论数据垄断:大数据视野下反垄断的法理思考

大数据对传统反垄断理论在法理层面提出了挑战,数据垄断需要重新思考市场力量判断、必要设施原理与消费者保护问题.通过对大数据的特征与反垄断理论进行法理层面的分析.首先,大数据对企业市场力量或垄断地位的强化非常复杂,不能一概而论,应当根据企业的所涉及的平台类型、网络效应特征、多宿主等情况来分类分析.其次,法律可以结合不同数据的类型,促进数据的合理共享流通.最后,数据隐私保护可能构成反垄断议题,但应避免将数据收集增加简单等同于产品质量下降.应注意数据隐私保护与反垄断制度的分工与配合,法律不应过多依赖反垄断法解决数据隐私保护,但可以将数据隐私保护作为衡量企业市场力量的参照.     

论平台经济反垄断与监管的二元分治

反垄断与监管在不同语境下有不同含义，需要辨析。市场经济发展历史表明，反垄断与监管两种治理机制二元分治，在动态中调适相互关系，既能充分发挥市场的决定性作用，又能更好发挥政府作用。平台经济的出现，对二元分治结构传统治理手段提出挑战，需要再次调适两者关系并推进数据监管。当今各国平台经济治理正进入重构期，将直接决定国家竞争力与数字经济发展未来。我国平台经济治理面临二元分治结构缺位与数据监管能力滞后等挑战，有必要以强化数据监管为重点，推动构建二元分治的平台经济治理体系。     

我国互联网领域经营者集中反垄断审查的不足与改进

虽然我国《反垄断法》对经营者集中的反垄断审查制度进行了专门规定,但是互联网领域的经营者集中企业营业额往往较低,加之经营者集中审查制度存在审查态度不明、审查标准模糊、综合审查要素宽泛、审查程序不健全等问题,我国《反垄断法》已不能有效应对互联网领域经营者集中导致的问题。针对上述问题,应当从以下方面予以回应:明确互联网领域经营者集中的立法态度,修改《反垄断法》中有关经营者集中的禁止性规定,细化综合审查要素,完善审查程序。     

企业合并反垄断审查中的经济分析方法

对企业合并案件进行反垄断审查,不可避免地要大量使用经济分析方法。反垄断审查机构在使用这些方法的时候,过于倚重市场份额,忽视其他市场因素的重要性;在使用买方力量、封锁效应等概念的时候没有弄清楚其真实的含义;使用＂市场支配地位的传导＂等似是而非的经济概念;没有认识到市场细分等经济现象的存在。本文以商务部公告的案件为基础,对企业合并反垄断审查案件中经济分析概念和方法的使用进行深入地探讨。     

因应超级平台对反垄断法规制的挑战

随着全球数字经济的持续高速增长,以互联网为依托的线上线下的市场要素和市场力量不断集聚,超级平台从市场要素发展为要素与市场的联合体。在互联网市场动态竞争的场景下,现行反垄断法规制的目标、逻辑及方法正面临巨大挑战。建议引入多元利益动态平衡机制,更新反垄断法规制理念,关注互联网市场生态竞争系统的健康运行,主张对超级平台施行"强监管、早监管、长监管"的规制模式,探索建立审慎科学的"预防+事中事后+持续"的规制逻辑,革新SSNIP和CLA,结合SSNDQ和SSNIC,强调非价格因素和用户体验在超级平台反垄断法适用时的实际价值和作用。与此同时,激励超级平台自身建立和完善开放型生态竞争系统,积极主动参与由政府主导的反垄断合作规制项目,培育和提升超级平台的自治能力和社会责任。在此过程中,应总体抱持对超级平台包容审慎的规制态度,既要持续激励超级平台的竞争动能与效能,也要防治超级平台走向竞争固化所带来的弊病,最终实现互联网市场上开放型生态竞争系统的稳定运行。作为新兴科技产业与新兴经济业态的典型代表,超级平台还需特别关注竞争规制与产业促进之间的互动,以增进整体经济的高质量发展。     

