A. Johnstone,Dilemmas of Internationalism: The American Association for the United Nations and US Foreign Policy, 1941–1948

Middle Powers are generally understood to perform diplomatic functions of constructive engagement and consensus-building to facilitate agreement in international negotiations. Middle Powers may, however, adopt more confrontational roles, especially when their accommodative functions become deficient. Whilst theoretical perspectives on Middle Powers account for such roles, limited empirical evidence has been provided to explore the conditions under which they revert to combative diplomacy. This article contributes to this area by examining the role of South Africa in the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organisation. During this period, South Africa shifted to a more confrontational approach epitomised by the heightening of its public diplomacy against developed countries and its co-leadership of the G-20 coalition of developing countries. The Cancun Ministerial collapse reflected both the possibilities and limitations of combative diplomacy as South Africa enhanced its international prestige but failed to extract any meaningful concessions, whilst triggering the threat of diplomatic retaliation by the major trading powers.     

British and American military operations in the Battle of Helmand, 2006–2011

In summer 2006, elements of the British Army were deployed to Helmand province in southern Afghanistan. The US Army followed with a surge in 2009 and 2010. The British and American military forces attempted to construct a counterinsurgency (COIN) approach to win the war in Helmand from 2006 until 2011, but the operational approach implemented was most often that of conventional warfighting. The inability to successfully implement COIN owed not to a lack of will, but rather to short tours, mission command, a lack of available resources, the particular situation on the ground in Helmand and the propensity of the Taliban to launch major conventional operations during much of the period in question.     

Diplomacy,terrorism, and national narratives in the United States–Iran relationship

The United States and Iran have failed repeatedly in the last thirty years to normalise diplomatic relations. Each attempt to open a dialogue has been set back by acts of terrorism or perceptions thereof, and the small openings for diplomacy were quickly shut. The difficulties of normal diplomacy should be understood in light of the national narratives that guide each country's international behaviour, narratives that include strong admonitions on terrorism and sow distrust. One method to overcome the obstacles thrown up by these national narratives is to explore their dynamics and attempt to write a new, common narrative.     

The Democracy Aid Calculus: Regimes,Political Opponents,and the Allocation of US Democracy Assistance, 1981–2009

To encourage the spread of democracy throughout the developing world, the United States provides targeted aid to governments, political parties, and other non-governmental groups and organizations. This study examines the calculations behind the allocation of democracy assistance, with special attention to the role of regime conditions and policy compatibility in the provision of aid. We argue that both concerns—the opportunity for successful democratization and critical goals related to containing and countering political opponents—are central to democracy aid allocations. We theorize how these two concerns determine the amount of aid allocated, operationalizing these concepts using measures of the original democracy level, change in the democracy level, and policy compatibility. We find support for our argument in tests of US democracy aid allocations by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) from 1981–2009.     

Politicians,Experts and Democracy. Civil–Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Bulgaria

Abstract

Central and Eastern European countries have made significant progress in their efforts to democratize postcommunist civil–military relations. Appointing civilian ministers of defense, improving institutional arrangements and asserting legislative oversight over the armed forces have been key priorities. Problems still abound and levels of reform vary in the region even after NATO's second enlargement since 1989. Challenges remain concerning competent democratic civilian management, and effective defense reform planning and implementation. This article argues that the lack of an integrated Ministry of Defense, the low level of civilian interest in defense matters, the reform-deterrent attitude of political and military elite, and ambiguous institutional lines of authority are factors that still hamper civil–military relations in Bulgaria. I assert that the domestic political environment and international factors together facilitate democratic civilian control over the armed forces.     

Abba Eban and the Development of American–Israeli Relations, 1950–1959

Abba Eban, Israel’s ambassador in Washington and representative at the United Nations from 1950 to 1959, had a central role in the transformation of American–Israeli relations during a period of frequent discord over key strategic issues. This analysis examines the influence of one prominent actor upon bilateral ties that would eventually become the American–Israeli “special relationship.” Eban’s oratory talent, linguistic skills, and effective style of diplomacy augmented both Israel’s image in the view of the American public and relations with official Washington. The article explores several critical elements of these relations during the 1950s, re-examining both Eban’s involvement in events such as Israel’s approach toward the problem of borders, its policy of military retaliation, and the response to severe American pressure following the 1956 Sinai campaign. Whilst not attributing the development of close relations between the two Powers solely to the works of a single individual, evidence suggests that Eban was the right man in the right place and time to provide the necessary foundations for the elevation of American–Israeli relations to “special” in the following decade.     

