Enron, a Perceived Crisis in Public Confidence, and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002

In the spring of 2002 Congress passed and President Bush signed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), the first major piece of campaign reform legislation since the early 1970s. While momentum for reform had been growing since the mid-1990s, without the Enron scandal and its potential threat to public officials, additional support to overcome the procedural barriers and opposition from the Republican leadership in both the House and Senate would have been difficult to overcome. In addition, Bush Administration ties to Enron had the effect of demobilizing the president on the issue, making it virtually impossible for him to veto a bill he fundamentally opposed. The Enron scandal provided the “window of opportunity” needed by reform-oriented elites to pass a controversial and far-ranging law that was not a high priority on the public's agenda. The end result is a law, pending a Supreme Court ruling on its constitutionality, that has the potential to alter fundamentally how electoral campaigns are funded and conducted.     

Facebook,the Conservatives and the Risk to Fair and Open Elections in the UK

The Conservative party spent £1.2 million on Facebook during the UK 2015 general election campaign. This enabled the party to target specific voters in marginal constituencies with tailored messages. Their use of Facebook in 2015 shows how central digital media had become to their campaign communication. It also shows, however, that this communication may be compromising the principles of fair and open elections in the UK, for example by allowing parties to effectively bypass constituency spending limits and avoid transparency. Unless electoral legislation and regulation are changed to take account of developments in digital media they are liable to become increasingly anachronistic and ineffective.     

The Politicization of Marriage in Contemporary American Public Policy: The Defense of Marriage Act and the Personal Responsibility Act

The sexuality politics terrain in the United States is currently marked by a complex and contradictory set of developments‐non-traditional family structures are becoming more common, popular opinion is moving in a more tolerant direction, and the lesbian and gay rights movement has enjoyed some victories, but conservative family values and patriarchal heterosexual marriage have been vigorously promoted by influential right-wing social movements and more deeply institutionalized through important public policy initiatives and court decisions. This article considers the theoretical implications of these developments with respect to the conceptual approaches to citizenship and sexuality. It then analyses two major pieces of federal legislation in depth: the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and the Personal Responsibility Act (PRA). DOMA effectively encourages the states to ban same-sex marriages. The PRA is generally considered as a welfare 'reform' law that imposes compulsory 'workfare' schemes and time limits for benefit recipients. It nevertheless has a significant sexual regulation dimension. Both the religious right's campaign against same-sex marriage and the welfare reformers' attack on the rights of single mothers contribute to a reactionary politicization of marriage. In conclusion, the article contends that it is only insofar as lesbian and gay rights issues are understood more broadly as but one aspect of sexual regulation and citizenship rights struggles that we can develop more effective ways of advancing the sexual liberation movement as a whole.     

The Campaign Value of Incumbency: A New Solution to the Puzzle of Less Effective Incumbent Spending

A puzzle in research on campaign spending is that while expenditure is positively related to votes won, this effect is far more strongly, or even exclusively, enjoyed by challengers rather than by incumbents. We unearth a new explanation for the puzzle, focusing on the hidden, yet variable, campaign value of office perquisites which incumbents deploy in their campaigns to win votes. When these variable office benefits are unobserved, then the effect is to make observed incumbent spending less effective than spending by challengers. Using data from the 2002 Irish general election, where incumbency was assigned a variable campaign value and included in declared campaign spending, we are able to demonstrate this hidden incumbency effect and estimate its relationship to electoral success, in terms of overall votes, share of votes, and probability of winning a seat. Contrary to previous research showing ineffective incumbent spending, we find that when the campaign value of office is also measured, public office value “spending” is not only very effective in winning votes, but also seems to be more effective than regular incumbent spending.     

Interest groups,campaign contributions,and probabilistic voting

This essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral-policy decisions of candidates for office. Interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates' policies and opposing groups' donations remain unaltered. Candidates, however, recognize that their policy choices affect contributions. Campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy-oriented voters' perceptions of candidates' positions. In this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates' electoral policies, and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups.     

