Disappearing Without a Moral Trace? Rights and Compensation During Times of Emergency*

Scholars are divided over whether a victim’s rights persist when an agent permissibly responds to an emergency. According to the prevailing view the moral force of rights is not extinguished by moral permissibility and the agent, therefore, has a duty to compensate the victim. According to another influential view permissibility does erase the moral force of rights and the agent, therefore, can only have a duty to compensate for reasons other than the fact that they committed a rights transgression. I argue that liability does not follow even if we grant that the victim’s rights persevere. A non-pecuniary remedy such as a formal apology provides an adequate way of vindicating the victim’s rights and of recognizing the agent’s causal role. Thus, the answer to the question of what remedy the permissible transgressor owes the victim does not provide us with an answer to the question of who should bear the burden.     

POWER IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: A REVIEW AND COMMENTARY

The two books I have been reviewing have made a number of points about the nature of power in the American economy. Our economic society is dominated by large institutional actors. Supporting this reality are layers of traditional reasons, some of which are myth-like. These institutions are not necessarily as efficient or as innovative as these traditional beliefs inform us, and they coalesce to form an interconnected whole that operates to serve institutional interests first. In the process, large business corporations come to see natural persons as roles. This perception at once increases the individual's mobility and her irrelevance. Many of us are leading meaningless lives as we serve the objectives of others in our work. Overall, the large American business corporation has brought a new form of social organization that substantially truncates us as natural, whole persons. In the process, these organizations are challenging the family as a dominant form of organization in our society. Rights in our society accrue to the actor with productive capacity. Through the use of political power, market research, and advertising, we can discern a type of power that subtly conditions us to believe that this reorganization of our environment is proper and right. As we pursue our own “free will,” therefore, we actually submit to the objectives of the large business corporation. Generally speaking, Adams, Brock, and Coleman agree on this fundamental point: the dignity of individual purpose and meaning that we share and that define us as human beings is thwarted by a set of institutional arrangements that have fundamentally reoriented our society to serve the institutions' own objectives of profit and growth. Why is this important? It seems that in social systems, like mechanical systems, something is lost when mass is increased. As our important institutions become larger, what is lost is a kind of knowledge about our own environment and how it works. In the place of this first-hand knowledge, we come to rely on second-hand knowledge provided by social-science experts. Without this first-hand knowledge, we lose the confidence that we have the ability to see for ourselves what has meaning and to bring about desired changes in our lives. With the loss of confidence, we lose power, a form of power that each of us is told from childhood that we, by nature, should have. Our individual wills and perceptions atrophy without use. We come to believe that our place in the social order is inevitable and natural. In short, the individual, the source of both knowledge and political rights, has become secondary to the will and strength of large private and public institutions. How can natural, individual actors regain–or perhaps realize for the first time –power in their own lives? In reaching for an answer to this question, I believe Adams, Brock, and Coleman have overlooked some essential features of our modern political economy.     

An Acquittal for Epistemicism

Scott Soames argues that consideration of the practice of legal judgement gives us good reason to favor the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory of vagueness against epistemicism. Despite the fact that the value of power-delegation through vagueness is evidenced in practice, Soames says, epistemicism cannot account for it theoretically, while the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory is capable of it. In this paper, I examine the two possible arguments against epistemicism that can be extracted from Soames’s account: (1) an argument based on unknown obligations, and (2) an argument based on power-delegation through vagueness. The first argument tries to convince us that, as based on epistemicism, the law has already decided the borderline cases, so that judges have obligatory decisions even in such cases: therefore epistemicism is inconsistent with the discretion of judges in borderline cases. I show that even if we sympathize with Soames’s intuitions concerning the legal practice, the argument he offers is not conclusive since it is either invalid, unsound, or paradoxical. The second argument holds that only the gaps which the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory predicts give judges the possibility of lawmaking in borderline cases. However, by categorizing the vague laws as imperfect laws, the judges can claim the right of lawmaking without any need to refer to gaps in the law. By neutralizing these arguments, I argue that epistemicism is able to explain the phenomena just as well as the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory.     

A Break?

