Quality of Will,Private Blame and Conversation: Reply to Driver,Shoemaker, and Vargas

In this paper, I defend my book Conversation and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2012) in response to three critics: Julia Driver, David Shoemaker, and Manuel Vargas. Driver raises questions about my account of private blame. Shoemaker finds problems with my account of quality of will. And Vargas questions the conversational nature of my account.     

Embracing Emotionality: Clothing My “Naked Truths”

There is increasing awareness and recognition that researchers’ emotions will contribute to a richer and deeper understanding of what they are studying. Researchers’ emotions as analytic tools are particularly relevant when working with marginalized or oppressed groups because of the emotional aspect generally associated with human suffering. This paper discusses how adopting a reflexive practice can help researchers embrace and use their emotions as a part of the research process, enabling a more humanistic approach to studying crime and those whose marginalization and oppression are intricately tied to their crime. More specifically, this paper examines my own experiences of doing research with Aboriginal female offenders in a federal prison. I problematize the process of embracing emotionality by reflecting on the paralysis that evolved in my research with these women as I experienced an overwhelming sense of despair and hopelessness. I contend that social science in the academic arena, not unlike many other institutions in society, has adopted a method of surveillance thereby instilling a sense of fear and judgment upon those working in academic arenas. After describing my reflexive process throughout this emotional paralysis, I describe my discovery of safe spaces as a way of dealing with my emotions and how engaging in creative analytic practice enabled me to clothe my nakedness and vulnerability as I represented, and ultimately re-created my self in the research process. As part of that evolution, embracing emotionality ultimately enabled me to engage in knowledge building as well as advocacy with and for Aboriginal women in prison.     

Responsibility and Global Justice

The two traditional ways of thinking about justice at the global level either limit the applicability of justice to states—the only distributions that can be just or unjust, strictly speaking, are within the state—or else extend it to all human beings. The view I defend in On Global Justice (Risse 2012 ) rejects both of these approaches. Instead, my view, and thus my attempt at meeting the aforementioned challenge, acknowledges the existence of multiple grounds of justice. My purpose here is to explain what my view has to say about responsibility. First of all, I explain what my view implies about the responsibilities of the state for the realization of justice. Then I explain that in addition to obligations of justice, my view also gives rise to obligations of account‐giving. I end by sketching what all this implies for institutional reform at the global level.     

Reply to Five Critics of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Why Tolerate Religion?</Emphasis>

This is my contribution to a symposium on my book Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton, 2013), in which I respond to essays by François Boucher (Montreal) and Cécile Laborde (University College London), Frederick Schauer (Virginia), Corey Brettschneider (Brown), and Peter Jones (Newcastle). I clarify and revise my view of the sense in which some religious beliefs are “insulated from reasons and evidence” in response to the criticisms of Boucher and Laborde (2015), but take issue with other aspects of their critique. I defend most of my original argument against utilitarian and egalitarian objections from, respectively, Schauer and Brettschneider. I also discuss and defend the “No Exemptions” approach to conscientious objection to neutral laws of general applicability against a variety of objections, arguing, in particular, that my view is probably not very different from that of Jones.     

试论权利的逻辑构成

在我国法学界,对权利的逻辑构成的研究是随着权利研究和权利实践的逐步深入应运而生的。在已有研究的基础上阐述自己的认识。在对国内学界在此问题上的各种观点进行归纳和简要分析的基础上,认为权利是由主体、利益、行为和正当性四要件构成的,并对这一分析框架的相关内容做出了说明。希望对我国的权利研究有所助益。     

Outsiders and justice consciousness

The foundations of my justice consciousness lie in two books that share the name “outsiders.” I was introduced to S.E. Hinton's novel before I was a teenager and it was my first real contact with the “Greasers,” the “Socs,” and a world of juvenile delinquency divided by social class. Written by a 16‐year‐old girl around the time I was born, I think it was this book that initially sparked my fascination with juvenile delinquency and the study of crime. I pursued this interest in college and became concerned with inequality and the ways in which our social surroundings shape our choices and our life chances. Reading Howard S. Becker's classic statement of labeling theory in his version of Outsiders changed my perspective again and I have never looked at the world in quite the same way since.     

Transphobic discourse and moral panic convergence: A content analysis of my hate mail

Recently, new social anxieties about transgender people have begun to emerge, framed as an issue of “grooming”—a term typically used in the context of child sexual abuse. In this way, moral panic about transgender people seems to be merging with oft-repeated social fears about pedophilia, resulting not only in policies criminalizing trans people and their allies but also in escalating hatred and threats toward trans-affirming educators. This pattern requires further inquiry. As a trans academic who has been at the center of moral panic, my own hate mail can provide material for this exploration. I conducted a content analysis of 231 letters and e-mails sent to me containing messages of hate, to answer the following research questions:

1. What beliefs and understandings did my correspondents indicate having about me and my research?
2. To what extent did my correspondents’ beliefs and understandings about me reflect intersecting contemporary moral panics around trans and queer people, pedophilia, and educators?
3. What stated or implied goals did my correspondents aim to achieve by writing to me?