超越市场力量和垄断力量：平台经济时代的反垄断规制

在反垄断理论中，市场力量或垄断力量是损害消费者福利的反竞争的经济力量。我国反垄断法中以“市场支配地位”的表述涵盖了这两种经济力量。反竞争力量可以通过这两种方法之一来行使，即提高自己的价格或提高竞争对手的成本。市场力量或垄断力量在实质上是相同的，都降低了消费者福利。数字平台经济不同于传统市场，具有双面市场、动态竞争和创新驱动的特征，对传统反垄断认定规则带来了挑战，有必要将反垄断分析集中在实现反竞争力量的方法上。反垄断规则对这两种反竞争力量整合的判断标准是不完整的，未能应对平台经济所带来的创新驱动和实施的自我优待。解决这一困境的路径需要超越传统反垄断对市场力量或垄断力量的分析方法，以更细致入微和多元化的替代分析方法识别垄断违规的行为，以新思路开启对平台经济下市场力量、市场支配地位的反垄断规制，提高传统反垄断法在互联网时代的适应性和适用性。     

外资并购反垄断审查的区别原则探析

我国<反垄断法>关于企业并购的反垄断审查规定对于_保护市场竞争秩序有着积极作用.但是,由于我国的境内企业和外资企业的发展并不平衡,外资时我国境内企业的并购已经威胁到了我国的经济安全.内外资统一的反垄断审查标准并不能给我国市场带来真正的公平竞争环境.因此在并购的反垄断审查中,必须建立针对外资并购的区别原则.     

论反垄断法语境下的市场界定

对市场的界定是进行并购反垄断审查的重要前提.需求替代性和供给替代性是界定相关市场的理论基础.在此基础上,产品功能界定法和假定的垄断者测试是界定相关市场的具体方法.由于假定的垄断者测试有大量的经济数据作支撑,因此应当作为界定相关市场的主要方法.     

专利联营反垄断的分析及审查

为有效践行《中华人民共和国反垄断法》关于规制知识产权滥用行为的规定,应为作为知识产权高端战略模式的专利联营构建具体的反垄断分析框架。在反垄断立法的规范分析基础上,应在执法实践中重视具有开放式结构的要素分析程式,围绕联营专利的效力、相互关系、相关市场、组织模式和许可协议特别条款等五大要素展开合理性审查并予综合考量。     

大数据领域反垄断规制的理论证成与制度构建

随着大数据拓展领域加深,数据带来的市场优势价值凸显出来,企业利用大数据实施垄断行为的可能性也随之增加.在国外,对于大数据领域是否需要反垄断干预的问题仍存在不小的争议.而现实中,企业对大数据的不当利用催生出大数据的反竞争效果,创新需要的呼应与反垄断法规制特点的适配性反映出大数据领域反垄断规制正当性,数据驱动型并购、算法共谋、滥用数据市场支配地位行为的危害,体现出大数据领域反垄断规制的必要性.对此,建议从理念与路径两个层面审视,采取包容审慎态度,坚持鼓励创新、适度干预,对传统反垄断法进行保留与创新,在严厉规制与创新激励之间寻求平衡.     

Smartphone platforms as privacy regulators

A series of recent developments highlight the increasingly important role of online platforms in impacting data privacy in today's digital economy. Revelations and parliamentary hearings about privacy violations in Facebook's app and service partner ecosystem, EU Court of Justice judgments on joint responsibility of platforms and platform users, and the rise of smartphone app ecosystems where app behaviour is governed by app distribution platforms and operating systems, all show that platform policies can make or break the enjoyment of privacy by users. In this article, we examine these developments and explore the question of what can and should be the role of platforms in protecting data privacy of their users.The article first distinguishes the different roles that platforms can have in ensuring respect for data privacy in relevant ecosystems. These roles include governing access to data, design of relevant interfaces and privacy mechanisms, setting of legal and technical standards, policing behaviour of the platform's (business) users, coordinating responsibility for privacy issues between platform users and the platform, and direct and indirect enforcement of a platform's data privacy standards on relevant players. At a higher level, platforms can also perform a role by translating different international regulatory requirements into platform policies, thereby facilitating compliance of apps in different regulatory environments. And in all of this, platforms are striking a balance between ensuring the respect for data privacy in data-driven environments on the one hand and optimization of the value and business opportunities connected to the platform and underlying data for users of the platform on the other hand.After this analysis of platforms’ roles in protecting privacy, the article turns to the question of what should this role be and how to better integrate platforms in the current legal frameworks for data privacy in Europe and the US. The article will argue for a compromise between direct regulation of platforms and mere self-regulation, in arguing that platforms should be required to make official disclosures about their privacy-related policies and practices for their respective ecosystems. These disclosures should include statements about relevant conditions for access to data and the platform, the platform's standards with respect to privacy and the way in which these standards ensure or facilitate compliance with existing legal frameworks by platform users, and statements with respect to the risks of abuse of different data sources and platform tools and actions taken to prevent or police such abuses. We argue that such integration of platforms in current regulatory frameworks is both feasible and desirable. It would make the role that platforms already have in practice more explicit. This would help to highlight best practices, create more accountability and could save significant regulatory and compliance resources in bringing relevant information together in one place. In addition, it could provide clarity for business users of platforms, who are now sometimes confronted with restrictive decisions by platforms in ways that lack transparency and oversight.     

