Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?

There is not yet a Chinese international relations theory (IRT)mainly due to three factors: the unconsciousness of ‘international-ness’in the traditional Chinese worldview, the dominance of the WesternIR discourse in the Chinese academic community, and the absenceof a consistent theoretical core in the Chinese IR research.A Chinese IRT is likely and even inevitable to emerge alongwith the great economic and social transformation that Chinahas been experiencing and by exploring the essence of the Chineseintellectual tradition. The Tianxia worldview and the TributarySystem in the two millennia of China's history, the radicalthinking and revolutions in the nineteenth and twentieth century,and reform and opening-up since 1978 are the three milestonesof China's ideational and practical development and thereforecould provide rich nutrition for a Chinese IRT. In addition,a Chinese IRT is likely to develop around the core problematicof China's identity vis-à-vis international society,a century-long puzzle for the Chinese and the world alike. Received for publication May 16, 2006. Accepted for publication June 27, 2007.     

ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture: a constructivist assessment

In the wake of the Asian financial crisis and the subsequentviolence that built up and then tore apart East Timor in 1999,serious criticisms were levelled at the Association of SoutheastAsian Nations (ASEAN) and its diplomatic and security culture.This article examines to what extent members of ASEAN –after the Hanoi Summit in 1998 until mid-2001 – collectivelyembraced new understandings in relation to norms associatedwith the ‘ASEAN way’. This question is exploredwith respect to four initiatives: the initiation of the retreatof ASEAN foreign ministers, the participation of ASEAN membersin United Nations missions in East Timor, the adoption of theASEAN Troika concept, and the passing of rules of procedureof the ASEAN High Council. It is argued that due to concernsabout ASEAN's image and reputation, some of the shared understandingsintrinsic to ASEAN's long-standing diplomatic and security culturehave been relaxed, particularly the principle of non-interference.While this development reaffirms the value of constructivisttheorizing in international relations, the article also demonstratesthat the aforementioned initiatives and agreements do not yetamount to a radical change in ASEAN's diplomatic and securityculture. The main reason for this is that norms associated withthe ‘ASEAN way’ are still perceived to serve theimportant and necessary function of helping to mediate estrangementand insecurity among ASEAN leaderships, as well as limitinginterference by non-ASEAN states.     

Why do states join US-led military coalitions?: The compulsion of the coalition's missions and legitimacy

Why do states join US-led military coalitions? The war/dispute-diffusionliterature suggests that opportunity and willingness are crucialdeterminants of coalition participation (Siverson and Starr, 1990,1991). A state joins a coalition if it has a strong interestin war and enough capability to send armed forces abroad. Alliancestudies connect coalition participation problems with the reliabilityof allied countries (Leeds, 2003; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004).These studies seem to provide a fairly good picture on the question;however, they are not free of problems. In particular, theystudy only coalitions for interstate war and militarized disputesbut ignore coalitions for other purposes. Coalitions can beformed for military operations other than war (Kober, 2002).There are coalitions for humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping,and even for the evacuation of noncombatants. This article showshow difference in operation-types and collective legitimacyaffect the decision of a state to participate in US-led coalitions.A coalition with United Nations' authorization may appear tobe a legitimate international ‘police’ act and attractmore partner states. A coalition for intervention into domesticaffairs may be less attractive to possible participants becauseof the violation of the noninterference norm of internationallaw. Statistical analysis on United States coalition partnersfrom 1950 to 1999 suggests that how and for what purposes coalitionsare formed cannot be overlooked. Coalition participation isnot fully explained by the existing perspectives found in war/dispute-diffusionliterature and alliance studies, and there is a need to invoke‘the compulsion of the coalition's missions and legitimacy’. Received for publication November 16, 2005. Accepted for publication April 20, 2006.     

Japanese and American Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism

Regular convening of East Asian summits and rising concernsabout the American dollar have heightened interest in Asiancooperation. Japan will necessarily play a central role in regionalendeavors, and the United States must at least acquiesce ifregional coordination is to progress. Among American accounts,the most theoretically elaborate and systematically comparativeanalysis is A World of Regions, while Remapping East Asia providesthe most authoritative overview of recent developments. Japanese-languagestudies of East Asian regionalism agree that regional cooperationis far less institutionalized and rule-based in East Asia thanin Europe, but they include a wider range of opinion about thedesirability and feasibility of cooperation. Skeptics on theright warn that efforts to create a regional community wouldweaken the United States–Japan alliance, undermine universalvalues, and cede regional leadership to China. Optimists onthe left counter that regional cooperation holds out the onlyhope for ameliorating nationalist conflicts. Most numerous arecentrists arguing for active cooperation on economics and theenvironment, but only cautious moves on politics and security.Despite their caution, Japanese authors convey a sense thatchanges to the American-led global and regional order are occurringand likely will continue.     

