Rewriting Roe v. Wade

Presented in this essay are suggestions for rewriting Roe vs. Wade, the case that resulted in the establishment of a constitutional right to abortion. Essentially, the argument is 1 of equal protection. It is suggested that abortion be viewed as presenting a problem that might be termed "the law of samaritanism" -- the law regarding obligations imposed on certain individuals to provide assistance to others. In American law it is a deeply rooted principle that an individual is ordinarily not required to volunteer assistance to another individual who is in danger or in need of aid. The argument presented maintains that if a pregnant woman is required to carry the fetus to term and deliver it, then she is being compelled to be a Good Samaritan. It is argued further that if the generally limited scope of obligations of samaritanism under current law are considered, and the special nature of the burdens imposed on pregnant women by laws forbidding abortion are also considered, the obvious conclusion is that the equal protection clause forbids imposition of these burdens on pregnant women. The argument is developed in a lengthy form and calls for an extended discussion of the law of samaritanism. The uniqueness of the abortion case also creates problems as the equal protection argument is approached, and an approach to equal protection questions is sketched.     

Authority,Nationality, and Minorities

Prominent normative theories for accommodating minority national groups appeal to the value of national cultures and/or the psychology of group recognition. This article aims to show that an argument from political authority provides a better justification. Building on Joseph Raz's theory of authority, the article argues that members of minority national groups are disadvantaged in relation to their majority counterparts under standard democratic institutions; such institutions do not provide minority national groups with comparable access to the conditions for legitimate political authority. Constitutional arrangements for accommodating minority national groups—such as territorial self‐government or power‐sharing—are justified insofar as they might offset this disadvantage.     

Caste Discrimination: A Twenty‐First Century Challenge for UK Discrimination Law?1

Discrimination based on caste affects at least 270 million people worldwide, mostly in South Asia. Caste as a system of social organisation has been exported from its regions of origin to diaspora communities such as the UK, yet despite the prohibition of caste‐based discrimination in international human rights law caste is not recognised as a ground of discrimination in English law. The overhaul of its equality framework and the proposed new single equality act present the UK with an opportunity to align national legislation with international law obligations. The Government's decision not to include protection against caste discrimination in the new legislation leaves race and religion as the only possible legal ‘homes’ for caste. This article considers the argument for legal recognition of caste discrimination in the UK, the capacity of race and religion to subsume caste as a ground of discrimination, and the role and limitations of law in addressing ‘new’ forms of discrimination such as casteism.     

The Argument from Transnational Effects I: Representing Outsiders through Freedom of Movement

This article and its sequel examine an argument that has become a shibboleth for the European pro‐attitude towards international and supranational legal arrangements. I call it the argument from transnational effects. The argument says that supranational or transnational forms of integration, in particular market integration, are desirable on account of democracy itself. National democracies find themselves thereby forced to confront and to internalise the externalities that they cause for one another. A fortiori, democracy becomes supposedly emancipated from the confines of the nation state. Since the argument favours normative limitations on national political processes it seems to lend strong support to the introduction of transnational constitutional discipline. In this article and its sequel it is claimed that the argument, correctly understood, cannot support the creation of transnational democracy. Rather, in a critically recalibrated form, the argument, paradoxically, provides strong backing for the existence of bounded political communities without, for that reason, succumbing to ontologically questionable beliefs about the essence of national communities. Hence, the argument is really as much about the limits set to transnational integration as it is about their legitimacy. This explains why it is of central relevance to constitutionalism in a global age. The opening sections of this article offer an interpretation of John Hart Ely's constitutional theory. Examining the latter helps to articulate adequately the democratic sensibility expressed in the argument. It is argued that Ely's theory exceeds the scope of a mere theory of judicial review. It presents, indeed, a theory of constitutional authority, which is highly relevant to an analysis of the argument from transnational effects. The article then distinguishes and discusses two different readings of the representation‐reinforcing task that Ely attributes to constitutional legality. According to one reading, representation is secondary and only ancillary to the realisation of equality. According to another reading, equal participation is prerequisite to the success of representative democracy whose aim is to discover common ground. It is concluded that the first reading is easier to accommodate in a transnational setting. It will be seen that Ely's theory—at any rate, the first reading of it—is basically concerned with the problem addressed by the argument from transnational effects. This article's discussion of the argument distinguishes two different types of situation. A third, more general type will be dealt with in a subsequent article. The first situation affects people who realise that they would be better off if they were to benefit from the laws of a different democracy. Hence, they would like to have these laws imported. It is argued that their interests do not find support in the argument from transnational effects. The second situation concerns someone who encounters obstacles when moving from one democracy to another. Such obstacles can emerge either as a result of discrimination against non‐nationals or from the sheer fact that laws between and among bounded societies are different. The antidote against the latter is to submit national legislation to a proportionality test. Even though reinforcing representation prima facie seems to support this conclusion, the article claims that virtual representation, correctly understood, actually restricts the sweep of constitutional control to cases of behavioural discrimination. Extending the scope of control would actually violate the respect that it is owed to national democratic autonomy pursuant to the principle of virtual representation. It is also shown that only by limiting its sweep the argument from transnational effects can be prevented from endorsing neoliberal political goals.     

