Population growth and foreign policy

Australian foreign policy is examined in light of the population issue and its relationships to its developing Asian neighbors. Rapid population growth has been a 20th-century phenomenon. In the ESCAP region, almost all governments are anxious to reduce growth rates and welcome international assistance for population programs. The motivation of these governments seems to be both political and economic. Asian countries do not share the view expressed at Bucharest by Latin American and African representatives that high population growth rates are not a problem. Results of national family planning programs in 16 developing Asian countries are assessed. Major fertility decline has only occurred so far in the most prosperous of these countries. Future fertility trends are hard to predict. Present inadequate knowledge of the determinants of human fertility and limited knowledge regarding fertility limitation techniques hamper progress in population reduction. Australia has aided these countries in demographic training and data collection. For both economic and humanitarian reasons, this aid should be extended to program implementation.     

Economic growth and the population explosion: Simulation experiments using a growth model with population endogenous

The purpose of this analysis is to shed some light on the issue of how much economic growth, unaided by population control policies, can bring down fertility and defuse the population explosion in the less developed countries. The paper explores the demographic evolution of an ideal less developed country over a 100 years time span under alternative assumptions concerning capital accumulation, rate of technological progress, and returns to scale. The model used incorporates (a) a population projection matrix with coefficients which are a function of time and of endogenously generated levels of income per capita, and (b) a gross reproduction rate‐GNP per capita function with parameters estimated from a time series of cross sections spanning the period 1860 to 1959. This function was designed to reflect dominant traits of the historical experience concerning the effects of economic growth on fertility in a context characterised by the absence of population control policies.     

Reassessing the Effect of Economic Growth on Well-being in Less-developed Countries, 1980–2003

Development debates have been greatly influenced by the growth consensus: the conventional wisdom that economic growth should be the primary priority for less-developed countries (LDCs) because it most effectively improves the well-being of the world’s poor. We compare the impact of growth to other independent variables in an unbalanced panel analysis of up to 109 LDCs and 580 observations across six time points (1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2003). Our dependent variables include caloric consumption, infant survival probability, one-to-five year survival probability, female life expectancy, and male life expectancy. First, we find that gross domestic product (GDP) has significant positive effects on caloric consumption, female life expectancy, and male life expectancy. Second, GDP does not have robust effects on infant and one-to-five survival probabilities. Third, fertility, urbanization, and secondary school enrollment have larger effects than GDP in the majority of models. The more powerful effects of fertility, urbanization, and secondary schooling cannot simply be attributed to an indirect effect of GDP. Fourth, we find that dependency variables do not have robust significant effects. Fifth, over time, GDP has become much less effective at improving caloric consumption and infant and one-to-five survival. We infer that there are serious limitations to concentrating exclusively on economic growth to improve well-being in LDCs.     

Population growth and development in the third world: The neocolonial context

Less developed countries (LDCs) that were colonies of other nations continued operating under the same social and political structures set up by the former ruling nations. The small minority of elites in the LDCs held on to the power acquired during colonial times. In order to preserve their political and financial status after independence, they maintained their close linkages to the capitalist nations and their multinational corporations (MNCs). The elites did not generally have popular support, however. These capitalist nations and their commercial interests continue to dictate most LDCs development process which supports the financial interests of the MNCs and the local elites and not those of the majority, the poor. The poor realize that they are trapped and unable to break away from the economic and political structures, therefore, to assure some form of security, they have many children which exacerbates their poverty. Yet population control policies based on Malthusian theory and those that rely on such undimensional, technical approaches as family planning alone cannot cure the multidimensional social problems of high population growth and poverty. Neither the Malthusian nor Marxist theories totally explain the situation in the LDCs or even provide workable solutions. Research on population and development in LDCs needs to address both the Malthusian concern for the problems posed by high growth rates and the Marxist critique of class struggle in development trends. To eliminate the trap of poverty and dependent economies, each country must design its own remedies based on its history, culture, and geography and alter the prevailing social, economic, and political power structures in favor of the poor. 6 propositions that must be modified to each nation's particular problems and needs are presented to guide LDCs in formulating or reformulating policies to alleviate the problems of population and poverty.     

