Council of the Chamber of Attorneys of the City of Moscow Disciplinary Proceedings Against Attorney Sh. [Summer 2008]

[Main accusation: showing disrespect for the court.—Eds.]

Being an independent professional adviser on legal questions, an attorney may not be held liable in any way . . . for an opinion expressed by him while carrying on work as an attorney, unless he has been found guilty of a criminal act (inaction) by a court verdict that has entered into legal force.

… According to general principles of jurisprudence in the Russian Federation, and also generally accepted norms of morality (interpersonal intercourse), the legislator presumes constructive cooperation among professional participants in criminal court proceedings, with each of them performing the procedural function assigned to him by law.     

UNGER'S CRITIQUE OF FORMALISM IN LEGAL REASONING: HERO,HERCULES, AND HUMDRUM

“Doctrine can exist—the formalist says or assumes—because of a contrast between the more determinate rationality of legal analysis and the less determinate rationality of ideological contests. This thesis can be restated as the belief that law making and law application differ fundamentally, as long as legislation is seen to be guided only by the looser rationality of ideological conflict… The modern lawyer may wish to keep his formalism while avoiding objectivist assumptions. He may feel happy to switch from talk about interest group politics in a legislative setting to invocations of impersonal purpose, policy, and principle in an adjudicative or professional one. He is plainly mistaken; formalism presupposes at least a qualified objectivism.”     

反垄断从宽处理制度及其中国化

Aiming at attracting cartel members to surrender or expose illegal acts of others by reducing or exempting them from public law responsibilities, the leniency program in anti-monopoly law is an effective mechanism throughout the world to discover and crack cartels. The leniency program can be divided into various categories, all of which are based on three preconditions: Filing an application, providing effective information and fully cooperating with anti-monopoly authorities. China has a legal tradition similar to the program as well as legal grounds for establishing such program. However, implementation of the program in China may face potential problems arising from various factors including inner conflicts of the anti-monopoly legal regime, ambiguity of enforcement rights and weakness and lack of administrative law liabilities. Li Junfeng, Ph.D, is a lecturer at Shanghai University, an attorney-at-law, and a legal adviser of Shanghai Entrepreneur Coalition. His major research is on law and economy, competition law and commercial law. He presided or participated some projects funded by Shanghai governmental institutions. He has released over ten articles in academic journals, such as Studies in Comparative Legal Science, Economic Law Forum, Economic Review, etc. His monograph — Research on Private Enforcement of Anti-monopoly Law — is to be published.     

The Juristic Study of Law's Formal Character

Abstract. The author summarizes the essential elements of a general theory he is developing which he calls “The Formal Character of Law.” He explains that law's formal character is a potentially major branch of legal theory that is still relatively unexplored. In his view, it is possible to identify formal attributes in (1) legal rules, (2) other basic legal constructs such as interpretive method, the principles of stare decisis, legal reasons, and legislative and adjudicative processes, and (3) a legal system viewed as a whole. For example, a legal rule has, in varying degrees, such formal attributes as generality, definiteness, and simplicity. (Other constructs have other formal attributes.) Such attributes are formal in the sense that they apply to or accommodate highly variable content and do not prescribe or proscribe content. Of course, legal phenomena have other characteristics besides their formality. The author's main technique for developing his theory is to address a common set of questions to the varied formal attributes of (l), (2), and (3) above. Among other things, the answers to these questions further explicate how law is formal, demonstrate that law is not merely a means of serving problem-specific policy but also serves formal values (which may sometimes trump or limit policy), treats the relations between form and content—specially how good form begets good content and bad form bad content, explores the design and implementation of appropriate formality—its “anatomy and physiology,” and analyses the “pathology” of legal form including not only the “formalistic” (the overformal), but also the “sub-stantivistic,” and shows how the overall theory is important both jurisprudentially and in practical ways.     

The Role of Culture in Legal Languages,Legal Interpretation and Legal Translation

The aim of this short essay is to highlight and concisely explore—but not address in depth—some cultural aspects related to legal languages, legal interpretation and legal translation. We would like to consider briefly the following questions: How can elements of legal language, as exemplified by proper names and euphemisms, be connected with cultural (extra-linguistic) factors influencing language units’ formation? How can judicial discourse reflect the culture of a given justice system? How can the legal interpretation affect the degree of legal culture? Are theories of legal interpretation universal or applicable to specific legal cultures? What is the impact of culture on the context of legal translation? How can the cultural background affect the decision to use terms in translation? How does cyberculture impact legal translation?

