Carbon tax scenarios for China and India: exploring politically feasible mitigation goals

China and India are two Asian giants and global players. They both have large populations and booming economies hungry for energy. China and India will therefore play a major role in shaping future global emissions of greenhouse gases. This paper assesses emissions reductions targets that can be realistically adopted by China and India in the following rounds of climate negotiations. The analysis is based on a business-as-usual (BaU) scenario and on four carbon tax scenarios until 2050, developed using the WITCH model. Results show that the lowest level of taxation (starting at 10$ per tonne of CO₂ in 2020) would reduce emissions in 2050 by 25% in China and by 30% in India, with respect to the BaU, at little cost. The marginal abatement cost curves are, however, steep and a higher level of taxation brings little emissions reductions at high costs. In China, only the two highest tax levels reduce emissions in 2050 below the 2005 level. In India, emissions in 2050 are higher than in 2005 even with the highest tax. Therefore, the pledge of the G8 and the MEF of reducing global emissions by 50% in 2050—with high-income countries cutting them by 80% and low-income ones by 25–30%—appears extremely costly and therefore unrealistic. A more sensible international climate architecture would push for the introduction of a moderate control of emissions in China and India and would avoid overly ambitious targets.     

Climate agreements and India: aligning options and opportunities on a new track

The Climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2009 witnessed the emerging power of Brazil, South Africa, India, and China (BASIC). Although still focussed on domestic development goals, BASIC countries have made important steps toward a greater engagement in the global climate agenda. For India, the shift was marked by a voluntary, but conditional, target of reducing emission intensity, away from the past normative position based on “equal per capita,” emissions entitlements. The new track aims at finding cost-effective mitigation strategies that align national development goals and climate actions. This paper examines the mitigation potential of a domestic sustainable development policy using a suite of integrated assessment models. The long-term goal is to keep temperature increase below 2°C. This article shows that it is possible to match domestic development goals and climate mitigation. Win–win options exist and side benefits—in terms of energy security and local pollution—are important. However, development policies are not sufficient to achieve the desired emissions reductions. We find that it is necessary to introduce a constraint on the carbon budget. The price of carbon that emerges is however much lower than in a conventional mitigation scenario. Finally, this paper proposes to shift the negotiations away from the current climate-centric focus toward “development,” in order to reduce conflicts and deliver greater global and national benefits.     

Environmental effectiveness and economic consequences of fragmented versus universal regimes: what can we learn from model studies?

A post-2012 regime aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions could develop towards a universal or fragmented regime. The fundamental difference between a universal and a fragmented regime is that the first involves a single comprehensive climate regime in which all countries participate, whereas the second involves either multiple treaties or a single treaty in which not all countries participate. This study assesses the literature on a wide range of different model studies concerning the environmental effectiveness and economic consequences of various universal and fragmented climate regimes. The most important conclusions (e.g. relative position of regions in terms of costs) are generally consistent across different studies, despite the differences in methodology. We conclude that stabilising GHG concentrations at low levels is more costly with a fragmented regime than with a universal regime, because reduction targets must be achieved by a smaller number of countries or because fragmented treaties may prevent reducing GHGs where it is cheapest to do so. However, establishing a universal regime will be challenging due to cost differences between regions if emissions are allocated based on specific allocation rules and incentives to free-ride on a universal regime. Even though alternative behaviours such as responsibility, the implementation of transfer schemes or exclusive membership can increase the likelihood of achieving a universal regime, a fragmented regime seems more feasible. Therefore, a transitional fragmented ‘coalition of the willing’ could be established first, which could provide the basis for a larger, universal regime in the long term.