Since the financial crisis of 2008 we have seen a rise in suicides across the world. Greece for example in 2011 saw a sustained increase in suicides of 35.7%. In this article I draw our attention to well-publicized suicides that took place in Greece. I focus on the suicide notes left behind. The suicide notes, I suggest, can be read as offering us a critique of the anxious times in which we find ourselves. They are offering us a critique in two senses: (a) a critique of the way we are being governed (through austerity memorandums and a neoliberal logic); and (b) a critique of the affirmative ways of responding towards the financial crisis (through occupations, demonstrations etc.). Consequently these suicide notes can be read as a demand for having a break from this neoliberal logic and organization of life and asking us to re-imagine our social and political realm. In arguing thus, the article draws on Sigmund Freud, Michel Foucault, Wendy Brown and others.     

The skeptic's guide to a movement for universal health insurance

The social movement has become institutionalized as a form of political action. The aim of this article is to evaluate the possibilities presented by this form as a strategy to bring about universal health insurance in the United States. I draw on the work of social movement theorists, on the substantial body of empirical research on health-related social movements, and on relevant comparative work from Canada to develop a template for this evaluation. Using that template I compare the failed campaign for President Bill Clinton's health insurance plan with a recent, more successful campaign in the state of New York. I conclude that the keys to success are, first, a broad-based coalition that combines an ideologically and/or grievance-motivated grass roots with financially and politically well-endowed mainstream organizations; second, a "master frame" that resonates with the American people; and, third, a political window of opportunity. The prospects for such a conjunction are not hopeless, but they are not high.     

Addressing the shortage of kidneys for transplantation: purchase and allocation through chain auctions

Transplantation is generally the treatment of choice for those suffering from kidney failure. Not only does transplantation offer improved quality of life and increased longevity relative to dialysis, it also reduces end-stage renal disease program expenditures, providing savings to Medicare. Unfortunately, the waiting list for kidney transplants is long, growing, and unlikely to be substantially reduced by increases in the recovery of cadaveric kidneys. Another approach is to obtain more kidneys through payment to living "donors," or vendors. Such direct commodification, in which a price is placed on kidneys, has generally been opposed by medical ethicists. Much of the ethical debate, however, has been in terms of commodification through market exchange. Recognizing that there are different ethical concerns associated with the purchase of kidneys and their allocation, it is possible to design a variety of institutional arrangements for the commodification of kidneys that pose different sets of ethical concerns. We specify three such alternatives in detail sufficient to allow an assessment of their likely consequences and we compare these alternatives to current policy in terms of the desirable goals of promoting human dignity, equity, efficiency, and fiscal advantage. This policy analysis leads us to recommend that kidneys be purchased at administered prices by a nonprofit organization and allocated to the transplant centers that can organize the longest chains of transplants involving willing-but-incompatible donor-patient dyads.     

On the evaluation of procedural systems in laboratory experiments

Conclusion This article has criticized various aspects of the Thibaut and Walker research. Thibaut and Walker have greatly contributed to the study of procedural justice by conceptually isolating issues and suggesting ways they can be empirically studied. Our criticisms in Section I point out weaknesses in the design of particular experiments but do not question the appropriateness of laboratory research on the operating characteristics of procedural systems. In this realm, Thibaut and Walker's work will provide the starting point for future research.We do question the appropriateness of laboratory research for answering subjective questions, as outlined in Section III. While we agree that experimental research can indicate how people feel about a system, we do not think that objective measurement of the incidence of such subjective feelings tells us anything about the objective qualities of the systems considered. The assertion that one system is superior to another because some people feel it is so goes beyond the limitations of the experiments and the data. This type of overgeneralization is seriously misleading when it is used to support policy recommendations, particularly when other factors, such as the costs we discuss in Section II, are not considered.We wish to thank Dr. Jacqueline Macaulay, Professor Stewart Macaulay, and Dr. Neil Vidmar for their comments on an earlier draft of this article. Responsibility for its contents rests solely with us.     

从实体自我到关系自我——后现代心理学视野下的自我观

现代主流心理学在考察"自我"时,假设了我们每个人都有一个作为精神实体而存在的"我",它是个体存在的核心,统领着我们的一切.后现代心理学对这种实体自我观进行了猛烈批判,认为根本就不存在所谓真实的实体自我.后现代心理学从社会建构主义出发,将自我视为关系的创造物,是我们在与他人的关系中通过语言建构而成.它将自我理解为关系性的、多元的、变化的、去中心的.从现代社会向后现代社会的转变过程中,人们自我意识观的变化要经历策略操作者、混杂人格和关系自我这三个不同的阶段.后现代心理学自我观的提出对我们理解自身、解决自身的心理问题具有重要意义.     

