March divided,fight united? Trade union cohesion and government appeal for concertation

Why does the government appeal for concertation? Starting from the principal?agent framework and delegation theory, the article argues that the government is more willing to share decision-making power with trade unions when the policy preferences endorsed by the unions are closer to those of the cabinet. Furthermore, it maintains that government propensity to negotiate with trade unions increases as the heterogeneity of union policy preferences grows because the cabinet can exploit its agenda-setting power to divide the union front. The article tests these two hypotheses through a longitudinal analysis of the Italian case (1946–2014). In detail, it takes advantage of two original datasets built through content analysis that provide unique in-depth information on the policy preferences of parties and cabinets and measures the policy positions of the main Italian trade unions, thus allowing assessment of their reciprocal heterogeneity. The results confirm the expectations.     

Vertical Competition in Unitary States: The Case of Italy

In unitary states – states in whichconstitutional powers are owned by thecentral government – vertical competitioncan generate stable outcomes, that isoutcomes that do not unravel througharbitrary repossessions by the center.Stability is a product of institutionalcommitment devices. Through these ademocratic government, though it cannotbind successor governments, can effectivelyoblige them to respect some of thedecisions it has made. A number of suchcommitment devices exist in Italy; theymake possible stable vertical competitionbetween central and regional governments.     

Corruption and support for decentralisation

Existing explanations of individual preferences for decentralisation and secession focus on collective identity, economic considerations and party politics. This paper contributes to this literature by showing that preferences for fiscal and political decentralisation are also driven by concern about the quality of government in the face of corruption. It makes two claims. Firstly, information on national-level corruption decreases satisfaction with national politicians, and subsequently increases preferences for decentralisation and secession. Secondly, information on regional-level corruption pushes citizens of highly corrupt regions to prefer national retrenchment and unitary states. The effects of this political compensation mechanism crosscut national identities and involve regions that are not ethnically or economically different from the core. We test our argument using a survey experiment in Spain and confirm its cross-national generalisability with data from the European Values Study.     

The Political Foundations of Trust and Distrust: Reforms and Protests in France

This article argues that the high level of protest activity in France is, at least partly, the result of distrust between the government and the trade unions, and that such distrust is inevitable in a society where unions are sometimes strong enough to mobilise against the government but not confident in their own future strength. This trust problem can be overcome if governments are willing to make institutional changes that commit them to future policies, but such political engineering is costly and unstable, which explains why governments sometimes prefer open confrontation. The empirical part of the paper analyses four French social and labour market reform initiatives in the 1990s and 2000s, demonstrating that the ideas developed in this article help to explain important features of contemporary French policy-making.     

The interaction of monetary policy and wages

This paper focuses on the interaction of monetary policy and wage formation in economies with strong labor unions. Government and unions are viewed as endogenous utility maximizers and the macroeconomic consequences of their strategic interaction are explored with the aid of some elements of simple game theory. Specifically, it is shown (a) how labor unions adjust wages to prices so as to maximize their utility following changes in monetary policy; (b) how the effectiveness of monetary policy is circumscribed without necessarily being nullified by the utility-maximizing reactions of unions; and (c) how the interplay of government and unions can create a persistent tendency towards inflation and unemployment simultaneously.     

Responsiveness without Representation: Evidence from Minimum Wage Laws in U.S. States

How well does public policy represent mass preferences in U.S. states? Current approaches provide an incomplete account of statehouse democracy because they fail to compare preferences and policies on meaningful scales. Here, we overcome this problem by generating estimates of Americans' preferences on the minimum wage and compare them to observed policies both within and across states. Because we measure both preferences and policies on the same scale (U.S. dollars), we can quantify both the association of policy outcomes with preferences across states (responsiveness) and their deviation within states (bias). We demonstrate that while minimum wages respond to corresponding preferences across states, policy outcomes are more conservative than preferences in each state, with the average policy bias amounting to about two dollars. We also show that policy bias is substantially smaller in states with access to direct democratic institutions.     

Trade unions,nonneutrality and stagflation

The claim that in policy games nonneutrality and a stagflation bias emerge in equilibrium if the unions care about inflation, per se, is discussed. This assumption is shown to be not necessary to obtain a stagflation bias; the same applies to nonneutrality if a government acts in the economy. The question of whether unions should be envisaged as “institutions” (i.e., interested in variables unrelated to wages and employment) is also addressed. Two model-based alternatives providing “microeconomic” foundations versus “macroeconomic” foundations to unions' behaviour are presented. The conclusion is that the modelling of unions remains an unsettled problem.     

