The Economic Sources of Congressional Approval

Abstract Models of congressional approval have, in both theory and specification, often imitated models of presidential approval. Through their modeling decisions, researchers have implicitly assumed that the economic determinants of presidential and congressional approval are identical. Such assumptions have discouraged other researchers from testing competing hypotheses about the economic determinants of congressional approval. Using aggregate‐level time‐series analysis, this study investigates the question of whether or not the economic determinants of approval vary by the target of political judgment. I find that presidential approval is driven largely by sociotropic prospections, a result consistent with previous research. In contrast, I find the public relies most heavily upon egocentric retrospections when judging the U.S. Congress.     

Strategic Position Taking and Presidential Influence in Congress

The rise and fall of presidential success in Congress remains a central puzzle in the literature. We model success as two interrelated processes: presidential position taking and Congress's decision to support or oppose the president. The analysis emphasizes the importance of strategic position taking in determining presidential success. We show that presidential approval significantly influences success, not only because it affects congressional behavior, but also because it shapes presidential decisions to take positions. Moreover, we explain that legislative success during the honeymoon period is driven by presidential position taking. Our findings highlight the role of a president's strategic decisions for theories explaining congressional‐executive relations.     

Override propensity in the US congress: veto challenge and override vote by the two chambers

In contrast to the study of the US presidential veto, the study of the congressional override of vetoes has been scarce. This study examines the influences of partisanship in Congress, presidential popularity, presidential legislative assertiveness and the chamber in which a bill originated. By using the logit model, the article examines the models of House veto challenge, Senate veto challenge, House vote for override and Senate vote for override. The study shows substantial influences of the presidential party's margin, the cameral origin of a bill and the president's legislative assertiveness on the veto challenges by the two chambers. However, none of the variables are significant in the models of override vote. This may suggest fragmented decision-making in Congress after it decides to challenge a veto.     

论美国经济制裁中的总统权力边界

美国具有较为完善的经济制裁体系,主要依据《敌国贸易法》和《国际经济紧急权力法》对外实施单边经济制裁。虽然《国际经济紧急权力法》是国会限制总统权力的法律,但是在内容上却给予总统以广泛的行政权力。总统既享有固有的外交权力,又获得国会赋予的对外贸易管制权,而司法部门在涉外问题中基于政治问题和国际礼让原则,并不做司法审查,总统经济制裁的行政权力扩张得到了立法与司法的支撑。在美国经济制裁中,立法权、行政权与司法权受商业利益、个人追求与党派之争的影响,逐渐脱离法治轨道。从宪法授权以及美国经济制裁的发展历程上看,经济制裁措施存在不完全符合宪法等要求的问题,我们在应对美国经济制裁时可从这些问题着手加以研究。     

Giving credit when credit is due: credit giving to the president in the United States Congress

How do members of the US Congress give credit when credit is due for political achievements? Focusing on an important credit giving scenario – credit giving to the president of the United States – this research suggests that credit giving is a form of non-roll call position taking and members give credit in a way that is reflective of individual, institutional, and constituency factors. Using an original data set composed of the official congressional statements concerning the death of Osama bin Laden, findings suggest the proximate decision to issue a statement is related to individual and institutional factors. Within the issued statements, however, credit giving is primarily driven by presidential popularity in the constituency. In addition to being less predictable in their credit giving behaviour, members of the Senate are less likely to give credit than their colleagues in the House of Representatives. Finally, Republican women in the House of Representatives are less likely to give the president credit than other members.     

Exemption from import/export requirements for personal medical use. Final rule

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is amending its regulations to expressly incorporate the restrictions on personal use importation imposed by Congress in 1998 and to expand upon those restrictions to curtail the diversion that has continued even after the 1998 congressional amendment. Specifically, DEA is limiting to 50 dosage units the total amount of controlled substances that a United States resident may bring into the United States for legitimate personal medical use when returning from travel abroad at any location and by any means. This regulation will help prevent importation of controlled substances for unlawful use while still accommodating travelers who have a legitimate medical need for controlled substances during their journey.     

The Impact of Presidential Campaigning for Congress on Presidential Support in the U.S. House of Representatives

Presidential influence is partly a function of the partisan, economic, and international context within which the president governs. Presidents are, however, more than bystanders relying on the political milieu for policy opportunities. Recent scholarship demonstrates that presidents consciously influence this milieu and build political capital by campaigning for congressional candidates. We contribute to this literature by assessing the effects of presidential campaigning on legislative support for two presidents who governed under extremely dissimilar circumstances: Bill Clinton in the 106th Congress and George W. Bush in the 108th Congress. We find evidence of campaign effects on congressional policymaking during both administrations.     

Ideological cohesion between congress and the president: Does the road to the white house matter?

