Party systems,electoral systems and constraints on corruption

This article explores the relationship between the party system, electoral formulas and corruption. Previous research has focused on the various incentives for political actors to monitor, or engage in corruption based on variations in the electoral formula. However, the electoral formula has mainly served as a proxy for the party system – whether multi-party or two-party. In this analysis, I test directly the relationship between party systems and corruption and in addition, add a degree of nuance to the established line of thinking within this literature. I argue that two-party systems in countries with predominantly single-member district (SMD) electoral formulas will demonstrate lower corruption on average than multi-party systems in SMD countries. However, I argue that this interaction effect does not play out in countries with proportional representation (PR). I test this hypothesis on 70 democratic and semi-democratic countries from 1987 to 2005 and find strong empirical support for the claim that multipartism in SMD countries is associated with higher levels of corruption, while the party system’s relationship with corruption plays no role in PR countries.     

新型政党制度所蕴含的中国智慧

中国共产党领导的多党合作和政治协商制度是从中国土壤中生长出来的新型政党制度,充分汲取了中国传统民本智慧、和合智慧、包容智慧,展现出了无与伦比的内在优越性,实现了群众根本利益与群体特殊利益的有机统一、实现了政党关系的非对称性和谐、实现了通过政党协商进行科学民主决策、实现了集中力量办大事,从而克服了垄断型一党制和竞争型两党制、多党制的固有弊端。作为和谐型多党制的新型政党制度充分展现了中国智慧,为世界政党制度发展与进步提供了新方向和新选择。     

A method for measuring and decomposing electoral bias for the three-party case, illustrated by the British case

The measurement of bias in election results, whereby one or more parties are advantaged in the translation of votes into seats at the expense of others, is attracting increasing attention. So far, almost all of the analytical work – aimed at both identifying the extent of bias in an election result and establishing its causes – has focused on either two-party systems or on the largest two parties in multi-party systems. Building on the firm foundations of one such approach, this paper introduces an original procedure for analysing bias in three-party systems using a readily-appreciated metric for both evaluating the degree of bias and decomposing it into the various causal factors. This is illustrated using the example of the 2005 British general election and a comparison of the results from two-party and three-party analyses of six recent elections there.     

Proportional Representation,Majoritarian Legislatures,and Coalitional Voting

Voters in elections under plurality rule face relatively straightforward incentives. In proportional representation systems, voters face more complex incentives as electoral outcomes don’t translate as directly into policy outcomes as in plurality rule elections. A common approach is to assume electoral outcomes translate into policy as a vote‐weighted average of all party platforms. However, most of the world’s legislatures are majoritarian institutions, and elections in PR systems are generally followed by a process of coalition formation. Results obtained using this assumption are not robust to the introduction of even minimal forms of majoritarianism. Incentives to engage in strategic voting depend on considerations about the coalitions that may form after the election, and the voters’ equilibrium strategies are shaped by policy balancing and the postelectoral coalition bargaining situation, including considerations about who will be appointed the formateur.     

Elections as a democratic linkage mechanism: How elections boost political trust in a proportional system

Elections offer a privileged moment in representative democracy, when citizens have the opportunity to express their views, both on the track record of the incumbent government, as on the way the country should be governed in the future. Procedural fairness theory assumes that taking part in a decision making procedure that is perceived to be fair, strengthens the legitimacy of the entire process. Most of the empirical research assumes that the attitudinal effects of elections are mainly due to the fact that one's preferred party wins the elections. In multi-party systems, however, such a clear distinction is not always possible and therefore it is hypothesized that the winner-loser-logic is weaker in this kind of party system. In this study we rely on a unique Belgian panel study to ascertain how electoral participation has an effect on political trust. The results show that in a proportional system all voters rise in political trust following their participation in elections. The winner-loser effect is not significant. Furthermore, the analyses suggest that especially the respondents with the initially lowest trust levels gain most by participating in elections. The theoretical implication of this finding is that apparently elections are still considered to be an important and legitimate linkage mechanism between citizens and the political system.     

The long and the short of it: Electoral institutions and the dynamics of party system size, 1950–2005

While institutional theories of party system size are usually examined cross‐nationally, there is ample reason to expect that changes in electoral institutions will affect party system size within countries as well. Although some of this effect may occur immediately, most of the effects are likely to be realised over time and across subsequent elections. A series of error‐correction models examine the short‐ and long‐term effects of changes in electoral institutions on party system size. The results indicate that changes in electoral institutions do produce the expected effects on party system size, and that these effects occur mostly over the long term.     

