The Impact of Objective and Empathic Dispositions on Local Government Budget Analysts' Spending Preferences

The spending preferences of local government budget analysts are based on individual decision modes; how individuals attend to, encode, and process information. While academicians and practitioners tend to assume that a budget analyst's disposition to act leads to specific spending preferences, that assumption is rarely tested empirically. This study draws on two theoretical constructs derived from social psychology, rationality (objectivism), and emotions (empathy). Leary and his colleagues demonstrate that objectivism predisposes one toward rational decision making in a variety of settings, while Eisenberg and her colleagues show that highly empathic individuals are predisposed toward helping and prosocial behavior. Results of this study suggests that empathic budget analysts, those scoring higher on the empathy scale, have distinctly different spending preferences than those budget analysts scoring higher on the objectivism scale; empathic budget analysts are disposed toward humanitarian criteria in decision making while objective budget analysts are disposed toward quantifiable cost-benefit considerations.     

TRANSLATING THE PROBLEMS OF THE ELDERLY INTO EFFECTIVE POLICIES: AN ANALYSIS OF FILIAL ATTITUDES

This paper examines the political implications of current decision making efforts that underpin recent cost-cutting measures of federally supported programs serving the elderly. Current policy changes that favor the private sector (e.g., shifts of the cost of care to other levels of government and to elderly individuals and their families) have also generated a renewed interest in the policy of mandating family responsibility. The paper also examines attitudes concerning filial responsibility, such as multigenerational living. The inadequacy of current policy analysis that has encouraged the disestablishment of the current long-term care system and the shifting of care costs to the private sector, especially to the individual and the family are also examined.     

Conflict‐Induced Displacement,Understanding the Causes of Flight

This study investigates circumstances that affect individuals’ decisions of whether or not to flee their homes during civilian conflicts. Building on the “choice‐centered” approach to studying forced migration, I test the argument that people make a decision to flee or stay even under highly dangerous circumstances. Using primary data collected through a public opinion survey in Nepal, I test a number of hypotheses regarding the impact of factors such as violence, economic opportunity, physical infrastructure or geographical terrain, and social networks on forced migration, providing an individual‐level test of the choice‐centered approach to studying forced migration. The empirical results are consistent with the major hypotheses developed in aggregate‐level studies and provide better insights into the factors that affect individual‐level behavior. Beyond conflict, there are a number of significant economic, social, physical, and political factors that affect individuals’ choice to flee.     

Volunteering and the state

Volunteering participation rates vary greatly across countries even when the potential volunteers’ individual characteristics are controlled. We therefore analyze the volunteers’ motives against the backdrop of the predominant political and economic environment in different countries, focusing on the state’s role in influencing an individual’s decision to volunteer. Combining individual-level data from the European and World Values Survey with macroeconomic and political variables for OECD countries, we identify three channels through which governmental activities influence voluntary labor: size of the state (i.e., amount of public social expenditure), political consensus between voters and the government, and government support for democratization.     

Crisis Accountability: Ministerial Resignations in Sweden

Accountability processes after crisis events sometimes entail harsh criticism from public and political players alike, forcing cabinet ministers to be on top of the political game and sometimes even resign. However, harsh accountability processes are just as likely to leave ministers undamaged. This article combines two existing theories that propose different factors to account for variation in outcomes: ministerial resignations as a consequence of cabinet formation and individual positions; or resignations as a result of blame management strategies involving individual actors within the cabinet and beyond. Ten crisis episodes in Sweden are analysed and compared. The findings suggest that individual political power bases and experience matter to how well blame management strategies can be employed, while the composition of the government gives structural constraints. The dynamic interplay and framing battle between incumbent decision makers, and external arenas and the skill with which individual ministers engage and frame responsibility, play a key role in determining their post‐crisis careers.     

Party ambiguity and individual preferences

Although the literature on party ambiguity does not lead to a consensus, recent findings suggest that party ambiguity is a good strategy for electoral success. However, the literature on decision processes shows that individuals generally dislike ambiguity. The aim of the present project is to test the effect of party ambiguity on party preferences at the individual level, to see if findings in decision processes still apply. Using election data from eight Western European democracies, I define a measure of party ambiguity at the individual level and find that ambiguity has a negative effect on party preferences. In addition, I find that individuals with a high interest in politics are less likely to like ambiguous parties.     

Social Networks and Collective Action

Despite growing attention to the role of social context in determining political participation, the effect of the structure of social networks remains little examined. This article introduces a model of interdependent decision making within social networks, in which individuals have heterogeneous motivations to participate, and networks are defined via a qualitative typology mirroring common empirical contexts. The analysis finds that some metrics for networks' influence—size, the prevalence of weak ties, the presence of elites—have a more complex interaction with network structure and individual motivations than has been previously acknowledged. For example, in some contexts additional network ties decrease participation. This presents the potential for selection bias in empirical studies. The model offers a fuller characterization of the role of network structure and predicts expected levels of participation across network types and distributions of motivations as a function of network size, weak and strong ties, and elite influence.     