Can we handle the truth? Legal fictions in the determination of death

Advances in life-saving technologies in the past few decades have challenged our traditional understandings of death. People can be maintained on life-support even after permanently losing the ability to breathe spontaneously and remaining unconscious and unable to interact meaningfully with others. In part because this group of people could help fulfill the growing need for organ donation, there has been a great deal of pressure on the way we determine death. The determination of death has been modified from the old way of understanding death as occurring when a person stops breathing, her heart stops beating, and she is cold to the touch. Today, physicians determine death by relying on a diagnosis of total brain failure or by waiting a short while after circulation stops. Evidence has emerged that the conceptual bases for these approaches to determining death are fundamentally flawed and depart substantially from our biological and common-sense understandings of death. We argue that the current approach to determining death consists of two different types of unacknowledged legal fictions. These legal fictions were developed for practices that are largely ethically legitimate but need to be reconciled with the law. However, the considerable debate over the determination of death in the medical and scientific literature has not informed the public of the fact that our current determinations of death do not adequately establish that a person has died. It seems unlikely that this information can remain hidden for long. Given the instability of the status quo and the difficulty of making the substantial legal changes required by complete transparency, we argue for a second-best policy solution of acknowledging the legal fictions involved in determining death. This move in the direction of greater transparency may someday result in allowing us to face squarely these issues and effect the legal changes necessary to permit ethically appropriate vital organ transplantation. Finally, this paper also provides the beginnings of a taxonomy of legal fictions, concluding that a more systematic theoretical treatment of legal fictions is warranted to understand their advantages and disadvantages across a variety of legal domains.     

Sentencing: Must justice be even-handed?

The question considered is whether a convicted criminal has been treated unjustly if the only reason he receives a much heavier sentence than another criminal convicted of the same crime is that he came before a different judge. The answer offered is that such a criminal would not be treated unjustly. The principle of equality in punishment, properly understood, does not forbid even such gross disparities in sentence (though it also does not require them). The paper discusses the 1978 Model Sentencing and Corrections Act in detail and has important consequences for the current movement to reform punishment to assure just deserts.Work on this paper was supported in part by a Summer Research Grant from Illinois State University, 1981.     

Majority Party Change and Committee Jurisdictions in State Legislatures

Committee jurisdictions are important in legislative organization, but the reorganization of jurisdictions has received scant attention, particularly in state legislatures, where the fluidity of committee organization allows us to examine rationales for change. In this article, I examine whether new majorities use jurisdiction reorganization for agenda‐control purposes. Examining 39 state legislatures between 2003 and 2012, I test whether committee patterns are less stable in legislative sessions under new majorities and the extent to which reorganization reflects party priorities. I find that new majority parties eliminate committees that reflect the other party's policy priorities and create committees that reflect their priorities.     

The Law’s ‘Majestic Equality’

Anatole France’s The Red Lily is best known for this ironic aphorism: ‘The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.’ The laws mentioned in this aphorism are open to two criticisms. The first criticism is that they forbid conduct that oughtn’t to be forbidden. The second criticism is that they unfairly place greater burdens of compliance on some (here, the poor) than on others (here, the rich). It may be onerous for the poor to comply with the law against, say, sleeping under bridges; not so for the rich. It is this second criticism that I read France as expressing, and it is the reach of this criticism that I explore in this essay. Specifically, I want to ask whether the second criticism may apply to a law even if the first criticism does not – whether there can be laws that are good in the sense that they forbid behavior that genuinely ought to be forbidden, but that are nonetheless unfair in the distribution of compliance burdens they yield. Some examples may tempt us to say ‘no.’ It may be more burdensome for thrill-seekers than for the rest of us to comply with laws against speeding, but that does not make speeding laws unfair. But I argue that the answer is ‘yes.’ Good laws can, and surprisingly often do, yield unfair distributions of compliance burdens. I conclude the essay by showing how remedies for this sort of unfairness might work.     

Vladimir Shapoval: "The CEC Is Destined to Be the Scapegoat"

"The law is harsh, but it is the law"—the well-known ancient Roman saying is entirely suitable as a brief synopsis of the Lb.ua interview with the chairman of the Central Election Commission (CEC), Vladimir Shapoval.