Electoral Reform and Party System Change: An Analysis of Nordic Elections with Two Different Electoral Systems

Electoral system reforms are frequently discussed in various parts of the world, although major electoral system changes have been quite rare in established democracies. This article aims at predicting how the party systems in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden would change if elections were conducted under a plurality system or a mixed‐member majoritarian system. To this end, results of the last parliamentary elections are recalculated. The analyses show that the Nordic party systems would be subjected to drastic change. In Denmark, plurality elections would create a two‐party system; in Finland, Norway and Sweden, one party would be much larger than the others. Keskusta and Arbeiderpartiet would be superior to the other parties in Finland and Norway, respectively, whereas Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet would almost take complete control over the Swedish legislature. In practice, smaller parties would have to team up with larger ideologically similar parties. Under a mixed electoral system, several small and medium‐sized parties would survive, but in most countries, the main competition would take place between two basic political alternatives. Smaller parties are well‐advised to go against electoral system reforms that involve single‐member districts.     

Intra-Party Democracy and Party Responsiveness

This study examines whether parties respond to their supporters or to the median voter position. Party leaders require the support of the ‘selectorate’, which is defined as the group that has influence in party leadership selection. Inclusive parties, which rely on rank-and-file membership to select their leaders, will respond to their members. Exclusive parties, which rely on office-seeking members for leadership selection, will respond to the median voter position. Thus, intra-party institutions that (dis)enfranchise party members are crucial for understanding whether a party responds to their supporters (or to the median voter position). Using data from 1975–2003 for six West European countries, this article reports findings that inclusive parties respond to the mean party supporter position. While there is evidence that exclusive parties respond to the median voter position in two-party systems, this finding does not extend to multiparty systems. This study has implications for the understanding of intra-party institutions and political representation.     

Von der Zweiparteiendominanz zum Pluralismus: Die Entwicklung des deutschen Parteiensystems im westeuropäischen Vergleich

With the federal election of 2009, the German party system no longer belongs to the party systems with two-party dominance but to the pluralistic systems. The article develops a typology of party systems, decribes the change of the type of Germany's party system, shows that the development of the German party system is an exception in Western Europe and argues that the change in the structure of the system casts a return to two-party dominance into doubt.     

It's Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or, Duverger's Laws Upside Down)

This article presents, discusses and tests the hypothesis that it is the number of parties that can explain the choice of electoral systems, rather than the other way around. Already-existing political parties tend to choose electoral systems that, rather than generate new party systems by themselves, will crystallize, consolidate or reinforce previously existing party configurations. A general model develops the argument and presents the concept of 'behavioral-institutional equilibrium' to account for the relation between electoral systems and party systems. The most comprehensive dataset and test of these notions to date, encompassing 219 elections in 87 countries since the 19th century, are presented. The analysis gives strong support to the hypotheses that political party configurations dominated by a few parties tend to establish majority rule electoral systems, while multi-party systems already existed before the introduction of proportional representation. It also offers the new theoretical proposition that strategic party choice of electoral systems leads to a general trend toward proportional representation over time.     

Institutions and the stabilization of party systems in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe

Most explanations of party system stability focus on the strength of mass-elite linkages. We highlight the role of institutions, focusing on how electoral rules and elected institutions, especially the presidency, impact elites' incentives to coordinate on a stable set of parties or to form new parties, thus affecting electoral volatility. Using Central and Eastern European elections data, we find that directly elected presidents increase volatility and that presidential power magnifies this effect. Absent a directly elected president, high district magnitude is associated with increased volatility, but district magnitude dampens the impact of an elected president on volatility; hence, our findings underscore the interactive impact of institutions on party systems. We also find evidence that bicameralism and concurrence of presidential and parliamentary elections decrease electoral volatility. Our model not only explains persistently high electoral volatility in Eastern Europe, but the extreme stability of Western European party systems.     

Parliamentary Election Turnout in Europe since 1990

This article examines the cross-national variations in turnout for parliamentary elections in Europe since 1990 – a continent with a vast range in turnout levels and some clear subregional patterns, especially that of low turnout in East-Central Europe. A full range of socio-economic, mobilizational, party system, institutional, and contextual factors are examined for bivariate relationships with turnout. A multivariate model then indicates that cross-national turnout is higher where there is strictly enforced compulsory voting, in polarized two-party systems and countries with a high level of party membership, and where there are no relevant elected presidents or strong regional governments. Variances on these and other key factors are what accounts for the subregional pattern of East-Central Europe and the highest turnout case of Malta; however, Switzerland is confirmed to be a significant national dummy variable.     

Center Parties, Party Competition, and the Implosion of Party Systems: A Study of Centripetal Tendencies in Multiparty Systems

Centripetal party competition is traditionally associated with the need to capture the median voter in a two-party system, whereas the existence of center parties is associated with centrifugal party competition. This article argues that the existence of a 'pivotal center party' leads to centripetal party competition in multiparty systems. A pivotal center party is so strong in electoral terms that forming a majority either to the left or to the right of it is unrealistic. Therefore, office-seeking political parties are forced on to a centrist course. This dynamic can be so forceful that the major parties to the left and to the right of the center party decide to govern in a broad coalition, and we may speak of an 'implosion' of the party system. The theoretical argument can explain party system developments in the Netherlands and Finland.     