Self‐Determination and Sovereignty over Natural Resources

This article makes the normative case for a differentiated approach to the sovereignty of states over natural resources. In the first half of the article, drawing on the example of the Yasuní‐ITT‐Initiative, I will argue that countries commit a moral wrong when they exploit natural resources for their own benefit (and to the detriment of the climate), but that they have the moral right to do so given the current structure of the international system. In the second half of the article, I address the question of whether states' rights over natural resources can be justified. Central to my argument will be the distinction between “control rights” and “income rights.” Only control rights, I will argue, can be justified as inherently tied to collective self‐determination.     

Complicity,Collectives, and Killing in War*

Recent work on the ethics of war has struggled to simultaneously justify two central tenets of international law: the Permission to kill enemy combatants, and the Prohibition on targeting enemy noncombatants. Recently, just war theorists have turned to collectivist considerations as a way out of this problem. In this paper, I reject the argument that all and only unjust combatants are liable to be killed in virtue of their complicity in the wrongful war fought by their side, and that noncombatants are not permissible targets because they are not complicit. I then argue that just combatants have some reason to direct force against unjust combatants rather than unjust noncombatants, because they should respect the reasonable self-determining decisions of other political communities, when those communities settle on the distribution of a negative surplus of cost for which they are collectively but not individually responsible. These collectivist reasons will not fully justify the Permission and the Prohibition, but they can contribute to that justification.     

Beyond the Janus Face of Zionist Legalism: The Theo‐Political Conditions of the Jewish Law Project*

Abstract. What are the assumptions that underline the Jewish Law Project? To what extent is this project relates to Zionism as a political program and national vision? Does the secular version of this project and the religious one have anything in common? I argue that aside from the ideological lines that guide the Jewish Law Project, within it rests a reductionist and utopianist stance vis‐à‐vis halakhah which are considered to be obvious. I shall attempt to claim that reductionism and utopianism as tacit assumptions, which are neither explicit nor declared by the carriers of the Jewish Law Project, are definitely not trivial. Then, by detrivializing these two assumptions I will suggest viewing the halakhic‐legal relations defined by the Jewish Law Project through these same parameters—the reductionism of the halakhah and its utopian approach.     

当代中国社会保障权之可诉性透视——基于《人民法院案例选》（1992-2010）的文本分析

国家义务是实现社会保障权的法定义务。探讨社会保障权的可诉性,对全面把握和评判社会保障权之国家义务履行状况,具有决定性意义。以《人民法院案例选》（1992-2010）为参照系,当前中国对社会保障权的维护主要体现在社会保险权之工伤保险领域,在内容上主要表现为国家的尊重和保护义务。在明显具有给付性质或特征的社会保险权之养老保险、社会救助权、社会福利权等领域,国家对其法定义务的履行还任重而道远。在工伤认定案件中,法院对劳动者权利诉求的支持;以及在社会优抚权案件中,法院对《行政诉讼法》的扩张性解释,这些人性化举措都将如星星之火,可以燎原。     

Scaling the baseline: Technicalities and environmental regulation in Owens Valley,California

If we want to understand the logic of environmental regulation—as well as its uneven effects—we should look to how regulators and regulated alike generate and deploy baselines. In this article, I chart the scalar frames used to mark the “natural” conditions that are perceived as normal, desirable, and worthy of legal protection and intervention. I explore these frames and resulting legal standards through the case of Owens Lake, California, which has long been a subject of state efforts to regulate resources and remediate pollution. This case study provides an opportunity to understand how presumed technicalities of environmental governance, such as baselines, are constructed and deployed.     

