私法中的“人”——法人体系的序列化思考

与传统的私法视角下、交易场合中，法人与自然人一律平等，皆为无差别的“私法中的人”的思维不同，在历史观中，“社团法人”与“财团法人”是具有法社会学意义的两大法人“模型”。两模型之角力，体现为不同的法人类型通过消长其“社团性”，调整团体与团体成员各自就法人财产进行支配的“法律上的距离”，而排列为与其公、私域属性相适应的，促进社会整合的法人类型序列。在历史上这可呈现为各法人本质学说流派的论争，在当代则反映为某些民法典中，不同社会功能法人类型的财产权强弱之差序安排。最终这将促使民法扬弃对法人的狭隘私法定性，正视与回应法人跨越公、私体制的“复合人”特质，进而也提高民法应对社会分化与转型的能力。     

“一国两制”视野下法律文化的同一性与多样性及其在中国的体现——写在中国特色社会主义法律体系形成之后

法律文化的概念外延包括了规范制度形态、意识观念形态、实践活动形态的法律文化。法律体系问题主要属于规范制度形态的法律文化,而法系的问题主要属于意识观念形态和实践活动形态的法律文化。由于实行"一国两制",在"两岸三地"即中国大陆、香港、澳门和台湾存在着多种法律体系与法系,这是"中国特色"的体现。中国特色社会主义法律体系形成之后,我们还可以在"一国两制"的视野下,继续探讨法律文化的同一性与多样性问题,对中西方法律文化中蕴藏的优秀精神——对法治的崇尚和对统治的信念,通过实践不断地选择,融化成一种崭新的、先进的法律文化体系,将法治精神与民族精神融为一体,建成法治国家。     

违背善良风俗故意致人损害与纯粹经济损失保护

"背俗故意致损",是在权利和利益区分的基础上进行侵权法思考必然会遭遇的一个问题。德国民法典立法者设立第826条时,并不具有利用该条将法律与道德、习惯等法外规范相连通的直接目的。第826条的功能在后世学说的解释中形成了形式功能与实质功能两大功能群。试图为"背俗"设置实质判断标准的实质功能越来越受到学者的批判,并且在学说上出现了将纯粹经济损失保护作为第826条核心功能的观点。故意要件的本质是在缺乏社会典型公开性的纯粹经济损失领域维持行为人的预见性。法解释对该要件有所软化,但不宜将故意降低为重大过失。背俗要件的判断标准存在于判例之中。应当借鉴动态系统理论,以本土判例为素材,建构我国的"背俗故意致损"判例类型。纯粹经济损失概念并不表达一个真正的类别,而是包含了千差万别的事物,该领域不存在一般保护规则。"背俗故意致损"只是纯粹经济损失保护中的"最小值"。应当建立特别规范、保护性法律和"背俗故意致损"三层纯粹经济损失的立法保护体系。     

Some Remarks on the Notions of Legal Order and Legal System

Abstract
In this paper, the authors discuss some problems related to the existence and identity of legal norms and legal systems. Firstly, two criteria for identification of legal norms are analyzed: linguistic criteria and non-linguistic criteria. Secondly, the dynamics of legal systems and the distinction between legal system and legal order are examined (close to Raz's distinction between momentary legal system and legal system). Based on the logical relations of membership and inclusion, two ways of analysing the change of legal systems are suggested. Thirdly, a criterion for identification of legal orders (from Bulygin) is discussed and it is shown that this criterion does not explain adequately, on the one hand, the existence of some norms, i.e., customary norms; and, on the other, the existence of invalid norms; i.e., unconstitutional norms. The main conclusions of this paper are: (a) the concepts of legal system and legal order could not explain the existence of law in a given society; (b) the concepts of legal system and legal order could be considered models of rational normative systems.     