Yours,Mine, or Everyone’s Property? China’s Property Law in 2007

China’s passage of the Real Property Rights Law in 2007 undoubtedly marked a milestone of its economic transition to market economy. It delineates the boundary of property belongings and the authority of disposition by including or excluding specific individual and groups of individuals. The purpose of this paper is to trace the debate, deliberation, and decision of the law-making process to show the process of bargaining and compromise of various political interests in China’s complex and difficult economic transition.     

AMBIGUITY, CONTRADICTIONS, AND FRUSTRATIONS AT THE BALLOT BOX: A PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE

A theoretical analysis of citizen participation in politics from a public choice perspective indicates that widespread apathy and disinterest are not aberrations in citizen behavior due to civic irresponsibility or the personal failings of individuals. Rather such responses are highly rational adapta- tions to a political system and political decision-making process over which the individual has little control and participation in which, while demand- ing, yields few tangible returns. Elections and voting are poor mechanisms for aggregating choice, allocating resources or directing public policy.     

An Insider–Outsider Theory of Popular Tolerance for Corrupt Politicians

This article addresses the puzzle of electoral support for corrupt politicians in emerging democracies by examining citizens’ varying attitudes toward political corruption. We make an important theoretical distinction between perceptions of and tolerance for corruption, and argue that these different attitudes vary across individuals depending on whether they are political insiders or outsiders. We test our theory using Afrobarometer survey data from 18 sub‐Saharan African countries and find that individuals included within clientelistic networks simultaneously perceive corruption as ubiquitous and are more tolerant of malfeasance. Meanwhile, those individuals with partisan or ethnic ties to the incumbent are less likely to consider corruption as widespread. Finally, we explore whether variation in attitudes toward corruption influences citizens’ voting behavior, and find that insiders are less likely to “vote the rascals out.”     

The Formal Delegation of Regulatory Decisions in the Telecommunication Sector: An Explanation Using Classification Trees

Research on regulation has traditionally focused on studying the delegation of regulatory competencies from political principals to an independent regulatory agency. In this article, we argue that this delegation is nuanced by different factors that affect whether a specific regulatory decision is formally delegated. We examine and explain formal delegation patterns at the level of individual regulatory decisions in twelve countries located in Europe, Latin America, and South Asia. The data were gathered by coding the twelve countries' telecommunications legislation. The data analysis was undertaken using a classification tree model—a nonparametric model. We found that the maturity of the market has the greatest effect on the formal delegation of regulatory decisions, but this effect is also influenced by the other theoretical factors considered, particularly the level of political constraints and the type of regulation.     

Mixed evidence for a relationship of cognitive fatigue to political engagement

Daily cognitive fatigue is widespread, yet we are still learning about its influence on political behavior. Existing research suggests fatigue will reduce consumption of politics at the margin. Moreover, when fatigued individuals do engage with political material, they should be more likely to choose content and decision rules that require minimal effort. We find mixed empirical evidence for these claims. In observational data, we find a negative relationship between fatigue and engagement, on average, but the coefficients are typically small and statistically insignificant and we find substantial variation across different measures of fatigue. In three experiments, we find mixed evidence that manipulated fatigue reduces the demand for political content over sports and other non-political entertainment. In a fourth experiment, we find no evidence that manipulated fatigue shapes heuristic versus systematic processing. We discuss the limitations of our study, its relationship to existing work, and avenues for future research.     

Consideration and Choice: Analyzing Party Choice in the Swedish European Election 2014

For a long time the question of to what extent party choice in the European Parliament (EP) elections is primarily dependent on voters’ orientations towards the European Union (EU) or just a mere reflection of orientations towards issues and actors in national politics has been debated. By combining insights from individual‐level models of party choice in second‐order elections with theories of sequential decision making this article investigates if, how and at what stages in the decision process attitudes to European integration matters for party choice. In line with previous work on first and second decision rule criteria in EP elections, this article develops and tests hypotheses about how voters’ orientations work at different stages of the voter decision process. The findings, based on Swedish data from a probability‐based three‐wave Internet campaign panel, indicate that many voters are in fact considering more than one party to vote for in the beginning of the election campaign. As expected, left‐right orientations function as a main decision rule with respect to which parties voters even consider voting for, while proximity on the European integration dimension mainly matters as a second decision rule in the final stage of the decision process. Using a sequential model with consideration and choice stages, the article reveals a much larger complimentary effect of EU proximity on party choice than has generally been found in previous research. This serves as a distinct contribution to the emerging research field of individual party choice in second‐order elections.     

Communication in committees: who should listen?

In a parsimonious model of a collective decision problem with partially conflicting interests, we show that restricting communication may enhance decision quality. If disclosed information is observed by decision makers with different preferences, individuals may strategically withhold information. In this case, a committee member’s silence arouses the other members’ suspicions. As a consequence, in case of residual uncertainty, individual votes may react less to information that is publicly observed.     