In what format and under what timeframe would China take on climate commitments? A roadmap to 2050

Balancing China’s energy needs to fuel its rapid economic growth with the resulting potential impacts of climate change presents an enormous climate policy dilemma, not simply for China but for the entire world. This is the major reason why the role of China is an issue of perennial concerns at international climate change negotiations. In response to these concerns and to put China in a positive position, this paper maps out a realistic roadmap for China’s specific climate commitments toward 2050. Taking many factors into consideration, the paper argues that China needs to take on absolute emissions caps around 2030. However, it is hard to imagine how China could apply the brakes so sharply as to switch from rapid emissions growth to immediate emissions cuts, without passing through several intermediate phases. To that end, the paper envisions that China needs the following three transitional periods of increasing climate obligations before taking on absolute emissions caps that will lead to the global convergence of per capita emissions by 2050: First, further credible energy conservation commitments starting in 2013 and aimed at cutting China’s carbon intensity by 46–50% by 2020; second, voluntary “no lose” emission targets starting in 2018; and third, binding carbon intensity targets as its international commitment starting in 2023. Overall, this proposal is a balanced reflection of respecting China’s rights to grow and recognizing China’s growing responsibility for increasing greenhouse gas emissions as China is on its way to becoming the world’s largest economy.     

中国船舶企业的环境保护社会责任探析

国际海上运输促进了国际贸易的发展,但船舶航行中泄漏的油类和排放的温室气体也导致了对海洋和大气环境的污染.同时,船舶企业在造船、修船和拆船过程中的不当排放也导致了海洋环境的污染.环境保护是船舶企业应当承担的社会责任.为了保护海洋和大气环境,应对气候变化,国际海运界推行了一系列防止船舶油污和温室气体排放的措施和标准,对船舶企业设计和建造船舶提出了环境保护要求.中国船舶企业应当坚持绿色造船理念,设计和建造符合国际船舶能效要求的船舶,采用强调环境保护内容的造船合同文本以及在船舶建造、修理和拆解过程中注重对环境的保护.     

我国气候变化立法的缺陷及其对策分析

我国气候变化立法存在着一些较为明显的缺陷,这在一定程度上制约着我国温室气体排放控制战略的实施。目前,气候变化问题已经成为威胁人类生存和发展的一大国际环境问题。温室气体的排放控制战略是《气候变化框架公约》所确立的应对气候变化问题的根本举措。我国应当按照《气候变化框架公约》和《京都议定书》的法律要求,健全和完善气候变化立法以进一步控制温室气体的排放量,从而为全球气候变化问题的应对做出更大的贡献。     

A Clean Development Mechanism with global atmospheric benefits for a post-2012 climate regime

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol allows the crediting of emission reductions from greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement projects in developing countries. The CDM is an offsetting mechanism and, in principle, a zero game to the atmosphere: emission reductions achieved from CDM projects allow industrialised countries to increase their emissions, respectively. The article explores how the CDM could be moved beyond a pure offsetting mechanism in a post-2012 climate regime by crediting only a fraction of the emission reductions from CDM projects, thereby providing a net atmospheric benefit. Potential implications on the carbon market are assessed in a qualitative manner and different design options for such a reform to the CDM are discussed. An important conclusion is that the effects on carbon market depend considerably on whether the use of the CDM is limited through caps or not.

Environmental liability reform and privatization in Central and Eastern Europe

The legacy of severe environmental degradation inherited by the new Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies requires liability reform to aid the cleanup of existing pollution sources and create incentives for future environmental risk reduction. The paper analyzes a host of liability approaches to meet these goals, given economic and institutional characteristics specific to the CEE nations, and explores the impact of environmental liability rules on privatization and foreign investment. A principal conclusion of the analysis is that, for a host of efficiency-based reasons, liability should not be retroactively applied to the new owners of privatized firms. Also, the paper advocates the use of national liability funds to finance the cost of existing liabilities, while highlighting dangers associated with their use. In addition to the desirability of alternative privatization mechanisms, the paper also analyzes altemative liability rules to govern prospective environmental hazards.     

