Extension of the portfolio allocation model to surplus majority governments: a fuzzy approach

Scholars have long studied the conditions under which the cabinet making process will result in minority, surplus majority, or minimum-winning governing coalitions in parliamentary systems. Since Riker, a good number of these attempts have been based on rational choice assumptions. Among formal approaches in this vein, Laver and Shepsle’s (Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary governments, 1996) portfolio allocation model argues that parties centrally located in policy space have a greater potential for being part of any governing coalition and that parties located at the issue-by-issue median have a high likelihood of forming a minority government. However, the model predicts that surplus majority coalitions will only form when the number of salient policy dimensions in the political system is greater than two. We incorporate fuzzy set theory in the portfolio allocation model, permitting us to model ambiguity in parties’ policy preferences. The reformulated model accounts for the formation of surplus majority coalitions in two-dimensional policy space. We illustrate the model’s conclusions with a case study of the 1996 surplus majority coalition in the Lithuanian Seimas.     

The organization of influence on the EC's common agriculturalpolicy: A network approach

The common agricultural policy of the EC with its market regulations is decided at EC level by a multilevel system of government, in which the Commission and the parliamentary parties of the European Parliament play the supranational role and the national ministries of agriculture act as parts of the intergovernmental system of the Council of Ministers. National interest groups have thereby three major access routes to the EC system, first through their national governments, or second indirectly, transmitted by their European peak organizations, or third directly to the supranational EC actors. The network approach is applied to study empirically the densities of access through these various routes. The links between actors in the agricultural policy domain are conceptualized as links for the exchange of resources, the most important resource of a policy domain being the final control of policy decisions. The political actors of the governance system originally hold full control of this valuable resource which they exchange for influence resources possessed by the interest groups, as public support or expert knowledge. Empirically, answers to the network questions depend on the type of resource and the viewpoint of the interviewed actors. An index is developed which indicates the resource flows between actors and the distribution of equilibrium control of policy decisions. It is shown that the national ministers of agriculture depend very much on the support and expertise of their national farmers' lobby, whereas the Commission relies more on contacts within the political sector itself. Multilevel systems need a lot of political coordination, so that the political actors within such systems, especially at the supranational level, seem to deal first of all with each other and not so much with the demand side of politics, compared to the national ministers of agriculture.     

The organization of influence on the EC's common agricultural policy: A network approach

Abstract The common agricultural policy of the EC with its market regulations is decided at EC level by a multilevel system of government, in which the Commission and the parliamentary parties of the European Parliament play the supranational role and the national ministries of agriculture act as parts of the intergovernmental system of the Council of Ministers. National interest groups have thereby three major access routes to the EC system, first through their national governments, or second indirectly, transmitted by their European peak organizations, or third directly to the supranational EC actors. The network approach is applied to study empirically the densities of access through these various routes. The links between actors in the agricultural policy domain are conceptualized as links for the exchange of resources, the most important resource of a policy domain being the final control of policy decisions. The political actors of the governance system originally hold full control of this valuable resource which they exchange for influence resources possessed by the interest groups, as public support or expert knowledge. Empirically, answers to the network questions depend on the type of resource and the viewpoint of the interviewed actors. An index is developed which indicates the resource flows between actors and the distribution of equilibrium control of policy decisions. It is shown that the national ministers of agriculture depend very much on the support and expertise of their national farmers' lobby, whereas the Commission relies more on contacts within the political sector itself. Multilevel systems need a lot of political coordination, so that the political actors within such systems, especially at the supranational level, seem to deal first of all with each other and not so much with the demand side of politics, compared to the national ministers of agriculture.     

The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship

Abstract.  Perhaps the strongest empirical finding in political science is 'Gamson's Law': the near-perfect relationship that exists in parliamentary systems between a coalition party's seat contribution to the government and its quantitative allocation of cabinet portfolios. Nevertheless, doubts remain. What would happen if the salience or importance of the various portfolios was also taken into account? Should it not be the case that payoffs correspond with bargaining power rather than seat contributions? And perhaps most significantly, would addressing these issues produce evidence that the parties designated to form governments extract disproportionately large payoffs for themselves, as predicted by 'proposer' models of bargaining? Utilizing the results of a new expert survey of portfolio salience in 14 Western European countries, the authors of this article explore each of these questions. Their basic finding is that salience-weighted portfolios payoffs overwhelmingly mirror seat contributions, contra proposer models and any other models based on bargaining power. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications for formal models of bargaining.     

