emanating from the electoral connection, for it also suffers from the influence of executive–legislative relations.     

Legislative Institutions as a Source of Party Leaders' Influence

Legislators' actions are influenced by party, constituency, and their own views, each weighted differently. Our survey of state legislators finds that legislator's own views are the strongest influence. We also find that institutions are an important source of party leaders' influence. Legislators in states where members rely more on party leaders—states without term limits, with less professional legislatures, and where the majority party controls the agenda—put more weight on leaders' preferences. Beyond direct party influence, the views of party leaders are preemptively incorporated into legislators' preferences when the rules of the legislature make party leaders more powerful.     

Professional Projects of Elite Chicago Lawyers, 1950–1974

This article reports results of an inquiry into the composition and policies of the leaders of the Chicago Bar Association. The leadership cadre was partitioned into three status groups on the basis of background characteristics and law school attended. Outside educational elites, dominating the board during the early 1950s, pursued policies that defended prestigious areas of legal work from other encroaching professionals and sought to constrain the plaintiff side of the personal injury bar. Local ethnic elites obtained a share of the leadership during the mid-1960s and transformed the judicial politics of the CBA to conform to local Democratic party objectives. At the center of the leadership cadre was a group of local aristocrats, well connected to major corporate and civic organizations, whose participation in the leadership roles fluctuated less dramatically than that of the other groups. A review of policies suggests that the local aristocrats were responsible to some extent for integrating the various specialized projects pursued by disparate segments of the Chicago bar. Detailed examination of the composition and policies of this local bar leads to the conclusion that associations of the legal profession are capable of accommodating diverse interests to an extent not previously measured or assessed.     

What Role for the Party Group Leader? A Latent Variable Approach to Leadership Effects on Party Group Cohesion in the European Parliament

Previous research has identified several structural and situational factors that affect party cohesion in parliamentary voting behaviour. The potential role of leadership has been neglected so far. The authors apply a latent variable approach to model leadership effects in roll call votes from the European Parliament (EP), 1979–2001. Other things being equal, their findings suggest that a small but significant 7 per cent share of the total variance in party group cohesion is due to the party group leaders. About 40 per cent of this leader component can be accounted for by their experience inside the European institutions, their career prospects, and their ideological positions.     

Party Control in a Committee-Based Legislature? The Case of the European Parliament

Does a strong committee system reduce the ability of political parties to dominate a parliament? This article seeks to answer this question in the case of the European Parliament (EP). Specifically, the article assesses the extent to which party leaders control their committee members in the EP. On the basis of interviews with Members of the European Parliament, the article analyses: (1) the extent to which EP party group leaders control committee assignment and (2) how much influence they have over the direction of committee activities, specifically through group co-ordinators. The results show that national delegation leaderships are increasingly involved in directing the committee assignment process and that group co-ordinators, in some cases, are able to control committee business in the EP.     

Legislative Bellwethers: The Role of Committee Membership in Parliamentary Debate

Political parties and legislators use legislative debates to establish their reputation, challenge rivals, and engage in coalition management, among many other tasks. Yet, existing theories on parliamentary debates have abstracted away from the need for information and expertise, which are costly to acquire. Drawing on the “informational” perspective on legislative organization, we address this problem by arguing that party leaders use committees as training arenas for their backbenchers. They task their assigned members with acquiring specific expertise and then rely heavily on those members during the corresponding debates. We turn to the Portuguese legislature, from 2000 to 2015, to discuss how saliency, government dynamics, and party size affect the use of experts. We test this theory using a novel approach to classify speeches that leverages the texts of legislation as training data for a supervised approach.     

Legislative Voting Behavior,Seen and Unseen: A Theory of Roll‐Call Vote Selection

The empirical study of legislative behavior largely relies on roll‐call vote analysis, but roll‐call votes in many legislatures represent only a sample of legislative votes. We have good reasons to believe this sample is particularly poor for inferring party effects on legislative behavior. The selection of votes for roll call may be endogenous to exactly the characteristics of voting behavior (for instance, party cohesion) that we want to study. We must understand the roll‐call vote institution and account for its selection effects before we can draw inferences about legislative behavior from roll‐call results. This article develops a game‐theoretic model of roll‐call vote requests predicated on party leaders requesting votes to enforce party discipline. The model offers general and testable predictions about the selection process and how it affects observed and unobserved legislative voting behavior, particularly party cohesion.     

