Cashing out food stamps: Impacts on food expenditures and diet quality

On July 1, 1982, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico implemented a cash food assistance program, known as the Nutrition Assistance Program, as a replacement for the existing Food Stamp Program. The Nutrition Assistance Program differs from the former Puerto Rico Food Stamp Program in two important respects: cash replaced coupons as the form of issuance and eligibility standards and benefits were reduced to bring program costs into line with a reduced funding level. Based on household food use survey data collected before and after the introduction of the Nutrition Assistance Program, this paper examines the program's impacts on household food expenditures and diet quality. The results of the analysis indicate that the cashing out of food stamp benefits in Puerto Rico had virtually no impact on food expenditures and diet quality, while restrictions on eligibility and benefits under the Nutrition Assistance Program caused a decline in the money value of food used at home of about 2 percent and reductions in the availability of food energy and five specific nutrients ranging from 1.8 to 3.2 percent of the adult male Recommended Dietary Allowances.     

A re‐examination of welfare states and inequality in rich nations: How in‐kind transfers and indirect taxes change the story

Previous studies find large crossnational differences in inequality amongst rich Western nations, due in large part to differences in the generosity of welfare state transfers. The United States is the least generous nation and the one having the most aftertax and transfer inequality. But these analyses are limited to the effects of cash and nearcash transfers and direct taxes on incomes, while on average, half of welfare state transfers in rich nations are inkind benefits—health insurance, education, and other services. Counting inkind benefits at government cost and accounting for the indirect taxes used to finance transfers substantially reduces crossnational differences in inequality at the bottom of the income distribution. The findings have implications for how we think about tradeoffs across welfare state domains that all nations face and we illustrate this with reference to the current U.S. debate about health insurance. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Disability benefit coverage and program interactions in the working-age population

Over three-fourths of the working-age population in the United States is insured for Disability Insurance (DI); this group is protected against a total loss of earned income typically associated with severe disability. However, little is known about the role the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program plays in protecting against the financial consequences of severe disability for this population. We find that over one-third (36 percent) of the working-age population is covered by SSI in the event of a severe disability. Three important implications follow, which we discuss in sequence below: (1) SSI increases the overall coverage of the working-age population; (2) SSI enhances the bundle of cash benefits available to disabled individuals; and (3) interactions with other programs also enhance the safety net, most notably in the area of health insurance coverage. Ignoring these implications could lead to inaccurate inferences about disability program coverage, health insurance coverage, and the well-being of working-age individuals with disabilities. The first major finding is that SSI substantially increases overall cash benefit coverage. Thus SSI dramatically increases protection against the financial risk of disablement in the working-age population. While roughly 23 percent of the U.S. working-age population was not insured for DI in November 1996, SSI provides coverage for more than half of this seemingly "uncovered" population. An important innovation of our analysis is that we account for the possibility that many of those who appear ineligible for SSI based on current income could become eligible as a result of a disability shock that causes their earnings to drop. Thus the estimated proportion that is protected by SSI increases when the possibility of earnings loss because of disability is considered. Considering DI and SSI together, roughly 90 percent of the working-age population would be potentially covered for benefits in the event of a disability. Those who are covered by SSI--as opposed to those covered by DI alone-tend to be relatively young, less educated, and in relatively poor health. The remaining 10 percent or so are not covered by either DI or SSI. This group is economically vulnerable in some sense (they are poorer, older, and more likely to be women than those covered only by DI), but they are not as economically vulnerable in terms of income, resource holdings, and private health insurance coverage as those who are eligible for SSI. A disproportionate share of those who are not covered by either DI or SSI consists of married women. The second major finding is that SSI substantially enhances the bundle of available cash benefits. Roughly one-third of those covered by DI are initially covered by SSI as well. SSI enhances the bundle of available cash benefits through two mechanisms: (1) SSI provides cash payments during the 5-month DI waiting period, and (2) SSI supplements the DI benefit after the DI waiting period for people whose initial SSI payment is larger than the DI benefit. We find that the role of SSI cash payments is temporary for most of those who are initially covered by both SSI and DI: They would receive SSI during the DI waiting period, but would lose SSI eligibility afterwards because the higher DI benefit completely offsets the SSI benefit. However, a smaller group of DI beneficiaries with low DI benefit levels would continue to be covered by both SSI and DI after the DI waiting period because the relatively low DI benefit would not completely offset the SSI benefit. The third major finding is that interactions with other programs also substantially enhance the safety net. The most important interactions involve health insurance coverage. In the working-age population, Medicare is available to DI beneficiaries, but only after a 24-month waiting period. By contrast, SSI is an important pathway to Medicaid benefits for severely disabled adults with limited income and resources and has no waiting period. SSI can provide a pathway to health insurance coverage during the 24-month Medicare waiting period for some DI beneficiaries through providing access to Medicaid. Interactions with other programs, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Food Stamp, Unemployment Insurance (UI), workers' compensation (WC), and veterans' disability programs, modify the role of DI and SSI in protecting people against the adverse financial effects of disablement. The nature of the interactions with other programs differs depending on individual circumstances. Employment-related programs (including UI, WC, and veteran's disability programs) are particularly important for those who are covered by DI. By contrast, the means-tested programs (including TANF and Food Stamp) are more important for those who would be eligible for SSI. In conclusion, SSI plays a substantial role in protecting working-age people against the adverse financial consequences of disablement through three mechanisms: (1) providing coverage to many who are not DI insured; (2) providing additional cash benefits to many who are DI insured and also covered by SSI; and (3) enhancing the social safety net by interacting with other programs, most notably Medicaid. Through these mechanisms, the role of SSI is substantial enough that it cannot be safely ignored in econometric and policy research on DI.     