Habermas's European constitution: Catalyst,reconstruction, refounding

Jürgen Habermas has long been one of the EU's most prominent and influential critical friends, engaged as much at the level of legal and political praxis as social theory. In particular, he has a close and complex longstanding interest in the idea of an EU constitution. On the occasion of his 90th birthday, I want to discuss three treatments of the EU constitution located in Habermas's work: constitution as catalyst, as reconstruction, and as refounding. We find the different treatments, and the priorities that underscore them, emphasised at different times—partly reflecting changing political circumstances. We also observe some tension between the different approaches. Yet, as someone broadly sympathetic to his overall project, I argue that the best understanding of the Habermasian position, and certainly the most attractive version of that position in today's political climate, involves reconciling all three treatments within a single package.     

On the Puzzle Surrounding Hans Kelsen's Basic Norm

Whereas fundamental norms in the juridico‐philosophical tradition serve to impose constraints, Kelsen's fundamental norm—or basic norm (Grundnorm)—purports to establish the normativist character of the law. But how is the basic norm itself established? Kelsen himself rules out the appeals that are familiar from the tradition—the appeal to fact, and to morality. What remains is a Kantian argument. I introduce and briefly evaluate the Kantian and neo‐Kantian positions, as applied to Kelsen's theory. The distinction between the two positions, I argue, is reflected in an ambiguity in the use of the term “regressive.”     

The Juror,the Citizen,and the Human Being: The Presumption of Innocence and the Burden of Judgment

In this essay, I suggest that the criminal trial is not only about the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but also about the character and growth of the jurors and the communities they represent. In earlier work, I have considered the potential impact of law and politics on the character of citizens, and thus on the capacity of citizens to thrive—to live full and rich human lives. Regarding the jury, I have argued that aspects of criminal trial procedure work to fix in jurors a sense of agency in and responsibility for verdicts of conviction. Here, I draw on those ideas with respect to the presumption of innocence. I suggest that the presumption of innocence works not primarily as legal rule, but rather as a moral framing device—a sort of moral discomfort device—encouraging jurors to feel and bear the weight of what they do. I offer an account of character development in which virtues are conceived of not merely as modes of conduct developed through habituation and practice, but also as capacities and ways of being developed in part through understanding and experience. The criminal trial, framed by the presumption of innocence, can be an experience through which jurors and their communities, by learning what it means and feels like to carry a certain sort of moral weight, may engender a certain set of moral strengths—strengths valuable to them not just as jurors, but also as citizens, and as human beings.     

Online Grooming and Preventive Justice

In England and Wales, Section 15 of the Sexual Offences Act (2003) criminalizes the act of meeting a child—someone under 16—after grooming. The question to be pursued in this paper is whether grooming—I confine myself to online grooming—is justly criminalized. I shall argue that it is. One line of thought will be indirect. I shall first try to rebut a general argument against the criminalization of acts that are preparatory to the commission of serious offences. Grooming is one such act, but there are others, sometimes associated with terrorism. According to me, the general argument misapplies certain considerations about autonomy that are alleged to be in force in other areas of criminal law. Contrary to that general argument, criminalization of preparatory acts does not, in general, bypass the agency of citizens. Moreover, the criminalization of preparatory acts can disrupt activity that would have led to very serious crime, and with relatively low costs to the perpetrators, costs that reflect the non-occurrence of the more serious crime. There is evidence that grooming is harmful in itself, and so another point against the general argument is its assumption that preparatory offences are often harmless or at least victimless. There are objections to some of the undercover policing techniques that lead to a Section 15 prosecution, but these objections are not all weighty.     

Responsibility and Global Justice

The two traditional ways of thinking about justice at the global level either limit the applicability of justice to states—the only distributions that can be just or unjust, strictly speaking, are within the state—or else extend it to all human beings. The view I defend in On Global Justice (Risse 2012 ) rejects both of these approaches. Instead, my view, and thus my attempt at meeting the aforementioned challenge, acknowledges the existence of multiple grounds of justice. My purpose here is to explain what my view has to say about responsibility. First of all, I explain what my view implies about the responsibilities of the state for the realization of justice. Then I explain that in addition to obligations of justice, my view also gives rise to obligations of account‐giving. I end by sketching what all this implies for institutional reform at the global level.     

