<Emphasis Type="Italic">Liberellas</Emphasis> Versus <Emphasis Type="Italic">Konservatives</Emphasis>: Social Status,Ideology, and Birth Names in the United States

Despite much public speculation, there is little scholarly research on whether or how ideology shapes American consumer behavior. Borrowing from previous studies, we theorize that ideology is associated with different forms of taste and conspicuous consumption: liberals are more drawn to indicators of “cultural capital” while conservatives favor more explicit signs of “economic capital”. These ideas are tested using birth certificate, U.S. Census, and voting records from California in 2004. We find strong differences in birth naming practices related to race, economic status, and ideology. Although higher status mothers of all races favor more popular birth names, higher status, white liberal mothers more often choose uncommon, culturally obscure birth names. White liberals also favor birth names with “softer, feminine” sounds while conservatives favor names with “harder, masculine” phonemes. These findings have significant implications for both studies of consumption and debates about ideology and political fragmentation in the United States.     

The evolution of norms: American policy toward revolution in Iran and Egypt

Is there a growing norm against violence towards civilians that constrains how the United States deals with its client states? This article examines two similar cases that suggest there is. In Iran in 1978 and in Egypt in 2011, the United States faced a possible revolution by a democratic/Islamist opposition, yet American policy makers gave their major regional ally opposite advice. In 1978, the White House urged the Shah to crack down on the opposition, and, in 2011, it pressed the Mubarak regime, as well as other regimes, to refrain from violence. This indicates that in situations where the American government is culpable for a potential bloodbath, policy makers are loath to take on that responsibility, which significantly shapes their policy toward revolution in a way that it did not when President Carter called the commitment to human rights “absolute.”     

The Mormon dilemma: How old and new religious divides hurt Mormon candidates in the United States

This paper shows that attitudes towards Mormons are very divisive on two levels: many religious conservatives distrust Mormons and refuse to vote for them because they are not Christian as they claim to be, while religious and political liberals see Mormons as part of a repressive religious coalition along with evangelicals and Catholics. Mormon politicians are in an awkward position between these two sides of America's “culture war,” not fully accepted by either. Using new survey questions about attitudes towards Mormons and Mitt Romney, this paper explores the nature of the two anti-Mormonisms and their electoral consequences. I argue that feelings about Mormonism have been an important factor in respondent evaluations of Mitt Romney.     

The Development of Carter's Urban Policy: One Small Step For Federalism

Proposals for a national urban policy underwent drastic revisionin the Carter White House after mid-January 1978. The followingarticle analyzes the evolution of the policy up to that change.     

Same-Sex Marriage,Korean Christians,and the Challenge of Democratic Engagement

The contest over gay rights (e.g., same-sex marriage) dramatizes the clash between increasingly nonwhite (“majority-world”), religious conservatives and mostly white, progressives. It renews longstanding debate about the compatibility of religious conservatism and liberal, pluralistic democracy. A study of one influential group, Korean Christians, shows that the younger, western-educated generation generally combines religious conservatism and political liberalism; they are much more likely to espouse liberal-democratic principles and to participate in the larger, plural society than the older, immigrant generation. However, the polarizing politics of gay rights partly reverses the generational pattern: the historically insular, first generation participate more in mainstream politics, while some western-educated, second-generation Korean Christians become intolerant and isolated from elite-educated circles. Ideological minorities self-segregate themselves in the face of hostile, energized majorities, whether progressives in Korean Christian circles or conservatives in secular, educated ones. Public deliberation on same-sex marriage depends on whether it becomes viewed like the clear-cut issue of interracial marriage or the more ambiguous one of abortion.     

Emotional Substrates of White Racial Attitudes

A steep decline in biologically based racial animus over the past four decades has not led to a softening of opposition to race‐conscious policies such as affirmative action. One explanation for this is that a new racial belief system—referred to as symbolic racism or racial resentment—has replaced “old‐fashioned racism.” Another is that nonracial values such as ideology and a preference for small government now drive policy opinions. Our theory suggests that whereas disgust once accompanied ideas about “biologically inferior” groups, anger has become fused to conservative ideas about race in the contemporary period. As a result, anger now serves as the primary emotional trigger of whites’ negative racial attitudes. We experimentally induce disgust, anger, or fear using an apolitical task and find anger is uniquely powerful at boosting opposition to racially redistributive policies among white racial conservatives. Nonracial attitudes such as ideology and small government preference are not activated by any of these negative emotions.     

