European Parliament Elections and Political Representation: Policy Congruence between Voters and Parties

It is often said that European Parliament elections fail as an instrument to express the will of the European people. However, while the elections are not contested at the European level and are often dominated by national issues, this does not necessarily imply that they fail to connect policy views of voters and representatives. This article examines policy congruence between voters and candidates, utilising the candidate and voter surveys of the European Election Study 2009. First, it demonstrates that policy preferences of candidates and voters are constrained by three separate policy dimensions. Second, it shows that the quality of representation is high in terms of left/right, the main dimension of conflict in European politics, but lower on the cultural and European integration dimensions. Finally, it establishes that in some cases the aggregation of national parties in political groups in the European Parliament poses problems for effective political representation.     

The Partisan and Policy Motivations of Political Donors Seeking Surrogate Representation in House Elections

Political Behavior - Non-constituent donors constitute an increasingly important fundraising base for members of the U.S. House. These donors are theorized to be seeking “surrogate...     

At-Large Elections and Minority Representation in Local Government

Despite a long history of legal challenges alleging that elections conducted at-large suppress minority representation, this remains the dominant electoral system in local governments throughout the United States. Moreover, a large empirical literature remains divided over the present-day impact of at-large elections on the political success of underrepresented groups. We reconcile the competing findings in this literature by providing contingent, causal estimates of the effect of conversion from at-large to ward elections on minority officeholding, using a novel identification strategy afforded by the California Voting Rights Act of 2001. We find a dramatic positive effect of conversion in districts where Latinos constitute a sufficiently large share of the voting population, and in large and residentially segregated districts. When these conditions are not satisfied, we consistently see null estimated effects.     

Elections and Representation in Local Government: A Victorian Case Study

This article examines the application of different views of representation in the electoral systems at local government level: interest, corporate and mirror representation. The electoral framework underpins the process of representation, influencing both who are eligible to become voters and how their votes are collected and counted. The paper examines the interrelationship between representation and the electoral framework in local government in Victoria. We use a historical analysis, and identify a long period of interest representation; a short, relatively recent period of corporate representation; and an attempt to introduce some elements of mirror representation. We conclude by arguing that local electoral reform needs to take into account the multiple meanings of representation.     

The Voting Rights Act and Hispanic Political Representation in the Southwest

Extensions of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in 1970 and 1975 expandedcoverage to the southwestern United States and included provisionsfor non-English speaking minorities. In the South, the VRA hadthe effect of increasing the number of black voters and electedofficials. In this article, we examine the changes in numbersof Mexican American and other Hispanic elected officials inthe five southwestern states for federal, state, and local officesduring the eleven-year period of 1973–1984. Gains occurredduring the period, although they were uneven across the statesand for different types of offices. The VRA served to removethe more blatant obstacles to electoral participation, but thelaw's fullest impact has also required effective political mobilizationby Hispanic organizations to increase voter registration andproduce a conducive environment for Hispanics to seek and winelective positions.     

Policy Networks,Elections, and State Subsidies1

What are the effects of electoral competition on the disbursement of state subsidies in industrialized democracies? I argue that the scope of subsidies, which ranges from economy‐wide to regional and industry‐specific subsidies, is determined by the extent of political (electoral) monopoly conditioned by economic threats from foreign competition. The mechanism through which electoral competition is linked to subsidies is the policy network. I assess this argument by examining thirteen Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in the period 1990–1993. The findings offer amendments to models of policy networks and speak to the importance of domestic institutions on factor mobility and trade policy.     

Impact of National Politics on Local Elections in Scandinavia

The impact of national politics on local county and municipal elections since about 1970 is studied at the aggregate national level in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. At this level, the local politics swing, i.e., the change in party support from one local election to the next, can to a high degree be predicted by the swing in national politics support. In Sweden, the national politics support is simply the party support at the national election held on the same day as the local elections, while opinion polls are used for Denmark and Norway. With the swing model for proportional impact from national to local politics, it appears that the national impact is stronger in Norway and Sweden than in Denmark. The swing model can be improved by including feedback from the difference between local politics and national politics support at the previous election. The feedback force from national to local politics estimated by the feedback model is also stronger in Norway and Sweden than in Denmark. Further, a preliminary analysis of Danish data indicates that the feedback model is especially relevant for analysis of data from the individual municipalities.     

Immigration and Refugees: Punctuations in the Commonwealth Policy Agenda

In April 2013, Australia's population reached 23 million. Up to 60 percent of population growth in Australia comes from immigration and 40 percent of population growth comes from natural increase. It is therefore not too surprising that the issue of immigration receives a considerable amount of attention in the overall Commonwealth policy agenda. However, immigration policy is a complex policy area that is vulnerable to sudden increases in policy attention. Such increases in policy attention may be related to external shocks, wars or changing global economic conditions. This article charts some of the contextual factors, which result in high‐salience punctuations and intense policy activity in the area of immigration.     

Managerialism, Politics and Legal Bureaucratic Rationality in Immigration Policy

Against claims that public sector reforms have made the functions of managers similar to those in private firms, critics of the managerialist model point to constraints on public sector managers that make their decisions on resource allocation and policy development different from those affecting corporations. Through an examination of policy formulation, program management and decision-making in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, this article demonstrates that managerialist program planning, outcome orientation and performance measurement have been introduced, but that this has not precluded an expansion in non-market oriented routine, non-discretionary decision-making involving bureaucratic legal rationality within a legislative and regulatory framework. While some clients have been defined and assessed in terms of economic criteria, they access departmental processing not in terms of market signals, but according to their compliance with the Migration Act and Migration Regulations. Managerialism has not occurred at the expense of classical administrative practices, rather managerialist and legal bureaucratic forms have both grown and influenced political calculations on policy-making.     

Voting Paradoxes under Proportional Representation: Evidence from Eight Danish Elections

Voter preferences for eight general elections for the Danish parliament are analysed using survey data to investigate the possible presence of five types of social choice paradoxes that may occur in list systems of proportional representation. Two serious paradoxes fail to manifest themselves, while three others occur with different frequencies. One paradox always occurs – namely, for the social ordering of political parties based on pair-wise comparisons to be significantly different from that of the allocation of seats according to a principle of proportional representation. This result challenges the common view that a party receiving more seats than another must be presumed to be the one preferred by a majority.