THE PERFORMANCE OF NATIONAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS: A "GOOD NEWS, BAD NEWS" FINDING FOR REFORM POSSIBILITIES

This paper seeks to contribute to an understanding of how macro health systems work by comparing three possible sets of influences on national health care outcomes: 1) health care facilities and their presumed link to national affluence, 2) social characteristics which are assumed to promote healthy behavior, and 3) political variables in the form of welfare state development. Our findings bear both optimistic and pessimistic connotations. On the one hand, the somewhat limited importance of the first set of factors shows that good health in a country is not simply the function of high spending levels. However, the surprisingly strong role of “social development” in determining health care outcomes that emerges implies that much more than the direct provision of health care must be manipulated to ensure optimal health for a nation's population.     

What accounts for Duverger's law? The behavioral mechanisms underpinning two-party convergence in India

Duverger's Law states the single-member district plurality rules should produce two-party competition. In district-level election races where this expectation holds, what political behaviors—ranging from elites' strategic formation of political parties to voters' strategic abandonment of losing candidates—account for these outcomes? Using data from state elections in India, this article demonstrates that no single mechanism accounts for most electoral outcomes consistent with Duverger's Law. However, mechanisms related to the behavior elites, far more than voters, produce convergence on two-party competition. This article uncovers relatively little evidence of outcomes driven by strategic voting, instead finding that much of the convergence on two parties is attributable to various forms of strategic entry in which parties selectively field candidates in certain races. In particular, elite collusion—when multiple parties coordinate on where to field candidates—is especially important. Data from other countries confirm that these findings are not unique to India.     

All voting is strategic

All voting is strategic because the shared outcomes are note within the choice set of any voter, the elements of which can only be strategies. Voting behavior need not re- flect the individual's ordering of outcomes, and the conventional distinction between sincere and sophisticated voting is misguided. In voting choice, the ordinal ranking of outcomes must be supplemented by intrapersonal evaluation of utility differences among these outcomes and also by predictions concerning the behavior of other participants in the nexus of interdependence.     

Accepting Authoritative Decisions: Humans as Wary Cooperators

Why are people more willing to accept some governmental decisions than others? In this article, we present results from a series of original experiments showing that people's reactions to a given outcome are heavily influenced by the procedure employed to produce the outcome. We find that subjects react much less favorably when a decision maker intentionally keeps a large payoff, thereby leaving the subject with a small payoff, than when that same payoff results from a procedure based on chance or on desert. Moreover, subjects react less favorably to outcomes rendered by decision makers who want to be decision makers than they do to identical outcomes selected by reluctant decision makers. Our results are consistent with increasingly prominent theories of behavior emphasizing people's aversion to being played for a “sucker,” an attitude that makes perfect sense if people's main goal is not to acquire as many tangible goods as possible but to make sure they are a valued part of a viable group composed of cooperative individuals.     

A median-voter model of economic regulation

A basic median-voter model is developed and extended to analyze issues of economic regulation and public policy outcomes. The model is used to generate comparative static results relating changes in public-policy outcomes to changes in relative group sizes, total population, information costs, and population heterogeneity. The model is also used to explore the issue of optimal group size — the size of the special-interest group that maximizes the group's per capita public policy gains. Comparative static analysis reveals how optimal group size and gains per capita are affected by changes in population heterogeneity, the size of the total population, and relative knowledge levels.     

Public Service Motivation,Task, and Non-task Behavior: A Performance Appraisal Experiment with Korean MPA and MBA Students

ABSTRACT

Appraisals of public employees are important for a host of reasons, and particularly so with the increasing emphasis on pay-for-performance systems and performance-based management in the public sector. However, managerial appraisals of employees can be somewhat subjective and our understanding of the appraisal process in the public sector is largely U.S.-centric. In this study, we explore whether characteristics of managers, like a rater's public service motivation (PSM), affect appraisal outcomes for their subordinates. Using a mixed experimental design, we analyze these dynamics in a non-U.S. context with MBA and MPA students enrolled in one of Korea's top universities. We find that rater PSM moderates the influence of both task and non-task behavior on an employee's performance appraisal.     

I Respectfully Dissent: Consensus, Agendas, and Policymaking on the U.S. Supreme Court, 1888–1999

Scholars have been intrigued by the abrupt change in the rate of nonconsensual opinions that the Supreme Court has published over time, which substantially increased beginning with the battles concerning the court's New Deal transition in the 1930s. Notwithstanding, none of the prior studies on this topic has made any link, whether theoretical or empirical, between the Supreme Court's issuance of these special opinions and the justices’ policy preferences. We utilize fractional cointegration to examine the relationship between consensus, agendas, and decisionmaking on the Supreme Court. We find that there is a systematic interrelation between the justices’ policy preferences and their issuance of nonconsensual opinions that is dependent upon the policy agenda before the court. In turn, this connection influences the court's policy outcomes, demonstrating that the justices’ behavior regarding nonconsensual opinion writing is a classic example of judicial policymaking.     

THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT'S EFFECTS ON PATIENTS,PROVIDERS, AND THE ECONOMY: WHAT WE'VE LEARNED SO FAR

As we approach the tenth anniversary of the passage of the Affordable Care Act, it is important to reflect on what has been learned about the impacts of this major reform. In this paper, we review the literature on the impacts of the ACA on patients, providers, and the economy. We find strong evidence that the ACA's provisions have increased insurance coverage. There is also a clearly positive effect on access to and consumption of health care, with suggestive but more limited evidence on improved health outcomes. There is no evidence of significant reductions in provider access, changes in labor supply, or increased budgetary pressures on state governments, and the law's total federal cost through 2018 has been less than predicted. We conclude by describing key policy implications and future areas for research.     

Voluntary purchase of public goods

This paper examines the application of Buchanan's ‘independent adjustment’ model of public good provision to individual donations to voluntary or non-profit organizations. An individual's donation function is a simple transformation of the Marshallian demand function; consequently donation functions ‘reveal,’ in principle, preferences for public goods. The existence of a tax-subsidy system sustaining a Pareto optimal level of provision is demonstrated, and the relationship to the existing subsidy scheme in the U.S. is examined. Finally, two implications of the model suggest that it is not appropriate as a representation of actual donor behavior.     

Scale economies and rent-seeking in legislative parties

This paper examines equilibrium legislative party size, based upon scale economies in producing political outcomes. Political production — finding policies legislators desire and vote-trading to pass them — has strong scale economies up to, but not far beyond, a majority of the voters. Either one or two parties is efficient, but a larger number is not. A single party's optimal long-run strategy is to benefit a dominant majority by avoiding the creation of an effective second party. But short-term rent-seeking is in legislators' and leaders' interests, which eventually causes a second effective party and a stable two-party equilibrium. Estimates of party size for the U.S. Congress suggest considerable short-term rent-seeking.     

Strategic Party Government: Party Influence in Congress, 1789–2000

Why does the influence of Congressional parties fluctuate over time? Building on prevailing answers, we develop a model, Strategic Party Government, which highlights the electoral motives of legislative parties and the strategic interaction between parties. We test this theory using the entire range of House and Senate party behavior from 1789 to 2000 and find that the strategic behavior of parties complements members' preferences as an explanation for variation in party influence. Specifically, the strongest predictors of one party's voting unity are the unity of the opposing party and the difference between the parties in the preceding year. Moreover, we find strong links between party behavior in Congress and electoral outcomes: an increase in partisan influence on legislative voting has adverse electoral costs, while winning contested votes has electoral benefits.     

Determining the effects of government's perceived ecological roles on Chinese consumers' proenvironmental attitude,and green consumerism: The moderating effect of greenwashing perceptions

While the normative ecological roles of a government's effect on consumers' proecological attitude and green consumerism have received less attention, greenwashing interaction effect remains unexplored. Building on the two normative theories – stakeholder theory and social contract theory, the study tests a theoretical model integrating mediating and moderating relationships using survey data from 202 consumers across China. Results show a government's normative ecological roles positively and significantly on consumers' proenvironmental attitudes and green consumerism. It also confirms the mediating roles of the proenvironment between the ecological roles of a government and green consumerism. Further, tests of greenwashing moderation effect generated mixed outcomes. Insignificant greenwashing interaction effect between proenvironment and green consumerism, but, it proved significant interaction between ecological roles of a government and green behavior. The study proposes research avenues on how researchers can step up the theme and policy implications to practitioners.     

Questioning Kaufman: How Cross‐Level Political Coalitions Interact with Organizational Structure

Herbert Kaufman's The Forest Ranger is considered a landmark study of how organizations can be structured to elicit compliance from field officials, yet there have been few attempts to validate Kaufman's claims. The author argues that the outcomes observed by Kaufman resulted from interplay between organizational structure and political context—a variable that Kaufman ignored. This argument is supported by case studies of two agencies with structures similar to Kaufman's U.S. Forest Service but poorer outcomes: the same agency today and India's forest departments. Both differences in organizational structure and poorer outcomes are found to be the result of political context. Specifically, coalitions assembled around agencies use the implementation process to shape outcomes in ways that could not be accomplished solely through changing laws or formal administrative structure. This points to the importance of building supportive field‐level coalitions to complement administrative reforms.     

