Terrorism: The relevance of the rational choice model

Terrorism in general, and suicidal terrorism in particular, is popularly seen as “irrational,” but many economists and political scientists argue otherwise. This paper distinguishes three different senses of irrationality: unresponsiveness to incentives, deviation from narrow self-interest, and failure of rational expectations. It concludes that an intermediate position on the rationality of terrorism is appropriate. The typical terrorist sympathizer deviates only slightly from homo economicus. But active terrorists arguably stray from narrow self-interest and rational expectations, and suicidal terrorists probably violate both. Deterrence remains a viable anti-terrorism strategy, but deviations from rational expectations increase the potential of persuasion and appeasement.     

Extending the rational choice model from the economy to society

That the extension of the rational choice model beyond the economy to all society can finally lead to integration of social theory is often claimed by the model’s advocates. The underlying assumption is that this model is valid for both the economy and society, in the form of an economic approach to, or a utilitarian paradigm of, all social behaviour. The meta-theoretical presupposition or injunction that agents are (should be) profit-seekers or utility-optimizers is therewith given the mission to integrate and ‘save’ contemporary social science. However, such extensions of the rational choice model from the economy to society neglect the fact that this presupposition has been partly mitigated and compromised within economics itself. If so, then suspicion is strong that the rational choice model would be even less appropriate for the other social sciences and thus fall short of achieving its self-designated role of integration of social theory. The conclusion of an interdisciplinary analysis drawing both from economics and sociology is that rational choice is far from being an integrative model of the economy and society.     

Sequential vote choice: Applying a consideration set model of heterogeneous decision processes

This article analyzes the relative effects of a classic set of long-term and short-term determinants of party choice by treating voters' decision processes as a two-stage heterogeneous process. Departing from a consideration set model of voting behavior (CSM), we use panel data collected in Sweden in 2014 to analyze which voters considered voting for more than one party. To evaluate the CSM approach we estimate the relative effects of long-term and short-term determinants, for different parts of the electorate and at different stages of the decision process.Results confirm that the choice process for the ‘considering kind’ of voters is influenced by another mix of long-term and short-determinants than stable and party identified voters. Findings suggest that continued analyses of multi-stage decision making may bring new insights into electoral behavior. We argue that the core ideas of CSM – the sequential decision-making process and heterogeneity in the impact of long-term and short-term determinants – are generally applicable for analyses of voting behavior.     

Endogenous bargaining power and the theory of small group collective choice

Contrary to some criticism (Musgrave and Musgrave, and West) the small group collective choice model may yield a determinate, Pareto optimal solution even with all or none bargaining. Such bargaining as well as the solution are implied by the basic assumptions of the theoretical model.     

The theory of economic regulation and public choice and the determinants of public sector bargaining legislation

In this study we used the theory of economic regulation and public choice to derive a model to explain the pattern of public sector bargaining laws among the states. We find this type of legislation is influenced by the following demand factors: (1) the extent of public sector union membership, which represents the interest group hypothesis, has a positive influence on pro-union legislation; (2) the extent of employer opposition to unions, as measured by unfair labor practice charges against employers in representation elections, has a negative effect on bargaining laws; (3) two taste variables — the salaries of public employees and the percent of nonwhite employment in the state — have a positive influence on these laws. A result which will be surprising to many people is that the extent of private sector union membership has no significant influence on the passage of public sector bargaining legislation.Our empirical analysis indicates that supply factors are also important in explaining the pattern of public employee bargaining laws across the state. We find that states are more likely to enact pro-union legislation under the following conditions: (1) constituents appear to hold pro-labor views as represented by their Congressmen's voting record; (2) neighboring states have passed mandatory bargaining laws; and (3) when competition is greater among the political parties.     

Interpreting the dynamics of public housing: Cultural and rational choice explanations

Abstract

This article uses culture of poverty and rational choice theories of poverty to explain how quickly nonelderly household heads leave public housing. Data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics serve as the basis for the analysis.

Although a significant proportion of all household heads have public housing spells lasting five or more years, the majority have spells lasting less than five years. The availability of other housing options has a strong impact on how quickly individuals move out of public housing. Family structure and human capital play a more modest role. To the extent that one's childhood experiences affect the likelihood of exiting public housing, they appear to do so mostly through their effect on the acquisition of human capital. Finally, the evidence presented is inconsistent with the notion that public housing is a trap from which it is more difficult to escape the longer one lives in it.     

A rational choice model of citizen participation in high and low commitment electoral activities

Weisberg and Grofman (1981) propose a rational choice model of voter turnout which they test with data from the 1976 Presidential election. We extend and generalize that model to cover a wide variety of forms of electoral participation including working on a campaign, wearing campaign buttons, and talking to others about the campaign. We find that voters who see a difference between the candidates, with one candidate positively evaluated and the other negatively, are roughly twice as likely to participate in high involvement electoral activities as are those who are alienated from or indifferent to the candidates.     

The Shapley value analyzed under the Felsenthal and Machover bargaining model

In 1996, Felsenthal and Machover proposed a bargaining procedure for a valuable payoff in cooperative and simple games. They proved that the value underlying their bargaining scheme was the Shapley value by showing that it verifies the axioms that Shapley proposed for characterizing his value. They remarked that a direct proof of the result involves rather formidable combinatorial difficulties, but that it has some independent interest. In this paper, we prove such a combinatorial result and obtain a formula for the Shapley value that has a great potential to be extended to more general classes of games.     