数据生产论下的平台数据安全保障义务

《数据安全法(草案)》构建了平台数据安全保障义务框架,包含着数据安全制度、个人信息权利保护与监管配合义务三个维度。传统的民事侵权责任理论已经无力解释平台的数据安全保障义务的庞杂体系与多样化内容。应从数据社会生产的角度分析,平台已经成为了数据生产要素提取加工者、数字经济基础设施、数字经济多边市场。根据霍菲尔德的"特权-无权力"框架分析,平台的数据安全保障义务的扩张,实际上是数字经济社会生产中膨胀的平台权力的纠偏机制。合理的平台数据安全保障义务应以数字生产论为基础,合理设置平台对数字产品的质量责任与安全生产义务,划定平台数据安全保障义务的边界,促进数字经济发展。     

网络平台的公共性及其实现——以电商平台的法律规制为视角

网络平台是组织生产力的新型主体,在数字经济时代承担着维护网络市场秩序、保障用户权益的公共职能。网络平台对其用户,特别是对平台内经营者,具有强大的支配力和影响力,此种平台权力属于典型的私权力。网络平台行使私权力有助于减少平台内经营行为的负外部性,弥补政府规制能力的不足,但其私权力也容易遭到滥用。除了要借助市场竞争机制和传统私法规范约束平台私权力,还有必要引入公法原理及其价值要求,对平台私权力进行适度干预。网络平台制定和实施规则时,应遵循基本的程序正义和实体正义标准。法院应对平台滥用私权力的行为进行必要的司法审查。立法者应根据权责利相统一的原则,科学合理地设置平台责任。     

Dissolving privacy,one merger at a time: Competition,data and third party tracking

Amid growing concern about the use and abuse of personal data over the last decade, there is an emerging suggestion that regulators may need to turn their attention towards the concentrations of power deriving from large-scale data accumulation. No longer the preserve of data protection or privacy law, personal data is receiving attention within competition and antitrust law. Recent mergers and acquisitions between large digital technology platforms have raised important questions about how these different areas intersect and how they can complement one another in order to protect consumer welfare while ensuring competitive markets.This paper draws attention to one particularly complicated kind of digital data-intensive industry: that of third party tracking, in which a firm does not (only or primarily) collect and process personal data of its own customers or users, but rather data from the users of other ‘first party’ services. Mergers and acquisitions between firms active in the third party tracking industry raise unique challenges for privacy and fundamental rights which are often missed in regulatory decisions and academic discussions of data and market concentration. In this paper, we combine empirical and normative insights to shed light on the role of competition regulators in addressing the specific challenges of mergers and acquisitions in the third party tracking industry. After critically assessing some of the US and EU case law in this area, we argue that a bolder approach is needed; one that engages in a pluralist analysis of economic and noneconomic concerns about concentrations of power and control over data.     

Taming digital gatekeepers: the ‘more regulatory approach’ to antitrust law

Antitrust enforcement and competition policy in the digital economy is high on the agenda of authorities and policymakers. The distinctive features of digital markets and the strategic role played by large platforms apparently require a rethinking of the antitrust regime. Several reform proposals point to the need to integrate the antitrust toolkit with ex ante measures since there is a risk that ex post enforcement would be too slow to successfully keep markets competitive and contestable. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the invoked regulatory approach reflects the distinctive structural features of digital markets or whether it is just an enforcement short-cut.     

