The Politics of 'Eurocratic' Structure and the New European Agencies

The establishment of agencies at the European level is one of the most notable recent developments in EU regulatory policy. This article examines how politics has shaped the design of EU regulatory agencies. Building on the American politics literature on delegation, the article explains how principal-agent concerns and political compromise have influenced agency design in the EU context; shows how conflicts between the EU's primary legislative actors - the Council and the Parliament - and its primary executive actor - the Commission - have influenced the design of new bureaucratic agencies; and discusses how the growing power of the European Parliament as a political principal has changed the politics of agency design.     

Policy Information and Democratic Governance: Federal Social Policy Analysis, 1965–1997

This article considers the development of social policy analysis in the American central government in order both to present the highlights of that three-plus-decade history and to spell out the implications for the United States and other advanced industrial democracies. The argument is that (1) sound policy data and analyses have never been so needed in the face of increasing political polarization and overwhelming amounts of difficult-to-validate policy information produced in the electronic revolution; and (2) the American experience may be particularly useful to other advanced nations because what works in the United States should work better in these countries, in that they have less complex parliamentary structures without America's independent legislature to challenge the chief executive.     

Reciprocal policy diffusion: the regulation of executive compensation in the UK and the US

Because of popular and political pressure, governments have been compelled to regulate ‘excessive’ executive compensation and search both a policy and political solution. In this paper, I seek to establish the mechanisms of policy learning, competition, and emulation by examining American and British regulatory policies of executive compensation that show evidence of reciprocal diffusion, i.e. from the US to the UK and vice versa. The evidence suggests that during the past two decades, the extent of reciprocal policy diffusion varied and was primarily driven by policy learning. Using published government reports, press releases, public hearings, newspaper articles, and interviews, I demonstrate that reciprocal learning occurred because one country's policymakers and practitioners explicitly discussed and/or referred to the practices in the other country when deciding to adopt a specific policy solution to the problem of excessive executive pay. I discuss the implications for the literature on diffusion and point out avenues for future research. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Solitary Center: the Core Executive in Central and Eastern Europe

This article discusses the coordinative capacity of Centers of Government (COGs) in several Central and Eastern Europe countries. In formal terms, COGs are at the heart of the executive process; but their contribution to coherence in executive policymaking has remained limited. This observation applies both to coordination within the executive, and between the executive and other key participants in the political process. In important respects, the "solitary centers" operate in isolation from their political and institutional environment. In part, this weakness of linkage reflects the particular features of the post-Communist political systems; in part, it can be explained by a lack of nodality, authority and policy expertise at the COG. There are good reasons to assume that, as policy systems mature, problems of linkage will decline in significance. But this outcome cannot be taken for granted. Instead, we might be witnessing the emergence of a "new administrative type" in some Central and Eastern European countries.     

The First MBA President: George W. Bush as Public Administrator

President Bush was praised early in his first term as a tough-minded decision maker who knows how to get things done. This essay argues that President Bush possesses formidable political skills that have helped him achieve many of his policy goals, focusing on his most important national security policies: the war in Iraq, the war on terrorism and the treatment of detainees, the use of intelligence leading up to the war, and the reorganization of the executive branch. In the end, however, President Bush's deficiencies as a public administrator have undermined his policy successes.     

Practicing a Virtuous Politics: Bill Bolling and the Atlanta Community Food Bank

Bill Bolling created the Atlanta Community Food Bank (ACFB) in 1979 and, as its executive director from then until 2015, transformed a fledgling effort in a church basement into the “equivalent of a $100 million company.” This article tells the story of how Bolling built the ACFB from scratch, arguing that his accomplishments can be traced to his effectiveness as a political leader. The article explains how Bolling practiced a virtuous politics in building informal sources of power and in developing and applying political skills on behalf of the ACFB. In the process, the article challenges the traditional critical scholarly view of political leadership, offering Bolling as a case illustration of an emerging theory of a benevolent and effective form of political leadership.     