Debt crisis of the less developed countries and the transfer debate once again

In the perspective of substantial amount of net transfers from the debtor less developed countries (LDCs) to the creditor developed countries (DCs) in the recent debt crisis years, there is a renewed debate (that started in the context of German reparation payments after the First World War) on the question of transfer burden of debt. The present study assembles some evidence to show that the LDCs in general expanded their export‐volumes and faced losses in their export unit values in the process of their debt repayments. Many LDCs faced this transfer burden of debt irrespective of whether their export drive was in the field of primary products or manufactures. Thus the Keynesian analysis for German transfer problems seems to be relevant in the context of the present experience of the LDCs. For some debtor countries, the ‘insoluble’ transfer problem mentioned by Keynes exists as they are facing ‘Fisher's paradox’: The more the debtors pay, the more they owe.     

Fertility,development, and family planning, 1970–1980: An analysis of cases weighted by population

A series of related studies (Freedman and Berelson, 1976; Mauldin and Berelson, 1978; and Tsui and Bogue, 1978) have presented empirical findings based on multiple regression analysis which indicated that family planning program effort (FP), as measured by an index developed by Lapham and Mauldin (1972), was the single most important predictor of (or influence on) fertility reduction in less-developed countries (LDCs). The basic results have been confirmed repeatedly. A more extensive data set was used to extend the analysis to a comparison of results of corss-sectional models circa 1970 and 1980. The study builds upon the results of past studies yet differs from them in several ways. All the variables in the present study were measured at 2 points in time: circa 1970 and circa 1980, allowing a comparison between cross-sectional models for 1970 and 1980. Among the cases included in this multivariate analysis was China, a country usually excluded for lack of data. The analysis was extend to 85 countries. Cases were weighted by population, having the effect of increasing the impact of larger countries such as India and China on the outcome of the analysis. Total fertility rate (TFR) was used as an indicator of fertility. For 1970, family planning program effort had the strongest direct influence on fertility (a result consistent with previous studies). Life expectancy at birth was the other direct influence. The direct influence of life expectancy at birth was less than that of family planning, but the total influence was greater. After life expectancy and family planning, school enrollment and relative educational status of women had the strongest indirect and total influences. The other variables all had a positive influence on fertility. When the total variance attributable was considered, directly and indirectly to each of the independent variables, urbanization, carlorie supply, and per capita gross national product all accounted for less than 5% of the variance in fertility, all of it indirect. Life expectancy, family planning, and school enrollment each explained (directly plus indirectly) more than 10% of the variance in fertility. The pattern differed somewhat for 1980. Calorie supply, per capita gross national product, and relative educational status of women had no influence, direct or indirect on fertility. Also for 1980, life expectancy had a stronger direct influence on fertility than family planning. Overall, life expectancy at birth, family planning program effort, and total school enrollment emerged as the principal influences on fertility.     

State power, state embeddedness, and national development in less developed countries: A cross-national analysis

In this article, we test the prevailing statist argument about the state’s contribution to economic development in less developed countries (LDCs). State power in terms of centralized control of societal resources has been long considered a primary factor for economic growth. From the embeddedness perspective, the state’s effective embedding in the economy advances productive growth, while state power actually operates as a structural precondition of such policy action. Featured in our measurement are representative and financial embeddedness (operationalized as the central government’s tax income and its lending to the private sector and local states, respectively). The empirical testing is based on a pooled cross-national data of sixty-one underdeveloped countries. As indicated from modeling both manufacturing growth and increase in GNP per capita as dependent variables (during the period 1975–1990), the state power variable does not produce expected growth outcomes. However, two embedded state measures display significant but sectorbiased growth effects only for manufacturing production. Herein we further compare strong state power countries with weak ones, concluding that state power serves as a structural prerequisite so that late industrialization for LDCs can benefit from the growth coalitions in which the central state collaborates with (rather than dominates) actors at the subnational level of society and authorities. Ming-Chang Tsai teaches sociology in Taiwan. He was Fulbright Visiting Scholar in the Institute for Social, behavioral, and Economic Research, University of California at Santa Barbara (1998–99). He wishes to thank professors Diane Davis and Ian Roxborough for invaluable comments. An earlier version of this article was presented in the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, August 1997, Toronto.     