‘US, China and the Economics of Climate Negotiations’

Despite the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the US decision not to comply with its Kyoto commitments seems to drastically undermine the effectiveness of the Protocol in controlling GHG emissions. Therefore, it is important to explore whether there are economic incentives that might help the US to modify its current decision and move to a more environmentally effective climate policy. For example, can an increased participation of developing countries induce the US to effectively participate in the effort to reduce GHG emissions? Is a single emission trading market the appropriate policy framework to increase the signatories of the Kyoto Protocol? This paper addresses the above questions by analysing whether the participation of China in the cooperative effort to control GHG emissions can provide adequate incentives for the US to re-join the Kyoto process and eventually ratify the Kyoto Protocol. This paper analyses three different climate regimes in which China could be involved and assesses the economic incentives for the major world countries and regions to participate in these three regimes. The main conclusion is that the participation of the US in a climate regime is not likely, at least in the short run. The US is more likely to adopt unilateral policies than to join the present Kyoto coalition (even when it includes China). However, a two bloc regime would become the most preferred option if both China and the US, for some political or environmental reasons, decide to cooperate on GHG emission control. If the US decides to cooperate, the climate regime that provides the highest economic incentives to the cooperating countries is the one in which China and the US cooperate bilaterally, with the Annex B_?US countries remaining within the Kyoto framework.     

The regulatory anticommons of green infrastructures

Development of green infrastructures (renewable energy plants and transmission networks) is urgently needed if significant reductions of greenhouse gas emissions are to be accomplished in the next few decades. But the huge financial investments required by these infrastructures will not be undertaken without a well-designed regulatory framework. This paper argues that barriers to the implementation of such a framework can best be understood by drawing analogies to the Law and Economics literature on anticommons. Although situations of ownership anticommons (many owners with veto rights) and regulatory anticommons (many regulators with veto rights) display some differences from the point of view of the preferences and the coordination costs, it is submitted that this analytic framework can be employed to assess and criticize recent EU and US proposals which try to improve planning and siting procedures for cross-border green infrastructures. The literature on anticommons also suggests that effective remedies to suboptimal resource use are directly dependent on the design of the coordination mechanisms among all the regulatory levels.     

Multi-Stage: A Rule-Based Evolution of Future Commitments under the Climate Change Convention

This article presents the regional emission targets corresponding to different climate regimes for differentiating commitments beyond 2012 on the basis of the Multi-Stage approach. This approach assumes a gradual increase in the number of Parties involved and their level of commitment according to participation and differentiation rules. The analysis focuses on two global greenhouse gas emission profiles resulting in CO₂-equivalent concentrations stabilising at 550 and 650 ppmv in 2100 and 2150, respectively. Three Multi-Stage cases have been developed in order to assess different types of thresholds. These share three consecutive stages representing different commitments: stage 1 – no quantitative commitments; stage 2 – emission–limitation targets and stage 3 – emission reduction targets. The analysis shows that by 2025 all three cases result in emission reduction objectives for all Annex I regions of at least 30–55% below their 1990 levels for 550 ppmv, whereas for 650 ppmv target they range from 0 to 20%. Furthermore, early participation is required of the major non-Annex I regions through emission limitation targets i.e. before 2025 and 2050 for the 550 and 650 ppmv targets, respectively. The first participation threshold for adopting emission–limitation targets on the basis of a capability–responsibility index (as introduced here) can provide for a balanced and timely participation of non-Annex I regions. Major strengths and weaknesses of the climate regimes are discussed and important obstacles and pre-conditions for their feasibility and acceptability are highlighted.     

Genesis of the CDM: the original policymaking goals of the 1997 Brazilian proposal and their evolution in the Kyoto protocol negotiations into the CDM

A body of literature is emerging applying critical consideration to the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism’s (‘CDM’) achievement of policy goals regarding sustainable development, geographical distribution of projects and related matters. This article places this literature in the context of the policymaking goals of the CDM’s Brazilian architects. The CDM arose from the Brazilian Proposal’s Clean Development Fund, and was negotiated between Brazil and the United States in the weeks preceding the Kyoto Conference of Parties. The CDM’s Brazilian architects continued to pursue their underlying policy goals by taking a leadership position in the Marrakesh Accords negotiations. During this period Brazil’s primary policy objectives comprised achieving meaningful mitigation of GHG emissions to avoid dangerous interference with the climate system, derailing a perceived US/IPCC initiative to allocate emissions cap obligations in the Kyoto Protocol on the basis of current emissions, and taking a leadership position both among the G-77 and China and in the multilateral climate negotiations as a whole. The CDM arose in this context from the G-77 and China’s desire to coerce the North’s compliance with the North’s emissions cap obligations through an alternative means of compliance. As a result, there was no focus on broad conceptions of sustainable development, or on broad distribution of CDM projects throughout the South. Instead, the CDM’s Brazilian architects envisioned that CDM-related sustainable development would arise exclusively from the presence of the CDM projects. Similarly, the Brazilian Proposal advocated allocation of the Clean Development Fund on a basis proportionate to each non-Annex I countries projected 1990–2010 greenhouse gas emissions. These views persisted through the evolution of the Clean Development Fund into the CDM and through Marrakesh Accords negotiations. This article argues that the CDM has largely met the policy goals of its Brazilian architects and that the pursuit of different, additional, refined or more nuanced policy goals necessitates corresponding refinements to the CDM, or any successor mechanism, specifically targeting those different, additional, refined or more nuanced policy objectives, lending support to the emerging literature proposing changes to the CDM to pursue corresponding policy objectives.     