This study examines the impact of US presidential nomination politics on congressional‐executive relations. In particular, we pose the critical question of whether nomination reforms have had any systematic effect on the inter‐branch ideological gap. Using an indicator of liberal voting in Congress and a derived liberalism score for presidents, we analyse the ideological disparity between the branches over a 40‐year period from 1949 to 1993. Results do not support the view offered by Polsby and others that a shift toward more open and participatory decision making in the post‐reform nomination process has increased the probability that presidents will be ideologically distant from their fellow partisans in Congress. Indeed, the situation is quite the opposite, with post‐reform presidents being closer to the ideological centre of gravity of their parties in Congress than are presidents who reached the White House in the pre‐reform era.     

Command-level Police Officers’ Perceptions of the “War on Cops” and De-policing

Policing has been the subject of intense public scrutiny for the better part of two years after several high-profile police killings of unarmed African Americans across the United States. The scrutiny has been so extreme that some contend there is currently a “war on cops”—whereby citizens are emboldened by protests and negative media coverage of the police, and are lashing out by assaulting police officers more frequently. In response, it is argued that officers are de-policing (i.e. avoiding proactive stops). We surveyed command-level police officers from a southeastern state about their attitudes concerning the war on cops and de-policing. The majority of our sample believed there has been a war on cops over the last two years. Moreover, officers who felt strongly about the existence of a war on cops were more likely to believe that de-policing is common among officers in today’s world of law enforcement.     

Presidential Campaigning in the 2002 Congressional Elections

Theories involving coattails, surge and decline, presidential popularity, and the economy ascribe little importance to presidential efforts to influence congressional elections. Since such efforts do occur, we ask: What happens when a president campaigns for fellow partisans? We examined President George W. Bush's decisions to campaign for certain House candidates in 2002, and we assessed the effect of his visits on Republicans' electoral successes. Both the competitiveness of a race and the president's electoral self‐interest increased the likelihood of a visit on behalf of a candidate. Neither party loyalty nor presidential support in Congress had an effect. We conclude that presidential campaign visits significantly enhance candidates' electoral prospects.     

The FDA may not regulate tobacco products as "drugs" or as "medical devices"

Professor Richard Merrill contends that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not grant the FDA regulatory authority over cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products. The fact that Congress did not expressly deny the FDA regulatory authority over tobacco cannot, Professor Merrill argues, be used to infer such authority. This inference is particularly inappropriate in the case of tobacco regulation, he maintains, because there is compelling evidence that Congress had no intention of delegating this authority to the FDA. He is unpersuaded that presidential approval legally sanctions the FDA's claim of authority by granting it a superficial political legitimacy. Finally, he reminds us of the FDA's own repeated denials of jurisdiction over tobacco products, and he recalls the numerous times that Congress passed legislation directed at tobacco without granting the FDA any role in its regulation. Professor Merrill's Essay, like the other pieces in this volume, was written after the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina decided Coyne Beahm v. FDA, but before a three judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed that decision in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA. In Coyne Beahm, the District Court held that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act authorized the FDA to regulate tobacco products, but not tobacco advertising. The Fourth Circuit rejected the District Court's jurisdictional ruling and invalidated the FDA's regulations in their entirety. The Clinton Administration has since requested an en banc rehearing before the Fourth Circuit.     

Patent first, ask questions later: morality and biotechnology in patent law

This Article explores the U.S. "patent first, ask questions later" approach to determining what subject matter should receive patent protection. Under this approach, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO or the Agency) issues patents on "anything under the sun made by man," and to the extent a patent's subject matter is sufficiently controversial, Congress acts retrospectively in assessing whether patents should issue on such interventions. This practice has important ramifications for morally controversial biotechnology patents specifically, and for American society generally. For many years a judicially created "moral utility" doctrine served as a type of gatekeeper of patent subject matter eligibility. The doctrine allowed both the USTPO and courts to deny patents on morally controversial subject matter under the fiction that such inventions were not "useful." The gate, however, is currently untended. A combination of the demise of the moral utility doctrine, along with expansive judicial interpretations of the scope of patent-eligible subject matter, has resulted in virtually no basis on which the USTPO or courts can deny patent protection to morally controversial, but otherwise patentable, subject matter. This is so despite position statements by the Agency to the contrary. Biotechnology is an area in which many morally controversial inventions are generated. Congress has been in react-mode following the issuance of a stream of morally controversial biotech patents, including patents on transgenic animals, surgical methods, and methods of cloning humans. With no statutory limits on patent eligibility, and with myriad concerns complicating congressional action following a patent's issuance, it is not Congress, the representative of the people, determining patent eligibility. Instead, it is patent applicants, scientific inventors, who are deciding matters of high public policy through the contents of the applications they file with the USTPO. This Article explores how the United States has come to be in this position, exposes latent problems with the "patent first" approach, and considers the benefits and disadvantages of the "ask questions first, patents later" approaches employed by some other countries. The Article concludes that granting patents on morally controversial biotech subject matter and then asking whether such inventions should be patentable is bad policy for the United States and its patent system, and posits workable, proactive ways for Congress to successfully guard the patent-eligibility gate.     