公共服务均等化“善治”取向下的理性选择

公共服务均等化问题是公共管理改革和实践的重要命题。诞生于西方社会的治理理论及其“善治”理念，已成为当今国际社会公认的公共管理研究语境和改革实践的普遍诉求。目前，中国城乡之间、地区之间公共服务的不均等化状态引发了众多社会矛盾，严重偏离了公共管理的善治取向。本文基于不同于公共财政范畴善治框架，以公平和效率为尺度，研究公共服务均等化策略的合理性，认为公共服务均等化有利于实现善治理念的公平取向和效率取向，达到公平和效率的高度统一，中国政府应该从理念和制度两个层面加强公共服务均等化建设。     

Regional stabilization: a model for policy decision

A policy simulative model with the main purpose of simulating the effects of alternative policy moves and obtaining an accurate read-out of resulting urban-suburban conditions is the focus of this paper. The model deals with the movement of various population groups and the resulting effects on some very broad indicators of city-suburban life, rather than with particular topics like transportation, land use and the like. The level of abstraction is thus intermediate and is directed at providing practical policy suggestions for a particular city—Newark—for which the model is calibrated. The model, however, is general enough in nature so that it can be applied to other urban-suburban complexes and therefore the policy suggestions made on a fairly broad basis. The outputs of the model are graphically represented to show the results of alternative policies which then may be compared. As a side benefit the inputs to the model can also serve as a “social report” on the present status of an area. Policy questions to be answered by the model include: Should a city budget be directed somewhat differently? Should a city ask the state or federal government for funding and for how much? What may be expected from imposing a city sales tax, weighing the revenue benefit against costs of lost sales or citizens? And last, would the federal government not be better off by simply giving money to the poor directly instead of to cities?     

The effect of misperception on strategic behavior in legislative settings: Social psychology meets rational choice

This paper is about the conditions under which simple social psychological processes can affect collective decisions. In rational choice theory, social psychological effects are said to cancel out, be randomized, or be corrected by communication. Yet as Janis and Mann (1977) argued, there are generally recurring conditions in which such factors influence individual decisions. The question is, Under what conditions can we expect these factors to affect collective decisions? This paper suggests a general approach to identifying the effects of strategic misperception, illustrates it with an example of a social psychological process that affects player perceptions, and describes the preference distributions in which this simple process would change majority voting outcomes. The general conclusion is that strategic misperception may affect majority decisions under so many distributions of preferences that decisions cannot be predicted from knowledge of actors' preferences alone.     

The variable choice set logit model applied to the 2004 Canadian election

Formal work on the electoral model often suggests that parties should locate at the electoral mean. Recent research has found no evidence of such convergence. In order to explain non-convergence, the stochastic electoral model is extended by including a competence and sociodemographic valance in a country where regional and national parties compete in the election. That is, the model allows voters to face different sets of parties in different regions. We introduce the notion of a convergence coefficient, c for regional and national parties and show that when c is high there is a significant centrifugal tendency acting on parties. An electoral survey of the 2004 election in Canada is used to construct a stochastic electoral model of the election with two regions: Québec and the rest of Canada. The survey allows us to estimate voter positions in the policy space. The variable choice set logit model is used to built a relationship between party position and vote share. We find that in the local Nash equilibrium for the election the two main parties with high competence valence, the Liberals and Conservatives, locate at the national electoral mean and the Bloc Québécois, with the highest competence valence, locates at the Québec electoral mean. The New Democratic Party has a low competence valence but remains at the national mean. The Greens, with lowest competence valence, locate away from the national mean to increase its vote share.     

Incorporating groups into rational choice explanations of turnout: An empirical test

This study examines the problem of voter turnout from a rational choice perspective. It reviews the “paradox of voting” and finds one model, which incorporates the role of intermediary social groups and leaders, to be a promising solution. It tests the hypothesis that leader mobilization increases voter turnout, using an ecological analysis of turnout in five Montreal ethnic communities during three recent elections: the 1993 Canadian federal, the 1994 Quebec provincial, and the 1994 Montreal municipal elections. Data on mobilization are taken from semi-directed interviews with association leaders in each community. The results compare predicted and actual rankings of turnout for each community and election. The overall results are weak, indicating that the model does a poor job of predicting voter turnout.     

On the efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods

Voter initiatives are important for policy making in many countries. While much research shows that the initiative process affects policy choices, almost no evidence explains how the initiative process affects policy. Initiatives might change policy directly through voters approving laws that override the legislature; or the initiative process may change policy indirectly by providing a threat that induces the legislature to change policy. This article develops an empirical strategy to measure the direct and indirect effects of the initiative based on the idea that direct effects can be inferred from states that actually pass initiatives while indirect effects can be inferred from states where the initiative is available but not used. Evidence from 50 states on nine separate issues suggests that both direct and indirect effects are important, but the direct effect is several times larger than the threat effect.     

Economic choice, political decision, and the problem of limits

Assesses the arguments for the use of market, or political, processes for making collective choices. The border between “what is mine” and “what is ours” is contested, but it is unguarded. Where should it lie? How would we know when it should be adjusted? I uncover an old paradox: A society can never use political means to guard against incursions across the border for political ends. Some other mechanism, such as constitutional or other extra-statutory rules, are required.     

Ethnic conflict and elite bargaining: The case of Belgium

Ethnic cleavages have dominated Belgian politics for two decades, fragmenting the party system. Constitutional solutions have only met with limited success. In this article two theoretical approaches are applied to the Belgian situation: consociational elite accommodation and bargaining processes in conditions of common and conflicting interests. Bargaining theories, which deal with the actual process of accommodation and give adequate weight to contextual factors are found to explain the situation more adequately than theories which rely on a particular set of consociational ‘devices’.