The internal consistency of corrected labor force data in the census (1960-1980) and the estimation of labor force participation rates by age and sex for 1980

This work examines the internal consistency of corrected estimates of the economically active population in the Mexican censuses of 1960 through 1980, estimates participation rates by age and sex for 1980, and determines the degree of overestimation or underestimation of the 1980 census. The first section reviews results of evaluations of information on the active population and examines the internal consistency of the different estimates. The second establishes criteria for correction of participation rates by age and sex for 1980 and estimates the degree of overestimation or underestimation, and the third assesses the advantages and limitations of the results. Comparison of results from several studies suggests that the labor force was significantly overestimated in the 1960 and 1980 censuses and underestimated in the censuses of 1970 and 1990. Estimates of overestimation in the 1960 census ranged from 8.5 to 14.3%, while estimates of underestimation in 1970 ranged from -0.5% to -0.8%. Estimates of overestimation in 1980 ranged from 6.6% to 21.6%. Internal consistency of labor force data was also assessed through a comparative analysis of average rates of growth of the population aged 12 and over and of the economically active population according to the census and the various corrections. The study concluded that the female labor force was overestimated by 1.6 million workers in 1980, or 27.1%, while the male labor force was overestimated by 610,000 workers, or 4%. The total labor force was overestimated by around 10%. These estimates for 1980 appear more congruent with general trends in male and female labor force participation, and also with the rate of growth of the population over age 12.     

Adversarialism versus legalism: Juridification and litigation in corporate governance reform

Recent reforms of corporate governance law and related litigation rules in the US and in Germany indicate that reports of the spread of adversarial legalism are greatly exaggerated. Politics and legislation in the US since the mid‐1990s have turned quite decisively against shareholder litigation even as corporate governance and securities law reforms have expanded the role and scope of the regulatory state. Germany's extraordinary expansion of financial and corporate governance regulation since the early 1990s exemplifies juridification. Although these reforms included some liberalization of shareholder litigation rules, the changes reflected skepticism towards private litigation and imposed new constraints on the most prevalent forms of shareholder suits. Marketization of economic relations and the era of finance capitalism have produced far more legalism than adversarialism, more regulation than judicialization, and more ex ante transparency rules than ex post litigation remedies.     

Capital, Trade, and the Political Economies of Reform

Existing approaches to the study of economic reform have focused on the mobilization of special interests that oppose liberalization and have tended to assume that reform dynamics follow a similar logic across distinct policy arenas. Analysis of the dynamics of capital account and trade liberalization in 19 Latin American countries between 1985 and 1999 demonstrates otherwise. Movement toward liberalization is shaped systematically by the timing and salience of each reform's distributional costs and partisan political dynamics. In turn, the timing and magnitude of costs are mediated by the economic context, while salience depends on the informational environment. Our findings thus differ from the conventional wisdom on several scores, particularly by emphasizing the ways in which good rather than bad economic conditions can facilitate reforms, the conditionality of legislative politics of reform enactment on whether reforms are characterized by ex ante conflict or fears of ex post blame, and how the type of reform shapes its political dynamics .     

Applying Insights from Transaction Cost Economics to Improve Cost Estimates for Public Sector Purchases: The Case of U.S. Military Acquisition

ABSTRACT

This article uses Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to help characterize, explain, and ultimately reduce the cost growth that plagues many of today's major investments in military capabilities. There is mounting evidence of a systematic bias in initial cost estimates of new weapon systems purchased by the U.S. military. Unrealistically low cost estimates result in cost overruns. Fixing cost overruns can substantially impact public budgets and military readiness. Cost estimates serve a dual function: first, as an integral part of the decision-making process to evaluate military purchases/investments, and second, as a baseline for future defense budgets. In the first case, underestimating costs can result in too many new weapon program starts and excessive investments in those systems. In the second case, unrealistically low cost estimates result in overly optimistic budgets. Budgets planned on the basis of optimistic cost estimates create the illusion of more resources available than actually exist. Two factors are often blamed for unrealistically low cost estimates: bad incentives (psychological and political-economic explanations), and bad forecasts (methodological explanations). While briefly exploring the former, the focus of this study is on cost estimating methodology. Conventional public cost estimating techniques focus on the production costs of public purchases (input costs, learning curves, economies of scale and scope, etc.). The goal of this article is to improve cost estimates by expanding conventional cost estimating methodology to include TCE considerations. The primary insight of TCE is that correctly forecasting economic production costs of government purchases or acquisitions is necessary, but not sufficient. TCE emphasizes another set of costs—coordination and motivation costs (search and information costs; decision, contracting, and incentive costs; measurement, monitoring, and enforcement costs, etc.). This study encourages public officials and cost analysts to capture these costs and to understand key characteristics of public-private transactions (uncertainty, complexity, frequency, asset specificity, and market contestability) to generate more complete and reliable cost estimates and improve public sector purchases.     

Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work

Abstract. In modern democracies political parties exist because (1) they reduce transaction costs in the electoral, parliamentary and governmental arenas and (2) help overcome the dilemma of collective action. In Western Europe political parties are the central mechanism to make the constitutional chain of political delegation and accountability work in practice. Party representatives in public office are ultimately the agents of the extra–parliamentary party organization. In order to contain agency loss parties rely on party–internal mechanisms and the institutionalisation of party rights in public rules and, in contrast to US parties, they apply the full range of ex ante and ex post mechanisms. Generally, the role of party is weaker the further down the chain of delegation.     

Delegating to the Quango: Ex Ante and Ex Post Ministerial Constraints

This article examines delegation in the environment of quasi‐governmental, special purpose bodies. Better known as “quangos,” these agencies present a challenge for the theory of delegation, because their tasks are often comprised of routine administration, such as the distribution of benefits and the collection of user fees, rather than more politically salient policymaking. Do (spatial) policy conflict and legislative capacity affect the conditions under which authority is delegated to quangos? What effect do “good government” ideology and legislative capacity have on the presence of ex ante and ex post control over quangos? Theoretical predictions are examined with data from a study of Dutch public bodies as well as issue scales from the Manifesto Research Group. Multinomial logit statistical models produce evidence that although policy conflict and legislative capacity measures affect the probabilities of enacting both ex ante and ex post controls, their contributions to ex post measures, as expected in the presence of important hidden action incentives, are much stronger.     

Toward the usable recognition of individual benefits and costs in regulatory analysis and governance

Regulatory agencies in the United States and Europe have well‐deserved reputations for fixating on the total benefits and costs of proposed and final regulatory actions, without doing any more than anecdotally mentioning the subpopulations and individuals who may bear disproportionate costs or reap disproportionate benefits. This is especially true on the “cost” side of the cost–benefit ledger, where analysts exert little effort to even inform decisionmakers and the public that the costs of regulations might be distributed either regressively or progressively. Many scholars and advocates have observed that regulation can increase the efficiency of market outcomes, but caution about its untoward (or suboptimal) effects on equity. Here, we argue that without considering distributional information about costs and benefits, regulatory policies in fact can also cause violence to notions of efficiency, for two reasons: (i) society cannot hope to approach Pareto‐efficient outcomes without identifying those who must lose so that others can gain more; and (ii) because the harm experienced by involuntary risks and by imposed regulatory costs is likely non‐linear in its magnitude (at the individual level), efficiency is, in fact, a strong function of the shape of the distribution of these effects. This article reviews evidence about the distribution of regulatory costs and benefits, describes how agencies fail to incorporate readily available distributional information, and sketches a vision for how they could analyze costs and benefits to promote more efficient regulatory choices and outcomes.     

A policy analysis of hospital waiting lists.

The Canadian system of publicly provided health care has been praised for its cost containment attributes. Conventional cost measures do not identify costs associated with rationing access to medical facilities. This paper explores the economic relevance of hospital waiting lists and offers estimates of the economic costs of waiting for different hospital procedures in Canada. The estimated costs are relatively low as a share of overall economic activity but appear quite comparable to losses associated with labour strikes and lockouts.     