Workers with Disabilities Between Legal Changes and Persisting Exclusion: How Contradictory Rights Shape Legal Mobilization

It has become commonplace within disability sociolegal scholarship to argue that, in the last 30 years, a new legal and policy approach to disability has emerged, leading to a paradigm shift from a social protection framework to an antidiscrimination model. Some authors have stressed, however, that the new model has not fully replaced the older social protection approach. Yet little is still known about how the coexistence of these different models impacts on the everyday experience of disability in the workplace and on potential legal mobilization. Based on interviews with workers with disabilities who mobilized the law to obtain reasonable accommodation in Belgium combined with an analysis of evolving Belgian legal schemes relating to disability, this article explores how interactions between social, labor, and antidiscrimination rights shape legal mobilization of persons with disabilities in the workplace. We find that individual's initial self‐identification as workers or persons with disabilities influences how they frame their claim and the kind of legal norms they refer to in a first stage but that both their identification and their rights consciousness evolve and change through the course of legal mobilization as they interact with various professionals and navigate between the different concepts and rights available in current law.     

Comparing Legal Professions Cross-nationally: From a Professions-centered to a State-centered Approach

Legal occupations vary dramatically from country to country—in scope of activity, education, organization, and institutional setting. This essay proposes to study legal occupations focusing on their relations to the state rather than on their character as "professions." It builds on the recent renaissance of state-centered approaches in the social sciences. A review of the diversity of law work and legal occupations in different countries leads to state-centered conceptualizations that identify institutionally comparable features of law work. A sketch of the European historical background of modern legal professions yields theoretical principles that can inform the proposed approach. Variations in the role of the state and in the relation of lawyers to the state apparatus are then shown to be related to differences between national legal professions. Even where the law is primarily seen as a profession, the character of law work is better understood when related to the state.     

论法学研究的两种视角——兼评“法教义学和社科法学”逻辑之非

法学有两种观察或研究视角,即内部视角和外部视角。简言之,前者是规范(制度)事实视角,后者是社会(事实)视角。因之,法学也可两分为内部视角的法学和外部视角的法学。前者以法律规范为前提和纽带的制度事实为研究对象,以规范分析为基本方法,并强调规范中心和规范决定论;后者则以法律规范与其它社会事实之间的关系为研究对象,并运用其他社会科学,如经济学、政治学、社会学、人类学等的方法作为观察和研究法律现象及运作规律的具体方法。它强调社会(事实)中心和社会决定论。法学(尤其法教义学)是社会"科学"的重要一支,与社会科学之间是种属关系,因之,法教义学与所谓"社科法学"之间,在逻辑上不能以并列关系对待。与其说"法教义学与(和)社科法学",不如说内部视角的法学与(和)外部视角的法学。     

从司法实践的视角看经济全球化与我国法制建设--论法与社会的互动

在全球化背景下 ,我国将面临法律移植、法制现代化等一系列复杂的社会变革 ,这必然要求我们以多元的法律意识来取代单一形态的法律意识 ,以多元的理念与规则推进政治和司法体制改革 ,协调好传统文化与外来文化、作为规则的“法”和民间规范等的关系 ,从而使作为发展中国家的我国在全球化时代也能取得更大的发展。     

试论“超越法律”的企业社会责任

"超越法律"的企业社会责任,是企业负担的那些超出法律强制性义务规定且符合社会价值和期望的责任,确认这种责任的法律规范实为"软法",它主要通过责任目标内化于企业的商业行为和治理结构之中,以实现企业的"自我管制";通过保护利益相关者的实质性和程序性权利,提高利益相关者的谈判抗衡力量以实现市场的自发对抗;并以声誉机制和非政府组织的作用作为责任的实施机制的补充。     

以危险方法危害公共安全罪何以成为口袋罪

从道路交通秩序领域到市场经济秩序领域、公民个人权利领域、社会管理秩序领域,以危险方法危害公共安全罪的触角已经越伸越长。从交通肇事到生产经营非食品原料、"碰瓷"、偷窨井盖,危险方法行为犯罪行为方式可谓五花八门。以危险方法危害公共安全罪越来越显示出口袋罪的特征。产生这一结果固然有罪名本身的因素,但根本原因在于三个方面:一是对于刑事政策的不合理解读,二是对于社会效果内容的片面阐释,三是无视罪名的确定性内容。其实质是忽视了政策与规范之间的关系,过分关注结果的危害性而淡化了行为规范内容和主观心态。只有在司法中切实坚持罪刑法定原则,才不致使以危险方法危害公共安全罪成为口袋罪。     