The merits of Neo-Downsian modeling of the alternative vote: A reply to Horowitz

In Professor Horowitz’s rejoinders (2004, 2006) to Fraenkel and Grofman (2004, 2006a), he mischaracterizes our formal results, retreats from previous claims about the conditions for the alternative vote electoral system to generate centripetal outcomes, renders explicit his dubious assumptions about voter behavior in divided societies, and greatly exaggerates the global evidence in support of pro-moderation outcomes under the alternative vote. Here we respond to Horowitz's (2004), criticism in this journal of the formal model of Fraenkel and Grofman (2004) and to the broader defense in Horowitz (2006) of majoritarian vote pooling arrangements as means of mitigating ethnic conflict in deeply divided societies.     

Accounting for the survival of minority governments: An examination of the French case, 1988–1991

This article examines the post‐electoral conditions under which minority governments operate. It is argued that a minority government will remain in office for so long as it enjoys the support of either a commitment to relations, to behaviour, or to outcomes. If no such commitments are forthcoming, then it will only continue to survive if there is a specific constitutional device upon which it can rely. This hypothesis is tested upon the situation in France during 1988–91. Here, Michel Rocard's minority government survived because it enjoyed a commitment to outcomes. On the occasions when this commitment was absent, the government resorted to the use of Article 49–3 of the Constitution in order to remain in office.     

The Commons Select Committee System in the 2015–20 Parliament

The House of Commons select committees witnessed some of the most constructive political theatre of the 2010‐2015 Parliament. Recall Rupert Murdoch's public contrition, Margaret Hodge's assault on MNC tax evasion and Keith Vaz's timely interrogations of G4S, etc. The committees also embraced social media and adopted public engagement as a key task. These developments all reflect a newly emboldened system. In recent months, four reports have been published which reflect on these developments. They also look forward to the further substantial development of committee activity. The system thus sets sail with an abundance of specific suggestions, including ideas that could have far wider and more far‐reaching democratic implications.     

Japan's peacekeeping policy: Strategic calculation or internalization of an international norm?

Abstract

With the Gulf War as a trigger, Japan began to make a humanitarian contribution by dispatching the Self Defense Forces to United Nations peacekeeping operations. Given Japan's strong hesitation for participation in the past, Japan's peacekeeping policy presents an intriguing challenge to examine the factors for a preference change and sustained compliance. By investigating Japan's peacekeeping policies towards East Timor and Haiti, this article examines how Japan's behavior and preferences were influenced by either internalized norms or cost/benefit calculations. While norm-driven behavior is considered to be incompatible with strategic calculated behavior, the article demonstrates that these two factors can co-exist.     

Interbranch Negotiations over Policies with Multiple Outcomes

Whereas presidents represent the entire nation, members of Congress serve districts and states. Consequently, presidents and members of Congress often disagree not only about the merits of different policies but also about the criteria used to assess them. To investigate the relevance of jurisdictional?and by extension criterial?differences for policymaking, we revisit classic models of bargaining under uncertainty. Rather than define uncertainty about the mapping of one policy into one outcome, as all previous scholars have done, we allow for every policy to generate two politically relevant outcomes, one local and another national. We then identify equilibria in which the president's utility is increasing in the value that a representative legislator assigns to national outcomes. As an application of this theory, we analyze budgetary politics in war and peace. We find that during periods of war, when members of Congress assign greater importance to the very same national outcomes that preoccupy presidents, congressional appropriations more closely reflect presidential proposals.     

Con a voluntary workfare program change the behavior of welfare recipients? new evidence from washington state's family independence program (FIP)

This article examines a voluntary workfare demonstration program in Washington state—the Family Independence Program (FIP)—designed to encourage longer-term investments in employment and training (E&T) activities, with the ultimate objective of achieving economic self-sufficiency for welfare recipients. A unique longitudinal data set is used to compare E&T enrollment and the labor market and welfare outcomes for a sample of FIP clients and a comparison group of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recipients subject to the state's mandatory workfare requirements. Correcting for self-selection, the estimates obtained indicate that FIP's combination of financial incentives, enhanced support services, and a more client-centered environment results in an E&T enrollment rate that is from 9 to 12 percentage points higher during the post-FIP June 1989 to May 1990 period than the rate for respondents subject to the state's workfare program. Relative to the enrollment rate calculated for nonparticipants, FIP net impact estimates in this range represent a 33 to 44 percent increase in E&T enrollment. These results offer a more positive assessment of the potential of a voluntary workfare program to affect the behavior of welfare recipients than does the large-scale FIP evaluation carried out by the Urban Institute. However, both the evidence presented here and the Urban Institute's evaluation suggest that FIP had little impact on employment and earnings but significantly increased welfare receipt and the level of welfare benefits.