How do forensic scientists learn to become competent in casework reporting in practice: a theoretical and empirical approach

In their day-to-day work, carrying out complex tasks, forensic scientists use a combination of explicit, codified standard operating procedures and tacit knowledge developed through their ongoing practice. We show that tacit knowledge is an integral part of the activities of expert forensic science practitioners who continually add to their knowledge repertoire by engaging other scientists through communities of practice. We wish to shed fresh light on the gaining of tacit knowledge by forensic scientists during their apprentice formative years, termed as legitimate peripheral participation. In quantifying tacit knowledge exchanges, we use social network analysis, a methodology for the analysis of social structures, to map relational knowledge flows between forensic scientists within communities of practice at the Forensic Science Laboratory, Ireland. This paper sheds light on the importance of tacit knowledge within the training regime of forensic scientists and its recognition as equal to the part played by explicit knowledge.     

Estrangement and Empowerment in Scheingold's The Political Novel

This essay develops an understated argument in Stuart Scheingold's The Political Novel (2010), namely, how narratives of estrangement serve to empower re‐imagination without reinforcing the false promises of modernism. I argue that Scheingold's earlier work in The Politics of Rights and on cause lawyering provides guidance for understanding the character of empowerment to which Scheingold points in his latest work. In addition, I examine three film narratives that treat the “mournful legacy of the twentieth century”—Pan's Labyrinth, Life Is Beautiful, and Everything Is Illuminated. Emergent in these narratives, I suggest, is a way that storytellers point to empowerment by highlighting the largely overwhelming constraints that limit the agency promised by modernism and the strategic, though contingent, choices characters make to confront and cope with their own estrangement.     

Choice,Discrimination, and the Motherhood Penalty

Recent studies have documented substantial penalties associated with motherhood and suggest that discrimination plays an important role in producing them. In this article, I argue that the degree to which motherhood is conceptualized as a choice affects the penalties associated with making this choice. Two methods are employed to evaluate this argument. The first method is an analysis of state differences in the wage penalties for motherhood, in which hierarchical linear modeling is used with data from the 1988–2004 Current Population Survey. The second method is a hiring experiment in a highly controlled setting. The wage analysis shows that, net of the usual individual and state‐level factors that affect wages, mothers are penalized more in states where motherhood is perceived to be a woman's choice. The hiring experiment distinguishes between productivity‐based and discrimination‐based explanations for the penalty and provides strong evidence for a causal relationship between perceptions of choice and discrimination against mothers.     

The Norwegian Barents Sea Management Plan and the EC Marine Strategy Directive: Some Political and Legal Challenges with an Ecosystem-Based Approach to the Protection of the European Marine Environment

This article addresses some of the implications of the EU's proposed Marine Strategy Directive for ongoing work in the regional seas conventions and for national work on regional marine strategies. The starting point is the proposed directive's focus on the ecosystem approach to the protection of the marine environment. Key elements within this approach are analysed, such as integration of environmental considerations into other policy areas; introduction of ecological quality objectives; and establishment of holistic monitoring and assessment programmes. Is it possible to transform these concepts into legally binding obligations? What will the implications of the proposed directive be for the rights and obligations of EU Member States under international law? A Management Plan for the Norwegian Part of the Barents Sea ('Barents Plan') was adopted by the Norwegian Government in March 2006 and approved by the Norwegian Storting (Parliament) in June 2006. It provides an example of a concrete application of the concepts in the proposed directive. Based on an analysis of the proposed Marine Strategy Directive and the Barents Plan, some key political and legal challenges are discussed in this article.     

Michael Moore on Torture,Morality, and Law

During the past few decades, Michael Moore has written incisively on an array of matters concerning the relationships between law and morality. While reflecting on those relationships, he has plumbed the nature of morality itself in impressive depth. Among the topics which he has addressed, the problem of torture has been prominent and controversial. It is a problem, moreover, that has led to some of his most searching enquiries into the character of moral obligations. In the present essay I take issue not only with many of Moore's conclusions about torture, but also with some of his more far‐reaching claims about the domain of morality.