Two models of the urban crisis: An analytical essay on banfield and forrester

This essay examines the arguments and evidence used in two recent models of the urban crisis—Edward C. Banfield'sThe Unheavenly City and Jay W. Forrester'sUrban Dynamics. Although Banfield's model is sociological and Forrester's is economic and physical, both imply that not much can be done to alleviate urban problems and that positive programs may make them worse. The authors of this critique contend that the articulation of argument and evidence is inadequate to support the implication. They advocate that promising current programs be refined on the basis of evidence and experience and that policymakers continue to search for efficient new programs through social experiments.     

Modeling and testing the diffusion of expectations: An EITM approach

This paper uses the empirical implications of theoretical models (EITM) framework to examine the consequences of the asymmetric diffusion of expectations. In the spirit of the traditional two-step flow model of communication, less-informed agents learn the expectations of more-informed agents. We find that when there is misinterpretation in the information acquisition process, a boomerang effect exists. In this equilibrium the less-informed agents’ forecasts confound those of more-informed agents. We apply the EITM approach to a key economic variable known to have a relation to economic fluctuations – inflation expectations. Using surveyed inflation expectations data for the period, 1978–2000, we find the boomerang effect exists. One implication of this finding pertains to economic policy and economic volatility: because policymakers have more information than the public, the boomerang effect can lead policymakers to make inaccurate forecasts of economic conditions and conduct erroneous policies which contribute to economic instability.     

Thalidomide, BSE and the single market: An historical-institutionalist approach to regulatory regimes in the European Union

Abstract.  The success of the European Union in regulating the safety of products in the single market differs widely. In the last decade, the regulatory regime for pharmaceuticals has functioned without raising public concerns. The establishment of a European agency for pharmaceuticals in the early 1990s has been evaluated positively by both producers and consumers, and there have been no large scandals so far. At the same time, the food sector was subject to a whole range of crises, of which the BSE scandal was certainly the most significant one. In reaction to this, the regulatory regime for foodstuffs was reformed by setting up the European Food Safety Agency in 2002. This article adopts an historical-institutionalist approach, and thus tries to give an explanation for the striking differences between the two regulatory regimes. Accordingly, the development of supranational regulatory regimes is distinguished by two critical junctures: a crisis of consumer confidence and the establishment of a single market. It is crucial which of these occurred first. If a crisis of consumer confidence leads to the establishment of national regulatory authorities, these authorities act as stakeholders, which could be an obstacle for harmonization, but also ensures a necessary commitment to health and consumer protection once a single market is set up. If national regulatory authorities are missing, it might be easier to set up a single market, but a regulatory deficit is more likely to occur and, in case of a crisis, the whole regulatory regime has to be established at the supranational level.     

Estimating policy positions using political texts: An evaluation of the Wordscores approach

This paper evaluates a recently developed method for extracting policy positions from political texts, known as Wordscores. This computerized content analysis technique is a potentially powerful tool for scholars interested in the study of political elites, since it promises an easy and efficient way of inferring policy position from texts and speeches. In this article, we provide a systematic evaluation of this promising method. Using Danish manifestos and government speeches from 1945 to 2005, we compare the policy positions extracted using Wordscores with measures of positions from the well-known Comparative Manifesto Project and cross-validate these with party expert surveys. Our analysis shows that the word scoring technique arrives at largely similar estimates to independently derived position measures and produces time series of government positions with high face validity.     

An approach to the legislative production of the Spanish parliament (1979–1982)

Abstract. Analysis of Spain's first constitutional legislature (1979–1982) reveals (with the logical reservations derived from the fact that this was the first democratic legislature after the many years of Franco's dictatorship) the Spanish Parliament's important influence on the legislative process in terms of both initiating legislation and proposing amendments to bills introduced. This influence may possibly have stemmed from the fragile government of Union de Centro Democrático (UCD) at a time when the party had only a relative majority in Parliament and was torn by serious internal problems, both ideological and personal, which caused it to all but disappear in the 1982 election. All of this took place within the framework of a system of centralized political decision-making in which political leaders played a starring role.     

