The Human Rights Act 1998: research,freedom of speech and academic freedom

This article will consider rights to receive and express information and ideas from the perspective of the researcher, the researched, the researcher's institution and the wider community. It will also consider how the courts will resolve the inevitable conflicts between these rights. It does not address the right to education enshrined in Article 2 of the First Protocol² but rather the other Convention Articles, particularly Article 10, particularly relevant to the conduct of intellectual inquiry. It is intended to underline the potential reach of the Act for all public bodies which seek to be learning organisations, and the consequent need for such bodies to review their practices and procedures before the Act comes into force on 2 October 2000.     

Copyright, continuums and freedom of speech

‘A book may be good for nothing; or there may be onlyone thing in it worth knowing; are we to read it all through?’(Samuel Johnson) This section is dedicated to the review ofideas, articles, books, films and other media. It will includereplies (and rejoinders) to articles, the evaluation of newideas or proposals, and reviews of books and articles both directlyand indirectly related to intellectual property law.

Copyright and Free Speech Comparative and International Analyses ByJonathan Griffiths and Uma Suthersanen, Eds, 2005, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press Price: £80.00, Hardback, ISBN: 0199276048.pp. 426   If one were to summarize this     

论言论自由的保护

一、言论自由保护的一般原理 言论自由是以语言、文字、音像、电子、艺术或其他形式表达意见、寻求信息、接受观念、传播思想的自由.它对人类的生存和发展具有极其重要的意义.在很大程度上,人类社会政治制度的变革、经济组织的演进、科学技术的提高,都离不开言论的自由传播和广泛交流.人类社会前进的每一步都与言论自由密不可分.因此,人们通常把言论自由称为"第一权利"、"人类最重要的、潜力巨大的、活动的资源".从某种意义上说,言论自由的保障程度反映了一个国家的经济、社会发展水平.     

The irresistible force of freedom of speech meets the immovable object: trade mark law in South Africa

Legal context. The right of freedom of expression is a fundamentalright entrenched in the Bill of Rights incorporated in the SouthAfrican Constitution. While intellectual property rights donot enjoy this status, they are internationally recognised rightsgranted by a law of general application and may thus in termsof the Constitution limit the fundamental rights protected inthe Bill of Rights, and more particularly the right of freedomof expression. Where the enforcement of trade mark rights comes into conflictwith the right of freedom of expression, the two rights mustbe weighed up against one another and the competing interestsof the owner of the trade mark against the claim of expressionof a user without permission must be considered. The departurepoint of the weighing up process is that neither right is superiorto the other. Key points. This article discusses an action brought by SabmarkInternational, which claimed that Laugh It Off Promotions CCinfringed its registered trade mark BLACK LABEL in respect ofbeer by using a corruption of this mark with strong politicalundertones as ornamentation on T-shirts sold by it. It was claimedthat the offending use diluted Sabmark's registered trade mark.In an appeal, the Constitutional Court rejected the claim onthe basis that Sabmark had not shown that the offending usewas likely to cause economic damage to it. Practical significance. The case in effect equated trade markrights with rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights and thusgave important recognition to intellectual property rights.It created a precedent in intellectual property law, if notin South African law in general, in that the constitutionalcourt overruled a decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA)and in effect ruled that the SCA had not interpreted the relevantprovision of the Trade Marks Act correctly.     

Judicial protection of fundamental rights in the transition from the world of atoms to the word of bits: The case of freedom of speech

This article underlines the role of Courts in protecting fundamental rights in the atomic and the digital dimension. The main aim of this work is to show how the coming of the Internet has affected the exercise and the judicial protection of freedom of expression in a comparative perspective. In order to answer this research question, this study will focus on the role of Courts as ‘playmakers’ in interpreting and solving issues deriving from interconnected legal regimes affecting the protection of fundamental rights and, especially, free speech. More specifically, the comparative focus will be on the decisions of the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Right and the US Supreme Court.     

Compromise and religious freedom

Compromise is surprisingly common in the context of religious freedom. In Holt v. Hobbs, for example, a Muslim prison inmate challenged his prison’s no-beards policy on religious freedom grounds. He proposed, and was eventually granted, a compromise that allowed him to grow a half-inch beard rather than the full beard normally required by his beliefs. Some have argued that such a compromise is inconsistent with the purpose of religious freedom, which is to guard against interference with an individual’s religious practices. Accepting a compromise, after all, may require a significant modification to one’s default practices. But this paper argues that compromise can be appropriate if the purpose of religious freedom is to foster the inclusion and acceptance of all people in a diverse political community. Moreover, the benefits of compromise may lend support to the inclusion-based conception of religious freedom as against the more traditional non-interference conception.