The Military and SocietyBeyond the Postmodern Era

The degree to which the international security environment had changed after the Cold War became evident with the attacks on September 11. As a result, military forces in the United States (and perhaps in the West generally) are evolving from their Cold War and immediate post-Cold War perspectives to confront transnational and subnational non-state dangers. These changes have significant implications for military professionalism and the relations between the military and society. They are explored through a modified “Postmodern Military” model, called here the “Hybrid” model.     

Taoism and the concept of global security

Global security is typically discussed in the rationalist termsused to articulate contemporary modernism. To restrict analysisto such articulations, however, is to accept the limits anddistortions that this way of being and knowing creates. Thisarticle seeks to transgress these limits, and to compensatefor these distortions. It does so by discussing the conceptof global security from a Taoist perspective. Initially, itmaps what global security means to rationalists. Then it discusseswhat Taoism entails, and compares Taoist and rationalist epistemologies.Then it compares Taoist and rationalist thinking about globalsecurity, defined first in more general, ‘human’security terms, and second in more particular, politico-strategicterms. It concludes by highlighting the significance of theTaoist concept of wu-wei (‘no unnatural action’),and of Taoism as one way in which to contextualise the rationalistconstruction of global security.     

The balance of great-power influence in contemporary Southeast Asia

This article reviews and critiques recent scholarly work onSoutheast Asian relations with the great powers, examining thestrategies that ASEAN governments have used and the effectsof those strategies. The author argues that Southeast Asiangovernments have generally steered away from traditional balanceof power politics to promote a more complex ‘balance ofinfluence’ comprising military, economic, institutional,and ideational dimensions. A key feature of this balance ofinfluence strategy has been its inclusiveness. Southeast Asiangovernments have invited competing great powers to participatein the region's economic and diplomatic affairs so that theydevelop stakes in the region's peace and prosperity. The authorcontends that Southeast Asian efforts have been relatively successfulto date, contributing to a multi-dimensional balance that isrelatively resilient and places significant constraints on anyexternal power's ability to exercise unwanted dominance in theregion. Received for publication August 4, 2008. Accepted for publication September 24, 2008.     

North Korea's foreign economic relations

Many debates about engagement with North Korea hinge on theprecise nature of North Korea's foreign economic relations:whether trade and investment are on commercial or non-commercialterms; the extent of illicit activities, and the changing geographicpatterns of North Korea's trade. This article provides an effortto reconstruct North Korea's foreign economic relations, subordinatingour estimates to the discipline of the balance of payments accountingframework. Among the most salient findings for the debate aboutengagement and sanctions is that North Korea's trade and investmenthave continued to increase despite the onset of the nuclearcrisis and a decline in illicit activities. This growth hasoccurred in part because of the growing weight of China andSouth Korea in trade, aid, and investment. We also find thateconomic relations between North and South Korea have a substantiallygreater non-commercial component than those occurring acrossthe China–North Korea border. Received for publication November 29, 2007. Accepted for publication April 7, 2008.     

Exploring political determinants of the magnitude of financial reforms in developing countries

This paper aims to empirically explore political determinantsof the magnitude of financial reforms, namely, under which conditionsa country is more likely to choose a ‘big-bang’type of financial reform versus a gradual financial reform.Especially, how the International Monetary Fund's (IMF's) effecton the magnitude of financial reforms is conditioned by politicalinstitutions is quantitatively examined using 30 developingcountries' data from 1973 to 2002. Results demonstrate thatthe IMF's effect on facilitating a big-bang type of financialreforms is contingent upon the number of veto players in thecase of a democratic government. Also, a non-democratic governmentis more likely to engage in big-bang type of financial reformsthan a democratic government, holding other conditions constant. Received for publication October 8, 2006. Accepted for publication December 12, 2006.     