Washington’s Cold War Diplomacy in Italy in the 1970s

This article examines Washington’s cold war diplomacy in Italy as a case study of policy making. Italy caused concerns to US leaders throughout the cold war because of its strong and dynamic communist party (PCI). Worries became even more acute in the 1970s after the PCI spelled out its “historic compromise” strategy whose objective was to propel the communists into cabinet positions within a broad coalition government. How did the White House, Foggy Bottom, the Rome embassy, the CIA and Congress view such a development and who got the final word? How strong were domestic factors? This paper tries to analyze the differences in opinions and their influence in policy making.     

Public Attitudes Toward Immigration Policy Across the Legal/Illegal Divide: The Role of Categorical and Attribute-Based Decision-Making

Scholars debate the relative strength of economic and ‘socio-psychological’ sources of anti-immigrant sentiment. However, the literature often fails to distinguish legal from illegal immigration and therefore overlooks a major instance in which this debate is moot. To address this issue, we develop a theory that recognizes two different modes of evaluating immigrants: “attribute-based” judgment, in which respondents weigh immigrants’ desirability based on individual characteristics—human capital, race, language ability, and so on—and “categorical” judgment, which disregards these altogether. Categorical judgments arise when a policy issue triggers blanket considerations of justice or principle that obviate considerations about putative beneficiaries’ individual merits, instead evoking overriding beliefs about the desirability of the policy as a whole or casting the entire category as uniformly deserving or undeserving. We use experimental evidence from two national surveys to show that the principal distinction between attitudes toward legal and illegal immigration is not in the relative weight of immigrants’ attributes but the much greater prevalence of categorical assessments of illegal immigration policy, much of it rooted in rigid moralistic convictions about the importance of strict adherence to rules and laws.     

The Duty to Take Care: President Obama,Public Administration,and the Capacity to Govern

President Barack Obama inherited many challenges as he entered the White House. One of the most important obligations he faced was the constitutional duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” Meeting that commitment has been rendered more difficult because Obama seems not to have recognized that the people and organizations of the executive branch are facing a crisis in the capacity to govern. This essay argues that no matter how talented President Obama may be in public policy or on the stump, he likely will not accomplish his constitutional duty unless he engages that capacity crisis.     

Technocracy and democracy as spheres of justice in public policy

There is a long-standing debate about the proper application of democratic versus technocratic approaches to decision-making in public policy. This paper seeks to clarify the debate by applying Michael Walzer’s notion of “spheres of justice,” wherein both democracy and technocracy could be seen as distinctive approaches to justice that need to be protected from the domination of the other. The paper shows how the debate on democracy versus technocracy has evolved in both theoretical and applied settings in a manner that reflects the “domination” of one approach by the other. It elaborates the argument through several concrete examples drawn from comparative politics, public policy, and public management. It then explores how the “spheres” approach implies the need for an interpretive mechanism in order to mediate the competing notions of justice in particular policy issues.     

Partisan Discourse,Polarization, and the Politics of Military Fatalities in Iraq

Public deliberation on the costs of war is important to democratic decision-making. This article explores congressional rhetoric about military fatalities within the U.S. House of Representatives and in television news media interviews from 2004 to 2006. In the House, the results are consistent with the “ideological opportunism” model of congressional rhetoric, which suggests that politicians–particularly the president’s partisan opponents–will be highly communicative about combat deaths in an effort to express ideological perspectives on war and criticize opponents’ positions. The results also show that as local combat fatalities accumulate, the president’s partisan opponents tend to become increasingly vocal about these deaths. The results do not support the “newsworthiness” model of congressional rhetoric in TV media interviews, which expects opposition party support and presidential party criticism of the president. Politicians on the far ends of the ideological spectrum dominate discussions about the loss of troops in the House, and politicians in both the House and TV news interviews advance largely unwavering partisan positions on the conduct of war. The findings suggest members of Congress reinforce political polarization in debates over the use of force.     