Pricing privacy – the right to know the value of your personal data

The commodification of digital identities is an emerging reality in the data-driven economy. Personal data of individuals represent monetary value in the data-driven economy and are often considered a counter performance for “free” digital services or for discounts for online products and services. Furthermore, customer data and profiling algorithms are already considered a business asset and protected through trade secrets. At the same time, individuals do not seem to be fully aware of the monetary value of their personal data and tend to underestimate their economic power within the data-driven economy and to passively succumb to the propertization of their digital identity. An effort that can increase awareness of consumers/users on their own personal information could be making them aware of the monetary value of their personal data. In other words, if individuals are shown the “price” of their personal data, they can acquire higher awareness about their power in the digital market and thus be effectively empowered for the protection of their information privacy. This paper analyzes whether consumers/users should have a right to know the value of their personal data. After analyzing how EU legislation is already developing in the direction of propertization and monetization of personal data, different models for quantifying the value of personal data are investigated. These models are discussed, not to determine the actual prices of personal data, but to show that the monetary value of personal data can be quantified, a conditio-sine-qua-non for the right to know the value of your personal data. Next, active choice models, in which users are offered the option to pay for online services, either with their personal data or with money, are discussed. It is concluded, however, that these models are incompatible with EU data protection law. Finally, practical, moral and cognitive problems of pricing privacy are discussed as an introduction to further research. We conclude that such research is needed to see to which extent these problems can be solved or mitigated. Only then, it can be determined whether the benefits of introducing a right to know the value of your personal data outweigh the problems and hurdles related to it.     

经济全球化与反垄断立法

随着经济全球化的发展,基于国内因素的考虑而制定的反垄断法不可避免地遇到了各种问题,美国和欧盟等都开始对传统反垄断法进行调整。经济全球化也促进了反垄断国际规范的发展。中国在经济全球化的背景下应该及时制定反垄断法或反限制竞争法;并且在制度安排上应注意:坚持垄断中性的认识,充分体现合理规则,中国反垄断法应以规制限制竞争行为为中心,充分考虑国际市场因素,合理安排责任制度,有克制地赋予域外效力。     

The New City Regulators: Platform and Public Values in Smart and Sharing Cities

Cities are increasingly influenced by novel and cosmopolitan values advanced by transnational technology providers and digital platforms. These values which are often visible in the advancement of the sharing economy and smart cities, may differ from the traditional public values protected by national and local laws and policies. This article contrasts the public values created by digital platforms in cities with the democratic and social national values that the platform society is leaving behind. It innovates by showing how co-regulation can balance public values with platform values. In this article, we argue that despite the value-creation benefits produced by the digital platforms under analysis, public authorities should be aware of the risks of technocratic discourses and potential conflicts between platform and local values. In this context, we suggest a normative framework which enhances the need for a new kind of knowledge-service creation in the form of local public-interest technology. Moreover, our framework proposes a negotiated contractual system that seeks to balance platform values with public values in an attempt to address the digital enforcement problem driven by the functional sovereignty role of platforms.     

平台视角中的社会信用治理及其法律规制

在大数据时代,无论是企业还是政府都逐渐走向平台化。依托于数字技术的发展,以声誉为核心的信用治理在平台治理中发挥了重要作用。对于商业平台而言,信用治理可以高效地管理平台上的生产和交易行为,减少国家权力的介入;对于政府平台而言,信用治理不仅可以减少执法成本,还可以促进国家内部权力的整合,并促使国家权力进一步向社会领域延伸。但是,由于缺乏有效规制,信用治理在商业领域存在着评价黑箱化、商业化和垄断化的公平性问题。在公共管理领域,信用治理在信用信息平台建设、政府内部权力整合、数据收集和使用等方面都面临着挑战。对此,法律规制应该以整体制度设计、市场结构调整和优化规制手段为导向,并从限制信用评价的适用范围、引入多元治理模式和培育国家数据能力等方面实现对信用治理的具体规制。     

平台扼杀式并购的反垄断法规制

全球大型数字平台通过"复制、收购与扼杀"的策略扼杀并购了大量初创企业,引发了创新赛道垄断的顾虑。初创企业并购通常不会引起显著的市场结构变化,但随着时间推移,平台"切香肠式"的扼杀式并购,在扼杀潜在竞争对手、强化自身市场支配地位的同时,更会扭曲长期创新供给,致使未来市场可竞争性丧失。而并购效率改进收益的消亡、创业者奖励作用的证伪与动态竞争约束工具的全面失灵,进一步要求反垄断执法机构应摒弃目前普遍不作为的监管做法,及时识别与规制平台扼杀式并购。对此,有必要引入内部文档调查、并购价格组成分析等并购动机过滤机制,识别出那些出于消除未来竞争威胁或扼杀潜在迭代式创新目的的初创企业并购;同时,通过引入补充性的申报门槛、设定更具针对性的审查补救措施与授权必要的事后调查,将能有效地遏制平台资本的无序扩张,为初创企业创造一个不受主导平台扼杀式并购威胁的现代化营商环境。