Strauss and 'Straussianism': From the Ancients to the Moderns?

Do scholars inspired by Leo Strauss adhere to, or diverge from, his teachings as they contribute to turn of the twenty-first-century American conservative thought and new conceptions of the American political executive and constitutional order? Analyzing Strauss' view of the twofold task of political philosophy, as well as his position that modern political philosophy inexorably leads to philosophic and moral crises, the scaffolding of Strauss' political outlook – and the dimensions of its contemporary relevance – will begin to take shape. Turning to the writings on America by many of Strauss' most notable students, we discover that most of them point back to the admittedly liberal theories of John Locke and the American founders as the starting point for defining a new conservative outlook that will address the problems of modernity. We are thus confronted by a quandary. How can an important current of Strauss-inspired scholarship put forth that the theories of Locke and the American founders provide the foundation for addressing a crisis that Strauss states is rooted in that very modernity? We will discover that the thought of Strauss and an important strand of Straussianism are not the same, because Strauss-inspired scholarship on America adheres to only a facet of Strauss' two-pronged political philosophy. Strauss, however, cannot disavow responsibility for these students and followers, who embrace an important current of his thinking.     

Ministerial Advisers and the Politics of Policy‐Making: Bureaucratic Permanence and Popular Control

The advent of ministerial advisers of the partisan variety – a third element interposing itself into Westminster's bilateral monopoly – has been acknowledged as a significant development in a number of jurisdictions. While there are commonalities across contexts, the New Zealand experience provides an opportunity to explore the extent to which the advent of ministerial advisers is consistent with rational choice accounts of relations between political and administrative actors in executive government. Public administration reform in New Zealand since the mid 1980s – and in particular machinery of government design – was quite explicitly informed by rational choice accounts, and normative Public Choice in particular. This article reflects on the role of ministerial advisers in the policy‐making process and, on the basis of assessments by a variety of political and policy actors, examines the extent to which the institutional and relational aspects of executive government are indeed consistent with rational choice accounts of the ‘politics of policy‐making’. The reader is offered a new perspective through which to view the advent, and the contribution of ministerial advisers to policy‐making in executive government.     

Does it Matter Who Works at the Center? A Comparative Policy Analysis of Executive Styles

This article develops the concept of executive style to explore how variations in the relationships between politicians, career civil servants, and political appointees affect the types of policy outputs. A comparative analysis of home care policies in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia finds that the former’s civil service executive style – where professional civil servants work in close partnership with politicians in all phases of the policy process – led to the development of an innovative home care program with a long-term vision, whereas the latter’s politicized executive style – where politicians marginalize the role of civil servants in favor of political appointees – led to frequent changes in policy largely driven by short-term considerations.     

Roberts: Public Entrepreneurship and Innovation

This article presents a conceptualframeworkofpublic entrepreneurship. Public entrepreneurship is defined as the generation ofa novel or innuuative idea and the design and implementation of the innovative idea into publicsector practice. The conceptualfiamework is used to distinguish between public entrepreneurs and other actors in the policy process, and to clarify the differences between policy, political, executive, and bureaucratic entrepreneurs. Taking a functionalist perspective, the article difmentintes between individual and coZkctiue entrepreneurship and ginezates pmpaitims to move us cher to a theory of public entrepreneurship.     

Weak and Ineffective? Reassessing the Party Political Leadership of John Major

Interpretations on the party political leadership of John Major are dominated by perceptions of weakness and ineffectiveness. This article examines his party political leadership by considering the relationship between, first, his political ambitions, and, second, his style of political leadership. When evaluating the political ambitions of Major, the article will demonstrate that he was ideologically agnostic and a political pragmatist. When examining his party political leadership style, the article will demonstrate, via an examination of his management of the European policy divide and his Cabinet management, that he was politically indecisive and an avoider of political confrontation. The article concludes, however, that perceptions of his weakness and ineffectiveness should be contextualised due to the following two factors: first, the constraints of inheriting an ideologically divided parliamentary Conservative party; and, second, the contrasting circumstances that ensured that his predecessor and successor appeared strong and effective, which have magnified perceptions of his weakness and ineffectiveness.     

