证券投资基金中的委托代理问题

在证券投资基金中,投资人将财产委托给基金管理人之后,由于管理人的目的是从中获取最多的管理费,而投资人的目的是从证券投资中获取最大的资金收益,二者在关于财产方面的目标上产生了偏离。因为基金管理人与基金份额持有人之间存在信息不对称,在理     

论基金管理人与证券公司利益冲突交易的法律问题

本文对我国证券投资基金法有关证券投资基金管理人参与的利益冲突交易的规定结合具体的案例作了论述,以契约型基金为中心,着重探讨了基金管理人的忠实义务及利益冲突交易的问题,特别是在公司新股发行及增发、配股时,基金公司与承销商存在关联关系时,如何确保基金份额持有人利益不受相关自我交易的损害.     

我国证券投资基金管理人公司治理中基金份额持有人利益优先原则适用研究

基金份额持有人利益优先原则是我国证券投资基金管理人公司治理的法定原则。基金法律关系的本质决定了基金份额持有人利益应当优先于基金管理人及其股东、员工的利益。其是特定基金法律关系中基金份额持有人整体利益的相应优先,但并不适用于同一基金管理人同时受托管理的多个基金的持有人之间。并且,基金份额持有人利益优先原则一般来说可以扩张适用于基金管理公司,适用于基金管理公司参与的其他法律关系中的相对人。然而,如相对人的利益涉及社会公益时则持有人利益并不当然优先;而其利益的优先也不构成对其他相对人债权的根本否定。     

上交所实施新的《证券投资基金上市规则》

新修订的上海证券交易所《证券投资基金上市规则(2004年修订)》从2004年12月6日起开始实施。该《规则》的主要内容包括如下：(1)在上海证券交易所上市的证券投资基金需经中国征监会核准发售且基金合同生效；基金合蚓期限五年以上：基金募集金额不低于2亿元人民币；基金份额持有人不少于1000人：有经核准的基金管理人和基金托管人。     

投资基金立法研究

目前,我国投资基金发展迅速,但立法工作相对滞后。而从投资基金实践考察,一部规制投资基金的基本法不可或缺。本文介绍了投资基金的立法过程,分析了投资基金的立法宗旨、调整范围、立法体例,阐明了投资基金立法应重点规范的内容,其中包括基金份额持有人大会及其权利、基金管理人和托管人的责任、外商参股基金管理公司和私募基金等立法问题。     

证券投资基金销售管理办法

[公布日期 ]2 0 0 4 6 2 5 [类　　别 ]民商法·证券[施行日期 ]2 0 0 4 7 1[同时废止法规 ]2 0 0 2年《证券投资基金销售管理暂行规定》等文件第一章　总　　则第一条　为了规范证券投资基金的销售活动 ,促进证券投资基金市场健康发展 ,根据《证券投资基金法》及其他有关法律、行政法规 ,制定本办法。第二条　本办法所称证券投资基金 (以下简称基金 )销售 ,包括基金管理人或者基金管理人委托的其他机构 (以下简称代销机构 )宣传推介基金 ,发售基金份额 ,办理基金份额申购、赎回等活动。第三条　基金管理人、代销机构从事基金销售活动 ,…     

证券投资基金托管业务管理办法

1.2013年4月2日中国证券监督管理委员会、中国银行业监督管理委员会令第92号公布2.自2013年4月2日起施行第一章总则第一条为了规范证券投资基金托管业务,维护证券投资基金托管业务竞争秩序,保护基金份额持有人及相关当事人合法权益,促进证券投资基金健康发展,根据《证券投资基金法》、《银行业监督管理法》及其     

证券投资基金运作管理办法

[公布日期 ]2 0 0 4 6 2 9[类　　别 ]民商法·证券[施行日期 ]2 0 0 4 7 1第一章　总　　则第一条　为了规范证券投资基金运作活动 ,保护投资人的合法权益 ,促进证券投资基金市场健康发展 ,根据《证券投资基金法》及其他有关法律、行政法规 ,制定本办法。第二条　本办法适用于证券投资基金 (以下简称基金 )的募集、基金份额的申购和赎回、基金财产的投资、基金收益的分配、基金份额持有人大会的召开 ,以及其他基金运作活动。第三条　从事基金运作活动 ,应当遵守法律、行政法规和中国证券监督管理委员会 (以下简称中国证监会 )的规定 ,遵…     