An Exploration of Correct Voting in Recent U.S. Presidential Elections

Lau and Redlawsk (1997) proposed that the quality of voter decision making can be evaluated by measuring what they called correct voting —the extent to which people vote in accordance with their own values and priorities—but in so doing provided little guidance about what actually determines whether voters can make such high-quality decisions. This article develops a framework for analyzing the vote decision that views the quality of decision making as a joint function of individual characteristics and various higher-level campaign factors. We hypothesize that differences in cognitive capacity, political motivation, the availability of political heuristics, and macrolevel factors that affect the difficulty of the choice confronting citizens, including the nature of the political information environment, should all affect the probability of a correct vote. We find significant support for seven proposed hypotheses across three levels of analysis, which places responsibility for incorrect votes on both the individual and our electoral system.     

Political participation in Africa: The role of individual resources

This paper aims to examine the role of individual resources in explaining African political participation. If political participation is costly and requires inputs in terms of individual resources, and citizens in young developing country democracies face comparatively high participation costs and have more limited individual resource endowments than citizens in more established democracies, a resource approach to political participation should be particularly relevant in the African setting. On the contrary, however, empirical findings drawing on recent data for more than 27,000 respondents in 20 emerging African democracies suggest weak explanatory power of the resource perspective. Often, the relatively resource poor actually participate to a greater extent than the more resource rich. The results are encouraging in that they suggest fairly broad-based political participation, but also call attention to the need to evaluate the motivational forces behind the decision to take part.     

Political Trust,Individual‐level Characteristics and Institutional Performance: Evidence from Finland, 2004–13

Several scholars agree that low political trust has fundamental negative implications for society at large. This study tests the power of institutional performance theory in explaining the differences between individuals in political trust (cross‐sectional) and fluctuations of political trust over time (longitudinal). Indeed, the dominant scholarly debate has concerned whether political trust is stable and dependent of endogenous factors such as political socialization and social trust, or whether it is exogenous (i.e., in constant fluctuation due to later experiences with institutions and the outputs they produce). In terms of cross‐sectional differences, the aim is to assess the relative impact institutional performance on political trust of a citizen. As regards the longitudinal approach, political trust varies over time and from an explanatory perspective it is important also to understand how well the institutional performance theory predicts over‐time variation of political trust. The study employs repeated European Social Survey data for Finland between 2004 and 2013. The results show, first and foremost, the strong impact of evaluations of institutional performance on political trust: satisfaction with government and economy explains differences both between individuals and over time. Social trust and welfare state performance are also strong predictors, but they explain differences only at the individual level and do not predict over‐time variations.     

Toward a new institutional strategy framework for political marketing

The present literature on political marketing strategy has provided important knowledge about how the material context of technologies, polls or competitors influences strategy formulation. However, less attention has been directed to the constraints facing a political organization from the social context related to habits, norms or social conventions. This article thus aims at bringing organizational new institutional theory into the field of political marketing strategy. Accordingly, it is investigated how political organizations when initiating marketing strategies act or react toward institutionalized demands in their environment, such as issues or ideas that are considered socially appropriate. As such, a strategy framework consisting of a phase model and a typology is developed. The phase model is drawn from extant literature within organizational new institutional theory stating that decision makers will (1) scan information from their environment, (2) interpret this incoming information in available cognitive categories and (3), finally, select a strategy premised on their cognitive interpretations. On this ground, we build a novel typology that specifies which political marketing strategy decision makers will select under different cognitive framings of their environment. Here, we delineate four ideal type political marketing strategies—conformity, decoupling, defense and entrepreneurial—that correspond to how organizational decision makers interpret their institutional surroundings. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Responsibility Attribution for Collective Decision Makers

We argue that individuals use responsibility attribution heuristics that apply to collective decisions made, for example, by families, teams within firms, boards in international organizations, or coalition governments. We conduct laboratory and online experiments to tease out the heuristics subjects use in their responsibility attribution for collective decision makers. The lab experiments comprise a collective dictator game in which decision makers have weighted votes and recipients can punish individual decision makers. Our results show that recipients punish unfair allocations and mainly target the decision maker with proposal power and with the largest vote share. We find weak evidence that decision makers with veto power are targeted or that recipients punish proportional to vote share. The online experiment demonstrates that subjects indeed believe that the decision maker with proposal power has the most influence on the collective decision outcome. We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of vote choice.     

Human (In)Security and Democracy in Central America

Human security has increasingly shifted attention to the individual, while the state has become guarantor (or violator) of security given its role in governing the domestic environment. This article examines how variations in regime forms influence security, pointing to the importance of political security in the wider human security framework. To illustrate, the article examines the nature of political security in Central America, a region with weakly democratized states and histories of political violence. The findings suggest a link between democracy and human security that is mediated by state capacity and the ability to control non-state violence against individuals.