To Revoke or Not Revoke? The Political Determinants of Executive Order Longevity

Though many scholars study the formation of policy, less attention is given to its endurance. In this article, I seek to determine what contributes to the longevity of policy by examining the case of presidential unilateralism. While scholars widely recognize presidents’ ability to unilaterally make policy with executive orders, they largely do not account for how these same orders can be easily changed by subsequent administrations. To address this deficiency, I develop a theory of executive order duration based on both time‐invariant characteristics of the order and time‐variant changes in the political climate it faces. Using survival analysis to examine all orders revoked between 1937 and 2013, I find support for the theory. This study has implications for understanding the endurance of executive orders and other policy instruments as part of the law as well as understanding the strategic actions of policy makers given the transient nature of these tools.     

Presidents and Patronage

To what extent do presidents select appointees based upon campaign experience and connections? The answer to this question has important implications for our understanding of presidential management and political leadership. This article presents a theory explaining where presidents place different types of appointees and why, focusing on differences in ideology, competence, and non‐policy patronage benefits among potential appointees. We develop a formal model and test its implications with new data on 1,307 persons appointed in the first six months of the Obama administration. The empirical results broadly support the theory, suggesting that President Obama was more likely to place appointees selected for non‐policy patronage reasons in agencies off his agenda, in agencies that shared his policy views, and where appointees are least able to affect agency performance. We conclude that patronage continues to play an important role in American politics, with important consequences for campaigns, presidential politics, and governance.     

Myth and American politics

Accumulating tensions call into question the sustainability of the American political system, which ultimately depends on public faith in the justifying myth. This article takes sustainability as a policy problem, and attempts to reconstruct the significance of recent, scattered events in American politics from the standpoint of central theory in the policy sciences. The resulting construct emphasizes the significance of intellectuals in the decision processes of modern society and the continuing task of the policy sciences.     

Politics Can Limit Policy Opportunism in Fiscal Institutions: Evidence from Official General Fund Revenue Forecasts in the American States

Governments make policy decisions in the same areas in quite different institutions. Some assign policymaking responsibility to institutions designed to be insulated from myopic partisan and electoral pressures and others do not. In this study, we claim that differences in political context and institutional design constrain the policy choices governments make. Testable propositions based on an analysis of varying electoral incentives and time horizons created by these different contexts are empirically tested using panel data on official general fund revenue forecasts in the American states, 1987 to 2008. The empirical evidence reveals that executive branch agencies and independent commissions produce more conservative forecasts than legislatures with one important exception. Executive branch revenue forecasts in states with gubernatorial term limits are indistinguishable from legislative branch forecasts. Further, we find that legislative branch forecasts are more conservative in the presence of divided partisan legislatures than unified party government. In turn, this implies that entrusting policymaking authority to either the executive branch or an independent commission may only be consequential when the political system itself fails to check legislative excesses or executive myopia.     

Joseph Stiglitz: The Citizen-Bureaucrat and the Limits of Legitimate Dissent

Since being forced to resign his high-ranking post at the World Bank in 2000 for publicly dissenting from neoliberal ideas, Joseph Stiglitz has become a global policy celebrity, celebrated as the “Rebel Within.” While much has been said about his neo-Keynesian policy framework, little has been done to explore the political significance of his iconic status as a renowned “citizen-bureaucrat.” Yet, Stiglitz's iconic image in many ways has had a greater political impact than his policy ideas. In a world in which government and corporate bureaucracies increasingly squeeze out alternative visions, the citizen-bureaucrat suggests that space still exists within these unwieldy bureaucracies for the independent-thinker to put forward a rebellious agenda. Through an assessment of Stiglitz's policy career, this article argues that the image of the citizen-bureaucrat is, to a large extent, an ideological fantasy that masks a more uncomfortable political reality: that the available options for the “good bureaucrat” in today's neoliberal era, far from expanding, are more narrow than ever before.     