Ideology in Policy Debates: Congress and the S&Ls in the 1980s

Is a national value such as free enterprise relevant to congressional debates of important economic policy bills? This question was examined using debates of three reform bills that dealt with savings and loan industry problems in the 1980s. To employ free enterprise concepts in justifying policy stands challenged legislators because industry problems contrasted sharply in the early 1980s (overregulation) and later (excesses under deregulation). Research demonstrated, however, that free enterprise concepts dominated the earlier discussions and, intriguingly, were at the center of the 1989 debate about bailing out the industry and reforming it. The conclusion elaborates free enterprise's role and speculates about the influence of another national value on the S & L discussions. Enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery Enforcement Act of 1989¹ capped a decade of congressional struggle with the question of how to treat the problems of federal savings and loan institutions. Popularly known as “thrifts” or “S & Ls,” their status became a matter of increasing concern to Congress as the 1980s unfolded and public indignation over a prospective government bailout of unprecedented proportions mounted. This article focuses on an aspect of this struggle that has a larger significance, namely, the place of national values2 in the genesis of important economic policy statutes. Given the predilections of American society, the value that tends to loom largest in major economic policy debates is popularly know as “free enterprise” or “the market economy.” One may reasonably object that U.S. capitalism operates under a “mixed economy” whose features include enterprises owned or sponsored by the federal government as well as government subsidies and regulation of private businesses. The short answer to this objection is that the term free enterprise is used here in a mythic sense and “myths are an essential starting place for insights into how values shape policy…” (de Neufville and Barton, 1987). In essence, this article examines the following questions: (1) Did congressional debates on proposed statutes relate provisions of the 1980, 1982, and 1989 bills to free enterprise concepts? (2) If so, what adjustments were made in these concepts for the sharply contrasting circumstances encountered by S & Ls in the course of the decade? and (3) How was the peculiar relationship of government deposit insurance of S & L accounts to free enterprise treated in the bills? Two background sections introduce the discussion.     

Congress writes a law: Research and welfare reform

This paper traces the development of the Family Support Act of 1988 in the U.S. House of Representatives. The author, a Republican staff member, examines the impact of research on the policy environment that made welfare reform possible, on the arguments presented in committee hearings and bill-writing sessions, on the House debate, and on the final House/Senate Conference Committee approval. He concludes that social science research can and does play a useful role in formulation of public policy, although the domain of application is not as broad as many scholars think. However, given the partisan nature of policy formulation and the desire of social scientists to join the process, normal methods of quality control in social science research are too often forgotten, to the detriment of sound public decision-making.     

Why George W. Bush Is a Unilateralist and How It Will Affect the 2004 Presidential Election

ABSTRACT

U.S. President George W. Bush has had a stormy relationship with Europe. Bush campaigned on a theme of putting America's interests first and eschewing multilateralism when necessary. Since taking office, Bush has been true to his campaign pledges. Bush's style and substance have caused many in Europe to regard him as a “buffoon” at best and a dangerous cowboy at worst. What the Europeans do not seem to understand is that, for better or worse, George W. Bush's view of the world is held by a substantial portion of the American people, and even when the U.S. had a more Euro-friendly leader in President Bill Clinton, America's policies were often at odds with those preferred by its allies in Europe. This is due to a fundamental difference that has developed between Europe and the United States over the last century. Today, no matter who occupies the White House, American foreign policy is likely to be in conflict with Europe's. Far from being a liability, this difference is likely to be a political asset to George W. Bush in the 2004 presidential election.     

“Illegalizing” Families: State,Status, and Deportability NPS Christian Bay Best Paper Award Winner,APSA 2018, Boston

There is a paradox within United States immigration policy. Immigration policy separates families while also promising family unity. We address this paradox by arguing that state actors use “family” as a state-granted status. The state perceives some households as families and grants them benefits, while forcing other households to live as legal strangers. Individuals may form familial relationships, but the privileges and status of family are controlled by state actors and institutions. When state actors separate low-wage immigrant worker families, the state's family-status-granting power keeps these workers and their families in a state of “deportability”-a legally ambiguous limbo-satiating business interests and securing a captive low-wage workforce. Lacking legal legitimacy, but financially and socially tied to their families and communities in the U.S., these immigrants have few options but to accept off-the-radar work and to raise their children while living as “outlaws.”     

