Political Equilibrium and the Provision of Public Goods

This paper treats interest groups – peoplein their role as consumers of a public goodand people in their role as taxpayers – asthe unit of account for representativevoting. Each group is allowed to make aneffort to support its preferred candidateand, at the margin, the effort-benefitratio is the political price the group iswilling to pay to secure an additionaldollar of benefits.

Under reasonable assumptions, a uniqueequilibrium is assured and itscharacteristics are quite intuitive. Inparticular, the marginal political benefit(from consumers) of the last unit of outputmust equal the marginal political cost(from taxpayers). Alternatively, the rateat which the politician can transformtaxpayer income into consumer surplus mustequal the ratio of their political prices. The result will be optimal only on the rareoccasion when the effort-benefit ratios ofthe two groups are equal.

Since political goals are themselves ``public goods'' for thetwo interest groups,they face all the normal free riderproblems. Moreover, even small differencesin the effort-benefit ratios of the twogroups lead to large welfare losses.

How bad can things get? Each group has anincentive to try to overcome free-riderproblems and divert resources from privatesector activities to politics. And anyincrease in political effort is alwaysrewarded. However, (1) the marginal returnis always higher for the group with thesmaller effort-benefit ratio; (2) thedifferential return between the two groupsgrows the further we stray from optimality;and (3) both groups face diminishingreturns. These incentives may act asnatural checks on political outcomes –placing some limit on the amount of wasteand inefficiency democracy is likely toproduce.

The influence of a producer (of the publicgood) group that collects a rent increasesthe likelihood that public goods will beoverproduced. In fact, it is conceivableto have a good with no value to consumersproduced, solely because of the influenceof producers. Comparative static analysisreveal that the political system willrespond to changes in market conditions ina way similar to economic markets. Themagnitude of these shifts differs fromeconomic markets, however. For goods thatare being overproduced, the politicalmarketplace overresponds to changes indemand and underresponds to changes incosts. The converse is true for goods thatare being underproduced.

     

政治哲学视域中马克思生命理论探析

马克思变革了传统政治思维,使人的生命成为现代政治新的理论基点。其生命理论的发展逻辑,表现为生命的异化和异化的生命、生命的生产和生产的生命、生命的资本化和资本的生命化。他通过资本权力批判,揭示了生命理论的内核,强调资本权力在现代社会实现的双重转换,即商品经济使货币成为社会交往的中介,雇佣劳动使人的生命成为商品。资本权力运行的现实载体是工厂规训,人的生命在工厂中受到时间规训、机器规训、制度规训,最终成为一种受资本权力控制的生命工具。为此,马克思将人的发展作为其生命理论的价值旨归。     

对公共政策制定的政治哲学思考

公共政策制定是社会政治生活中公共决策系统的经常性活动。在现代社会,由于公共政策的巨大作用和影响,公共政策制定问题引起了广泛的关注。从政治哲学的角度审视,以公意为价值取向、以政治权力为基本依托,以政治秩序为最终归宿,才能建立起人民期待的合理、公正、有效的公共政策,从而进一步推进决策的科学化、民主化。     

新政治经济学视界中的我国公共企业改革

新政治经济学极大拓展了我国公共企业的改革视界,其若干理论范式给予后者许多有益的启示,如公共选择理论之于我国公共企业改革;产权理论之于公共企业的产权制度改革;委托代理理论之于我国公共企业激励机制的构建;制度变迁理论之于我国公共企业改革制度供给等。     

Between Psychoanalysis and Political Philosophy: Towards a Critical Theory of Political Myth

Abstract

This paper focuses on a specific aspect of political imaginaries: political myth. What are political myths? What role do they play within today's commoditized political imaginaries? What are the conditions for setting up a critique of them? We will address these questions, by putting forward a theory of political myth which situates itself between psycho analysis and political philosophy, in line with the tradition of critical theory that many still associate with the name of the Frankfurt School. We will first discuss the notion of political myth by illustrating the contribution of both disciplines to its understanding and then, through a discussion of the notion of social unconscious, we will apply this analysis to a contemporary example of political myth, that of a clash of civilizations.     

The Obligation to Contribute to Discretionary Public Goods

The principle of fairness, first introduced by H. L. A. Hart in 1955, is able to support a workable theory of political obligation upon liberal premises. In a previous paper, 'Presumptive benefit, fairness, and political obligation', I argued that the principle can establish general obligations to cooperate in the provision of 'presumptive public goods' (that is, public goods that are indispensable to the typical member of society). Because a wider range of governmental services is necessary for the provision of presumptive goods, the principle also supports obligations to support 'discretionary public goods' (goods that are desirable but not indispensable). The 'indirect argument' developed in this paper counters the criticisms of my previous paper presented by A. John Simmons in 'The anarchist position: a reply to Klosko and Senor'.     