Conclusion: On the possibility of a non-Western IR theory in Asia

In the conclusion, we seek to ascertain the possibility of anon-Western International Relations theory (IRT) in Asia. Wefind while there is a good deal of writing that can be regardedas ‘pre-theoretical’, these have not been fullyexploited or exported to other parts of Asia and beyond. Thereis certainly little that can be called an Asian IRT. This isnot because scholars in the region accept that Western IRT isunchallengeable nor that it has found all the answers to themajor problems of international relations. Nor is it becausenon-Western theories are ‘hidden from the public eye’.It is rather due to a lack of institutional resources, the head-startof Western IRT, and especially the hegemonic standing of WesternIRT. At the same time, the case studies point to the existenceof abundant intellectual and historical resources that couldserve as the basis of developing a non-Western IRT that takesinto account the positions, needs and cultures of countriesin the region. There is room in Asia for the development ofnon-Western IRT, but not an ‘Asian School of internationalrelations’ (although national perspectives such as a ‘ChineseSchool’ are possible) which would assume a degree of convergenceof perspectives and interactions among Asian scholars, whichclearly does not exist. This development should and could gobeyond simply ‘joining in to the existing game seekingto add local colour and cases to existing theory’, ordeveloping a localist exceptionalism (‘Asian values’)or organizing local thinking into rebellions against prevailingorthodoxies (especially realism and liberalism) in the mannerof the dependencia theory. Western IRT does not need to be replaced,but can and should be enriched with the addition of more voicesand a wider rooting not just in world history but also in informedrepresentations of both core and periphery perspectives withinthe ever-evolving global political, economic and social order. In the conclusion, we first offer some generalizations fromthe four case studies with a view to addressing the main questionposed in the introduction: the apparent absence of IRT in Asiaand possible explanations behind it. We then reflect on whetherthe question of a non-Western IRT in Asia is a meaningful one,and whether the way it is approached in this special issue couldresult in a productive debate that would advance the disciplineof IR. Although our empirical focus is on Asia, we suggest someinsights that have more general relevance for non-Western IRT. Received for publication May 16, 2006. Accepted for publication June 27, 2007.     

Thirty-seven degrees frigid: US-chilean relations and the spectre of polar arrivistes, 1950–59

After its 1948 proposal to internationalize Antarctica had been rejected, the United States accepted the Chilean Escudero Plan as a necessiry for avoiding further political disputes among the seven nations that had balked at the proposal's call to renounce their sovereign rights. US and Chilean officials proceeded to discuss revisions that might enhance the Escudero Plan's acceptabiliry to the other nations, all of which shared the goal of excluding the Soviet Union. Before there had been any substantial progress, the 1957–58 International Geophysical Year legitimated the USSRs presence in the far south, and already tense US-Chilean relations entered a phase of heightened apprehensiveness. This article explores the diplomatic and contextual nuances of this bilateral interaction that proved central in bringing the Antarctic Treary of 1959 to fruition.     

Transregional security cooperation after September 11, 2001

The aim of this article is to answer the question what kind of global security architecture emerged after September 11 and what functions Europe, East Asia and the United States assumed in this triadic structure. The empirical findings reveal that the transpacific security cooperation is the strengthening link in this global security structure, the transatlantic security cooperation the weakening one and the Asia–Europe Security Cooperation is to be seen as the emerging link. In order to explain these different institutional manifestations of transregional cooperation, different theories of International Relations are applied to the three cases. It comes as no surprise that neoinstitutionalism and constructivism offer the best insights into the formation and development of international institutions.

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American Perspectives on the Transatlantic Security Agenda

This article explores US perspectives on the new transatlantic security agenda in the context of the evolution of strategic culture. The war on terrorism and the Iraq War of 2003 serve as focal points to examine sources of divergence and convergence between US and European security policies. The article explores key questions including: Have we seen the collapse of a shared, transatlantic security culture since September 11? How have US leaders manipulated strategic cultures to achieve security objectives in the new era? Why has the Bush administration willingly engaged (and even encouraged) the intra-European divide? How significant to the United States is the shift in “old” and “new” European perspectives on the war on terrorism? The article concludes with an assessment of the implications of recent events for the future of transatlantic security ties.     

Thirty-seven degrees frigid: US-chilean relations and the spectre of polar arrivistes, 1950-59

After its 1948 proposal to internationalize Antarctica had been rejected, the United States accepted the Chilean Escudero Plan as a necessiry for avoiding further political disputes among the seven nations that had balked at the proposal's call to renounce their sovereign rights. US and Chilean officials proceeded to discuss revisions that might enhance the Escudero Plan's acceptabiliry to the other nations, all of which shared the goal of excluding the Soviet Union. Before there had been any substantial progress, the 1957-58 International Geophysical Year legitimated the USSRs presence in the far south, and already tense US-Chilean relations entered a phase of heightened apprehensiveness. This article explores the diplomatic and contextual nuances of this bilateral interaction that proved central in bringing the Antarctic Treary of 1959 to fruition.     