"Any electoral legislation, I emphasize, any, will always be 95 percent the product of political expediency. Always. This way gives them an advantage—so be it." This is how he calmly parried my emotional "How can the advantage of the strong be codified in the law (!), and the weak essentially have no chance? What can you do, how can it be?" "All this ‘whining and crying,’ say, the law is this and that in substance, I do not accept it. The laws were adopted—so we will follow them. You cannot get away from it," he added.

It might seem to someone who does not know Vladimir Nikolaevich that the chief vote-counting official is being clever, "covering up" the "distortions" of the authorities "at the local level." He is in fact speaking frankly. The chairman of the Central Election Commission formed on the eve of the 2007 preterm parliamentary elections by a "coalition"—a retired Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) justice, and a doctor of legal sciences who is an active member of the High Council of Justice (HCJ), he can permit himself that. Shapoval contrives to call things by their names: "How the law is written is another matter. And its parts are written abominably," he states bluntly.

In view of this, my discussion with Shapoval—formally tied to the start of a local elections campaign—went far beyond the bounds of a discussion of the legislation on this topic, and even the specifics of the campaign. The more so as I had already discussed this in detail with CEC Deputy Chairman Andrei Magera. Vladimir Nikolaevich, without concealing his indignation, related just what the HCJ is really afraid of (and it turned out it was not at all, or more precisely not only, what they are portraying it to be). Relying on nine years of experience as a CCU justice, he elucidated the risks of the invalidation of the 2004 constitutional reform by the current Constitutional Court—"only those who have face can lose it." Sketching out the situation in the body politic, he summed up, "If the Party of Regions (PoR) does not win the local elections, many questions will arise."     

Local Self-Government in Russia: An Unrealized Project

It so happened that, in 1989, A. Migranian and I initiated a long discussion over whether we, like many other countries, are fated to go through a period of authoritarian government during the transition to a modern market economy. It has also transpired that some people (as a rule from the ranks of the most radical democrats) who at the time refused even to pose the question of a "firm hand" and who saw no difference between pointing out the possibility of authoritarianism and calling for its introduction now cannot even imagine further progressive development of our homeland without such a "firm hand" and are placing all their hopes in this (guided, of course, by an enlightened head).     

Darwall,Habermas, and the Fluidity of Respect

What moral commitments do we manifest when we make claims upon one another? The practice of claiming is inescapable, and so any normative presuppositions of that practice are similarly inescapable (at least on pain of self‐contradiction). This inquiry thus promises an Archimedian point from which to address intractable moral disagreements in modern society. Whatever we happen to differ about, we can be shown to agree about these premises, and therefore to share commitment to whatever can be derived from these premises. The most prominent developer of this approach is Jürgen Habermas, who has sought to ground, inter alia, religious and cultural rights on this basis. I will argue that the strategy cannot resolve disagreement in the way Habermas hopes, and that this has been shown, perhaps inadvertently, by Stephen Darwall, who for very different reasons seeks to work out the premises of the practice of claiming (and who never discusses Habermas). Darwall has no apparent interest in finding a universally convincing basis for resolving moral controversies. He seeks to address, not the practical problems of a pluralistic society, but some specialized, albeit important, questions of metaethics, having to do with what kind of entity a moral claim is 1 1 These are the focus of a symposium on Darwall's book The Second Person Standpoint (Darwall 2006) in Ethics 118 (Oct. 2007). To avoid misunderstanding: I am not here attempting a comprehensive comparison of Darwall and Habermas, but only juxtaposing their views on a single important issue.
. Both Habermas and Darwall think that discourse presupposes a kind of respect among persons. Darwall, however, shows that respect is too fluid, and takes too many possible forms, to ground any but the most trivial specific moral claims.     

Who are Refugees?