论公共领域的结构性特征及其政治哲学意义

从描述性意蕴来看,公共领域是一个由公共空间、公共传媒、社团组织和社会运动四种现实形态构成的复合性存在,它是在与家庭共同体、经济共同体、国家共同体既相对立又相关联中获得其规定性的。因此,具有多重政治哲学意义。     

对传统公共物品理论的破与立——兼论后公共物品时代的政府职能定位理论

对于公共物品的界定,西方学者见仁见智,而国内学者大多以消费上的非竞争性和非排他性作为公共物品的充分条件和必要条件。本文否定了物品(包括服务)存在消费上的非竞争性和非排他性,进而否定了以物品的客观属性来界定公共物品的传统公共物品理论,主张以需求溢出理论作为后公共物品时代的政府职能定位理论。     

Does Public Policy Crowd Out Private Contributions to Public Goods

It is sometimes claimed that individuals' contributions topublic goods are not motivated by economic costs and benefitsalone, but that people also have a moral or norm-basedmotivation. A number of studies indicate that such moral ornorm-based motivation might be crowded out, or crowded in, bypublic policy. This paper discusses some models that can yieldinsight into the interplay between economic and moral ornorm-based motivation for voluntary contributions to publicgoods, and compares their policy implications. We distinguishbetween five types of models: Altruism models, social normmodels, fairness models, models of commitment and thecognitive evaluation theory.     

Theory and Methods in British Public Administration: the view from Political Science

This paper explores the contemporary history of that area of intellectual inquiry known as Public Administration. It focuses on developments in the 1980s and on the contribution of political science. It argues that the subject is diverse and characterized by competing theoretical frameworks. It evaluates organization theory, state theory, rational choice, public management and their associated methods. It concludes that Public Administration has reacted defensively to developments in the 1980s and that the distinctive contribution from political science lies in multi-theoretic research, methodological pluralism, setting one's own agenda, the avoidance of trivial organizations and the defence of public bureaucracies.     

中国特色社会主义经济理论体系对马克思主义政治经济学的发展与创新

中国特色社会主义经济理论体系是中国特色社会主义理论体系的重要组成部分,这一理论体系是对中国社会主义经济建设、特别是改革开放以来社会主义经济发展的实践和经验的概括和总结,是马克思主义经济学中国化的集中体现。它在社会主义的本质、社会主义市场经济理论、社会主义基本经济制度、社会主义分配理论等方面发展和创新了马克思主义政治经济学。     

On Sen's Liberal Paradox and its Reception within Political Theory and Welfare Economics

In this article, Amartya Sen's seminal proof of the impossibility of a Paretian liberal is briefly reviewed. I then discuss the reception of this alleged 'liberal paradox' within the fields of political theory and welfare economics. In particular, I examine the criticisms made by Brian Barry, and their wider implications for the field of social choice theory. It is argued that the various criticisms made on Sen's characterisation of liberty are fundamental, and that Sen's subsequent defence of his position is unconvincing. Moreover, there remain some wider doubts as to the usefulness of social choice theory's SWF approach to individual rights and freedoms.     

The Impact of Restrictive Immigration Policies on Political Empowerment: Ethnic Organization Persistence in Early Twentieth Century St. Louis

Using evidence from early twentieth century St. Louis as an illustrative case, this paper examines the impact of restrictive immigration policies on organizational activity by and for foreign-born persons. A wide array of ethnic churches, nationalist societies, singing clubs and foreign language newspapers flourished in the city during the first decades of the 1900s. The particularities of St. Louis politics aided the longevity of such groups. Despite radical policy change, however, the persistence of these organizations helped preserve many distinctive characteristics of immigrant groups and fostered their ability to act collectively in the political sphere. The historical interpretation presented suggests that citizenship practices giving priority to liberalization of voting may not be the most obvious or effective strategy for immigrant political empowerment.     

Creating Public Value with Tax and Spending Policies: The View from Public Economics

According to the framework rooted in public economics, governments can create public value by focusing tax and spending policies on remedying market failures and addressing concerns about fairness embodied in a social welfare function. By pursuing optimal tax and spending policies, governments navigate the omnipresent trade‐offs between equity and efficiency. Of course, in practice, the process by which policies are adopted does not resemble the planner's problem in social choice theory. In addition, real fiscal policies do not look much like the recommendations that arise from the optimal tax literature. Governments operate in public choice environments that are not conducive to focused remedying of market failure, and they suffer from their own tendencies to fail to achieve their objectives. Nevertheless, many of the tools are in place to help the federal and state governments focus tax and spending in ways that can maximize public value.     

Political Philosophy and Sophistry: An Introduction to Plato's Protagoras

This study of Plato's Protagoras seeks not only to advance the understanding of ancient sophistry, a task both important in its own right and essential to the study of the history of political thought, but also to lay a foundation for subsequent inquiries into the connection between ancient sophistry and the relativism characteristic of our age. According to the Protagoras , the chief difference between philosopher and sophist is that the latter wrongly believes himself to be beyond or above the concern for justice as a virtue; the examination of Protagoras' moral teaching, then, proves to be the key to understanding him and therewith the intellectual position he represents .