政府在日本金融制度演化中的作用

作者认为,日本金融行政的思想滥觞于明治维新以来的近现代经济发展史,日本政府通过学习西方金融制度引导本国金融制度的变革方向,在制度实施过程中各种关系的博弈过程形成了日本金融制度演化的路径。这种依靠政府力量推动的金融制度演化方式是造成日本完成经济追赶后无法赶超的一个主要原因。     

Developing the school financial audit model

This paper examines the development of school＇s financial audit model. The overall sample consists of 100 school auditors in Malaysia. Field work covered 4 states in the northern part of the Peninsular Malaysia, i.e., Perak, Pulau Pinang, Kedah and Perlis. A structured questionnaire with 41 closed ended items was used to collect the data. This study uses quantitative method such as correlation, chi-square and multiple regression analysis to test the variables. The finding confirms that the school financial audit model consists of general standard, audit work standard and reporting standard. This model can be used by various parties including private entities, state education department and other government agencies.     

Embedded policy preferences and the formation of international arrangements after the Asian financial crisis

New bilateral and multilateral arrangements emerged after the Asian financial crisis in the areas of financial assistance, financial regulation, and exchange rate stabilization. Strikingly, however, very few such arrangements emerged at the regional level. This paper argues that (1) the success of bilateral and international arrangements was the result of policy preference compatibility among East Asian countries and (2) the countries’ policy preferences can be explained as a function of their financial system features (securities-market-based or bank-credit-based) and external balance positions (capital-dependent or capital-sufficient). Although this framework cannot predict whether countries will agree on a particular policy proposal, it can explain the diversity of their proposals, the likely lines of conflict, the nature of their compromises, and why certain proposals succeed (or fail) even without the strong support (or opposition) of major powers.     

Rethinking calculation: the popularization of financial trading outside the global centres of finance

Abstract

The paper looks at the popularization of financial trading in Israel. It presents a qualitative analysis of the calculative models and techniques that are promoted by financial trading schools, service firms and books. Broadly, the popularization of trading in this field involves a focus on ‘technical analysis’ (TA) and relies upon a socio-psychological reading of financial charts. Incorporating explicitly non-economic ideas into traders’ calculative logic – including an emic notion of ‘performativity’ – popular TA constitutes an attempt to ‘reverse’ the making of markets: to calculatively trace price formations back to the minds, hearts and arrangement from which they had allegedly sprung as a means of foreseeing their future shape before it fully materializes. Tying the psyche and the market in a calculative loop, popular TA transcends existing social theories of financial calculation. The paper discusses this challenge and its implications for our understanding of the expansion of finance.     

Policy Inertia and the Persistence of Systemic Fragility

Many observers have diagnosed a fundamental shift in financial regulation since the 2008 crisis. In contrast, this article argues that changes have mostly been superficial. The ideas underpinning regulation have been adapted rather than overturned. Our financial system remains highly fragile, even if exceptionally loose monetary policy obscures such fragility temporarily. Governments show little appetite to correct the lopsided relationship between the financial sector and the real economy and turn the sector into a reliable engine of prosperity and stability rather than a continued source of systemic risk.     

WTO背景下的金融安全问题探讨

金融在一国经济中的命脉作用决定了金融安全是一个国家经济安全的核心 ;对金融安全区及其实现条件的探讨 ,有利于规避内在原因所导致的金融风险 ;一些重要措施的采取 ,可以保证更好地实现金融安全。     

Subprime catalyst: Financial regulatory reform and the strengthening of US carbon market governance

The 2008 financial crisis has had an important, but neglected, impact on carbon market governance in the United States. It acted as a catalyst for the emergence of a domestic coalition that drew upon the crisis experience to demand stronger regulation over carbon markets. The influence of this coalition was seen first in the changing content of draft climate change bills between 2008 and 2010. But the coalition's more lasting legacy was its role in shaping the content of, and supporting, the passage of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd–Frank bill) in July 2010. Although that bill was aimed primarily at bolstering financial stability, its derivatives provisions strengthened carbon market regulation in significant ways. This policy episode demonstrates new patterns of coalition building in carbon market politics as well as the growing links between climate governance and financial regulatory politics. At the same time, the significance of these developments should not be overstated because of various limitations in the content and implementation of the Dodd–Frank bill, as well as the waning support for carbon markets more generally within the US since the bill's passage.     