Positive Law and Systemic Legitimacy: A Comment on Hart and Habermas*

Abstract
The author revisits H. L. A. Hart's theory of positive law and argues for a major qualification to the thesis of the separation of law and morality based on a concept of systemic legitimacy derived from the social theory of Jurgen Habermas. He argues that standards for assessing the degree of systemic legitimacy in modern legal systems can develop through reflective exercise of "critical legality," a concept coined to parallel Hart's "critical morality," and an expanded understanding of the "external" and "internal" perspectives on legal systems. Following Habermas, he argues that modern positive law must retain systemic legitimacy. After suggesting criteria for measuring systemic legitimacy, the author concludes that the concept provides a useful approach to contemporary problems of "lawless" regimes and "law's imperialism."     

The Role of International Legal Norms in Ensuring the "Right to a Legal Defense"

On 22 November 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR adopted the "Declaration of the Rights and Freedoms of the Individual and Citizen."¹ Article 1 of the declaration states that universally recognized international norms on human rights have priority over the laws of the RSFSR where they directly give rise to rights and duties of citizens. But, in the words of A.M. Vasil'ev, this is "really only a defended, not a proclaimed right."² The systems of international and Soviet law set down the procedure and the order of realization of rights and freedoms and the ways and means for their legal defense. An important guarantee for the realization of rights and freedoms is ensuring the individual's right to a legal defense.     

Frontloading Mitigation: The "Legal" and the "Human" in Death Penalty Defense

The bifurcation of capital trials into determinations of guilt and sentencing presents defense advocates with what seem to be two distinct domains of knowledge—one apparently "legal" in character, the other "human." But this epistemological division is actually not so clear in practice. This article dissects the procedural and strategic mechanisms through which these two domains unsettle and reconstitute the other. I provide a historical, empirically grounded account that explicitly articulates the connections between developments in legal procedure, prevailing standards of care concerning the need to conduct humanistic investigations of mitigating factors, and the on-the-ground trial practice of "frontloading" as a defense strategy. Drawing from documentary research, interview data with leading capital defense practitioners, and analytical observations based on my own experience as a mitigation specialist, this article presents itself as a case study of the processes of mutually constitutive rupturing that reconfigure the categories of the legal and the human.     

法教义学的基本功能:从刑法学视域的思考

中国法学界系统地研究法教义学之功能的专门作品目前尚很少见。研究法教义学的功能,旨在回答法教义学的服务对象问题。若其功能不明,则必然会引发立场、方法与主体性之争,导致法教义学成为一种"无底盘的游戏"。法教义学乃是法学家针对规范适用、规范评价、规范塑造展开的理论建构与知识储备,具有司法与立法两个基本面向。其中,司法面向的法教义学具有三重功能:个案的妥当性解决、案件处理之间的协同性与理清社会发展的理想。立法面向的法教义学则是通过教义分析,明确法规范中存在的矛盾之处、有违明确性原则之处或处罚漏洞等,从而促进立法改进,确保法律良善。     

重大公共卫生事件下的刑事政策模式

坚持道德理性而否认规范理性,或者主张规范理性而排斥道德理性,都是有失偏颇的。规范目的与整体法秩序目的是两种不同层次的目的,两者互补互济、相辅相成,能有效衡平社会伦理道德与刑法规范的关系,并使刑法适用保持活性与弹力,充分迎合司法实践需要。信守规范目的而忽视整体法秩序的刑事政策,有时不利于维护社会共同体利益。信奉整体法秩序目的而忽视规范的刑事政策,可能不利于保护共同体成员的个人权益。重大公共卫生事件下,传统刑事政策面临诸多困境,应贯彻刑事政策发展模式。刑事政策发展模式要求正当事由得到现实化延伸,合理调适定罪量刑标准,扩展刑法解释体系范畴。刑事政策发展模式下,需要严控适用范畴,合法约束模糊管理,有效限制道德理性和规制辩证逻辑。     

