The external occipital protuberance: can it be used as a criterion in the determination of sex?

Sex determination of a corpse can be problematic in cases where the body is damaged. Useful criteria would assist in the identification of sex in such cases. The goal of this study is to determine the usefulness of the external occipital protuberance (EOP) in the determination of sex, especially in lateral cranium radiographs. The types and configurations of the EOP were investigated on normal lateral cranium radiographs of 1000 subjects (500 males and 500 females) and 694 dry-skull remains (371 males and 323 females) from a 16th Century Anatolian population for the purpose of sex determination. In the radiographic examination, the incidence of less prominent (Type 1) EOP is found to be 85.4% in females whereas 17.8% in males. The spine type (Type 3) EOP is found to be 63.4% in males and to be 4.2% in females. On the other hand, studies of dry-skull remains revealed the incidence of Type 1 EOP to be 67.5% in females and Type 3 EOP to be 55.2% in males. The crest type (Type 2) EOP is approximately equal in both sexes and is found to be less valuable for sex determination in both groups.     

Metastatic cancer of the urinary bladder: can it be a nonnatural death?

Deaths from metastatic carcinoma are almost exclusively viewed as wholly natural deaths. However, if it can be shown that a cancer has arisen as a result of a prior traumatic injury and the body's healing response to the injury, or treatment thereof, then in select cases, the manner of death shall reflect that of the precipitating injury. This case report is that of a woman who was rendered quadriplegic from spinal cord injury sustained in a motor vehicle crash when she was 22 years old. She died at the age of 49 years from widely metastatic squamous cell carcinoma of the urinary bladder. Her bladder cancer most likely arose from decades-long chronic irritation of the bladder epithelium by physical contact with an indwelling Foley catheter and urinary infections. Over the years, the chronic bladder irritation likely precipitated metaplastic, dysplastic, and finally neoplastic changes of the bladder epithelium, providing a link between her spinal cord injury, the indwelling Foley catheter, and her bladder cancer, engendering an accidental manner of death. The manner of death reflected the circumstances of her injury that predisposed her to the cancer that eventually caused her death.     

When Are People Persuaded By DNA Match Statistics?

The way in which statistical DNA evidence is presented to legal decision makers can have a profound impact on the persuasiveness of that evidence. Evidence that is presented one way may convince most people that the suspect is almost certainly the source of DNA evidence recovered from a crime scene. However, when the evidence is presented another way, a sizable minority of people equally convinced that the suspect is almost certainly not the source of the evidence. Three experiments are presented within the context of a theory (exemplar cueing theory) for when people will find statistical match evidence to be more and less persuasive. The theory holds that the perceived probative value of statistical match evidence depends on the cognitive availability of coincidental match exemplars. When legal decision makers find it hard to imagine others who might match by chance, the evidence will seem compelling. When match exemplars are readily available, the evidence will seem less compelling. Experiments 1 and 2 show that DNA match statistics that target the individual suspect and that are framed as probabilities (i.e., The probability that the suspect would match the blood drops if he were not their source is 0.1%) are more persuasive than mathematically equivalent presentations that target a broader reference group and that are framed as frequencies (One in 1,000 people in Houston would also match the blood drops). Experiment 3 shows that the observed effects are less likely to occur at extremely small incidence rates. Implications for the strategic use of presentation effects at trial are considered.     

Lak?a?�� as Inference

This paper questions a few assumptions of Ga?ge?a Up??dhy??ya??s theory of ordinary verbal cognition (laukika-???bdabodha). The meaning relation (v?tti) is of two kinds: ?akti (which gives us the primary referent of a word) and lak?a??? (which yields the secondary referent). For Ga?ge?a, the ground (b??ja) of lak?a??? is a sort of inexplicability (anupapatti) pertaining to the composition (anvaya) of word-meanings. In this connection, one notices that the case of lak?a??? is quite similar to that of one variety of postulation, namely, ?rut??rt??th??patti, where the subject hears only a part of a sentence and immediately grasps the words that are needed to render the sentential meaning complete. Unless he does that, sentential meaning, i.e., the composition (anvaya) of word-meanings shall suffer from the same inexplicability that characterizes instances of lak?a???. In fact, in the ???aktiv??da?? section of Tattvacint??ma?i, Ga?ge?a himself draws a parallel between the cognition of sentential meaning in a ?rut??rth??patti-like case and the cognition of sentential meaning in an instance of lak?a???. However, Ga?gesa himself treats ?rut??rth??patti as a piece of inferential cognition. If there is no fundamental difference between cases of ?rut??rth??patti and cases of lak?a???, then the cognition of sentential meaning in instances of lak?a??? must also be inferential in essence. In that case, we must admit, against Ga?ge?a??s view, that such cognition of sentential meaning cannot be accommodated within the framework of verbal cognition (???bdabodha). Therefore, I conclude that some revision is needed in Ga?ge?a??s theory of verbal cognition with respect to lak?a???.     

