The Role of Civil Wars and Elections in Inducing Political Assassinations

Political assassinations can dramatically impact political and social dynamics, especially in times of violent political conflicts or electoral competition. The current study explores if and how specific social and political events facilitate the occurrence of political assassinations. After an examination of the logic of political assassinations, a theoretical framework is presented, which explains the role of civil wars and electoral processes as facilitators of different types of political assassinations. The theory is tested via a dataset of political assassinations worldwide between the years 1946–2013. The findings confirm that different sets of structural and contextual factors facilitate assassinations against heads of state, legislators, and leaders of opposition movements/parties. In addition, the findings illustrate the tendency of elections, especially in nonliberal settings and in polarized societies, to facilitate political assassinations rather than to calm the political environment. In contrast, civil wars have a more limited impact on the probability of assassinations, and their intensity and endurance mainly enhance the risk of assassinations of legislators.     

Do Targeted Assassinations Work? A Multivariate Analysis of Israel's Controversial Tactic during Al-Aqsa Uprising 1

We assess the impact of Israel's targeted assassinations policy on rates of Palestinian violence from September 2000, the beginning of Al-Aqsa uprising, through June 2004. Literature concerning the relationship between repression and rebellion suggests four plausible effects of targeted assassinations on insurgents: deterrence, backlash, disruption, and incapacitation. Using differenced and lagged time-series analysis, this article utilizes multiple and logistic regression to evaluate the effect of targeted assassinations on Palestinian violence. It is concluded that targeted assassinations have no significant impact on rates of Palestinian attacks. Targeted assassinations do not decrease rates of Palestinian violence, nor do they increase them, whether in the short or long run. Targeted assassinations may be useful as a political tool to signal a state's determination to punish terrorists and placate an angry public, but there is little evidence that they actually impact the course of an insurgency.     

“Special” Communiqué Issued by the Belgian Marxist Terrorist Group, “Communist Combatant Cells” (CCC)

This section of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism is dedicated to the reprinting of selected, translated terrorist communiqués that provide insights into the mindset, worldview, or operational thinking of a group. In terms of communiqués, this section employs the following typology of terrorist communiqués. There are three types of terrorist communiqués: attack, strategic, and special. Attack communiqués are issued to claim responsibility for an attack, explain the target selected, and provide the political rationale for attacking the target. A strategic communiqué is a longer document that is issued to provide strategic direction or commentary on political events, issues, and developments relevant to the group's cause and constituency. It can be used to explain changes of strategy or reinforce the strategic direction of the group. The special communiqué is similar to the attack communiqué in that it is event-driven but addresses non-attack events like anniversary dates, hunger strikes, elections, deaths of leaders, ceasefires, issuing threats or warnings, annual progress reports, issuing apologies, and so on. All three communiqués are issued publicly and intended to influence various audiences.     

Does Targeted Capture Reduce Terrorism?

From January 1979 to December 2009, the Maoist insurgent Shining Path committed a total of 9,034 violent acts in a concerted attempt to topple the Peruvian government. These acts of violence included bombings, armed assaults, and assassinations. The Shining Path's leader Abimael Guzmán was captured by the Peruvian government on 12 September 1992. Using quarterly data and an interrupted times-series AutoRegressive Integrative Moving Average (ARIMA) study design, we investigated the effect of Abimael Guzmán's capture on the ability of the Shining Path to wage its war against the Peruvian government. Maximum-likelihood results revealed that the frequency of terrorist acts committed by the Shining Path dropped by 143 incidents per quarter a short time after Guzmán was captured. The analysis also evinced a positive relationship between the lethality of attacks and the frequency of the Shining Path's terrorist activity. We conclude that targeted capture shows some promise as an effective counterterrorism strategy, at least for terrorist groups such as the Shining Path that have a top-down type of organizational structure.     

Draining the Swamp: Democracy Promotion,State Failure,and Terrorism in 19 Middle Eastern Countries

This study empirically evaluates the question of whether or not the promotion of democracy in the Middle East will reduce terrorism, both in terms of terrorist attacks sustained by Middle Eastern countries and in terms of attacks perpetrated by terrorist groups based in Middle Eastern countries. Using a series of pooled, time-series negative binomial statistical regression models on 19 countries from 1972 to 2003 the analysis demonstrates that the more politically liberal Middle Eastern states—measured both in terms of democratic processes and in terms of civil liberties protections—are actually more prone to terrorist activity than are Middle Eastern dictatorships. The study demonstrates, furthermore, that an even more significant predictor of Middle Eastern terrorist attacks is the intensity of state failures, or episodes of severe political instability that limit central government projection of domestic authority, suffered by states in the region. States that are unable to respond to fundamental challenges to political stability posed by internal political strife, ethnic conflict or the phenomenon of “stateless areas,” geographic or political spaces within states that eschew central government authority, are significantly more likely to host or sustain attacks from terrorist groups. The findings have implications for current United States antiterrorism policy toward the Middle East and provide a statistical/empirical foundation to previous studies on the relationship between terrorism and state failure.     