Global inequality as one of the root causes of the financial crisis: a suggested explanation

Abstract

The global financial crisis was caused because the volume of toxic assets in the financial system had grown to the point where the system could no longer cope. The dominant view among heterodox economists is that this point of critical mass was reached because of various failures in the financial system. This paper puts the accompanying view that the toxic assets were created largely in response to external pressures, a principle source of which was global inequality: while income inequality was an important factor behind the supply of those assets, wealth concentration was a major factor behind the demand for them. The policy implications of this analysis are that income distribution and wealth ownership have to be more equitably structured if global financial crises are to be avoided in the future. This is not to exclude other proposals for making the financial system more transparent and accountable. The point, rather, is that these proposals are insufficient on their own. No matter how radical the re-structuring of the financial system, as long as there remain external pressures on it to create products or to indulge in practices that are harmful to it, such products and practices will continue to be introduced and financial crises will continue to occur.     

浅析全球金融危机下的中国经济机会

全球金融危机背景下,中国不可避免地受到了一定影响,但整体上仍保持着经济高增长的潜力。本文探讨了金融危机给中国经济在出口产业结构调整、能源价格机制改革、企业和金融机构海外市场的拓展,以及整个国家在世界经济中地位的提升所带来的机会。     

理性认识金融危机下我国中间阶层的作用

在全球性金融危机中,中国承受着巨大压力,一部分人认为,作为社会中流砥柱的中间阶层能够以其强劲的消费拉动中国经济,从而维护社会的稳定与发展。文章认为,在金融危机下,这不是一种理性的对待中间阶的态度,并从经济、政治和社会责任感三个角度,分析了在当前环境下这种观点是值得商榷的,随后,从不能正视中间阶层的现状,忽略中国社会发展的实情以及对中间阶层理解的偏差性等方面分析了持这种观点的原因。     

The unstable core of global finance: Contingent valuation and governance of international accounting standards

Accounting standards are the foundations of the financial regulatory edifice, and global financial governance is no more stable than the asset valuations that feed it. Yet for two decades and up to this day, no international accounting rule for financial instruments – the bulk of banks' balance sheets – has emerged that was more than a temporary fix, to be succeeded by further reforms. We show how banking regulators have been central to this dynamic and how their support for applying fair value accounting to financial instruments, the cornerstone of regulatory debate, has oscillated throughout the whole period. The two common international political economy approaches to global financial governance, which analyze it either as interest‐based bargaining or as ideas‐driven expert governance, fail to account for this pattern. In contrast, we show how the contingency of financial valuations itself has made it impossible for regulators to embrace or reject a stable set of accounting rules.     

论高速公路全过程财务跟踪审计

首先论述了高速公路建设实施全过程财务跟踪审计的必要性包括用以加强项目资金管理、控制造价、规范管理等;实施跟踪审计的原则;并着重阐述了财务跟踪审计的主要内容,包括审查会计信息是否失真,审查资产、负债的真实性、合法性及增减变化情况审查;有无隐瞒、收入体外循环问题,审查业主单位提供对外担保是否符合规定等。     

历史视野中的美国经济"双赤字"问题

多年来,美国经济发展中的一个重要特征是存在着高额的财政赤字和经常项目赤字.双高赤字起自上世纪80年代里根政府时期,可以说是"里根经济学"为取得成功所付出的代价.90年代的克林顿政府所采取的削减联邦财政赤字为主要内容的宏观经济政策获得了成功,而美国经济的持续繁荣则继续导致了美国贸易赤字的增长.小布什政府上台次年重新出现财政赤字,其后双赤字不断攀升,创下了历史最高记录.布什政府推行的减税计划造成政府税收下降和9.11事件以后美国政府开支的大幅度增加是联邦财政重现赤字的主要原因;美国贸易赤字居高难下并不断增加,从根本上说则是美国经济中消费和支出远远大于其产出的结果.双赤字对美国经济有利有弊,但归根到底弊大于利,同时也给世界经济增长蒙上了阴影,带来了诸多不确定因素.美国的双高赤字形势虽然可能会有所改观,但作为一种总体的状况恐会长期存在下去.     

Why reregulation after the crisis is feeble: Shadow banking,offshore financial centers,and jurisdictional competition

A crucial element in the complex chain of factors that caused the recent financial crisis was the lack of regulation and oversight in the shadow banking sector, which is largely incorporated in offshore financial centers (OFCs), but instead of swift and radical regulatory reform in that sector after the crisis, we observe only incremental and ineffective measures. Why? This paper develops an explanation based on a two‐level game. On the international level, governments are engaged in competition for financial activity. On the domestic level, governments are prone to capture by financial interest groups, but also susceptible to demands for stricter regulation by the electorate. Governments try to square the circle between the conflicting demands by adopting incremental and symbolic, but largely ineffective, reforms. The explanation is put to empirical scrutiny by tracing the regulatory initiatives on shadow banks and OFCs at the international level and within the United States and the European Union, where I focus on France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.     