宪法中的战争权

人民主权理论决定了战争决定权应由议会行使。战争宣布权一般属于国家元首。战争指挥权由最高行政长官掌握,是军事统帅权而不是军事统率权。战争执行权主要属于政府及其有关部门。最高军令权和军政权属于总统或首相;此外的军令权属于军官,军政权属于文官,在许多国家二者统属于国防部。在战争的决定权、宣布权、指挥权和执行权中,战争的决定权和指挥权（以及彼此的关系）是最重要的,也是宪法重点规范的对象。     

The rise and fall of legislative service organisations in the United States Congress

The abolition of Legislative Service Organisations by the 104th Congress (1995–96) constituted one of its earliest achievements. Although political dissensus had surrounded the role and activities of LSOs throughout their institutional existence, the Republican victory in the 1994 congressional elections was the critical factor prompting their abolition. Prior reform attempts had faltered upon the Democratic party's post‐1954 dominance of the House of Representatives and the diffuse representational and institutional benefits which LSOs conferred upon their members. However, when, under a new Republican majority, the perceived costs of LSOs were held to exceed their benefits, the organisations were rapidly terminated. The abolition of LSOs lends new and additional support to scholars who emphasise the continued salience of party to congressional politics in the United States.     

Explaining the Incidence and Timing of Congressional Responses to the U.S. Supreme Court

Sparked by interest in game‐theoretic representations of the separation of powers, empirical work examining congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory decisions has burgeoned in recent years. Much of this work has been hampered, however, by the relative rarity of such events; as has long been noted, congressional attention to the Court is limited, and most Court decisions represent the last word on statutory interpretation. With this fact foremost in our minds, we examine empirically a number of theories regarding such reversals. By adopting an approach that allows us to separate the factors that lead to the event itself (that is, the presence or absence of an override in a particular case) from those that influence the timing of the event, we find that case‐specific factors are an important influence in the incidence of overrides, whereas Congress‐ and Court‐specific political influences dominate the timing at which those overrides occur. By separating the incidence and timing of overrides, our study yields a more accurate and nuanced understanding of this aspect of the separation‐of‐powers system.     

The Influence of Congressional Preferences on Legislative Overrides of Supreme Court Decisions

Studies of Court–Congress relations assume that Congress overrides Court decisions based on legislative preferences, but no empirical evidence supports this claim. Our first goal is to show that Congress is more likely to pass override legislation the further ideologically removed a decision is from pivotal legislative actors. Second, we seek to determine whether Congress rationally anticipates Court rejection of override legislation, avoiding legislation when the current Court is likely to strike it down. Third, most studies argue that Congress only overrides statutory decisions. We contend that Congress has an incentive to override all Court decisions with which it disagrees, regardless of their legal basis. Using data on congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions between 1946 and 1990, we show that Congress overrides Court decisions with which it ideologically disagrees, is not less likely to override when it anticipates that the Court will reject override legislation, and acts on preferences regardless of the legal basis of a decision. We therefore empirically substantiate a core part of separation‐of‐powers models of Court–Congress relations, as well as speak to the relative power of Congress and the Court on the ultimate content of policy.     

对网络恐怖主义的忧虑:析国会对此的反应

早在9·11事件之前,计算机安全在美国实际上就是一个令人忧虑的问题,国会和政府对此都采取了相应的行动。尽管此前已意识到计算机安全的重要性,9·11事件的发生成为进一步加速国会进行相关立法的催化剂。该事件后,国会通过了一系列涉及计算机安全的法律,另外一些立法的议案也被提交到国会进行讨论。这些法律对美国公民、外国公民及整个世界都将有深远影响。     

Institutions and the Legislative Success of ‘Strong’ Presidents: An Analysis of Government Bills in Chile

This paper examines the approval of government bills in Chile, evaluating the effect of presidential prerogatives and policy substance, and considering both bill-specific and contextual effects. The results show that presidential prerogatives over financial policy, as well as the ability to affect the congressional agenda through urgent bill scheduling, significantly influence government bill approval. As expected, government success is enhanced during the honeymoon period. However, changes in public approval of the president do not appear to exert a significant effect on the passage of presidential bills.     

伊拉克战争对国际法治的冲击和影响

美英发动的伊拉克战争对国际社会提出了一系列值得认真思考的国际法问题。本文着重探讨这场战争对国际法基础的冲击以及违反联合国宪章规定非法使用武力问题 ,探讨在国际武装冲突中实施国际人道法面临的困境。在此基础上 ,作者提出了加强国际法治的若干建议。     

The executive on the battlefield: government amendments and cartel theory in the Chilean Congress

This article argues that cartelised coordination inside Chilean congressional committees is important for understanding the success rates of presidential initiatives. By way of an analysis of the amendment process undertaken both in the Chamber and Senate committees in the Chilean Congress during 2006–10, the authors review the approval patterns of legislative amendments. The analysis suggests two chief findings: coordination between government parties and the executive is crucial for the success of amendment; and the opposition’s success in generating legal transformations depends on the construction of inter-coalition alliances. It is hoped that the perspective offered here will contribute to the current literature on cartel party theory in Latin America.