Russian lobbying in the United States: stages of evolution

The article examines Russian lobbying in the US. The endogenous and exogenous factors of Russian lobbying are analyzed as well as its qualitative and quantitative characteristics. The article depicts stages of Russian lobbying development: (i) from government to private entities; (ii) nongovernmental lobbying; and (iii) a return to government. Additionally, occasional attempts by Russian entities to secure funding from the US budget are mentioned. Two case studies are studied to show the nature of current Russian lobbying in the US: lobbying campaigns by Techsnabexport, state‐owned corporation, and GML, a private business concern. The article concludes that Russian lobbying in the US is weak. At the beginning, it was mostly about investment consulting, and with the rise in oil prices and the decrease in political freedom, the need for and availability of lobbying diminished. Some private corporations were nationalized under President Putin and, as a result, lost control over their international expansion strategies, with the remaining private corporations being afraid of independent lobbying campaigns abroad. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

State Court Strategies and Politics during the Appropriations Process

This article explores state court budgetary strategies and their effectiveness in the appropriations process as perceived by key budgeting actors. In general, we find evidence of state judiciaries that try to remain "above politics" when dealing with budget issues. The most important strategies to this effect include submitting realistic requests, providing documentation to support needs, and not using budget "weapons" at their disposal (e.g., writs of mandamus). However, the survey results do indicate that state judiciaries use certain strategies that have a more political tint, such as lobbying by court officials.     

Social heterogeneity and wasteful lobbying

Using a general equilibrium model with endogenous policy, we explore how heterogeneity affects wasteful lobbying by sectoral interest groups. With the help of a simulation approach, we first investigate the impact of information heterogeneity on how lobbies react to a shift from a soft to a strict government budget constraint. Next, we examine how lobbying is influenced by heterogenous perception of the general equilibrium implications of lobbying effort. Finally, we explore the consequences of heterogenous specialization in households' asset portfolios. We conclude that social heterogeneity in information, perceptions, and portfolio compositions increases incentives to lobby.     

Measuring and Promoting Budget Transparency: The Open Budget Index as a Research and Advocacy Tool

Transparency in public budgeting has been a recognized principle of sound governance for a long time. Yet, reliable measures of budget transparency are hard to come by. This article introduces the Open Budget Index (OBI), a new tool based on surveys by independent researchers that compares key budget information published by governments across the world. Data from the latest survey, published in 2010 and covering 94 countries, reveal that on average, the state of budget transparency around the world is poor. Countries with lower incomes, weaker democratic institutions, and higher dependency on foreign aid and hydrocarbon sales tend to be less transparent. However, a number of countries have improved the quantity and coverage of the budget information that they publish, in some cases following civil society pressure based on OBI findings. More generally, OBI data help identify easy steps that governments and other actors could take to further improve budget transparency.     

Pressure or Information? Lobbying for Binding Renewable Energy Targets in the European Union

This article analyzes the European renewable energy industry's capacity for pressure‐based and information‐based lobbying and its strategies in two lobbying efforts: for a legally binding target of 20 percent renewable energy by 2020 (a proposal adopted by the European Council in March 2007) and for binding interim targets as a means to secure effective implementation of the 2020 target (a proposal that was not adopted). It finds that the industry has the capacity for information‐based lobbying but very limited capacity for pressure‐based lobbying. The article also discusses the effectiveness of the two lobbying types. It argues that information‐based lobbying is particularly effective early in the decision‐making process, and hypothesizes that early information‐based lobbying may compensate for limited capacity for pressure‐based lobbying and for information‐based lobbying that takes place later in the decision‐making process, but concludes that this strategy would have been unlikely to be effective in the second case.     

Lobbying: fantasy,reality or both? A health care public policy case study

This paper provides a theoretical explanation for lobbying as interpersonal rhetorical communication based on the tenets of symbolic convergence theory (SCT). SCT is a general theory of communication in the symbolic interactionism paradigm. Nowhere in the extant communication literature, including the scholarly public relations research, is lobbying explicated in this way. This paper utilises a health care public policy case study to illustrate SCT in lobbying practice. The emphasis here is on how lobbyists use homo narrans, or human storytelling, in influential face‐to‐face information exchange with public policy decision makers to be persuasive on behalf of their clients. The ultimate aim of this paper is to build the current body of theoretical and practical knowledge about lobbying, to advance more positive perceptions of lobbyists and lobbying and to improve the practice of lobbying in producing effective public policy outcomes. Copyright © 2001 Henry Stewart Publications     

Show Them Your Teeth First!

This paper investigates the choice of an interestgroup between lobbying (``words'') and pressure(``actions'') in order to influence a policymaker. Both lobbying and pressure are modeled asstrategic means of transmitting information that isrelevant to the policymaker. However, only pressure isdirectly costly to the policymaker. The interactionbetween the interest group and the policymaker isframed as a repeated signaling game. In equilibriumpressure – in contrast to lobbying – only occurswhen the interest group's reputation is sufficientlylow, and always improves its reputation. It is shownthat (repeated) lobbying cannot completely substitutefor pressure, and that the interest group may beforced to sustain its reputation through lobbying. Weconclude that pressure is typically used to build upa reputation, lobbying to maintain a reputation.     