Market Darwinism vs. Market Creationism: Adaptability and Fairness in the Design of Greenhouse Gas Trading Mechanisms

International rule-making and compliance routines with respect to the Kyoto Protocol are evolving rapidly. This paper examines potential designs of emissions-trading programs by comparing the emissions credit trading (ECT) and cap-and-trade models for achieving cost-effective reductions in atmospheric greenhouse-gas (GHG) loading in terms of their adaptability and fairness. Adaptability is a valuable attribute when markets and their governing institutions are evolving rapidly or when regulated entities do not yet have well-established and predictable compliance routines. Fairness in both procedures and outcomes is central to efforts to establish and maintain institutions of international governance. The key difference concerns the awarding of tradable emission rights, which occurs at the launch of a cap-and-trade program but following when firms reduce emissions below baselines in an ECT scheme. Implications of this difference are explored in terms of institutional adaptability and fairness during program-design stages. By not locking in emission rights at the outset, and by being amenable to incremental roll-out, ECT appears to have superior adaptive and fairness qualities during periods of rapid institutional evolution.     

The effectiveness of Kyoto Protocol and the legal institution for international technology transfer

Kyoto Protocol has certain provisions concerning environmentally sound technologies (ESTs) transfer, primarily including the direct provisions, the clean development mechanism and the fund mechanism, which are supposed to favor technology transfer for reducing the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the world. However, mainly due to the flaws of these provisions, ESTs have not been transferred as smoothly as possible to realize the Kyoto Protocol’s objectives. Therefore, the international community shall take the effectiveness of Kyoto Protocol as a fresh impetus to consummate the legal system of international technology transfer, that is, to develop a uniform technology transfer agreement under the WTO with a focus on promoting ESTs transfer, which may make the developing countries to acquire the technologies they need under the fair terms and help them build their capacities for sustainable development. China does not need to perform the obligation of reducing GHG emissions until 2013 according to Kyoto Protocol, but precautions shall be taken to improve its legal systems on technology transfer to make preparations for implementing the policy of scientific development and playing significant roles in related international legislation.     

Carbon emission right as a new property right: rescue CDM developers in China from 2012

Clean development mechanism (CDM) is encountering many uncertainties due to the coming end of the commitment period and critically suggested reformation. As the largest participant in the CDM market, China shoulders the biggest proportion of market risk. Among the studies on CDM in China, few have focused upon the legal aspect of CDM, which is crucial in defending developers’ interests. To fill this research gap in making the transition from policy to law, this paper claims that carbon emission right, which is the basis of trade, should be attributed as a property right in Property Law of People’s Republic of China. The present study will discuss the characteristics of carbon emission, definition, and legal attribution of carbon emission right. The valid object of carbon emission right in the CDM market under Property Law should be certified emissions reductions (CERs). The usufructuary right could be specifically applied in practice to the owners’ property right on CERs in China. Although experience from the CDM is not fully applicable to the development of cap and trading, the success of CDM market provides a reasonable platform to study emission right in the view of legal science. Furthermore, the proposed research acts as the pioneer study that lay the theoretical foundations in legal science on emission right trading for other potential schemes, which in turn addresses international environmental issues.     