The triumph of regulatory politics: Benefit–cost analysis and political salience

While benefit–cost analysis (BCA) is now a permanent part of the regulatory process in the United States, and many other countries around the world as well as the European Union have adopted it or are moving toward it, there have been few empirical attempts to assess either whether its use improves regulations or how BCA interacts with the political environment. We use a unique US database of the costs and benefits of 109 economically significant regulations issued between 2000 and 2009 to examine whether the amount of information provided in the BCA or political factors surrounding the regulation better correlate with the net benefits of the regulation. We find that there is little correlation between the information provided by the analysis and the net benefits. However, we find that regulations that receive few public comments and are not issued at the end of an administration, have the highest net benefits. These are the regulations that are the least politically salient. This interaction between the political environment and the economic performance of a regulation has been under‐examined and deserves further study.     

When Governments Regulate Governments

This article advances a political theory of regulation that accounts for the choices of regulators and regulated entities when both are governments. Leading theories of regulation assume that governments regulate profit‐maximizing firms: Governments set rules, to which firms respond rationally in ways that constrain their behavior. But often the entities that governments regulate are other governments. We argue that government agencies and private firms often face different compliance costs, and that agencies have greater incentives than firms to appeal regulations through political channels. Simultaneously, the typical enforcement instruments that regulators use to influence firm behavior may be less effective against governments. Our empirical subjects are public and private entities’ compliance with the U.S. Clean Air Act and Safe Drinking Water Act. We find that, compared with private firms, governments violate these laws significantly more frequently and are less likely to be penalized for violations.     

Getting Their Way: Bias and Deference to Trial Courts

How much do trial judges influence the law in the United States? I analyze a model of adjudication by a trial judge who engages in fact finding before deciding a case, but whose decision may be reversed. The model makes three broad points. First, it provides an informational rationale for ex post deference to biased trial judges that does not require an ex ante commitment by an appellate court to a standard of review. Second, it shows how procedural discretion can bring biased trial judges' rulings closer to appellate doctrine despite enabling trial judges to “get their way” more often. Third, de facto law as represented by trial judges' case‐by‐case adjudication will differ substantially from de jure law. As long as there are not too many extremist trial judges, de facto law will reflect the predispositions of trial judges, not legal doctrine.     

The impact of kindergarten entrance age policies on the childcare needs of families

The past two decades have seen a rising trend in the minimum entrance age for kindergarten in the U.S. A little‐noticed, but potentially large, consequence of raising the minimum entrance age is that it imposes additional childcare costs for families whose children are forced to stay out of school for an additional year. This paper develops a model for parents' kindergarten entrance age decisions and examines the relationship between socio‐economic factors and parents' desired entrance age for their child using a nationally representative dataset on kindergartners in the U.S. The estimates from this model are used to simulate the impact of alternate changes in kindergarten entrance age policies on the number and characteristics of children affected by the policy change, and to estimate the additional childcare cost burden from the policy change. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

The Cost‐Effectiveness of Welfare‐to‐Work Programs: A Meta‐Analysis

This article uses the tools of meta‐analysis to assess cost–benefit studies of 50 mandatory welfare‐to‐work programs that were targeted at Aid for Families with Dependent Children recipients and evaluated by random assignment. The findings suggest that the costs of a typical evaluated welfare‐to‐work program probably exceeded its benefits from the perspective of the government, but those assigned to the program, and possibly society as a whole, may reap small positive net benefits. However, there are individual programs that are very cost‐beneficial. Further analyses of the determinants of the cost‐benefits of welfare‐to‐work programs to government and society as a whole show that some services are cost‐neutral, but others entail net costs, which are sometimes substantial. The findings suggest that less successful programs might be made more cost‐beneficial by dropping vocational training and basic education as program components, leaving mainly lower cost components, such as mandated job search and sanctions, but also possibly the more costly financial incentives.     