Democratic Party Systems in Europe: Dimensions, Change and Stability

if a party system is really a system, i.e. a set of objects with relationships between the objects and between their attributes, and not simply an unordered set of political parties, then it is a vital problem in party research to identify the systems properties of this kind of system. We argue that the semantically relevant properties of the party systems in European democracies may be derived from the observational outcome of the operation of a party system, i.e. the national elections since the introduction of democratic procedure. Thus we arrive at five systems dimensions: functional orientation, fractionalization, radical orientation, polarization and volatility. The problems of party system change and stability are analysed by estimating the occurrence of trends and fluctuations over time in these party system dimensions for the set of European democratic party systems. The finding is that the widely accepted thesis of stability in European party systems is not corroborated.     

Manufactured Responsiveness: The Impact of State Electoral Laws on Unified Party Control of the Presidency and House of Representatives, 1840–1940

The modern history of divided government in America suggests that the framers succeeded in creating a government unresponsive to popular passions. Yet in the nineteenth century the party winning the presidency almost always captured control of the House of Representatives. Why and how could nineteenth century national elections be so responsive that they resemble parliamentary outcomes? We identify electoral institutions present in the states that directly linked congressional elections to presidential coattails. Specifically, we estimate the impact of state ballot laws and the strategic design of congressional districts on presidential coattail voting from 1840 to 1940. We find that presidential elections, as mediated by state electoral laws, strongly account for unified party control of the House and the presidency throughout the nineteenth century.     

India after the 2014 general elections: BJP dominance and the crisis of the third party system

ABSTRACT

This article critically assesses claims that India has entered a new party system after the 2014 general elections, marked by renationalisation with the BJP as the new ‘dominant’ party.’ To assess these claims, we examine the electoral rise of the BJP in the build-up to and since the 2014 general elections until the state assembly elections in December 2018. Overall, we argue that despite the emerging dominance of the BJP, a core feature of the third party system -a system of binodal interactions- has remained largely intact albeit in a somewhat weaker form. Furthermore, by comparing the post 2014 Indian party system with key electoral features of the first three party systems, we conclude that the rise of the BJP has thrown the third-party system into crisis, but does not yet define the consolidation of a new party system.     

Rationales Wählen als Reaktion auf Koalitionssignale am Beispiel der Bundestagswahl 2005

This article extends the calculus of rational voting (Riker/Ordeshook 1968) by considering the coalition building process and the legislative process (cf. Austen-Smith/Banks 1988) in multi-party systems. Comparing coalition preferences and their resulting legislative outcomes instead of party preferences, I elaborate preference profiles of voters on coalitions and estimate the probability that a coalition forms, given the parties’ coalition signals and an expected electoral result. I show the results of this rational calculus for the German Bundestag elections 2005 as a political map. Further, this calculus allows the identification of coalition signals that increase and those that reduce a party’s vote share.     

Federalist Institutions, Voting Behavior, and Party Systems in Spain

With the establishment of the 17 autonomous communities in Spainin the early 1980s, representation has been compounded. Thisarticles assesses the empirical implications of compounded representationin Spain by analyzing regional, national, and European electoraldata over time. Comparisons are also drawn across Spanish regions.In addition, the article discusses the effects of compoundedrepresentation on party systems and government formation inthe regions. Voting patterns vary depending on the level ofelection and also across regions. Party systems, subjectiveregional identity, and types of government in the regions arelinked as well. The evidence suggests that the federalizationof Spain has compounded representation by adding new layersof elections and representative institutions.     

Affective polarization in multiparty systems

Affective polarization captures the extent to which citizens feel sympathy towards partisan in-groups and antagonism towards partisan out-groups. This is comparatively easy to assess in two-party systems, but capturing the pattern of affect towards multiple parties is more complex in multiparty systems. This article first discusses these challenges and then presents different ways of measuring individual-level affective polarization using like-dislike scores, a widespread measure of party sympathy. Using data for 51 countries and 166 elections from five modules of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, I then show that affective polarization adds to existing concepts as a way of understanding political participation and democratic orientations. Studying affective polarization outside the US could therefore have important consequences for our understanding of citizen perceptions of politics as well as citizen behaviour, but we need the appropriate measures to do so.     

Breaking the Boundary: Pro-poor Policies and Electoral Outcomes in Brazilian Sub-national Governments

The article explores the role of state-led and of centre-led pro-poor policies in the electoral shift of state elections in the state of Bahia, in Brazil's Northeast. It analyses a pro-poor policy sponsored by a traditional party which has ruled the state for several decades during both the military and the democratic regimes. The article investigates the causes of the party's defeat in 2006 and its replacement by a non-traditional party. The argument is that the defeat of the traditional party and the victory of a non-traditional one can be explained as the result of the state's main pro-poor policy that has always created dependency between voters and sub-national politicians. Centre-led pro-poor policies introduced in the late 1990s, in contrast, have universal or clear targets, eliminating the intermediation of sub-national political brokers.