State government purchases in a federalist economy

This paper empirically examines the impact of state government purchasing preference laws on expenditures and revenue of individual states. Purchasing preferences allow firms located within a state to win state contracts without being the low bidder. We find that states with purchasing preference laws spend 3% more in real terms per capita than other states. Evidence is found indicating that the preferences require revenue increases to fund them (the tax base does not rise sufficiently), and that there is some apparent taxpayer resistance to these preferences. This evidence is consistent with a coalition model of state government behavior because it indicates there is significant redistribution of income between groups within the state.We thank the Center for Public Policy at the University of Houston for financial support. This paper benefitted by comments received from Gordon Tullock and an anonymous referee.     

Treaty Commitment as a Signaling Device: Explaining the Ratification of the International Covenant on Economic,Social, and Cultural Rights

This study investigates the determinants of the ratification of International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). To do so, it proposes an explanation that postulates that states employ treaty ratification as a device to signal their resolve to implement polices required by the treaty at issue in order to appease demanding domestic constituencies, predicting that states with lower compliance capacity tend to commit faster than states with higher compliance capacity. Applying this explanation to the ICESCR leads to two expectations. First, the larger government spending a proxy of high compliance capacity is hypothesized to delay the ratification process. Second, states with the unitary system are expected to ratify the ICESCR more promptly because the centralized power structure in unitary states significantly restricts the pursuit of the policy autonomy by minorities at local level that the right to self-determination entails. The Cox proportional hazard analysis lends support to both hypotheses.     

Do Voters’ Coalition Preferences Affect Government Formation?

Studies on coalition formation assume that political parties have two major goals: they aim to maximise office and policy payoffs. This paper shows that decision-making in the government formation game is also determined by the voters’ coalition preferences. Since the coalition formation process is not a one-shot game, parties have to take the coalition preferences of the electorate into account when they evaluate the utility of potential coalitions. If parties fail to comply with the coalition preferences of voters, they are likely to be penalised in future elections. The argument is tested by an analysis of government formation in the 16 German states between 1990 and 2009. The results support the argument: the formation of coalitions – at least in the German states – is not only determined by office- and policy-seeking behaviour of political parties, but also by the preferences of voters regarding their preferred outcome of the coalition game.     

The Reinvention of Public Personnel Administration: An Analysis of the Diffusion of Personnel Management Reforms in the States

Reform is a common theme in American public administration. During the twentieth century at least 12 major administrative reforms have taken place at the federal level and countless others in state and local governments. Frequently, these reforms have addressed the operation of public personnel management systems. Recent efforts associated with the reinventing government movement, for example, have proposed numerous alterations to civil service rules and procedures, and many jurisdictions have implemented significant changes in their personnel practices. This article examines the extent to which these kinds of personnel reforms have been implemented by state governments. A reform index is developed to document the considerable variation among the states in their approach to personnel practices. Several state characteristics are associated with scores on this index, including legislative professionalism, which bears a positive relationship to reform, and the level of unemployment within a state and the proportion of state employees associated with public employee unions, which are both negatively associated with reform.     

Fiscal Decentralization and Natural Disaster Mitigation: Evidence from the United States

How decentralized government structure influences public service delivery has been a major focus of debate in the public finance literature. In this paper, we empirically examine the effect of fiscal decentralization on natural disaster damages across the U.S. states. We construct a unique measure of decentralization using state and local government expenditures on natural resources, which include investment in flood control and mitigation measures, among others. Using state‐level panel data from 1982 to 2011, we find that states that are more decentralized in natural resource expenditures have experienced more economic losses from floods and storms. This effect is only pronounced in states that are at higher risks of flooding. Our findings suggest that fiscal decentralization may lead to inefficient protection against natural disasters and provide implications for the assignment of disaster management responsibilities across different levels of government in the U.S. federal system.     