Presidential campaign expenditures: Evidence on allocations and effects

This paper analyzes the impact of presidential campaign spending on election results. Analyses of expenditures and voting are often plagued by simultaneity between campaign spending and expected vote share. However, game-theoretic models of resource-allocation decisions made by a central actor (i.e., a presidential campaign) suggest that candidates will spend more in close races and in races likely to be pivotal. We provide empirical support for this theory; using Federal Communications Commission data from the 1972 presidential election, we find that expenditures were higher in states where the election was expected to be closer and in states likely to be pivotal. We use these two factors as instruments in a two-stage least squares model to estimate the effect of spending on votes. We find that, contrary to previous theory and research, presidential campaign spending significantly increases a candidate's vote share.     

Why bother campaigning? Campaign effectiveness in the 2009 European Parliament elections

This paper explores the effectiveness of European Parliament candidates' campaigns. We analyze the relationship between candidates' spending and their likelihood of success, controlling for a range of relevant co-varying factors. We then investigate whether the effects of electoral spending are conditioned by two variables: ballot design and incumbency. We find that, ceteris paribus, spending was positively related to a candidate's likelihood of electoral success in the 2009 campaign, though this effect is small in scale. We also reveal that the electorally positive effects of spending are observable across both 'party-centered' and ‘candidate-centered’ ballot structures, and that there is some evidence that incumbent spending is less effective than challenger spending.     

Contribution limits and the effectiveness of campaign spending

Much work on the apparent ineffectiveness on incumbent spending in congressional elections has hypothesized that the productivity of incumbent spending is low because incumbents operate on the “flat part” of their election returns function. Differences in campaign spending associated with state campaign finance laws allows for a test of this hypothesis because restrictions on campaign contributions tend to reduce campaign spending. Exploiting cross-state variation in campaign finance laws, this study tests whether campaign expenditures by state House candidates are more productive when candidates are subject to contribution limits. The results show that campaign expenditures by incumbents and challengers are more productive when candidates run in states with campaign contribution limits, as opposed to in states without limits. In states with contribution limits, incumbent spending and challenger spending are equally productive, and spending by both candidates is quantitatively important in increasing their vote shares.     

De Gaulle,Colonel Passy and British Intelligence, 1940–42

De Gaulle's relationship with his secret intelligence and subversive services, the Bureau central de renseignements et d'action (BCRA) headed by Colonel Passy, as well as with British intelligence is examined in the light of the now declassified archives of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the BCRA. These archives reveal that de Gaulle failed to interest himself seriously in secret intelligence or subversion before the arrival of Jean Moulin in London in October 1941. De Gaulle's subsequent relationship with the BCRA and British intelligence was defined by an obsessive need for political control, which only served to compromise the BCRA's otherwise successful collaboration with British intelligence.     

Implementing the Chief Financial Officers Act and the Government Performance and Results Act in the Federal Government

The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 and the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, along with other legislation passed by Congress, are stimulating major financial management reform in the federal government. This article evaluates reform implementation against nine criteria developed in previous research on this topic. The criteria are accounting system adequacy, congressional intent, ability of Congress to use financial statement data, executive branch implementation incentives, capability of the Office of Management and Budget, utility of financial statements for decision making, use of performance measures in budgeting, coordination of federal organizations charged with implementation responsibility, and executive and congressional support for reform.     

Additional incumbent spending really can harm (at least some) incumbents: An analysis of vote share maximization

The literature on the effects of campaign expenditures on electoral outcomes implicitly suggests that incumbent spending cannot have a negative marginal impact on the incumbent's vote share. Indeed, that literature has spent a great deal of effort finding positive and significant effects of incumbent spending. This paper shows that there are circumstances under which theory predicts zero and even negative impacts of incumbent spending. Estimating equations derived from the theory provide strong support for the base model, though only weak support for the extensions which predict nonpositive marginal products for incumbents.     

The Federal Antideficiency Act at 150—Where Do We Stand?

The Antideficiency Act of 1870 codified Congress's power of the purse to curb unauthorized agency spending. Is it still working? This paper analyzes all violations of the Act over 12 years by agency and type, causes and consequences, and how violations were detected. The number of violations has trended down slightly. While agency preventive controls have failed, detective controls are working. Employees and agencies are comfortable self‐reporting violations, which are neither pervasive nor material. The risk of violations increases during fiscal year transitions and periods of change. The Act remains effective at stopping unauthorized and overspending, but does not address wasteful spending.     