Uprooting or Sowing Violence?: Coca Eradication and Guerrilla Violence in Colombia

Belligerent nonstate actors including terrorist organizations often exploit illicit economies to fund their activities. In Colombia numerous belligerent groups are involved in illegal narcotics markets. For more than 20 years, the Colombian government has responded with targeted eradication of illicit crops, intending to undermine the groups' sources of revenue while simultaneously disrupting the illicit drug economy. Despite its duration, this policy's effect on guerrilla violence remains unclear. Examining the potential for violent backlash to these tactics, this research note assesses the impact of aerial coca crop eradication in Colombia from 2004–2005 on domestic Colombian guerrilla kidnappings, assassinations, and terrorism.     

A Crime–Terror Nexus? Thinking on Some of the Links between Terrorism and Criminality 1

Decreasing state sponsorship for terrorism in the post-9/11 environment has pressed terrorist groups to find alternative sources of financial support. Some groups have created their own “in-house” criminal capabilities, for example FARC, the LTTE, and Al Qaeda. Several analysts have argued that this “mutation” in organizational form may lead terrorist groups to ally with organized crime, whereas others have suggested that distinct organizational and ideological differences between the two will preclude cooperation. Drawing on both accounts, it is argued in this article that the degree of a terrorist group's organizational capacity and need are key predictors of the types of crime they will engage in, while ideological (political) distinctiveness will preclude fully symbiotic cooperation between terrorists and organized crime groups.     

Terrorism,Civil Liberties,and Political Rights: A Cross-National Analysis

This article examines the effect terrorism has on civil liberties and political rights across a wide range of democracies and regions. This study includes an analysis of the influence domestic and international terrorist attacks have on civil liberties and political rights in 48 democratic states from 1971–2007. The results from a time series cross-national analysis reveal that terrorism weakens civil liberties and political rights. However, certain types of democracies are more affected by terrorism than others. These findings have important implications for democracy and counterterrorism strategies in democratic states.     

Organizational perspectives on the formation and disintegration of terrorist groups

Abstract

This article treats terrorist organizations as political interest groups. Starting from the assumption that terrorists are rational political actors, it follows that organizational considerations will play a role in the formation and decline of terrorist groups, just as is the case in other political organizations. The effects of several factors, including recruitment, ability to provide selective and purposive incentives, the need for entrepreneurial political leadership, competition from other organizations, the ability to attract outside support, and the ability to form coalitions with other groups, are considered.     

Explaining Israel's Misuse of Strategic Assassinations

This study explains Israel's insufficiently discriminate use of strategic assassinations during the last two decades. It shows that the tool's misuse considerably diminished its overall contribution to Israel's national security. It identifies five dimensions of systematic misuse: timing, political views of the targets, organizational affiliation, domestic political consequences for the adversary, and the visibility of Israel's responsibility. It finds three clusters of causes for these patterns of misuse: a flawed decision-making culture, the prevalence of false causal stories, and the pernicious effect of norms. This study could not find evidence for a direct link between domestic political pressures to any systematic pattern of misuse.     

What Terrorist Leaders Want: A Content Analysis of Terrorist Propaganda Videos

In recent years, a growing body of empirical research suggests that indiscriminate violence against civilian targets tends to carry substantial political risks compared to more selective violence against military targets. To better understand why terrorist groups sometimes attack politically suboptimal targets, scholars are increasingly adopting a principal-agent framework where the leaders of terrorist groups are understood as principals and lower level members as agents. According to this framework, terrorist leaders are thought to behave as essentially rational political actors, whereas lower level members are believed to harbor stronger non-political incentives for harming civilians, often in defiance of leadership preferences. We test this proposition with an original content analysis of terrorist propaganda videos. Consistent with the principal–agent framework, our analysis demonstrates statistically that terrorist leaders tend to favor significantly less indiscriminate violence than their operatives actually commit, providing unprecedented insight into the incentive structure of terrorist leaders relative to the rank-and-file.     

A classification of terrorist groups

In contradistinction to existing typologies of terrorist organizations by ideology or intent, a functional classification is suggested. By analyzing terrorist groups according to their target population and base of operation, four basic types of organizations are delineated: Domestic‐based xenofighters, foreign‐based xenofighters, domestic‐based homofighters, and foreign‐based homofighters. On the basis of the operational objectives and specific limitations of these types of terrorist groups, it is proposed that xenofighters tend to adopt more indiscriminate tactics than homofighters, and that foreign‐based groups tend to perpetrate international terrorism, and are dependent on foreign countries’ support. Whereas the struggle against foreign‐based terrorists must focus on reducing the sponsoring countries’ motivation to support them, the battlefield regarding domestic‐based groups is home public opinion.     