Economic crises and augmenting financial bureaucratic power in South Korea

Despite negative public opinion, the role of the Korean government has expanded, while overcoming two rounds of global financial crises. The phenomenon of the re-swelling state is mainly attributed to the strengthening of the central bureaucracy, in particular the financial bureaucracy, rather than the whole central government or the state. The argument of the strengthening of the ‘state’ or the ‘government’ after economic crises might be subject to the error of generalization. Through the two rounds of economic crises, the financial bureaucracy succeeded in acquiring the authority of market supervision and industrial support. In consequence, the bureaucracy's institutional supremacy within the government grew less challenged. The central bureaucracy was no longer the loyal servant to the President. It has reinforced its institutional strength and autonomy vis-a-vis the President, the National Assembly, the Central Bank and civil society, under the pretext of building up the rational and autonomous market and democratic politics.     

Risk and Financial Armageddon in Ireland: The Politics of the Galway Tent

This article examines Ireland's financial crisis. Thus far explanation has focused on individual or collective administrative failure: the office(r) of financial regulation singularly failed to scrutinise the banks sufficiently: it was a matter of poor risk management. While this article would agree that the (mis)management of risk was important to how the crisis unfolded, I argue that an explanation of why the crisis emerged demands an altogether different focus. Put simply, after financial regulatory reform, a reconfiguration of risk in politics took place as the locus of decision‐making about financial risk shifted from the realm of the political/legal (Cabinet/Central Bank/Department of Finance) to the economic/legal (retail banks, shareholders/consumers). It was a critical development, one that mirrored events taking place in the UK, upon which Ireland drew experience, for now assessments about risk undertaken by the banks demanded that intervention could be justified only on an ascertainable risk, not a theoretical uncertainty (or spurious fear). The evidentiary bar for intervention was therefore raised, removing the precautionary instinct implicit in the prudential governance of Central Banks.     

The Banking Crisis: Grid,Group and the State of the Debate

The banking crisis and the recession it induced provide a salient backdrop to domestic and international politics. ² The International Monetary Fund (IMF 2010) estimates that total banking losses between 2008 and 2010 exceeded US$2.3 trillion. This article uses grid‐group theory to review the existing literature on the causes of the banking crisis and, in doing so, distinguishes between hierarchical, individualist, egalitarian and fatalist accounts of what went wrong and of what needs to be done to prevent another crisis from occurring. It is argued that the existing reform agenda is underpinned by a hierarchical analysis of the causes of the crisis and that this risks narrowing the support base for the reform process.     

Explanations of the Financial Meltdown and the Present Recession

The concern of this article is to locate the unfolding literature that seeks to explain the present financial crisis into three dimensions of contestability. The major areas of disagreements between various authors include: the role of government; the issues of whether the recession was unavoidable or whether it was inevitable; and the area of ideas and ideals and how economic ideas shaped and influenced the policy process. These explanations include the pragmatists and all that literature that had a time dimension of major actors trying to produce policies that aimed to stabilise the financial markets. These policy makers did not have the benefit of hindsight but were concerned that the financial markets were so fragile that there was no other choice but for governments to intervene. By contrast, there were the market fundamentalists who argued that the pragmatists had got it wrong and were therefore highly critical of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury and tended to blame the recession on government housing policy. Institutionalists have argued that the regulatory system is broken, while structuralists tend to focus on growing income inequalities, the concentration of wealth and how the changing structure explains the recession in the sense that households took the avenue of higher debt on their homes to sustain higher levels of consumption. Finally, there is the Keynesian Collectivist argument that points to the limits of Rational Expectations and Efficient markets. No one really know who is right, but the fierce debate that is emerging is highly important in that each explanation seeks to provide a framework for policy making     

Financial derivatives and the rise of circulation

The analysis argues that the outsourcing of production from the metropole generated problems of monetary connectivity that motivated the banking sector to develop and market a new species of derivative: the financial derivative. Virtually non-existent until 1973, such derivatives would soon become a 100 trillion dollar market. Making a market for these derivatives opened the door for speculative capital just as the attempt by this market to capture the risks embodied in local monetized relations led to emergence of a notion of abstract risk. The notion of abstract risk, embodied in the derivative and propelled by a self-expanding speculative capital, is globally significant because abstract risk functions as a social mediation, creating a new form of interdependence in the sphere of circulation even as circulation itself grows increasingly autonomous from production. We show that what makes the emergent culture of financial circulation historically new is that it is defined and determined through the objectification of abstract risk.