Stalemate in the States: Agenda Control Rules and Policy Output in American Legislatures

This article examines how the power of majority‐party leaders to set the legislative voting calendar influences policy change in American state legislatures. By generating an opportunity for party leaders to exercise gatekeeping or negative agenda control, such rules introduce an additional partisan veto player into a system of governance. This addition typically increases the size of the core or gridlock interval, which drives policy change downward. Using both traditional data on bill passage counts and new data on Affordable Care Act compliance, I find strong support for these claims. More specifically, when I calculate core sizes that are sensitive to agenda rules, I find that agenda‐control‐adjusted core size is negatively correlated with policy change, as expected. Moreover, even when I match states on their overall preference dispersion or polarization, the ability of party leaders to exercise negative agenda control is strongly negatively associated with policy change.     

Overview of the Faith,Law, and Morality Project of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges and Forum Presentations

On Monday, November 27, 1995, twenty-five judges, faith leaders, and community representatives converged on Lake Tahoe for the start of a bold experiment. Each of the participants had been formally invited to participate in a forum to discuss the important moral and ethical issues facing society today. Set in a retreat environment at Incline Village, Nevada, this forum would open a dialogue between judges, members of the faith community, and others about common issues and concerns. The participants' mission was to work in groups to draft a joint resolution – a call to action for judges, faith leaders and the community. Their work would be inspired by short reflections on faith, law and morality offered by fellow participants. The discussion format would alternate between small groups of six to seven each and the group as a whole. Most important would be the opportunity to listen; the diversity of individual viewpoints would enrich the participants' thinking on the fundamental yet complex interrelation between law and morality. How did it work? Exceedingly well.     

Marital cruelty: reconsidering lay attitudes in England,c. 1580 to 1850

The mid-eighteenth century is seen as a turning point after which English legal and lay attitudes to cruelty expanded from life-threatening violence to include a wider range of behaviours. This article reconsiders this chronology of changing ideas about marital cruelty. It follows the lead of recent scholarship that challenges the thesis of a ‘civilising’ process in attitudes towards state-violence and inter-personal violence and draws on new conclusions about marital relationships, spouses' gendered roles, and early modern manhood, which complicate simplistic views of patriarchal unions. Focusing upon the full array of acts – not just life-threatening ones – discussed in cruelty cases from c. 1580 onwards, this article questions the convention that social toleration for husbands' use of violence against their wives declined from the 1750s as part of an overall civilising process.     

Ethics of Disenfranchisement and Voting Rights in the U.S.:Convicted Felons,the Homeless,and Immigrants

This paper examines the contemporary ethical issues surrounding voting rights of three disenfranchised groups in the U.S.: convicted felons, the homeless, and immigrants. Even in modern countries like the U.S., voting and other forms of political participation are skewed toward the elite, those with higher incomes, those who are employed, and those with more education. Low voter turnout presents serious challenges to democratic responsiveness, or the ability of leaders to respond to the needs and demands of citizens. Hence, voting should be encouraged in accord with the common interest. An important conclusion is that allowing all citizens – irrespective of their status – to vote would give them a voice in the context of governance. This notion is also associated with distributive justice, a philosophical concept that concentrates on just outcomes and consequences.     

Up the Hill and Across the Aisle: Discovering the Path to Bipartisanship in Washington

Appeals for bipartisan diplomacy pepper popular commentary, often with wistful references to a bygone era where leaders (like Lyndon Johnson and Everett Dirksen) set aside partisan point scoring to serve the public interest. Here we reconsider the elements driving bipartisan contact in Washington. Stepping back from popular narratives, we situate the president‐opposing leader relationship within a more general class of institutional bargaining, leading to the prediction that bipartisan negotiation emerges from a particular combination of incentives and institutions—namely, when the president is strong politically (rendering opposing leaders willing to compromise) but opposing party leaders are strong institutionally (rendering them crucial to passing the deal). Utilizing Presidential Daily Diaries, hypotheses are tested against original data on presidents' personal interactions with opposing Senate leaders across 40 years, 20 Congresses, and eight presidencies (1961–2000).