Representation,agendas and institutions

Dynamic agenda representation can be understood through the transmission of the priorities of the public onto the policy priorities of government. The pattern of representation in policy agendas is mediated through institutions due to friction (i.e., organisational and cognitive costs imposed on change) in decision making and variation in the scarcity of policy makers' attention. This article builds on extant studies of the correspondence between public priorities and the policy activities of government, undertaking time‐series analyses using data for the United States and the United Kingdom, from 1951 to 2003, relating to executive speeches, laws and budgets in combination with data on public opinion about the ‘most important problem’. The results show that the responsiveness of policy agendas to public priorities is greater when institutions are subject to less friction (i.e., executive speeches subject to few formal rules and involving a limited number of actors) and declines as friction against policy change increases (i.e., laws and budgets subject to a greater number of veto points and political interests/coalitions).     

The Institutionalist: A Conversation with Hugh Heclo

This interview marks the 30th anniversary of the publication of Hugh Heclo's classic, A Government of Strangers: Executive Politics in Washington. This engaging conversation touches on such wide-ranging themes as Heclo's early mentorship by Aaron Wildavsky; his nurturing apprenticeship at the Brookings Institution, leading to the publication of A Government of Strangers; the increasingly intense partisanship and schism within the executive branch between career federal bureaucrats and political appointees; the conduct of presidential administrations as never-ending political marketing campaigns; the cynical harnessing of religion in the service of policy objectives; public service and institutional commitment; and the need for political leadership to engage the public honestly and responsibly on matters of fiscal concern.     

American Think Tanks: Policy Elites and the Politicization of Expertise

This article examines policy expertise and the role of think tanks in the context of shifting political alignments in American government. The article first considers the radical and neoconservative critiques of the liberal use of an elite group — or "new class"— of policy experts to formulate and legitimate political reform agendas, a strategy said to represent a technocratic threat to the future of representative government. The discussion then focuses in particular on the neoconservative critique and its promotion of a counter strategy designed to politicize policy expertise through the development of a conservative "counterintelligensia" and the funding of partisan think tanks. The political outcome is seen to be a significant variation in the relationships linking expertise, think tanks, and the setting of national policy agendas. Elite think tanks, conceptualized as policy "discourse coalitions," are analyzed as institutional mechanisms for coordinating the advice of leading policy experts with the interests of economic and political elites. Although the experts' role in these policy-planning organizations falls short of the threat envisioned by the technocratic critique, the political implications of the emergent elite relationship between expertise and policy formation is nonetheless seen to pose troubling questions for both the theory and parctice of representative governance.     

Federalism, Political Structure, and Public Policy in the United States and Canada

Two of the three large countries on the North American continent—the United States and Canada—share a number of similarities that often make it difficult for the untrained observer to differentiate between the two nations. On the surface, the two are structured similarly as federal systems that, by definition, exhibit shared power between the national government and provincial or state political entities.Although there are other important social and economic characteristics of the two countries that help explain differences in policy processes and outcomes, it is the contention of this article that one gets the clearest sense of what Elazar has called thinking federal by utilizing an analytical approach that joins questions related to federalism with some conceptual frameworks of the public policy field. Two frameworks undergird the argument in this article—the Lowi typology of different types of policies and Deil Wright's typology of different models that describe the American inter-governmental system.In both countries, policies must be sensitive to the greater interdependencies between units of government as well as to linkages between policy areas. The mechanisms or instrumentalities for dealing with policy issues are intrinsically complex. It is also clear that the intergovernmental networks that exist in both the U.S. and Canada are composed of an array of actors. The differing political structures of the systems do impact the types of intergovernmental policies that have emerged in the two countries. The executive dominance so imbedded in Canadian governments has contributed to their ability to adopt and implement certain controversial redistributive policies, such as a national health insurance program. By contrast, the fragmentation of the U.S. system makes redistributive policies more difficult.