The findings of this study can add to understanding of how moral panics can converge, and the consequences of their convergence for marginalized groups in academia and beyond.     

Critical justice consciousness: Social injustice and the criminal justice system

In this essay I examine the importance of social justice to my identity and the changing interpretation of my “justice consciousness” resulting from changes in my work life. Drawing on my academic experience as well as my experience as an attorney, I describe the meaning that social justice has for me. I also examine the connections that I see between social injustice and the operation of the critical justice system.     

Travelling law: Sex,drugs and Montesquieu

With thanks to Jatinder Barn with whom I have discussed this article throughout. Thanks also to Peter Fitzpatrick for his initial invitation and subsequent encouragement, and to my friend and colleague Paul Gilroy for introducingPersian Letters to our teaching syllabus and hence to my library. I retain sole responsibility for any inaccuracies arising from the research and any mistakes in argumentation.     

Response: The Politeness of History

In my response to the reviews of my book by Marianne Constable, Shai Lavi, and Renisa Mawani, I situate the argument of Common Law, History, and Democracy in America, 1790–1900: Legal Thought Before Modernism within a concern with contemporary forms of historical knowledge. Where contemporary historical knowledge practices subsume their objects of investigation, I adopt the temporality of the object of investigation—namely, the common law—as the structure my book. In different registers, Constable, Lavi, and Mawani urge me to take up more explicitly the foundational questioning about which they care. I welcome their readings. However, given the distinct problematic from which I start, I argue, the book is not in the first instance an argument about the ontology of history or law.     

Living and learning in Tacna,Peru

I spent the summer after my first year of college in Tacna, Peru. I lived in community with five Peruvian nuns and worked in the school where they were the administrators. I was completely immersed in the culture and language as no one spoke English. It was an experience that allowed me to connect with new ideas about community and social justice, ideas that have contributed to the way I have come to understand my position and my responsibilities in my global community. When I returned home from Peru, I wrote this reflection about my experience adapting and living in this wonderful and vibrant community.     

Mapping Utopias: A Voyage to Placelessness

I have a map which indicates clearly and beyond any doubt the way to Utopia. I start the journey with a survival kit of paradigmatic egalities, noumenal legalities, and nervous ideals. However, the more I move into the uncartographied space, the more I realise that my survival kit is changing, to the point of becoming porous and permeable. The journey to Utopia is condensed to a log of phenomenological bracketing, where the immersion to the Lebenswelt equals the loss of oneself, and where the descent from the Transcendental to the Natural proves to be as meaningful as the escalating bracketing from the Natural to the Transcendental. The negation of Utopia (ou-topos) displaces not only my Utopia but also my egocentric quest for identity: the ‘I’ becomes ‘me’ before it vanishes, space becomes place, intentionality turns back to itself and retraces its path. The more I approach my destination, the more negation devours distance. When I finally arrive to the designated point, where, according to the map, lies Utopia, the only thing I discover is a map, identical to the one I hold, that indicates, clearly and beyond any doubt, the way to Utopia. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Professor Stanley Cohen: an appreciation

Like so many others, I am saddened by the death of Stan Cohen, my PhD supervisor, mentor, and supportive friend at a particularly difficult time in my life. I first met Stan in summer 1976, when I was applying for a PhD place. In awe of the author of Folk Devils and Moral Panics, a book which did so much to open criminology up to the sociological imagination, I was soon at ease and enjoying a wide-ranging conversation, with the difficult questions posed gently and seemingly lightly, that was Stan's distinctive style. Stan was, of course, the perfect PhD supervisor: always encouraging; nudging me back in the right direction when I was veering off-track. I began my teaching at Essex, and the deviancy ‘dream-team’ – Stan and Ken Plummer – was the best possible start to an academic career.     

Justice as freedom,fairness, compassion,and utilitarianism: How my life experiences shaped my views of justice

This essay lays out my definition of justice and traces the origins of its conception. I identify and discuss very specific life experiences and how they have affected my understanding of justice. Specific incidents include early childhood experiences, key events in adolescence, and the most important episodes from early adulthood. I examine my own family conditions and early relationships and consider the influences of certain television shows and music in childhood and adolescence. I also discuss the effects of various educational experiences. The culmination of these life experiences was the emergence of a very strong sense of justice, reciprocity, and compassion for others, particularly for the least powerful and most vulnerable in our midst. These experiences in essence pushed me into the field of criminal justice and into the worlds of academia and social justice activism. They also allowed me finally to see my mission in life and to understand how all my life experiences have shaped my sense of justice.     