     

A Separate Peace? The Politics of Localized Law in the Post‐Revolutionary Era

Law is often seen as peripheral to Southern life before the Civil War, and the South as an outlier in the American legal history of that era. In The People and Their Peace (2009), Laura Edwards demonstrates the profoundly legal nature of Southern society and takes an important step toward integrating the legal history of the South with that of the nation. Edwards identifies two dueling legal cultures in North and South Carolina between 1787 and 1840—the law of local courts, which she terms localized law, and the state law of professionalized lawyers and reformers. She argues that white women, slaves, and the poor fared better in localized law—which was based on notions of popular sovereignty and the flexible rubric of restoring “the peace”—than in state courts, which were steeped in a national culture of individual rights that led to more restrictive results. This essay questions Edwards's dichotomy between local law and state law and her depiction of the popular content of localized law, while building on Edwards's innovations to suggest a new direction for Southern legal history.     

政府法律顾问制度模式研究——以律师职业为视角

完善政府法律顾问制度是全面推进依法治国的客观要求,是深入推进依法行政,加快法治政府建设的需要。因此,应加大政府法律顾问对政府工作的参与程度,建立以发现和预防为主的政府法律顾问制度工作机制,准确定位顾问律师与政府之间的关系,保证顾问律师的独立性。     

Legal Security from the Point of View of the Philosophy of Law

Abstract. The author analyses the concept of legal security from its historical evolution to its main structural aspects. In the first part he argues that legal security is a historical and cultural concept of the modern world. He considers a series of factors which lead from the general concept of security generated by an ideological monism and the social rigidity characterizing the Middle Ages to the concept of legal security protected by the legal monism of the modern state, where legal security, understood as formal or procedural justice, has become a principle inspiring the entire legal system. Then he considers legal security in the social state as the expression of the relationship between man and his social needs. In the second part the author makes a structural analysis of the concept of legal security in a modern legal order, identifying the different spheres in which it can be found: state,—focusing on procedural guarantees as limits to power—, law—considering the internal functioning of the legal system—, society—stressing the effects of the action of the social state on the idea of legal security.     

‘Mutual aid is present in every crisis’: An Interview with Dean Spade

The Covid-19 pandemic unravelled a crisis of the modern state, and its legal institutions on the one hand, and on the other hand of our interpretive frames—both philosophical and scientific. It is here that the idea and practice of mutual aid gains significance, both to think about how we can respond to acute crises of planetary scales as well as to the crisis of critique in the discipline of law. The task of mutual aid is not to rehabilitate law out of its crisis or to restore conditions and systems back to a state prior to a crisis. This is because, as Dean Spade says in this interview, ‘they are not broken systems needing to be fixed. They are working exactly as they were designed to work, constantly sharpening violence against targeted populations and enriching a very few people.’ Spade—Wismer Professor of Gender and Diversity at the Seattle University School of Law and a founder of the Sylvia Rivera Law Project—is a key scholar-activist voice on mutual aid in North America and Europe. He is author, most recently, of Mutual Aid: Building Solidarity During this Crisis (And the Next). In this conversation with Oishik Sircar, Spade discusses his theoretical and political influences, how he relates the idea of crisis to critique, his sobering assessment of the limitations not only of law reform but of the role of legal education in radical transformation, his own understandings of mutual aid, his favourite words, why and how he does not see himself only as a legal scholar-activist, and his vision of hope and hopelessness in times of acute and intense crises.

     

Five Years Later: Reconsidering the Original ABA Report on MDP

Reconsidering the original report issued in 1999 by the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, this essay suggests that that report properly attempted to deal with questions of legal ethics that might arise if the practice of law by lawyers were integrated into an enterprise in which nonlawyers had a significant degree of ultimate control, but that the commission, perhaps because of undue time pressure, neglected to pursue these questions deeply enough. This essay suggests that more was needed than a proposed mechanism for self-certification of compliance with rules of legal ethics, coupled with possible review of compliance. The "more" that was needed, this essay further suggests, was a proposal for the licensing of an enterprise in which lawyers do not have exclusive ultimate control, as a precondition to permitting lawyers in the enterprise to offer legal services to the general public. Thus, before it could offer legal services to the general public, such an enterprise would need to comply with requirements for obtaining a license, and noncompliance with rules of legal ethics could bring into play traditional disciplinary measures including, where appropriate, suspension or revocation of the license.     