新冠疫情背景下妨害传染病防治罪的解释扩张及其回归

新型冠状病毒肺炎疫情中的法律规范适用带来新视角与新问题,在超越可容忍的社会相当性且有刑事可罚追究必要的场合,我国刑法中妨害传染病防治罪的规范适用值得关注。该罪的对象被限定为"甲类传染病",本次新冠肺炎被列为"乙类传染病",从而该罪存在适用上的瓶颈。司法解释的渐进扩张具有唤醒妨害传染病防治罪和注重公共卫生安全法益保护的一面,但是选取的方式难以与刑事法治相契合。为了更好地实现刑法参与社会治理的功能需求,应当对妨害传染病防治罪采取"立法类型化调整、司法解释适度限制"的组合路径,使刑法规范的社会适应性与刑罚处罚的有限性相融合。     

习惯法/民间法研究范式的批判性理解——兼论社会控制概念在法学研究中的运用可能

概念是进行科学研究的基本分析工具,同时具有促进和制约研究的辩证属性,因此需要对概念进行反思。“习惯法”、“民间法”这两个概念对于挑战和批判“法律中心主义”具有重要学术贡献。但是“习惯法”、“民间法”概念定义过于宽泛,使其作为一种研究范式不能很好地对不同性质和不同运作方式的规范进行必要的区分,从而导致这种研究范式具有局限性。在法学研究中,可以尝试用“社会控制”概念来弥补习惯法/民间法研究范式的不足。     

The Nature of Legal Philosophy

Abstract. Philosophy is general and systematic reflection about what there is, what ought to be done or is good, and how knowledge about both is possible. Legal philosophy raises these questions with respect to the law. In so doing, legal philosophy is engaged in reasoning about the nature of law. The arguments addressed to the question of the nature of law revolve around three problems. The first problem addresses the question: In what kinds of entities does the law consist, and how are these entities connected such that they form the overarching entity we call “law”? The answer is that law consists of norms as meaning contents which form a normative system. The second problem addresses the question of how norms as meaning contents are connected with the real world. This connection can be grasped by means of the concepts of authoritative issuance and social efficacy. The latter includes the concept of coercion or force. The third problem addresses the correctness or legitimacy of law, and, by this, the relationship between law and morality. To ask about the nature of law is to ask about necessary relations between the concepts of normative meaning, authoritative issuance as well as social efficacy, and correctness of content.     

Explaining the process of change taking place in legal rules and social norms: The cases of institutional economics and new institutional economics

This paper deals with the phenomenon of institutional change and has been conceived as an attempt to answer the following question: Can we retain theimage of institutional change contained in a theory when we replace a methodological foundation on which the theory was built by a different and alternative one? For an answer to be developed, special attention is paid to the contributions made by institutional economists (IE) and those made by transaction cost—new institutional economists (NIE). The question clearly shows that it is a paper on applied methodology rather than a survey on institutional change contributions. Because of that, its main purpose is not to increase our knowledge about the characteristics of real changes in legal rules and social norms, their causes, their processes, or their effects, though several examples are given of those institutionalist and new institutionalist contributions that analyze those changes. Our purpose is to investigate the way in which these two groups of economists approach the object of analysis already mentioned. Our conclusion will be that institutionalist and new institutionalist contributions are built on two different and mutually exclusive approaches because their respective methods of analysis (holism versus methodological individualism) are different and, above all, because they build their respective analyses on some concepts that are mutually exclusive (concepts showing power or nonvoluntary influences versus concepts showing voluntary transactions). Their analyses contain different and mutually exclusiveimages of the changes taking place in legal rules-formal institutions and social norms-informal institutions. Some comments about the limitations of the holist method of analysis are made in the paper.     

私法中的“人格”范畴含义辨析

在私法理论和制度中，“人格”范畴具有“主体资格”、“主体”、“主体特质”、“主体性要素”四种含义。其中，“主体资格”指特定的实体可以成为私法法律关系之主体的法定条件；“主体”指特定的实体获得主体资格后的法律状态；“主体特质”指特定的实体可以据之享有主体资格的其客观上所具备的属性；“主体性要素”则是人格权的客体，指自然入主体得以构成的且应得到尊重和保护的客观要素。这四种含义之间的区别主要体现为：“主体资格”是“主体”得以形成的法定条件，“主体资格”范畴也就是用来描述“（某种）实体”与“私法主体”之间的“转化关系”的概念；而“主体特质”和“主体性要素”都是指“主体”（或拥有主体资格的“实体”）在客观上所具有的属性，这两个范畴都属于描述某种“事物”的概念。