Rorschach Tests,Pluralism, and Hopes for the Future: A Response to the Responses

In this essay, I address some of the concerns raised by contributors to the Symposium on Invitation to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law. I argue that law and society scholarship focusing on race increasingly offers some of our field's best empirical analyses of the interpenetration of law and society; I emphasize the importance of the methodological and theoretical diversity that characterizes our fragmented field, arguing that our pluralism is one of our greatest strengths; I clarify my intended meaning of the term “real law” as I use it in the book's subtitle, as a way to underscore the socially constituted quality of all law; I attempt to rescue the reputation of dialectics from charges of “relativism”; and I reiterate my appreciation for our field's engagement with questions of social justice that has characterized it since its inception. In the second half of the essay, I briefly describe my current prison research and offer some thoughts for the future of our field.     

A Reply to Five Friends

For an academic, there is no greater reward than having one's scholarship taken seriously. The five distinguished scholars who have contributed to this symposium on The Force of Law (Schauer 2015 ) have done just that, with varying degrees of agreement and disagreement, praise and criticism. But even critical commentary, and perhaps especially critical commentary, is evidence of serious engagement. More importantly, the commentaries contained here have advanced our understanding of law in valuable ways. I respond to each in this reply, but with full acknowledgment that my responses cannot do justice to the full breadth of their contributions and challenges. My hope is not that I will persuade readers that I am correct and my critics mistaken, but rather that the reader who absorbs both the challenges and my response will come away with a greater understanding of the issues that The Force of Law seeks to place on the agenda of contemporary jurisprudence.     

Searching for coherence in the law of involuntary manslaughter: The English experience

B.A., Cornell University 1970; J.D., Duke University 1970. I am indebted to my colleagues Carolyn Hamilton and Janet Dine, as well as to Andrew Ashworth of King's College, for their useful comments. That in the final analysis I may not have followed some of their suggestions does not detract from their value in helping me to formulate my ideas.     

Writing Workshops for First Year Law: my contribution as an applied linguist

“Law schools should focus more on teaching writing – not some Procrustean monstrosity called ‘legal writing,’ but the ordinary techniques of constructing a sentence and telling a story” writes Roosevelt in his review of Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary by Posner. The Australian Threshold Learning Outcome expects law graduates to be effective, appropriate and persuasive as communicators when interacting with both legal and non-legal persons. We also know that embedding learning outcomes or graduate attributes throughout a programme encourages progressive learning. Furthermore, the whole of degree curriculum design undertaken from a shared perspective reflects industry and student requirements better than individual subjects can. In the absence of any whole of degree curriculum, the semester-long series of Writing Workshops for First Year Law (WWFYL) was created. Building on the success of past collaboration (Curró and Longo), WWFYL reflect a move away from a solitary, silent teaching culture to open sharing of practice. The widening participation and skills agendas remind us of the need to focus on the integration of academic literacies into law. If law is language, can applied linguistics make a contribution to the literacy needs of students from diverse linguistic backgrounds? As an applied linguist, my objective is to raise awareness of the elements and features of legal writing and demystify the specialised discourse and textual features. In this paper I present my theoretical framework borrowed from socio-constructivist theories, focusing on how students learn specific subject matter in particular contexts: “a teaching and learning process that makes transparent the practices and discourses of the subject area” (D. Warren, “Curriculum Design in a Context of Widening Participation in Higher Education” (2002) 1 Arts and Humanities in Higher Education 85, p. 88). Two snapshots of my classroom discourse demonstrating the practical application of my teaching are presented, as well as evaluation data supporting my approach.     

Some remarks on the Gu\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{agu\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{ibhedabha\dot nga chapter in Udayana's ātmatattvaviveka

But under the requirement of philosophic consistency, and the impact of the perfectly valid reflection that experience is always my experience, and never part of some object independent of me, the world shrinks to the extension of my experience only, and I am left with bundles of my sensations. What are the natural consequences of such an epistemological sophistication? One plausible and natural reaction is what one might call the ‘Indian’ one. It runs roughly as follows: my experience of the world is, alas, only my experience. It is not ‘the real’. Moreover, the world disclosed in my experience is one of misery, precariousness, insecurity, which ends in old age and death and within which no secure, reliable, undeceptive goods can be found. The flux and precariousness which make it so unhappy a place, also make it most ill-suited to be an object of knowledge. — E. Gellner (1974: 114)     

饱学之士的睿智和从容

芮沐老先生是我的恩师，是我的益友，曾给我莫大的支持与帮助，在我法学思想的形成以及为人处事的态度上，有着无可替代的深刻影响。