Hundreds of millions of people around the world are unable to meet their needs on their own, and do not receive adequate protection or support from their home states. These people, if they are to be provided for, need assistance from the international community. If we are to meet our duties to these people, we must have ways of knowing who should be eligible for different forms of relief. One prominent proposal from scholars and activists has been to classify all who are unable to meet their basic needs on their own as ‘refugees’, and to extend to them the sorts of protections established under the United Nations Refugee Convention. Such an approach would expand the traditional refugee definition significantly. Unlike most academic commentators discussing this issue, I reject calls for an expanded refugee definition, and instead defend the core elements of the definition set out in the 1967 Protocol to the United Nations Refugee Convention. Using the tools of moral and political philosophy, I explain in this article how the group picked out by this definition has particular characteristics that make refugee protection distinctly appropriate for it. While many people in need of assistance can be helped ‘in place’, in their home countries, or by providing a form of temporary protected status to them, this is not so, I show, of convention refugees. The group picked out by the UN refugee definition is a normatively distinct group to whom we owe particular duties, duties we can only meet by granting them refuge in a safe country. Additionally, there are further practical reasons why a broader refugee definition may lead to problems. Finally, I argue that rejecting the call for a broader definition of refugees will better help us meet our duties to those in need than would an expanded definition.     

Lessons from Philosophy? Interdisciplinary Justice Research and Two Classes of Justice Judgments

More and more scholars of social justice have been calling for a closer collaboration between empirical and normative disciplines. Psychological and sociological research, as well as philosophical theories can, so they claim, learn from one another and work should be based on results obtained in the other fields of research. Some political philosophers do not share this view. They argue that, since most empirical research does not capture people's moral views on justice, its results cannot be of any value to their theories. Based on this critique I suggest in the first part of this paper that empirical research should distinguish between two classes of justice judgments: First, justice judgments in a narrow sense, which are made under conditions of impartiality and grounded in moral principles, and second, justice attitudes, which differ from other types of social attitudes only in their attitude objects. In the second part I present a quasi-experimental study that aimed at testing the two different classes of justice judgments empirically. The results show that justice judgments in the narrow sense can be obtained even under conditions in which complex experimental manipulations cannot be employed. In the third part of this paper I hypothesize that justice judgments which are based on the two formal criteria provided by political philosophy (impartiality and reference to moral principles) may serve as important intervening variables when trying to explain the impact of justice beliefs on different patterns of human behavior.     

网络化：学习型组织的创建路径——以公安机关为例

学习型组织不是简单的组织学习,把公安机关的“大练兵”活动理解为就是创建学习型公安机关的观点是片面的。在组织理论中,学习型组织是针对理性官僚制组织由于职能分工、层级科制所形成的学习智障而提出的新型组织管理模式。因此,学习型组织的创建必须从组织形态的改革入手,把僵化的金字塔式的组织转变成沟通顺畅的扁平化组织。现代化的信息平台和网络化沟通,为我们提供了很好的实现组织扁平化的工具。只有在组织形态发生变革的情况下,结合公安机关建立的一系列长效学习机制,才能真正走上公安干警个人、公安机关自身不断学习、可持续发展之路。     

Family, Social Inequalities, and the Persuasive Force of Interpersonal Obligation

To date, the privatization of the costs of social inequalitiesfor women and children has been criticized predominantly froma policy perspective. This article seeks to make a strongercase against remedying social inequalities through private lawobligations by addressing the theoretical difficulties withsuch privatization with a particular focus on familial obligations.I take my core examples from the current Canadian understandingof the spousal and child support obligations. My analysis proposes and proceeds on the basis of a new discoursefor obligations traditionally grouped together as "Family Law"obligations: first, interpersonal obligations, which arise fromand tie together two citizens through either a single interactionor through their relationship as a whole; second, social obligations,which are owed by the community as a whole to individual citizens. I argue that the persuasive force of the focus on an individual'sresponsibility for another's financial need has obscured thereality of the state's obligation, the broader social obligation,to respond to this need. I conclude with a discussion of theconsequences of my analysis for the future of the spousal andchild support obligations. If we deny an expanded role to thesesupport obligations, can we do so in a way that avoids leavingthe impoverished in an even more precarious position?     

Community policing,loose coupling,and sensemaking in American police agencies

This study examines the community policing movement in the United States using two concepts from organization theory—loose coupling and sensemaking—to frame the analysis and discussion. In particular, we focus on the degree of coupling between police agencies' general and specific community policing claims. Because community policing may be considered a fairly ambiguous (or broad) reform movement, police agencies must engage in interpretive processes to define, make sense of, and enact it at the local level. While we did not observe these interpretive processes, our analyses enable us to observe the products of these processes.