From Family Values to Religious Freedom: Conservative Discourse and the Politics of Gay Rights

On the issue of gay rights, today’s social conservatives are more likely to describe their opposition as a matter of religious freedom or personal conscience as opposed to a belief that gays and lesbians represent an existential threat to the traditional family. But how new is this contemporary argument, and how different is it from the family values politics of the previous era? This article develops what Victoria Hattam and Joseph Lowndes call “associative chains” from two important moments in anti-gay politics: Anita Bryant’s Save Our Children campaign and Kim Davis’s decision to not issue gay marriage licenses in Rowan County, KY. On one level, these moments reveal competing roles of the state in the lives of its citizens. Family values politics authorized an interventionist state for the protection of children, while religious freedom defenders promote a zone of personal conscience impervious to the state. On another level, however, these moments reveal the mutability of social conservative opposition to gay rights. Calls for protecting religious freedom preserve a heterosexism derived from antecedent family values politics. The novelty of religious freedom as a defense for homophobia obscures a persistent social conservative commitment to using the state to enshrine the heteronuclear family.     

Does AFDC-up encourage two-parent families?

Effective October 1990, the Family Support Act (FSA) of 1988 extended the previously state-optional AFDC-Unemployed Parent (UP) program to all states. This policy was undertaken in an effort to reduce the two-parent penalty of the AFDC program, but little is actually known about UP and its influence on family structure. This study clarifies what is meant by “two-parent family” in the federal legislation and provides new evidence on AFDC's incentive effects. The empirical analysis makes use of the cross-state variation in the generosity of AFDC benefits and the presence (or absence) of AFDC-UP before the FSA of 1988. Specifically, these state-level data are appended to data from the 1987 National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH). A real advantage of the NSFH is that it allows for the identification of those truly eligible for the UP program-married and unmarried couples who have an “in-common” dependent child. The major empirical finding is that contrary to the hopes of Congress, a state's provision of a UP program is not found to encourage two-parent families.     

KEEPING SODA IN SNAP: Understanding the Other Iron Triangle

Participants in SNAP have always been allowed to use their taxpayer-funded benefit to purchase Sugar Sweetened Beverages (SSBs). Despite an acute public health crisis surrounding the consumption of unhealthy products including SSBs, especially among the low-income citizens who also qualify for SNAP benefits, this policy has yet to be changed. Interviews with policy participants in Washington, D.C., reveal that change is being blocked by a culture of “personal responsibility” in America, plus three specific political forces: corporate lobbying primarily by the beverage and food retail industries; a desire by liberals to defend SNAP as income support for the poor even if nutrition outcomes are sub-optimal; and institutional inertia within the Department of Agriculture and the agricultural committees of Congress. In the 2018 farm bill debate, this “iron triangle” of bipartisan resistance to change was strong enough to block even a pilot study of SSB restrictions in SNAP.     

Who Governs in God’s City?

After clearing away some misconceptions about the power of the religious right in Colorado Springs, this article will examine three areas, education, medical marijuana, and gay rights, where the city’s religious conservatives have tried to influence public policy. With each area their efforts have only been partially successful. While the reasons for this uneven success are often particular to each policy dispute, taken together these issues point to discernible changes in the political behavior and ambitions of the city’s religious conservatives. Most importantly, religious conservatives have become far less confrontational and have turned away, to a significant degree, from direct political action and are focusing much more on community outreach programs. The paper will conclude by discussing some of the reasons for those changes and how they might have national implications for religious and social conservatives.     

Netzwerkstruktur, Handlungslogik und politische Räume: Institutionenwandel in europäischen und nordamerikanischen Grenzregionen

This paper is a contribution to the debate on political order and governance in a “debordered world” beyond the “Westphalian system”. It is based on empirical information about the development and change of political institutions in cross-border regions in Europe and North America in the 20th century. First, it is shown that the nation state is loosing its gate keeper role at the end of the century and that various sub-national actors institutionalise independent cross-border links or participate on an equal footing. Therefore, the pattern of interaction is changing from formal hierarchies to networks. Nevertheless, if we define hierarchies and networks as modes of governance, we cannot conform such a change since the mode of interaction has not changed over the years. There does not exist and never has existed any other mode of interaction as “negotiated agreement”. What has changed is the institutional logic for finding such a cross-border agreement. Whereas older institutions were designed to find a common solution by using a technocratic-deductive logic, younger institutions use a symbolic-inductive logic (mainly in Europe). In North America they are based either on a rationalistic-evolutionary logic (at the US-Mexican border) or on a discursive-constructivist logic (in the Pacific Northwest). Also in respect to the much proposed tendency towards “deterritorialization” of political orders we find strong differences between the continents: Whereas in Europe even the younger institutions are based on “spaces of place”, in North America the more recent institutions are much more oriented towards “spaces of flows”.