博客侵权问题研究

In recent years the cases of blog infringement are on the increase, attracting more attention from all walks of life. The author provides a preliminary discussion on the status, elements, and judicial finding of blog infringement, as well as civil liabilities for blog infringement, in the hope of contributing to the research and legislative regulation of blog infringement. Fang Yiquan is a professor and postgraduate supervisor of Law School of Wenzhou University, and a legal adviser of Wenzhou Municipal Government, whose main researches focus on civil law, commercial law and educational law. Professor Fang has been chosen as one of the “151 Talents of the New Century” of Zhejiang Province, one of the “Ten Outstanding Youths” in Wenzhou city, a “Prominent Educator” in Zhejiang Province. His scientific research achievements have received prefectural, provincial and ministerial rewards for over ten times. He has presided ten projects funded by the Humanities & Social Sciences of the Education Ministry of China and the Philosophy and Social Sciences of Zhejiang Province. He has released over 60 articles in academic law journals, such as Politics and Law Forum, Jurists Review, etc. His monographs include Compensation Liability of Student Injury Incidents, Research on Legal Problems of Campus Infringement, etc.     

The Inevitability and Indeterminacy of Game‐Theoretic Accounts of Legal Order

How is legal order possible? Why do people comply with law when it prevents them from doing what they think best? Two important books show how these questions can—and from some methodological perspectives must—be answered in the form of game‐theoretic accounts that show how legal compliance can be compatible with the broad self‐interest of officials and citizens. Unfortunately, however, these books also serve to demonstrate that game‐theoretic accounts along these lines lack the resources to explain how real‐world legal systems emerge and evolve or the various institutional shapes these systems take. The fundamental limitation of game theory, in this context and more generally, is its inability to predict or explain the size and shape of cooperative equilibria.     

Guarding the Law

Of late, many journalists who write successfully on socioeconomic and production issues have begun addressing legal issues as well. Breaches of the law, of legal order, of labor and state discipline, drunkenness, and other negative phenomena—these urgent problems are raised in many journalistic works that would not seem to be directly connected to the topic of law. You may perhaps have also noticed that the press is taking more interest in the work of the procuracy and its agencies….     

Universal Legal Concepts? A Criticism of “General” Legal Theory

Abstract. General theory of law (general jurisprudence, allgemeine Rechtslehre) has often claimed to deal with general or universal concepts, i.e., concepts which are deemed to be common to any legal system whatsoever. At any rate, this is the classic determination of such a field of study as provided by John Austin in the nineteenth century—a determination, however, which deserves careful analysis. In what sense, indeed, can one assert that some legal concepts are common to different legal systems? And, above all, in what sense can one assert that some concepts are common to different languages and cultures? My paper sets out to discuss such questions—although, obviously, they are too complicated to be answered in a single paper. The first section reconstructs the Austinian argument for general jurisprudence by placing it in its historical context. The second section tries to apply to legal concepts some suggestions derived from the contemporary debate on conceptual relativism. The third section, returning to the Austinian problem, comes to the following conclusion: Even if conceptual relativism were true and there were no general or universal legal concepts, this would not invalidate in any way the didactic and scientific value of (general) theory of law.     

Universities and the teaching of forensic sciences to lawyers—a note *

This article presents the findings of the survey conducted among business and accountancy students of the Nanyang Business School, Singapore, on the teaching of business law. The article is organised in three main sections. Section 1 formulates the framework for the research by outlining the three basic approaches adopted across many jurisdictions for the legal education of business students—the traditionalist ("black‐letter law"), the environmentalist and mixed approaches. Section 2 briefly describes the survey questions drawn up in the light of four principal objectives that, according to legal educators, the teaching of business law should achieve. Section 3 presents and examines the findings. The article concludes that law teaching at the Nanyang Business School conforms to the traditional approach. The author accordingly makes recommendations for the transformation of current teaching and assessment medthods: an injection of a great deal of “environmental” content and context‐based education; more use of actual and current cases, practical examples and a link to the business environment.     

Vladimir Shapoval: "The CEC Is Destined to Be the Scapegoat"

"The law is harsh, but it is the law"—the well-known ancient Roman saying is entirely suitable as a brief synopsis of the Lb.ua interview with the chairman of the Central Election Commission (CEC), Vladimir Shapoval.

"Any electoral legislation, I emphasize, any, will always be 95 percent the product of political expediency. Always. This way gives them an advantage—so be it." This is how he calmly parried my emotional "How can the advantage of the strong be codified in the law (!), and the weak essentially have no chance? What can you do, how can it be?" "All this ‘whining and crying,’ say, the law is this and that in substance, I do not accept it. The laws were adopted—so we will follow them. You cannot get away from it," he added.