Analysis of the governance architecture to regulate GHG emissions from international shipping

Despite the substantial and likely increasing contribution of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from international shipping and the related adverse impacts on global climate change, GHG emissions from international shipping are yet neither regulated by the Kyoto Protocol, nor through any other legally binding, internationally accepted regulation. This paper is looking into the governance architecture that is currently in place to regulate GHG emissions from international shipping with a view to analyze whether the institutional degree of fragmentation within this architecture is contributing to the current situation where no legally binding, internationally accepted regulation has been set up yet. Following the hypothesis that the degree and the characteristics of governance fragmentation have a crucial impact on the effectiveness and performance of a governance system, this paper focuses on the current architecture of climate change governance in international shipping and the institutional interplay between its actors. Therefore, the analytical framework builds on approaches from international environmental governance, regime theory, institutional interplay, and fragmentation in international governance architectures.     

China and climate justice: moving beyond statism

China is the largest national source of greenhouse gas (GHG) pollution causing climate change. However, despite some rhetorical progress at the 2011 Durban climate conference, it has consistently rejected calls to take on binding targets to reduce its GHG emissions. The Chinese Government has understandably argued that developed states are responsible for the predominant share of historical GHG emissions, have greater capacity to pay for the cost of mitigation, and indeed have an obligation to do so before China is required to take action. However, due to the explosive growth in its GHG emissions, China is now in a position to single-handedly dash any hope of climate stability if its position does not change. On the diplomatic level, other big polluters, particularly the United States, will not enter into new binding agreements to reduce substantially their own GHG emissions without a credible commitment from China. Challenging the “statist” framing of the climate justice, this article explores the possibility for China to take on a leadership role in climate change diplomacy in a way that allows it to maintain its long-standing principled resistance to binding national emissions targets while making meaningful progress toward combating the problem. Action by China’s rapidly growing affluent classes may hold the key to long-term climate stability.     

The EU 40 % greenhouse gas emission reduction target by 2030 in perspective

We assess the fairness and ambition level of the EU’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) of reducing domestic greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40 % relative to 1990. For this, we calculate which reduction targets for other major emitting economies are comparable to the EU target, given widely diverging effort-sharing approaches. We introduce a novel approach in which the EU target is taken as starting point for allocating emission reductions to other regions. Under this approach, the global emission level is an outcome of the analysis, contrary to standard effort-sharing approaches in which the global climate goal is specified. We find that the INDC of the EU, if other regions take on comparable targets based on a differentiated convergence per-capita approach, could be sufficient for a global 2 °C pathway. However, if emissions are allocated according to a historical responsibility approach, the global emission level in 2030 is much higher than the level of 2 °C pathways. Furthermore, we conclude that India, Mexico, and Brazil have more ambitious INDCs than the EU according to both a differentiated convergence per-capita approach and a historical responsibility approach.     

Administrative and policy issues in reimbursement for nursing home capital investment.

The way in which states reimburse for nursing home capital costs can create incentives for nursing home owners to use the home primarily as a vehicle for real estate speculation, with potentially adverse consequences for patient care. In order to help promote and control the stability, adequacy, and quality of capital investment in long-term care, an increasing number of states are using a fair-rental approach for calculating capital reimbursement. In this article we compare the fair-rental approach with traditional cost-based capital reimbursement in terms of administration and policy. We discuss issues of concern to the state (cost and reimbursement design options) and the investor (after-tax cash flows, rate of return, etc.). Our analysis suggests that fair-rental systems may be superior to traditional cost-based reimbursement in promoting and controlling industry stability, while at the same time providing an adequate return to investors, without incurring long-term increases in the costs of administering programs.     

Compelling the EPA to Regulate GHG Emissions Under the Act to Prevent Pollution From Ships

Shipping remains the only sector in the world not currently subject to any legally binding greenhouse gas emission (“GHG”) reduction measures. If left unregulated, ships may represent over 20% of GHG emissions by 2050. This article examines the possibility of compelling the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to regulate GHGs from ships under the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (the “APPS”), 33?U.S.C. § 1901, et seq. Unfortunately, until there is an international agreement to reduce GHG emissions from ships, as well as amendments to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and the APPS, a citizen suit under the APPS will not be effective.