Lak?a?ā as a Creative Function of Language

When somebody speaks metaphorically, the primary meanings of their words cannot get semantically connected. Still metaphorical uses succeed in conveying the message of the speaker, since lak?a?ā, a meaning-generating faculty of language, yields the suitable secondary meanings. Ga?ge?a claims that lak?a?ā is a faculty of words themselves. One may argue: “Words have no such faculty. In these cases, the hearer uses observation-based inference. They have observed that sometimes competent speakers use the word w in order to mean s, when p, the primary meaning of w does not make any semantic sense. In all such cases, s is actually related to p. After having observed this, when the hearer hears the utterance of w, and realizes that w’s primary meaning p is semantically unfit for the sentence-meaning, they infer on the basis of their prior observation that ‘the competent speaker must mean s by uttering w’. Thus lak?a?ā becomes a success.” This apparently well-argued reduction does not stand the critical examination; neither in Ga?ge?a’s framework, nor even in the general theory of language. For one can compose and interpret potentially infinite novel sentences based on lak?a?ā while the observational inferences one can make are finite. Ga?ge?a says very clearly that as far as the secondary meaning is concerned, no prior observation is required. This paper will argue that not only does language yield secondary meanings through lak?a?ā, but it also restricts the use of secondary meanings; for one cannot mean just anything by saying something. Lak?a?ā is a creative function with infinite potential within the limits set up by the language faculty.     

How long after writing can an ESDA image be developed?

ESDA has been used for a number of years as a means of developing indented images on paper and is an essential tool for the document examiner. This paper reports on the results of experiments with various aged documents to determine how long after writing images can be developed with ESDA. The results indicate that the latent image from some writing may remain longer than fifty years. The paper also reports an actual case in which images were developed years after the document was executed, thus dating the preparation of key pages.     

When legal rights are not a reality: do individuals know their rights and how can we tell?

Public knowledge of rights has been the subject of a number of empirical enquiries over the last decade. In England and Wales, knowledge of rights and its relationship with an individual's capacity to ‘self-help’ and ‘self-represent’ when faced with a civil justice problem has become the subject of renewed attention following changes to legal aid which, from March 2013, will see the availability of legal advice and representation dramatically reduced. Previous studies focusing on public knowledge of rights in this (and other) jurisdictions have illustrated a lack of knowledge amongst the general population and more specifically, a widespread tendency of individuals to assume that the law aligns with their own moral, ethical or social attitudes. However, many of these studies have also suffered from methodological shortcomings. In attempting to address some of these shortcomings this study uses an open-ended format to ask individuals with one or one or more civil or social justice problems to describe their rights/legal position. We find that whilst an open-ended question approach to exploring knowledge of rights yields insight not acquired by other formats, its utility is constrained by difficulty reconciling articulation and actual knowledge of rights. We discuss the implications of these findings as they relate to the development of future research in the field of family and social welfare law, Public Legal Education (PLE) and access to justice post-March 2013.     

Why is it a Crime to be Poor?

This article considers the historical development of certain aspects of poor relief in England and Wales and their connection with the treatment of vagrants. It will argue that it is the historical link between early statutes controlling both the movement of labourers and the destitute in the fourteenth century and the later parochial responsibility for the relief of poverty which led both to the inclusion of vagrancy provisions within the 1601 Poor Relief Act, and the continuing quasi-legal connection between vagrancy provisions and the relief of poverty. A nexus of punishment was created within the operation of the poor law by the two-fold role of justices of the peace; these officials not only adjudicated the settlement laws, but were also responsible for the legal control of vagrancy. The article will argue that this contributed to the harshness of the 1834 poor law reforms, and continues with contemporary approaches to the relief of poverty via Social Security legislation which prioritises the control of claimant fraud above the rights of the individual to relief from want. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.