The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990: The Path to No Fault Budgeting

The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, included in the controversial and comprehensive budget legislation passed by Congress in October, makes a number of significant changes in federal budgeting. It shifts the focus of the budget process from deficit reduction to spending control, provides five-year spending totals and mini-sequesters for defense, international and domestic appropriations, and puts entitlements and revenue expenditures on a pay-as-you-go basis. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit targets have been raised substantially, Social Security surpluses taken out of the deficit calculation and allowance made for further adjustments for inflation, Operation Desert Shield, and other emergency spending, minimizing the prospect for general sequestration. OMB has been given important new estimating authority and the roles of the congressional committees involved in budgeting have been altered.     

The Employment Opportunities for Disabled Americans Act: legislative history and summary of provisions

This article describes the legislative history of Public Law 99-643, the Employment Opportunities for Disabled Americans Act, and contains a summary of the provisions of the new law. The intent of this legislation is to enhance the work incentives for the disabled and blind under the supplemental security income (SSI) law. The law makes permanent and improves section 1619 of the Social Security Act, provisions that were enacted as a temporary demonstration project in 1980. These provisions encourage disabled and blind individuals who are eligible for SSI benefits to make work attempts by providing special SSI payments and Medicaid coverage while they do so.     

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board: Déjà Vu Seidman's Quasi Government?1

The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002, enacted in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, is the most significant securities legislation since the 1930s. Title I of the Act creates a quasi‐public entity, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), and vests it with sovereign regualtory power, subject to oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission, over the auditors of public companies. This article describes PCAOB's unique architecture, including independence from the profession it regulates, financing, and organizational structure. In doing so, it raises important policy issues of public administration, public finance, and public budgeting.     

How prices matter in politics: the returns to campaign advertising

The apparent ineffectiveness of incumbent campaign spending in congressional elections is one of the enduring puzzles in the political economy literature. Previous work in this area has assumed that advertising prices are uniform across congressional districts, and therefore that campaign spending alone is a good proxy for campaign advertising. However, candidates in different districts face widely different advertising prices and this paper shows that differences in advertising costs are one source of the apparent ineffectiveness of campaign spending. Accounting for the price of advertising, this paper shows that campaign spending is productive for both incumbents and challengers.     

Campaign finance reform and electoral competition

Using state senate data from 1984 through the beginning of 2002, this paper finds that campaign donation regulations clearly reduce the competitiveness in political races. This is reflected in several dimensions. Conservative estimates indicate that different donation limits are associated with anywhere from a 4 to over a 23 percentage point increase in win margins. The regulations increase the probability that only one candidate will run for office. And they increase the probability that incumbents win re-election. Campaign finance regulations also tend to reduce the number of candidates who run for office by an average of about 20 percent.     

Competition policy for elections: Do campaign contribution limits matter?

This paper examines whether campaign contribution restrictions have consequences for election outcomes. States are a natural laboratory to examine this issue. We analyze elections to Assemblies from 1980 to 2001 and determine whether candidates' vote shares are altered by changes in state campaign contribution restrictions. We find that limits on giving narrow the margin of victory of the winning candidate. Limits lead to closer elections for future incumbents, but have less effect on the margin of victory of incumbents who passed the campaign finance legislation. We also find some evidence that contribution limits increase the number of candidates in the race.     

The Enduring Effects of Competitive Elections

Research on U.S. congressional elections has placed great emphasis on the role of competitiveness, which is associated with high levels of campaign spending, media coverage, and interest group and party involvement. Competitive campaigns have been found to increase citizens' participation, engagement and learning. However, little is known about whether the effects of competitive campaigns have enduring consequences for citizens' attitudes and behavior. Analyzing a survey of citizens conducted one year after the 2006 congressional elections that includes an oversample of respondents from competitive House races, we examine whether exposure to a competitive House campaign affects voters' political knowledge and political interest as well as their consumption of political news. We find that competitive elections have positive effects that endure for at least a year beyond the campaign season, reinforcing the idea that political competition plays a robust role in American representative democracy.