Are the LDCs really the world’s least developed countries?

The term ‘the least developed countries’ (LDCs) is widely understood to designate, exactly as stated, the world’s least developed countries. In conjunction with the 2015 United Nations (UN) triennial review of the LDC category, this article attempts to critically evaluate the UN’s list of LDC countries in the light of various indicators – economic, social, political, military and security related, and psychological. It concludes that the official and actual lists of LDCs, despite important similarities, are not completely identical. The term ‘the LDCs’ as used by the UN is therefore not fully consistent with the reality it attempts to designate and describe.     

“A minimum of urbanism and a maximum of ruralism”: The Cuban experience

The case of Cuba provides social scientists with reasonably good information on urbanization policies and their implementation in 1 developing country committed to socialism. The demographic context is considered, and Cuban efforts to eliminate the rural-urban contradiction and to redefine the role of Havana are described. The impact of these policies is analyzed in terms of available data on urbanization patterns since January 1959 when the revolutionaries marched into Havana. Prerevolutionary urbanization trends are considered. Fertility in Cuba has declined simultaneously with mortality and even more rapidly. Projections assume a 1.85% annual growth rate, resulting in a population of nearly 15 million by the year 2000. Any estimate regarding the future trend in population growth must depend on prognosis of general living conditions and of specific government policies regarding contraception, abortion, female labor force participation, and child care facilities. If population growth in Cuba has been substantial, but less dramatic than that of many other developing countries, urban growth presents a similar picture. Cuba's highest rate of growth of the population living in urban centers with a population over 20,000, in any intercensal period during the 20th century, was 4.1%/year for 1943-1953. It dropped to 3.0% in the 1953-1970 period. Government policies achieved a measure of success in stemming the tide of rural-urban migration, but the aims of the revolutionary leadership went further. The objective was for urban dwellers to be involved in agriculture, and the living standards of the rural population were to be raised to approximate those of city dwellers. The goal of "urbanizing" the countryside found expression in a program designed to construct new small towns which could more easily be provided with services. A slowdown in the growth of Havana, and the concomitant weakening of its dominant position, was intended by the revolutionary leadership. Offical policies have been enunciated that connect the reduction in the dominance of Havana with the slowdown in urban growth and the urbanization of the countryside. Evidence is presented which suggests achievements along all of these dimensions, but by 1970 they were, as yet, quite limited.     

Fiscal incentives and direct foreign investment in less developed countries

This study found no support for the belief by the governments of most less developed countries (LDCs) that the provision of fiscal incentives is necessary to attract direct foreign investment and that the greater the generosity of these incentive programmes the greater would be the level of such investment. What mattered were the presence of natural resources and a proven record of economic performance. The provision of incentives could not compensate for the absence of either of these two factors. The study is a cross‐sectional one of 27 LDCs for the period 1965–73.     

Emigration and expulsion in the Third World

The right of individuals to leave their country, and conversely their right not to be forced to leave, are generally recognized tenets of international law. In developing countries, 2 patterns of assault on these rights are apparent. 1 pattern concerns political and ethnic pressures associated with the pain and tribulations of nation building in new societies, which tends to produce refugees. The 2nd pattern is an effort to block the brain drain of skilled personnel to more developed countries. The desire to be rid of those who don't fit in and the desire to make those with needed skills fit in explains much of the apparent inconsistency and vacillation of governments on both issues. States with no tradition of statehood often turn to authoritarian models to create cohesion. Where ruling elites attempt to strengthen national unity, they tend to turn on groups whose language ethnicity, religion, culture, political beliefs, or socioeconomic status do not fit in. The 2nd pattern of constraint on Third World emigration is a reaction to the threatened loss of manpower. While Sudan lost only 1% of its labor force to emigration, this included 70% of its medical graduates and such high percentages of high level clerical personnel as to become an obstacle to efficient government. It is not the least developed countries that suffer most from the brain drain; they have less competition for available openings and adjustment to developed country life is more difficult for their citizens. Many "drainees" feel political pressure to leave, although the decisive motivation appears to concern working conditions and employment. the "drained" countries not interested so much in imposing restrictions on themselves as in gaining recongnition of the responsibility of the industrialized nations to developing ones; they want compensation for losses incurred.     