Anglo–American Relations and the Cold War in 1950

1950 was a crisis year in the Cold War and saw a growing rift between the United Kingdom and the United States over how best to wage it. It was in the Far East that the most dangerous crisis occurred. Britain recognised the People's Republic of China, not only because the Communist regime clearly controlled the mainland, but also because it was felt that it was not irretrievably linked to the Soviet Union. The United States, on the other hand, regarded China as a Soviet satellite and displayed a consistently hostile attitude towards it. The situation worsened with the outbreak of the Korean War in June. Although the United States and Britain agreed that the invasion of South Korea must be repelled, the British were anxious not to broaden the conflict, whilst the Americans used it as a stick to beat the Chinese. The war also prompted accelerated rearmament and the Americans favoured the rearmament of West Germany. Things came to a head in November, with the large-scale Chinese intervention in Korea, followed in early December by a visit to Washington by the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. The British believed that the United States had already concluded that a global war was inevitable, whereas they wished to avoid it if possible. As this article shows, the events of 1950 amply demonstrated the subordinate position of Britain in the “special relationship.”     

Gerald Fitzmaurice (1865–1939), Chief Dragoman of the British Embassy in Turkey by Berridge,G.R

Nixon was one of the first American politicians to advocate the building of a strong US‐Japan economic alliance and the Nixon administration laid the foundation for the healthy post‐Vietnam dialogue that the Carter and Reagan administrations cultivated with Tokyo. This article examines that foundation, and its contribution to the general post‐World War II US‐Japan relationship. Vietnam changed America, and it even changed the way a once arch‐cold warrior, Nixon, viewed the significance of US‐Japan relations. After years of Washington's scoffing at or ignoring Japanese interests, this American ‘discovery’ of Japan was an important development in itself. Hence, this article also examines a relationship in transition which, for Nixon's America, was an important first step in the construction of a post‐Vietnam view of Asian/Pacific cooperation.     

The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Development of Democracy in Africa

The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung （FES） started to work in over 20 countries in Africa since their independence. To promote democracy has always been the focus of our work in Africa. We believe that democracy is the important and necessary precondition for the sustainable development of mankind. And we are fully aware that there is still no blue print for democracy in Africa.     

The London Ambassadorship of David K. E. Bruce During the Wilson-Johnson Years, 1964–68

Using recently released sources, this article offers a fresh perspective on the London ambassadorship of David K. E. Bruce in the years of Harold Wilson and Lyndon Johnson, 1964–68. Bruce's running of the US Embassy is examined, as are his views of the Anglo-American relationship. Further attention is given to his diplomatic management of the Anglo-American relationship in the context of the difficult personal relations between Wilson and Johnson and with regard to policy differences over the Vietnam War and Britain's position as a world power. It is argued that while Bruce did help to ease some of the personal strains between Wilson and Johnson, he was generally less significant to the White House than has previously been asserted. It is also contended that his vision of Britain joining the EEC, yet retaining extensive military commitments beyond Europe was not viable.     

“Exporting Democracy”? Neoconservatism and the Limits of Military Intervention, 1989–2008

This article challenges the almost universal consensus that post–Cold War neoconservative foreign policy has been characterised by the objective of “exporting democracy” abroad for strategic or moral reasons or both. Instead, the article contends that the touchstone of neoconservatism was the attempt to preserve America's so-called “unipolar moment”—its apparent position as the single pole of power in every region of the world. Moving beyond the abstract and grandiose rhetoric employed by many neocons, the article points out that neocons made a distinction between the respective uses of military and non-military power, arguing that the former should be reserved only for situations where strategic interests were at stake rather than for the sake of ideals. The article goes on to argue that this focus on strategic interests facilitated a close alliance with other conservative nationalists who were also dedicated to maintaining America's position as the single pole of world power. Thus neoconservatism should be analysed and evaluated—by both conservatives and liberal interventionists alike—on the basis that it was a strategy dedicated primarily to preserving American unipolarity, not to the promotion of ideals.