     

The fact of reason: Kant's prajna-perception of freedom

Conclusion I have been experimental in my comparative approach, using the instrument of Hua-yen Buddhism to investigate Kant's fact or reason. What has been demonstrated? Certainly, the hypothesis that comparative study is flexible enough to illuminate strands of our own philosophical tradition is both interesting and compelling. But for Kant, does the study of practicability with reference to the buddhi-mind end in the perception of the dharmadhatu? I have marshalled some evidence to support this theory, implicit throughout the Second Critique. At the end of the Grundlagen, Kant offers one further note suggesting this conception must have been a continuing influence on his later moral thinking. Referring to the idea of a purely intelligible world, he says it serves to produce in us a lively interest in the moral law by means of the splendid ideal of a universal kingdom of ends in themselves (rational beings), to which we can belong as members only if we are scrupulous to live in accordance with maxims of freedom as if they were laws of nature.⁴¹     

Character-building and freedom in education

Educators, parents, and policy-makers in the United States, as in other countries, are concerned about the apparent inability of many schools to contribute to the development of character and civic virtue in their pupils. The answer, experience shows, is not for government to require a pedagogy of state-defined character education which, in a pluralistic society, would inevitably create new conflicts. Instead, education policy should take advantage of the growing interest on the part of educators in creating autonomous, distinctive schools, and the continuing interest, on the part of parents, in being able to choose what school their children will attend. Schools which exhibit a distinctive character based upon a shared understanding of the goals of education are effective not only in teaching academics but also in developing positive character traits in their pupils. Charter schools and educational vouchers are two means of encouraging and supporting such coherent schools. The article concludes with a series of policy recommendations designed to balance the autonomy of schools against the need for public accountability. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Regina v. Butler: The harms approach and freedom of expression

In Regina v. Butler the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly accepted the argument that obscenity law should be based on harm rather than morality. The court's opinion, and the view of certain feminists, depends heavily on social science research that shows exposure to some pornographic materials may have harmful effects. However, an analysis of these studies indicates that the findings encompass a wide range of stimuli and are not limited to pornography. Based on the research, the court's shift to a harms approach should logically include all presentations containing harmful messages, regardless of the degree of sexual explicitness. As such, this article argues that the court has not really abandoned its moral approach to obscenity. It has just disguised it by adopting the rhetoric of harmfulness.     

The freedom of navigation in international law and the utility of international society discourse

In the international law of the sea, the emergence of new actors and systems influencing relations between states has lead to evolving rules and calls for the redefinition of the traditional issues such the allocation of jurisdiction and rights to states in its maritime zones. In the maritime domain, this is seen thrice in the evolution of the various maritime zones in the United Nations Conferences for the Law of the Sea （UNCLOS I, II and III）. In the maritime domain, there are certain actions that are not dependent on any state＇s consent. One of such is the rule of freedom of navigation. This paper, argues for the possibilities of concomitance between international law and studies in international society based on the growing recognition of the importance of examining the sociological and historical element in rule development. This paper focuses on a rule in the international law of the sea with the aim of determining the extent to which norms have caused changes in rule development, if any. This method, known as the English School method of international relations, acknowledges the benefits of international law positivism in highlighting generality with the benefits of a normative discourse in highlighting alternatives and the utility of compliance. So, although the maritime domain is rooted in a state system, one where the parts interact as a whole, a branching-out analysis towards the normative discourse in the development of this rule will facilitate more understanding, as the case-specificity of most issues in the maritime domain cannot be overemphasised.     

The normative concept of guilt in criminal law between freedom of will and neurobiological determinism

To make criminal conduct liable to punishment, criminal responsibility, defined as individual blameworthiness in terms of social ethics, is required as point of reference--both to create and limit the state's right to punish the offender. Neurobiological findings and more recent investigations in brain research have given rise to serious doubts regarding this "conditio sine qua non" of the state's power monopoly. As a result of preceding unconscious decisions, so the argument goes, Man is not free in his will, and the normative principle of culpability would need to be relinquished in favour of a "law of measures" detached from guilt. A detailed analysis of the underlying experimental setups, in particular the investigations by Benjamin Libet involving the measurement of the readiness potential, has shown, however, that the results of the test methods do not justify the demand for a profound change up to the point of a total revision of criminal law, and that they cannot invalidate the concept of freedom of will apostrophised on principle. The empirical data obtained fail to demonstrate if and why decisions of the will should not be free, the more so as the nomothetic method used ignores completely the idiographic understanding and interpretation of the always context-related and socio-structurally (pre)-moulded personality of the offender. Performed in a laboratory setting as individual actions with a comparatively simple structure and unrelated to a concrete situation, they can by no means be translated to the (more) complex situation under which an offence is committed including the decision-making processes determined by psychodynamic, motivational and intentional aspects as well as highly specific reciprocal interactions within the offender-victim constellation. Even if these experiments had shown the determined nature of human decisions, they would not necessarily have to bring about a conceptual change of paradigms of the normative concept of guilt, because as a result of self-attribution, the intra- and inter-subjective experience of the freedom of will renders the mere "illusion of freedom" sufficient to assign to an individual the appropriate sense of responsibility, which is also accepted by him. The alternative of a law of measures independent of guilt and culpability must be rejected because it is incapable of instituting sufficient protection, both in qualitative and quantitative terms, against prognostically diffuse and utilitarian hypertrophied prophylactic efforts on the part of the state up to the point of a revolutionised anthropological design, as shown quite clearly by the repressive and restrictive tendencies apparent in criminal policy since 11 September 2001. Consequently, the classic principle of guilt as one of the humanitarian foundations of punishment imposed by the state needs to be protected and upheld in the face of rash and inadequately considered law amendment endeavours. With its principles having slowly grown over the ages under democratic consent, criminal law is capable of immunising itself against uncritically generalised restructuring attempts based on inductive false conclusions and the confusion of coincidence, correlation and causality, let alone against the neurobiological "occupation tendencies" of normative premises. Regardless of their undeniable fascination, future brain research activities and the respective findings in the neurobiology of thinking, decision-making and acting as an indispensable empirical and epistemological starting point must always be reviewed in terms of their factual and normative implementation powers in favour of or against the human freedom of will.