Size,Democracy, and the Economic Costs of Running the Political System

The search for the optimal size of political systems is one of the most enduring in political thought. Given the validity of arguments for and against small units, one might expect variation in rearrangements of unit sizes. However, the reform trend is uniform: units, often at the local level, are amalgamated to harvest scale effects. The purpose of this article is to evaluate the argument on economies of scale in the economic costs of running political systems. Our testing ground is a recent Danish reform. It allows us to avoid endogeneity problems often facing researchers of size reforms. The reform was directed by the central government and constitutes an exogenous shock to 239 municipalities, whereas 32 municipalities were left untouched. We thus have a quasi‐experiment with pre‐ and posttreatment observations for both an experiment and a control group. Our findings show that scale effects, measured as administrative costs per inhabitant, are considerable.     

Testing the Effects of Sale Method Restrictions in Municipal Bond Issuance: The Case of New Jersey

Can state governments save money by restricting the practice of selling tax‐exempt bonds through negotiation, or do such regulations impose additional costs? Circumstances in New Jersey recently created a natural experiment to test this proposition. This study finds significant cost savings for those issues sold through competition both before and after such restrictions were put in place. All else equal, issues sold competitively after the policy change did not have significantly higher interest costs, despite a shift in volume toward competitive sales, suggesting that there exists room for increased use of competitive sales without incurring a cost penalty.     

Accruing Retirement Costs for Federal Employees

The president's 2003 budget proposed that federal agencies pay the full cost of their employees' pension and retiree health benefits as such benefits are earned starting in 2003. The main reason for the proposed change is to provide policymakers and agency managers with a more complete measure of the cost of providing current services. The main disadvantage of the proposal is that estimates of the accrual costs of retiree health benefits are subject to large errors. The proposed change would not increase total outlays, nor would it affect the budget deficit or surplus.     

Public versus private production and economies of scale

The cost of producing the same good often differs substantially for public and private producers. We investigate the effect of organization in a case where the production technology is simple: The cleaning of Danish schools. Three forms of organization are used: Decentral municipal, central municipal or private. For small schools the organizational form has little impact on cost. For larger schools decentral municipal production is the most expensive. On average centralization reduces costs by 5%, while privatization reduces costs by 30%. Similar cost differences are reported in the literature for other cases, but it is a new result that the cost differences are due to economies of scale. Public choice theories predict that cost differences are due to ownership or competition. We find evidence that both theories help explain the cost differences.     

A Bonfire of the Regulations,or Business as Usual? The UK Labour Market and the Political Economy of Brexit

Employment and labour market regulation initially appeared as one of the solid red lines in the UK's renegotiation of the country's place in the EU. The basic argument is that the UK's more deregulated labour market would sit uneasily in the more organised models, based on statutory instruments or collective bargaining, found on the continent. While there is a legitimate problem here, EU employment regulations appear manageable from the point of view of business, while unions see them as important tools for socially responsible economic restructuring. Most of UK employment case law is now deeply entangled with EU law; labour market regulations have, on the whole, become part of the way of doing business in the Single Market; and a simple cost–benefit analysis appears impossible because some costs are not quantifiable and the costs of others are reduced when taken as a bundle. Labour unions agree that transposition of European law needs to be done taking into account local sensitivities, while internationally oriented companies do not see EU regulations on the whole as detrimental to business. Importantly, though, the costs and benefits of EU employment regulations are not symmetrically distributed across different companies: large companies are better able to reap the rewards and accommodate the costs of operating in the Single Market than smaller companies.     

Socio‐economic Considerations in Biosafety and Biotechnology Decision Making: The Cartagena Protocol and National Biosafety Frameworks

Article 26.1 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety left open the possibility for member countries to include in their biosafety regulatory processes the assessment of socio‐economic considerations. Countries may also decide to include such assessments as part of their national legislation or regulations for the approval and deliberate release into the environment of genetically engineered technologies. Countries are debating if and how to implement assessment of socio‐economic considerations. This paper contributes to the ongoing policy dialogue by discussing issues related to socio‐economic assessment including scope, timing, inclusion modalities, methods, decision‐making rules and standards, and the integration of socio‐economic assessments in biosafety and/or biotechnology approval processes. This paper also discusses the implications of such inclusion for technology flows and public and private sector R&D. If inclusion is not done properly, it may negatively impact technology flows especially from the public sector and render an unworkable biosafety system.