It might seem to someone who does not know Vladimir Nikolaevich that the chief vote-counting official is being clever, "covering up" the "distortions" of the authorities "at the local level." He is in fact speaking frankly. The chairman of the Central Election Commission formed on the eve of the 2007 preterm parliamentary elections by a "coalition"—a retired Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) justice, and a doctor of legal sciences who is an active member of the High Council of Justice (HCJ), he can permit himself that. Shapoval contrives to call things by their names: "How the law is written is another matter. And its parts are written abominably," he states bluntly.

In view of this, my discussion with Shapoval—formally tied to the start of a local elections campaign—went far beyond the bounds of a discussion of the legislation on this topic, and even the specifics of the campaign. The more so as I had already discussed this in detail with CEC Deputy Chairman Andrei Magera. Vladimir Nikolaevich, without concealing his indignation, related just what the HCJ is really afraid of (and it turned out it was not at all, or more precisely not only, what they are portraying it to be). Relying on nine years of experience as a CCU justice, he elucidated the risks of the invalidation of the 2004 constitutional reform by the current Constitutional Court—"only those who have face can lose it." Sketching out the situation in the body politic, he summed up, "If the Party of Regions (PoR) does not win the local elections, many questions will arise."     

Epinomia: Plato and the First Legal Theory

Abstract. In comparison to Aristotle, Plato's general understanding of law receives little attention in legal theory, due in part to ongoing perceptions of him as a mystic or a totalitarian. However, some of the critical or communitarian themes that have guided theorists since Aristotle find strong expression in Plato's work. More than any thinker until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Plato rejects the rank individualism and self‐interest which, in his view, emerge from democratic legal culture. He rejects schisms between legal norms and community values, institutional separation of law from morals, intricate regimes of legislation and adjudication, and a culture of rampant litigation. He rejects the alienation of individuals, from each other and from their communities, that is so easily bred within highly complex political and legal systems. An understanding of his approach to some of the classic questions of legal theory provides insight not only into some central ideas of his own thought, but also into the roots of critical and communitarian critiques of law.     

Does Legal Semiotics Cannibalize Jurisprudence?

Does Duncan Kennedy successfully cannibalize jurisprudence? He attempts to do it by demonstrating the inexistence of rightness in legal argumentation. If there is no right legal argument, then there is no right answer in adjudication, adjudication is not a rational enterprise and legal doctrine cannot be said to be a science. It can be shown that skepticism is self-defeating. Duncan Kennedy can avoid self defeat only because he actually believes in a lot of legal arguments. His thesis that judges decide questions of policy without any methodology that distinguishes them from legislators does not hold. Judicial reasoning is subject to constraints that do not affect legislators. It must be based on the sources of law and is limited by rules of procedure. Even when the judges have ‘interstitial’ legislative powers they are, unlike the legislator, bound to fit the system and their decisions are considered in procedure from the perspective of the right answer doctrine. The only work that can convincingly refute the skeptic argument against legal science is the reconstruction of jurisprudence as a scientific enterprise. Such work is beyond the scope of any single paper. The article aims to give some inspirations for such a task.     

Choice,Privacy and Publicly Funded Legal Advice at Police Stations

Section 58 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 confers on all suspects held in police custody a right to consult a solicitor in private. The free legal advice which suspects arrested for certain minor offences can request is restricted to telephone advice from a call‐centre operated by CDS Direct. It is lawful for the Legal Services Commission to restrict the delivery of legal advice in this way. Empirical research, however, reveals that there are police stations that lack the facilities for suspects to speak by telephone with legal advisers secure in the knowledge that what is said will not be overheard. It is unlawful and incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights to expect suspects to speak by telephone to a legal adviser under such conditions.     

Legal Concepts as Mental Representations

Although much ink has been spilled on different aspects of legal concepts, the approach based on the developments of cognitive science is a still neglected area of study. The “mental” and cognitive aspect of these concepts, i.e., their features as mental constructs and cognitive tools, especially in the light of the developments of the cognitive sciences, is discussed quite rarely. The argument made by this paper is that legal concepts are best understood as mental representations. The piece explains what mental representations are and why this view matters. The explanation of legal concepts, understood as mental representations is one of (at least) three levels of explanation within legal philosophy, but—as will be argued—it is the most fundamental level. This paper analyzes the consequences of such understanding of concepts used in the field of legal philosophy. Special emphasis is put on the current debate on the analogical or amodal nature of concepts.