加压式减负:基层减负难的一个解释性框架

基层减负是加强基层治理现代化建设的重要议题。对珠三角A镇的实地调研显示:基层减负取得了一定的成效,但基层工作人员的减负获得感仍然不强,工作压力有增无减,加班加点仍是常态,无效劳动时间越来越长。“加压式减负”的解释框架有助于理解基层负担“越减越负”的悖论:基层减负难,难在做形式主义减法的同时不断地做实质性职责扩张的加法,加压环境的刚性存在使基层处于一种任务超载而资源匮乏的境地,进而造成基层形式主义应对方式的蔓延。基层减负,不是要减少基层政府的工作量,而是要厘清政府与市场、政府与社会的边界,优化纵向政府间权责资源配置,完善基层工作激励约束机制,真正使基层更好地把工作重心落到为公众服务上来。     

中国政府绩效管理的研究热点与前沿解析——基于科学知识图谱的方法

当前政府绩效管理已成为与公共部门人力资源管理、政府财政与预算、政府信息资源管理、政府组织管理与战略、风险与公共危机管理等一并备受公共管理学界竞相推崇的热点议题。近十年来,国内学术界产出的政府绩效管理文献可谓汗牛充栋,亟待对这些文献及其研究主题予以科学评估和综述概览。运用CiteSpace Ⅳ可视化分析软件对中国知网(CNKI)期刊数据库政府绩效管理主题文献进行聚类和计量分析,发现中国政府绩效管理研究热点主题集中于政府绩效管理体系构成与制度要件、政府绩效管理与行政管理体制改革、政府绩效管理的合法性与外部宏观改革逻辑等研究层面,而未来的研究倾向于政府绩效管理的"预算绩效""公共价值""行政体制改革"及其他如"政府绩效评估"等维度。运用知识图谱和文献聚类方法梳理政府绩效管理研究的学术热点与前沿动态,有助于提升政府绩效管理研究质量和学术元意识,明晰政府绩效管理研究的知识进路和逻辑脉络,促进中国特色政府绩效管理理论体系与话语建设。     

The political economy of food pricing: An extended empirical test of the interest group approach

Several recent studies have documented the magnitude and impact of distortions in food pricing. However, little attention has been paid to the nature of the political agendas that determine the levels of direct and indirect protection granted to producers and consumers. This paper offers evidence that, regardless of the degree of economic development, the level of political pressure wielded by interest groups in food markets, and hence the level of protection they receive, is an inverse function of the relative size of their constituencies. The results recommend the application of collective action concepts to the understanding of agricultural policies in countries which are at different stages of development.     

The 2016 Referendum,Brexit and the Left Behind: An Aggregate‐level Analysis of the Result

Why did Britain vote for Brexit? What was the relative importance of factors such as education, age, immigration and ethnic diversity? And to what extent did the pattern of public support for Brexit across the country match the pattern of public support in earlier years for eurosceptic parties, notably the UK Independence Party (UKIP)? In this article we draw on aggregate‐level data to conduct an initial exploration of the 2016 referendum vote. First, we find that turnout was generally higher in more pro‐Leave areas. Second, we find that public support for Leave closely mapped past support for UKIP. And third, we find that support for Leave was more polarised along education lines than support for UKIP ever was. The implication of this finding is that support for euroscepticism has both widened and narrowed—it is now more widespread across Britain but it is also more socially distinctive.     

The economic theory of regulation and trucking deregulation: Shifting to the state level

Federal deregulation of the trucking industry in 1980 created a general gain in economic welfare at the expense of the monopoly rents of powerful interests, leading some scholars to ponder the limitations of the economic theory of regulation. However, analyzing only the federal changes excludes evidence from the significant intrastate sector of the trucking industry, regulation of which remains largely unchanged from that prior to 1980. This paper argues that after a decade of clear federal policy success, truckers continue to capture most state regulators, sustaining monopoly rents in what would otherwise be an inherently competitive industry. Using data from the fifty states, we demonstrate the extent to which the economic theory is in fact consistent with trucking industry evidence.     

A social-ecological approach to voluntary environmental initiatives: the case of nature-based tourism

This paper addresses the role of voluntary environmental initiatives by the tourism industry to alleviate social dilemmas for the management of natural resources. The objective is to explore whether previous findings on the determinants of voluntary action in the management of common-pool resources (CPR) also apply to a sector, such as tourism, where non-extractive uses are dominant. The paper applies the social-ecological systems framework recently developed by Ostrom (Science, 325, 419–422, 2009) to analyze qualitative data from meta-analyses of successful voluntary environmental initiatives in tourism. Results show that the determinants of voluntary action in tourism are partially consistent with previous research on CPR, finding relevant the presence of leadership, norms of behavior among members of the voluntary initiatives, shared mental modes, salience of the resource for users, and substantial productivity of the resource system in the likelihood of self-organization. However, other variables that have been shown to be relevant in non-tourism CPR situations are not supported by this analysis, such as: most variables regarding the ecological system (its size, predictability, and the mobility of its derived resource units) as well as the number of users and supportive collective choice rules that enable users to craft and enforce some of their own rules. The implications of this partial mismatch in findings are not straightforward. The paper presents a set of research questions that open a path for further research.