Terrorism,Crime, and Transformation

This article argues that some of today's terrorist groups have transformed into transnational criminal organization (TCO) who are more interested in profits than politics. This dynamic has important implications for policymakers as some traditional, politically motivated terrorist groups further profit-minded agencies under a political banner. The author argues that there are different degrees of transformation; some terrorists commit criminal acts to support political operations, while others view profit-driven criminal acts as their end game. The articles further argues that unlike some observers suggest, TCOs and terrorist groups will not cooperate with each other to advance aims and interests, instead utilizing their "in-house" capabilities to undertake criminal or political acts.     

Explaining Lone Wolf Target Selection in the United States

The rise in lone wolf terrorist attacks worldwide in recent decades makes understanding the types of targets lone wolves choose a crucial locus of research, yet this topic remains understudied. In light of this lacuna, this article analyzes 84 lone wolf terrorist attacks that occurred in the United States between 1940 and 2012, identifies patterns in lone wolf target selection, and proposes and tests causal explanations for these patterns. I find that (1) a majority of lone wolves select civilian targets in familiar areas and (2) this is due to their relative weakness and their ideology.     

The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study

Since 1982, Hezbollah has evolved from a “revolutionary vanguard” terrorist organization bent on violently overthrowing the Lebanese government to a hybrid terrorist organization that uses legitimate political tools to the same end. Today Hezbollah operates on the civilian plane of da’wa, social welfare, and religious education; the military–Resistance plane (jihad); and the political plane. In its drive to dominate Shi’ite society, Hezbollah overcame its chief rival, Amal, and now plays a decisive role in Lebanon's political system and the Middle East. Understanding Hezbollah's emergence as a prototypical hybrid terrorist organization is key to understanding global and local jihad movements.     

Medical technology in combatting terrorism

State‐sponsored terrorism is a form of coercion, backed up by the threat and use of violence, to achieve political ends. These terrorist tactics also involve signaling of intentions and responses between the terrorist sponsor and those whom it targets. Accordingly this study examines Iranian state sponsorship of anti‐U.S. terrorism in the period of 1980–1990 as an example of political communication aimed at manipulating U.S. policy through the threat and use of violence. Official Iranian media are quantitatively content‐analyzed to demonstrate their systematic use of threat‐projections as warnings and indications to the U.S. in this period.     

Internal organizational problems and the sources of tensions of terrorist movements as catalysts of violence∗

The internal organizational problems of terrorist groups are analyzed. The purpose is to investigate how violent action by members of such organizations can be triggered by internal organizational problems rather than by external factors exclusively. Two kinds of problems are studied: command problems and political problems. Command problems include the following: reconciliation of security with efficient communication, the clustering of ethnic groups under stress, the role of women, and the quality of the membership. The political problems include the following: the self‐destructive potential in each terrorist organization (especially in case of its victory), the problem of inflated membership, and the role of terrorist leaders as the givers of moral dispensation.     

Investing in the Market of Violence: Toward a Micro-Theory of Terrorist Financing

Terrorist financing is the dedicated pursuit of adequate capitalization within a market of violence, wherein terrorist organizations seek to extract resources and funding from the social, political, and economic environment in which they operate. At the same time, the effectiveness of a terrorist group in this pursuit is highly dependent on their organizational type and design, its leadership capabilities, and its capacity for organizational learning—factors that shape the ability of terrorist groups to identify and exploit a limited set of investment and rent-seeking opportunities.     

Italian terrorism: Record figures and political dilemmas

The political assassination of Aldo Moro in May 1978 had a stunning effect on the Italian public similar to that experienced by Americans in the wake of the assassination of President Kennedy. The Moro case underscored the key political dilemmas confronting Italian leaders of all parties. It also led to a temporary breakthrough in the prosecution of political crimes by the arrest of leading suspects and the erosion of the terrorist supporting infrastructure. But without more effective legislation bolstering the discretionary use of force of police agencies, the frequency of terrorist activities has not diminished; the objectives have shifted temporarily from “revolutionary” to anarchial motives—compounding the prospects for prompt societal resolutions at the frustrations of issues.     

Middle Eastern terrorism in Europe: Trends and prospects

Abstract

Europe has been the preferred operational area for Middle Eastern terrorist groups—some 418 attacks from 1980–1989. Unlike European Marxist revolutionary or separatist terrorist groups, the Middle Eastern groups present Europe with a regional security problem. The most dangerous element in this Middle Eastern terrorist threat is the state‐sponsored activities of Iran, Libya, Syria, and Iraq. These countries provided the fuel for a decade of Middle Eastern terrorist bloodshed in Europe. Given the problems of solving the various political conflicts and feuds in the Middle East and the continuing attractiveness of Europe as a substitute battlefield for Middle Eastern terrorist elements, the threat of Middle Eastern terrorist activity in Europe should continue into the 1990s.