Deconstructing the ASEAN security community: a review essay

Once viewed as a bastion of stability and economic growth, theAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is now besetwith a variety of seemingly intractable problems ranging fromterrorism to internal secessionist conflict and economic stagnation.The central and evolving role of ASEAN in the internationalrelations of Southeast Asia since 1967 raises the question ofhow we should conceptualize the organization. This review articleargues that Amitav Acharya's recent claim that a nascent securitycommunity is emerging in Southeast Asia is flawed for at leastfour reasons. First, a variety of problems surround the independentvariable – norms – that Acharya uses to explainASEAN's emergence as a security community. The author failsto adequately explain why the norms he privileges emerged asASEAN's dominant norms. The lack of a convincing explanationfor the origins of the author's favored ASEAN norms is damagingbecause, prima facie, other kinds of norms – ‘perversenorms’ – appear to give us greater purchase in understandingthe organization. Second, a critical flaw in Acharya's argumentrelates to its tautological nature. Third, from an empiricalperspective, the dependent variable, the nascent ASEAN securitycommunity has arguably never existed. Finally, alternative explanationsfor ASEAN are not fully explored. While Acharya examines neo-liberalinstitutionalism and neo-realism, he overlooks the possibilitythat a form of realist institutionalism may most accuratelyexplain ASEAN's history, and perhaps even predict its future.     

Alliance formation and national security

The premise that nations form alliances in order to improve their security is widespread in the study of international relations. Yet in spite of the crucial role played by this assumption, the claims of policy makers and statesmen form our only evidence that it is the need for greater national security which motivates the formation of alliances. What is more, we have no systematic evidence that the concern for national security would be a consistent predictor in the face of other plausible goals. Our intent in this paper is to supply this evidence.

From the assumption that greater national security is a primary incentive to form an alliance, we construct a series of hypotheses, each building successively on the previous hypothesis to predict conditions at the individual, dyadic and systemic levels of analysis. By constructing an indicator of national security, we are able to test these hypotheses against historical information about European alliances from 1815 to 1965. Our evidence that security considerations are indeed central to alliance behavior improves the empirical and theoretical foundation of a considerable body of studies in international relations and foreign policy preceding this one.     

Japan–UK: perspectives of partnership

One of the most remarkable developments that took place in the postwar international order is the relationship between the United Kingdom and Japan, two major world powers. Formerly bitter enemies in war, their relationship is today perhaps at the best ever. They are connected by a network of shared interests in the politico-strategic, scientific-technological and socio-cultural spheres, beyond the economic realm. Nonetheless, as cooperation between Japan and Europe has been the fragile side of the triangle of “Japan–US–Europe” relations, the promotion of Japan–UK ties at bilateral, regional and international levels might have a significant effect. The trilateral structure of “Japan–Britain–EU” relations also creates diverse dynamics that involve all three forces in a broader regional cooperation including the security arena, than would be possible on just a bilateral Britain–Japan level. These impulses might help to facilitate Europe to become a more influential global actor and to serve as a key enabler of the British foreign policy toward the Asia-Pacific region. Under this context, this article strives to explore how Japan–UK bilateral relationship, one of the strongest ties binding Asia to Europe, stands today, by shedding light on the new horizons of their partnerships for global responsibilities.Monir Hossain Moni is a PhD Scholar under the Japanese Government Monbukagakusho: MEXT Scholarship Program at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies (GSAPS) of Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan. He is currently on study leave from his position as an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences and Japan Study Center of University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh     

政府金融干预与经济发展:泰国、马来西亚案例研究

本文主要探讨泰国与马来西亚政府金融干预体制的特点及其在社会经济发展中的作用。泰国、马来西亚政府金融干预在保护本国金融部门发展、推动社会均衡发展方面成效显著;但在支持本国支柱产业的建设、促进工业化进程方面效果欠佳。这主要与两国金融体制的局限性和政府的社会发展政策有关。金融危机后,两国推行的改革措施,正推动两国政府金融干预机制向更科学、合理的方向发展。     

Southeast Asia: theory between modernization and tradition

This article inquires into the absence of non-western theorizingupon Southeast Asian international relations by positing thatmodernization and its conceptual kin ‘realism’ haveproclaimed themselves as the mainstream in both theoreticaland empirical research. This is as much a product of postcolonialwestern scholarship as it is of indigenous scholarship in reproducingthe former's frameworks. The effect of this Gramscian hegemonyis to marginalize possibilities for non-western internationaltheory. There are nonetheless flickers of hope for a generic‘Southeast Asian contribution’ to theorizing InternationalRelations, inclusive of non-mainstream western scholarship,if one considers the categories of transitional and hybrid scholarship,in addition to historically informed possibilities of a traditionalSoutheast Asian statehood. Received for publication May 16, 2006. Accepted for publication June 27, 2007.