我国开放式基金投资者利益保护机制探析

开放式基金是指基金份额总额不固定,基金份额可以在基金合同约定的时间和场所申购或赎回的证券投资基金。目前开放式基金已经成为证券投资基金的主流产品,涉及众多投资者利益。而在我国的资本市场中,开放式基金经历了近八年的快速发展,但仍存在一些问题,损害了基金持有人的利益,打击了投资者的积极性,不利于资本市场的健康发展。本文分析了当前基金投资者的利益保护机制,同时对改善现有保护机制提出了建议。     

证券投资基金合同中的仲裁条款对基金份额持有人的法律约束力

本文拟通过对基金合同性质的分析和对《证券投资基金法》、《合同法》、《仲裁法》相关条款的解读,得出基金合同中仲裁条款应对基金份额持有人具有法律约束力的结论。     

论我国私募股权投资基金与证券投资基金一体规范

《私募投资基金监督管理暂行办法》对于私募股权投资基金设立、基金管理人和基金托管人权利义务等一系列重要问题未作出规范,由此导致法院在处理部分私募股权基金纠纷案件时只能选择参照适用我国《证券投资基金法》作为裁判依据。 我国《证券投资基金法》未将私募股权投资基金纳入其调整范围。 法院此举缺乏正当性。 事实上,私募股权投资基金与证券投资基金在行为性质上同属金融活动,在法律关系的构建上均主要以信托关系为基础,两者产生的法律风险亦具有同质性,将两者一体规范能解决司法裁判适法正当性的问题,既有必要性和可行性,也能提高监管效率、促进行业发展。 我国应当将私募股权投资基金纳入《证券投资基金法》,实现私募股权投资基金与证券投资基金的一体规范。     

Disputes about corporate expression absorption and their legal remedies

Corporate expression is the expression that a company gives to the outside in its capacity as a legal entity. Often referring to resolutions made by shareholder meetings and the board of directors, based on good faith and bound by contractual spirit, a company must be held liable for its expression. Corporate expression absorption refers to the corporate behaviors and situations wherein the majority voting shareholders and directors replace the will of the minority voting shareholders and directors within their own will. Among them, the majority voting shareholders at a shareholders’ meeting (shareholders’ general meeting) are decision-making shareholders, and directors, managers and other senior management staff that decide corporate affairs are called decision-making members. Corporate expression absorption consists of two sorts: absorption by shareholders’ meeting and absorption by the board of directors. Shareholders’ meeting is a company’s authoritative organization; when the voting rights of some shareholders exceed the statutory limit, they will be able to manipulate the expression of shareholders’ meetings and replace the will of other shareholders with that of their own. The expression absorption by the board of directors refers to the practice wherein the majority directors decide on important corporate matters in accordance with the majority rule. Thus, it can be seen that the corporate expression absorption is a double-edged sword, not only capable of uplifting operational efficiency but also likely to help decision-making shareholders achieve personal gains and transfer corporate interests. As for the disputes of corporate expression absorption, the following legal remedies might be adopted: (1) Limit the voting rights of decision-making shareholders. (2) Provide shareholders with veto power over specific events. (3) Ask the chambers of commerce (industry associations) to arbitrate specific events. (4) Preserve the market value of shares held by dissenting directors. (5) Expand cumulative voting; (6) Provide shareholders the right to exit. (7) Legal remedies for corporate deadlock. (8) Shareholders’ derivative lawsuits. __________ Translated from China Law, No. 4, 2005     

论表决权信托——以小股东利益保护为背景展开的研究

公司控制权的存在,使控制股东可获得大于其股权比例的收益,转移、减少其相应的风险,实现其利益的最大化。表决权是争夺控制权的基本工具,中小股东的表决权往往只是一种抽象的存在,在控制权争夺中其表决权的作用不能充分实现,其利益容易受到损害。表决权信托通过对表决权的重新安排,为中小股东利益保护提供了一个较好的外部机制。     