A comparative insight into the status of the lobbying regulation debate in Estonia

This paper focuses on different approaches towards regulating lobbying. Special attention is paid to policy formulation regarding lobbying regulation in Estonia. The Estonian case study is juxtaposed with the regulatory solutions of lobbying in Scandinavian and post-communist countries. The reason for choosing such a comparative framework is justified by the fact that these two sets of countries have chosen rather dissimilar approaches in interpreting the role of lobbying in society. As Estonia's policy decisions are often determined by both of these two spaces of political culture, the article polemicizes over the question of which path Estonia could take in terms of regulatory framework for lobbying. The analysis concludes with policy recommendations to Estonia as well as with suggestions for further theoretical research directions for understanding better the policy impact of lobbying regulations designed and implemented by post-communist states. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Public affairs practice and lobbying inequality: Reform and regulation of the influence game

Although vigorous lobbying by groups within society is essential for the functioning of democracy, it is widely perceived that resource‐rich groups, particularly corporations, enjoy unfair advantages and influence. This perception damages public trust in the efficacy of civic participation and the legitimacy of policymaking. This problem intermittently leads reformers and scholars to assess and develop policies that might assist in addressing lobbying power imbalances. This paper takes up Moloney's call for exploring ways of intervening in the communicative economy to directly address the problem of lobbying inequality. It considers the extent of lobbying inequalities and theoretical frameworks for understanding how resources enable an influence advantage, before assessing the types of regulatory approaches that have been used by democratic institutions. Voluntary measures that could be taken by the corporate sector and professional associations are considered, alongside the current interest in using digital platforms to identify inequalities and incorporate public preferences as a variable in allocating lobbying resources.     

Balancing inside and outside lobbying: The political strategies of lobbyists at global diplomatic conferences

This article seeks to explain the use of inside and outside lobbying by organised interests at global diplomatic conferences. At first sight, the lobbying at these venues is puzzling as it does not seem to be a very fruitful way to acquire influence. The use of outside strategies especially is perplexing because most aspects of international negotiations fall outside of the purview of national constituencies. It is argued in this article, however, that the presence of outside lobbying is not so puzzling if lobbying is seen both as a way to attain influence and as a way to pursue organisational maintenance goals. Empirically, the article draws on interview data with 232 interest group representatives that participated at either the 2012 session of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Geneva, or the 2011 (Durban) and 2012 (Doha) United Nations Climate Conferences. The analysis demonstrates that organisational needs, and especially the competition actors face in obtaining resources, significantly affects the relative focus of organised interests on inside and outside lobbying.     

Lobbying the state or the market? A framework to study civil society organizations’ strategic behavior

This article lays out a framework for the conditions under which a civil society organization lobbies the state and when it turns to the market. This strategic choice cannot be understood solely from within current frameworks of lobbying strategies; insights from interest group studies must be complemented with the social movement literature's understanding of market‐based strategies. We build an overarching framework by extending the inside and outside lobbying dichotomy to include strategies that target the market. We also argue that it is crucial to understand the relations between both lobbying venues, as their relative power affects the choice not only between inside or outside lobbying, but also between the state or the market. The result is a richer framework more suited to capture the breadth of contemporary civil society organization lobbying behavior and, more importantly, to facilitate the comparative assessment of different strategic choices in future empirical research.     

Unity and conflict: Explaining financial industry lobbying success in European Union public consultations

This article examines the contingent nature of financial industry lobbying power in the context of the policy formation stage of six European Commission regulatory proposals. I argue that lobbying success is a function of how well finance is able to speak with a unified voice. Building on existing studies, I examine industry unity as explicit preference alignment between actors but also in terms of actors abstaining from stating preferences. Staying silent on an issue sends signals to policymakers about issue saliency and industry support. Using a novel dataset derived from document coding and interviews, I examine the impact of industry unity on lobbying success in shaping six financial regulatory proposals in the context of the European Union. My findings show that lobbying success is partially contingent on the extent to which finance is united behind a common position. Critically, however, lobbying success is also related to the nature of that position, whether supporting the proposal or whether in favor of strengthening or weakening regulatory stringency.     

Targeting the lobbying effort: The importance of local government lobbying

Abstract Local government is subject to extensive lobbying, which is reasonable given the greater importance of the local public sector in large welfare states. Most of the scholarly attention has been focused on lobbying at the national level, often addressing the impact of interest groups on public policies. This article discusses a decision–making model where interest groups optimize their lobbying efforts given the way that different local governments and individual politicians respond to these activities. A number of propositions are tested on the basis of data from Norwegian local government. Contrary to prior theorizing, we do not find that representatives seeking re–election are contacted more frequently by interest groups. Interest groups target their lobbying activities toward politicians who are members of the relevant council committees, and they exert stronger pressure on members of the executive board and active representatives who perceive themselves as influential. Inter–municipal differences are also of importance: The lobbying activities are more intensive where electoral participation is low and in the larger urban municipalities, while the size of legislatures and the strength of the local political leadership affect lobbying efforts negatively. Interest groups tend to be more active in the richer local governments. The demands of the residential population impact weakly on lobbying efforts.     