Population and development: fact,fancy and politics

Massive population growth is an accepted fact in developing countries at a time when developed, Western countries, i.e., the U.S., have become increasingly disenchanted with foreign aid. The gap between the very rich and very poor becomes wider and sharper. Most people live either in countries where the per capita income is below $320 or above $1,280. Lowering fertility rates would be favorable to economic conditions in the long run but with little short-run effect, population control is not a high priority government activity. The theme of the 1974 Bucharest Conference was that if development were encouraged, fertility would take care of itself. Programs which directly influence fertility rates are needed to improve development. Family planning programs are low cost compared to other development policies, and they improve maternal and child health. Women cannot be educated or employed unless they have the freedom of choice not to have children or when to have children. Western enthusiasm for fertility control has been met with suspicion in many devleoping areas. Western attitudes should be balanced by restructuring world trade and constructing relationships which would hasten economic development.     

What Has Driven the Great Fertility Decline in Developing Countries since 1960?

Several developing countries are currently experiencing a significant fertility decline, however, academic economists have paid little attention to this transition. This paper seeks to explain the fertility transition by infant mortality, urbanisation, income, culture and educational attainment of females and males using annual data for 92 developing countries over the period 1960–2014. External instruments are used to deal with endogeneity. The results suggest that increasing per capita income, improved female education and increasing secularisation have been important determinants for declining fertility in the developing world.     

Sociological explanations of economic growth

Even if questions of how resources aredistributed within and between societies are our main concern, we must continue to grapple with the issue of the causes of economic growth because economic growth and level of development continue to be among the most important causes of inequality, poverty, unemployment, and the quality of life. This paper’s dependent variable is the economic growth rate of 55 less developed countries (LDCs) during two time periods—1970–78 and 1965–84. The causal model consists of control variables—level of development and domestic investment in 1965—and a variety of independent variables drawn from major sociological theories of economic growth published during the last three decades. Multiple regression analysis shows that, net of the effects of the two control variables, the variables that have the strongest effect on economic growth rates are: (1) direct foreign investment, which has a negative effect; (2) the proportion of the population in military service; and (3) the primary school enrollment ratio, both of which have positive effects of economic, growth. On the other hand, variables drawn from some theories receive no empirical suport. The mass media of communications, ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, democracy and human rights, income inequality, and state-centric theory’s key variable—state strength—all fail to show any significant impact on economic growth rates when the control variables and the significant independent variables are held constant. The theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Fertility,family planning,and development: Indirect influences

This paper focuses on the indirect influences on changing fertility and on the direct and indirect influences on family planning effort. Complete data on the variables under consideration were gathered from a variety of sources for 65 developing countries. The results here should be generalized only to high fertility, high mortality, low education, and low per capita gross national product nations. 1) Some social variables, like education, are more important than others for explaining fertility and family planning effort. The treatment of social setting as a single variable obscures the importance of lower level education (literacy, primary, and secondary school enrollment) for fertility and family planning. 2) Ignoring the indirect influences on fertility may lead us to understimate the importance of some variables on fertility, and perhaps to overestimate the importance of others. When both direct and indirect effects (the latter through family planning effort) are examined, the impact of education increases to nearly equal that of family planning effort in 3 of the 4 models developed here. 3) Program effort can be explained at least as well with a single variable (literacy or female school enrollment) as with the composite variable "social setting." 4) In addition to its importance in explaining fertility, education may also be important in explaining mortality. 5) It appears that the absolute and relative status of women may be an important variable which has not yet been adequately measured. Overall, the results of this study lend additional support to the position that, in addition to family planning effort, education may play a more crucial role than is obvious in fertility reduction in developing countries.     

Public funds for private enterprise: The international finance corporation 1

In a recent article Helleiner [1974: 351] argues that the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) scheme has operated in such a way as to transfer real resources from developed countries (DCs) to less developed countries (LDCs). Helleiner attempts to substantiate this claim empirically by examining the net acquisition of SDRs which has been made by DCs, and the net use of SDRs which has been made by LDCs since the SDR facility was established. In this article it is suggested that, although the SDR agreement has, indeed, served to create an ‘informal’ SDR/aid link, net use data taken at face value do not necessarily reflect the extent or nature of this informal link.     

