Foreign policy by commission: Reforming the intelligence community

Can presidential commissions serve as a source of significant policy innovation in the area of intelligence analysis? This study shows that intelligence commission recommendations present a decidedly mixed bag. We cannot speak of a linear movement toward improving the quality or management of intelligence analysis in which one problem is solved and attention then is turned to the next. Yet presidential commissions looking into intelligence analysis cannot be mere symbolic window dressing. Many of their recommendations have been listened to. It would be more accurate to see them as having in each instance narrowed the range of policy choices receiving serious consideration as means of improving the intelligence product.     

Trump and the US intelligence community

President Trump has publicly denigrated the value of the United States' intelligence community (IC), imperilling the morale and retention of intelligence officers. Unless he establishes a better working relationship with the IC, the White House not only risks hollowing out the IC but could also wind up politicising the intelligence process and misusing intelligence products.     

The use and abuse of medical intelligence

When a leader suffers from a diminished ability to formulate high quality judgments and decisions, international peace and security may be compromised. Systematic use of medical intelligence on foreign leaders can provide early warning to American leaders about the potential for destabilization in particular regimes where leaders are gravely ill. This information remains particularly important in less democratic governments, where power and decision making remain concentrated in the hands of very few, or even one man, or where an entire governmental structure appears unstable. This paper examines the impact of medical illness in foreign leaders in four cases in American foreign policy: the Shah of Iran; Ferdinand Marcos; Tancredo Neves; and Boris Yeltsin.     

高职院校利用社区体育资源开设体育课的研究

运用文献资料法对社区体育资源的概念进行了界定。在此基础上,分析了高职院校利用社区体育资源开设体育课程的必要性、可行性及其重要意义,并提出了利用社区体育资源开设体育课的应注意事项。     

The use of intelligence to determine attribution of the 2010 Haiti cholera disaster

Some public health crises and disasters represent threats to national security. In 2010 and 2011, Haiti experienced a cholera disaster surpassing all others in the world following a catastrophic earthquake. A novel integrated intelligence system, the Haiti Epidemic Advisory System (HEAS), provided critical information indicating the United Nations was the accidental source of the cholera disaster. This report reviews the operational context of the HEAS in relation to traditional public health surveillance and the role of intelligence in the determination of biological threat attribution.     

The use of intelligence by insurgent groups: the North Vietnamese in the Second Indochina War as a case study

The need to define intelligence is understandable because the secrecy surrounding it can almost make it appear too amorphous to study. In most definitions, the authors not only attempt to define what intelligence is but also who does it. Until recently the focus has been on the state with occasional focus on sub-state actors such as law enforcement agencies. After 9/11 there was a shift from the study of inter-state intelligence to the use of intelligence against non-state actors such as Al Qaeda. The literature still treated these non-state actors as something to be acted upon rather than intelligence actors in their own right. By examining the North Vietnamese use of intelligence during the Second Indochina War this article takes a step to redress that oversight. This article will discuss the North Vietnamese use of intelligence in the context of definitions of intelligence and intelligence actors and will use John Gentry’s proposed model of violent non-state actor intelligence as its analytical framework.     

Dartmouth,Sir Mansfield Cumming and the origins of the British intelligence community

This article uses original archive material to trace the connection between two processes of institutional development that was to result in the British intelligence Community becoming an integral part of government. The first process was the development in the latter part of the nineteenth century of a scheme of education and training for naval cadets at Dartmouth. The importance of this scheme is that it gives, through the Records of Progress and Conduct, a unique insight into the qualities that the first two heads of Britain's foreign intelligence service, and the first head of Britain's signals intelligence unit brought to their respective posts. This article argues that there are a number of timeless and vital competencies which cadets Smith, Sinclair and Hall displayed, albeit in embryonic form, that were critical, later on, in propelling their respective organizations to the centre of government. This is the second process of institutionalization. It is a position that they still occupy today.     

Making future leaders in the US intelligence community: challenges and opportunities

This article explores what factors are important in developing the future leaders of the US intelligence community in the post-9/11 security environment. It surveys traditional leadership theory to assess whether any of its perspectives are applicable to understanding leadership in the intelligence context. It argues, that although some leadership theory may be applicable, the intelligence studies field may be better served by developing its own body of leadership theory. Second, any leadership theory needs to consider together the two synergistic components of intelligence leadership: personal leadership development and the ability to lead organization reform. Furthermore, the role of intelligence governance may be the most critical factor in promoting better leaders of US intelligence agencies and the broader community.     

The intelligence of fear

Intelligence agencies long have brought unwelcome news to civilian political and military masters – and sometimes suffered severely for it. Even in Western democracies, insecurities and outright fear produce behavioral responses by individuals and defensive institutional reactions that distort normal intelligence activities and affect the overall performance of intelligence agencies. Causes of fear include: political leaders, overseers, agency managers, and the security elements of their organizations. This article highlights the importance of institutional factors, especially organizational cultures and incentives, on the activities and overall performance of intelligence agencies and suggests that motivated biases, caused by personal and organizational self-interest and fears, are more significant causes of intelligence failures than are commonly believed.     

The future of the intelligence analysis task

Abstract

Information technology will have a significant impact on the intelligence analysis workflow, skills, and organization in the next couple of decades. In future, instead of ingesting information themselves, analysts will use a range of information tools to add value to data. Future analysts will need less knowledge of subject matter, and more general reasoning skills. The future task will involve more creativity, and less focus on detail, than today.     

The springtime of French intelligence

Dominique Prieur (avec Jean‐Marie Pontaut), Agent secrète (Paris: Fayard 1995). Pp.248. Ff110. ISBN 2–213–59277–2.

Paul Paillote (entretiens avec Alain‐Gilles Minella), L'homme des services secrets (Paris: Julliard 1995). Pp.323. Ff129. ISBN 2–260–01341–4.

Claude Silberzahn (avec Jean Guisnel), Au coeur du secret, 1.500 jours aux commandes de la DGSE. 1989–1993 (Paris: Fayard 1995). Pp.330. Ff120. ISBN 22–13–59311–6.