论限售股司法拍卖的法律效果——以“公开承诺承继”为视角

资本市场不少股东在取得限售股份的同时作出公开承诺,如期限锁定承诺、业绩保障承诺、不占用资金承诺等。在限售股被质押融资的情况下,一旦债务逾期可能会被法院强制执行,强制执行后新取得股东是否需要承继这些公开承诺所附的权利负担,现行法律与监管规则不一致,各证券交易所的监管规则也有差异,导致实践中呈现"混乱"局面。从公开承诺的性质以及现行法律关于法院强制执行的权利负担承继原则来看,强制执行后公开承诺义务不应被新股东承继,但可能会造成法院强制执行成为原股东逃废债务的渠道,进而损害上市公司及其他投资者的合法权益,不利于建立健康的证券市场秩序环境。参考"买卖不破租赁"等案例,将公开承诺义务物权化,赋予其追溯效力,可能是解决这一问题的有效方案。     

公司分立中小股东保护的若干法律问题研究

公司会因各种原因引起分立 ,公司分立中小股东尤其应当给予保护 ,小股东应享有异议估价权、股份收买请求权、不作为及损害赔偿等请求权。我国在未来公司立法中应引入累积投票权、股东派生诉讼及股东投票权排除等制度以保护小股东的权益。     

Public bads and private firms: efficiency and sustainability with different allocations of voting rights

A number of authors have proposed that firms can internalize externalities through their shareholders. This paper investigates this proposition, focusing on public bads. Theoretically it is, indeed, possible that shareholders decide that the firm reduces its public bads at the cost of profits, thereby increasing Pareto-efficiency. One of the factors which help determine the size of the reduction is the number of shareholders with a (very) small stake in the firm. The greater this number, the greater the reduction will tend to be. It is shown that the reduction in public bads can be reversed by takeovers, but under special conditions only while takeover defences may also be used. Unfortunately, there are a number of factors which significantly limit the internalization of external effects in practice. The paper also discusses a change in the legal share-voting system whereby the direct owners of the shares (i.e., the shareholders) no longer possess, in their capacity of direct owners, the legal right to vote at the General Meetings of firm owners. Instead, these rights become the property of the beneficial owners of the shares (i.e., the people who ultimately provided the money to buy the shares), but on the condition that they delegate their voting rights to a proxy voting institution. This institutional innovation may significantly increase the internalization of external effects among other things because many beneficial owners have a tiny stake in the firm.     

The appraisal remedy and merger premiums

The appraisal remedy affords corporate shareholders the optionto redeem their shares for cash in the event of certain transactions,including mergers. Access to appraisal for publicly traded shares,however, differs from state to state. We present the first large-sampleempirical study of the effect of appraisal rights on targetshareholder gains from acquisitions. We examine 1,350 mergersinvolving publicly held firms. We find some evidence that appraisalreduces average shareholder gains in transactions involvingself-interested managers. For the entire sample, however, wefind no evidence that appraisal has any effect, positive ornegative, on target shareholder gains from takeovers.     

论证券投资基金的法律地位

正确认识证券投资基金的法律地位是进行证券投资基金立法和理论研究的基础。笔者在找出我国理论界对证券投资基金性质及法律地位认识分歧的根源之后,简要论述了公司型基金的法律主体地位,并从投资基金的社会主体性和法律主体性两个层次、事实判断和价值判断两个方面,详细论证了信托型基金的法律地位,指出我国的投资基金立法应从主体角度对信托型基金进行规范,同时希望立法大胆创新,把信托型基金列为与自然人、法人具有平等地位的第三民事主体。     

Regulatory induced herding? Evidence from Polish pension funds

The paper documents herding among pension fund managers in Poland. Herding occurs despite the lack of an economically significant link between fund performance and the flow of new capital or members. To explain this phenomenon, the paper outlines a model that attributes herding to performance incentive contracts imposed by the authorities in Poland. The model shows that penalties for underperformance imposed by the regulator are likely to cause fund managers to follow each other’s portfolio choices and pursue similar investment strategies. Since herding causes similar portfolio allocations by all funds, the results call for a reduction in the number of funds, or a review of the relative performance incentive system and current constraints on portfolio allocation. The latter could also help reduce the dominance of government bonds in investment portfolios of pension funds.     

少数股东保护的新进路：少数股东股份的优先股化

公司少数股东权益的保护属世界性难题,现有保护方法具有这样或那样的不足。在特定情况下,将公司少数股东持有的股份部分或者全部转化为累积参加优先股,以其对公司重大事务实质上已经不产生任何影响力的表决权,换取较高的投资回报,从而对少数股东加以切实的保护。