The "Kerala model" of development: development and sustainability in the Third World

The Indian state of Kerala with a population of 29 million has made the transition to a society with low infant mortality rate, low population growth, and a low crude death rate in less than 30 years. The average life expectancy for women is 74 years (vs. 60 years for India as a whole) and 71 years for men (vs. 59 years for India), the infant mortality rate is 16.5/1000 live births (vs. 91/1000 for India), and literacy is almost universal. The population growth rate fell from 44/1000 in the 1950s to 18/1000 in 1991. By 1985 the population growth rate had stabilized to a demographic replacement level net reproduction rate. Kerala's female/male ratio is 1.04:1 as opposed to the Indian average of 0.93:1 and China's 0.94:1. All this was achieved without coercion by democratically elected state governments. In the late 1970s Kerala ranked number one in 15 out of 21 Indian states with respect to selected infrastructural and basic services. This development came about despite a low per capita income. In 1991-92 the state of Punjab, with more than twice the per capita income of Kerala, had 33 PQLI (Physical Quality of Life Index) points less than Kerala. In addition, the HDI (Human Development Index) of Kerala was more than twice the national average. The HDI was 0.925 for the US in 1994 vs. 0.775 for Kerala, where the per capita income was one-hundredth of the US per capita income. This progress was accomplished by the elimination of absentee landlords and the return of the land to the tiller; and large amounts of funds spent on education, health care, infrastructure, agricultural credits, and housing. Staples were made available to the poor at subsidized prices. The Kerala model may be taken as an early prototype of sustainable development because of improvements in the quality of life, environmental stability, social and economic equality, and the decline in political strife.     

The relation between rate of growth and level of development

The paper tests the hypothesis that countries pass through three successive phases of development: an initial phase of stationary or slow growth; a phase when the growth rate is increasing (accelerating growth), and finally, a phase of decreasing (decelerating) growth. Since the regressions turn out to be significant at the 0.1 per cent level, it may be taken that the hypothesis is confirmed. An explanation is offered and deviant cases are discussed. One of the consequences of the established regularity is that the gap is widening between the least developed and other countries, but the countries at the intermediate level of development are catching up. Thus the usual twofold classification of countries will have to be replaced by a threefold one: less developed, developing and developed countries.     

No Condition is Permanent: Middle Class in Nigeria in the Last Decade

The economic debate on the existence and definition of the middle class has become particularly lively in many developing countries. Building on a recently developed framework called the Vulnerability Approach to Middle Class (VAMC) to define the middle class, this paper tries to estimate the size of the Nigerian middle class in a rigorous quantitative manner and to gauge its evolution over time. Using the VAMC method, the middle class group can be defined residually from the vulnerability analysis as those for which the probability of falling into poverty is below a certain threshold. The results show the size of the Nigerian middle class from is around 20 percent of the total population in 2012/13. However, the rate has been slower than expected given the high growth rates experienced in the country over the same period. The results also paint a heterogeneous picture of the middle class in Nigeria with large spatial differences. The southern regions have a higher share and experienced more growth of the middle class compared with the northern regions.     

Tax revenue instability,with particular reference to sub‐Saharan Africa

This article examines the temporal instability of tax revenues across a sample of developed and less developed countries. It is shown that instability is especially high in LDCs and is highest in open economies with low per capita income, high output variance and inflationary problems. Even allowing for these factors, revenue instability appears to be particularly high in sub‐Saharan Africa. Revenue instability can be expected, via the government budget constraint, to be associated with expenditure instability and/or instability in the sources of deficit finance. Cross‐section evidence for LDCs confirms that countries with high tax revenue instability tend also to have high expenditure instability. Time‐series evidence for six African countries however, suggests that revenues and expenditures do not move together in a uniform manner, and the direction of causality is generally ambiguous. There is some evidence however that foreign borrowing is used more to finance expenditure increases than to counteract revenue shortfalls.