治理结构多元化：地方政府机构改革的新思路

通过对当代中国地方政府机构改革的一些典型个案进行分析,发现其陷入困境的深层次原因在于强调国家统一管理而导致的地方治理结构单一化。当代中国的地方治理结构单一化是历史遗传和传统体制的产物,与转轨时期纵向政府间关系中存在的压力型体制也有着内在的关联。随着改革的深入,地方治理结构单一化的弊端逐渐显现出来。但是,从美国和英国等西方发达国家的实践来看,地方治理结构多元化与国家的统一管理并不矛盾。因此,在已有的地方政府机构改革的思路基础上,实现地方治理结构多元化应该成为继续推进当代中国地方政府机构改革的新思路。     

Comparing Implementation Processes in Sweden and the United States

This article attempts a systematic comparison of how policy is implemented in Sweden and the United States. We suggest that differences might be explained by examining policymaking processes, policy content, and governmental structure. The comparison reveals differences in 'incentive structure'. Both Sweden and the U.S. have responded to the complexity and uncertainty that accompanies increased demands on central government by adopting 'softer' mechanisms for implementation. The effect of these shifts in both systems is to devolve important decisions to lower levels of government. In Sweden, this devolution is still accompanied by strong incentives for national policymakers to undertake implementation, although the incentives may not be as strong as they were in the past. In the U.S., it is accompanied by a radical weakening of incentives to carry out implementation and increasing instability in policy content and relations among key actors.     

Civic Culture and Government Performance in the American States

In a recent study, Robert D. Putnam reported a strong relationshipbetween civic culture and government performance among the newlyempowered regions of Italy. This article extends Putnam's methodologythe American states. Using similar techniques, we constructindices of civic culture and government performance for thestates. When correlated, the results reveal a clear link betweencivicness and performance. States that are more civic lend tohave governments that enact more liberal and innovative policies.This relationship between civicness and performance remainsstrong even after controlling for political culture, ideology,education, and other factors.     

Trade union power in Britain: The recent debate

It is frequently claimed in the media that the trade union movement is the dominant political force in Britain. Such conclusions are based upon impressionistic and subjective judgements rather than thorough academic analysis. Fortunately, there has been a resurgence of more serious study of the trade union relationship with, and influence over, government. The aim of this article is to review this literature and it is divided into four major parts: the strategies unions use in influencing government; the growing literature on the economic role of the unions; the effect of unions on government policy making; the power of the trade unions in relation to that of capital.     

Try Federalism

The present article follows up a previous study (Anckar 1998) which showed a strong association between size and party system fragmentation. The aim of the article is to see whether the explanatory power of size can, in fact, be attributed to a federal form of government. 77 countries with free party systems constitute the research population. The dependent variable has three components: number of parties, electoral support for the leading party, and the 'effective number of parties' calculated according to the Laakso-Taagepera formula. Preliminary tests reveal that federal states have a more fragmented party system than unitary states. However, when controlling for size, electoral system, the 'effective threshold,' and presidentialism, the results clearly show that federalism is overshadowed by size and also, to a lesser extent, by the effective threshold.     

Public‐Sector Unions and the Size of Government

Public‐sector unions are generally thought to increase the size of government through collective bargaining. This article challenges this idea for the case of teacher unions in the United States and argues that while collective bargaining institutions sometimes lead to increased education spending, this is not the norm. Using a new longitudinal data set spanning all states before and after they granted collective bargaining rights to teachers, the article shows that although states that mandate districts to bargain with teachers have higher education expenditures than states that do not, the differences precede collective bargaining. Difference‐in‐differences analyses find no evidence that introducing collective bargaining rights led to average increases in the level of resources devoted to education. Although existing theories cannot explain these null findings, the article shows one reason behind them is that most laws granting collective bargaining rights to teachers were not unambiguously prolabor, but included both pro‐ and anti‐union provisions.     

Direct Democracy Paradox: State Fiscal Policies in the United States and the Threat of Direct Initiatives

Many studies have argued that the initiative process in U.S. state governments strengthened the proximity between the citizens' preferences and policy output. In contrast, this study hypothesizes that the direct initiative process weakens, rather than strengthens, the link between citizen preferences and state fiscal policy. Governments respond to the threat of initiatives but only those of conservative agendas. The results show that while the level and the progressivity of tax rates in the states without direct initiatives are influenced by citizen preferences, those in states with direct initiatives are more conservative than those without direct initiatives and the former are insulated from the influence of the citizen preferences.