The acceptance,relevance and dominance of lobbying the EU Commission — a first‐time survey of the EU Commission's civil servants

Among public affairs techniques lobbying is by far the most mystifying one — at least in Europe. Lobbying comes from the Latin word ‘labium’ and means ‘entrance hall’ or ‘lounge’. Therein the essential meaning can be seen: today political decisions are not made in plenary assemblies but primarily in the pre‐political phase of balancing the various interests. Lobbying is to be understood as the ‘diverse intensive activities of social groups, chambers and companies in the political and bureaucratic vestibule’ (Beyme 1980). Modern lobbying on the EU level is an intermediary policy for the support of political decision making — even if some critics refuse to believe it. Lobbying at EU level has become a politically realistic dimension. Even if the mass media still take a very sceptical and negative view of lobbying in Brussels, based on the existing European taboo on influencing politics, an in‐depth analysis reveals various lobbies at work in EU institutions. Lobbying today is an essential part of all EU decision areas. This paper describes the functional theory approach of lobbying known as ‘cooperation as confrontation through communication’. For the first time, recipients of lobbying in the EU Commission are demonstrating their acceptance of lobbying efforts. The paper is based on the doctoral thesis ‘The acceptance, relevance and dominance of lobbying the EU Commission’ by Peter Koeppl, University of Vienna (unpublished). Copyright © 2001 Henry Stewart Publications     

Targeting the lobbying effort: The importance of local government lobbying

Local government is subject to extensive lobbying, which is reasonable given the greater importance of the local public sector in large welfare states. Most of the scholarly attention has been focused on lobbying at the national level, often addressing the impact of interest groups on public policies. This article discusses a decision–making model where interest groups optimize their lobbying efforts given the way that different local governments and individual politicians respond to these activities. A number of propositions are tested on the basis of data from Norwegian local government. Contrary to prior theorizing, we do not find that representatives seeking re–election are contacted more frequently by interest groups. Interest groups target their lobbying activities toward politicians who are members of the relevant council committees, and they exert stronger pressure on members of the executive board and active representatives who perceive themselves as influential. Inter–municipal differences are also of importance: The lobbying activities are more intensive where electoral participation is low and in the larger urban municipalities, while the size of legislatures and the strength of the local political leadership affect lobbying efforts negatively. Interest groups tend to be more active in the richer local governments. The demands of the residential population impact weakly on lobbying efforts.     

Collusion, Collective Action and Protection: Theory and Evidence

This paper provides a novel explanation forthe formation of protectionist lobby groupsin imperfectly competitive sectors. Thelevel of collusion is shown to be a crucialdeterminant of the ability of firms tosustain lobbying. We show that greatercollusion reduces firm contributionsto tariff lobbying, when the governmentvalues welfare sufficiently and thecross-price elasticity between the domesticand foreign goods is sufficiently high. The empirical evidence from the U.S.supports the theory. Greater collusionreduces the level of PAC contributions.     

Comparative lobbying research: advances,shortcomings and recommendations

This review article suggests that there is a new school of comparative lobbying emerging. However, this development is taking place only gradually. Unlike the earlier studies, which studied corporatism/pluralism, outside lobbying and lobbying regulations, the new comparativists are mainly focusing on inside lobbying strategies and success as a function of country‐level factors. Yet, the literature still suffers from underdeveloped theories. I stress that our knowledge can be improved with better theorizing. Better theories, in turn, can be formulated by improving the use of quantitative data gathering, qualitative research, formal models and better communication between researchers working with different methodologies in different disciplines. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Determinants of Firm‐Level Lobbying and Government Responsiveness in Agricultural Biotechnology in China

Understanding what stimulates agribusiness firms to lobby the government and what makes the government responsive to lobbying are the two issues that have been discussed extensively in the debates concerning determinants of biotechnology policy. This paper examines the factors influencing agribusiness firms' lobbying and government response using econometric modeling on a new data set of 160 leading agribusiness firms in the food, feed, chemical, and seed industries in China. The results show that approximately 10% of agribusiness firms lobbied the government about biotechnology policy and regulations and over half of those that lobbied received a verbal or written acknowledgment from government agencies. Seed and feed companies are more likely to engage in lobbying than chemical companies. Owning GM patents not only has a positive impact on firms' lobbying activities, but firms with these patents are more likely to receive a government response to their lobbying efforts. The experience of selling GM products does not significantly influence lobbying activities or response from the government.     

Corruption and Rent-Seeking

The rent-seeking theory was one of thefirst economic instruments developed tomodel corruption in the public sector.Comparing corruption with lobbying, itproposes that the former is the lesser oftwo evils, since lobbying entails the wastage of resources inthe competition forpreferential treatment. This study showsthat the traditional rent-seeking theorymisunderstands three factors: first, theimpact of a corrupt monopoly on the rent'ssize; second, corruption as a motivationfor supplying preferential treatment andthird; that corruption involves a narrowerrange of interests than those ofcompetitive lobbying. Taking these factorsinto consideration, the opposite argumentis valid: corruption has worse welfareimplications than alternative rent-seekingactivities.