The COVID Cash Transfer Study: The Impacts of a One-Time Unconditional Cash Transfer on the Well-Being of Families Receiving SNAP in Twelve States

There is growing interest in the use of unconditional cash transfers as a means to alleviate poverty, yet little is known about the effects of such transfers in the U.S. This paper reports on the results of a randomized controlled study of a one-time $1,000 unconditional cash transfer in May 2020 to families with low incomes in 12 U.S. states. The families were receiving, or had recently received, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits. We examine the impact of the cash transfer on five pre-registered outcomes (material hardship, mental health, parenting, child behavior, partner relationships) and several secondary outcomes (hardship avoidance, consumption, employment, benefit use). We find no statistically significant effects (powered to detect effects of 0.09 standard deviations) of the cash transfer on any outcomes for the full sample. In pre-specified exploratory analyses, we find significant reductions in material hardship (-0.17 standard deviations) among families with less than $500 of earnings in the previous month, roughly the bottom 50 percent of monthly earnings for the study sample.     

Scraping by: Income and Program Participation After the Loss of Extended Unemployment Benefits

Many Unemployment Insurance (UI) recipients do not find new jobs before exhausting their benefits, even when benefits are extended during recessions. Using Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) panel data covering the 2001 and 2007 to 2009 recessions and their aftermaths, we identify individuals whose jobless spells outlasted their UI benefits (exhaustees) and examine household income, program participation, and health‐related outcomes during the six months following UI exhaustion. For the average exhaustee, the loss of UI benefits is only slightly offset by increased participation in other safety net programs (e.g., food stamps), and family poverty rates rise substantially. Self‐reported disability also rises following UI exhaustion. These patterns do not vary dramatically across household demographic groups, broad income level prior to job loss, or the two business cycles. The results highlight the unique, important role of UI in the U.S. social safety net.     

Does state AFDC generosity affect child SSI participation?

This article examines the extent of interactions or spillovers between the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) programs for children. In the early 1990s, the Social Security Administration substantially relaxed child eligibility criteria for SSI benefits. Since the changes, the number of U.S. children receiving cash and medical benefits through SSI tripled to nearly 1 million. The article describes a family's decision to participate in SSI and/or AFDC, and uses state‐level data for three years before, and three years after, the Zebley decision to estimate the effect of state program generosity on child program participation. The expansions in child SSI eligibility increased child SSI participation and contributed to increased total program participation by children in the early 1990s. Child SSI participation increased more in states with lower AFDC payments and higher state SSI supplementation payments. These results suggest that families use SSI and AFDC as substitutes. At least 32 percent of the Zebley increase in SSI is likely attributable to the SSI–AFDC benefit gap for the median AFDC benefit state. © 2000 by the Association for Public Policy and Management.     

Expanding access to health care for Social Security Disability Insurance beneficiaries: early findings from the accelerated benefits demonstration

Most Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries must complete a 5-month waiting period before they become entitled to DI cash benefits and an additional 24-month waiting period before Medicare benefits begin. The Accelerated Benefits (AB) demonstration is a randomized experiment designed to test the effects of providing newly entitled DI beneficiaries who do not have health insurance with a generous health benefits package during the Medicare waiting period. This article presents early findings on the prevalence of health insurance coverage among newly entitled beneficiaries and the characteristics of those without health insurance. It also examines the effects of AB on health care utilization, the extent to which AB reduces unmet medical needs, and the costs of providing the AB health benefits package.     

Health Insurance and Young Adult Financial Distress

We study how health insurance eligibility affects financial distress for young adults using the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) dependent coverage mandate─the part of the ACA that requires private health insurance plans to cover individuals up to their 26th birthday. We examine the effects of both gaining and losing eligibility by exploiting the mandate's implementation in 2010 and its automatic disenrollment mechanism at age 26. Our estimates show that increasing access to health insurance lowers young adults’ out-of-pocket medical expenditures and debt in third-party collections. However, reductions in financial distress are transitory, as they diminish after an individual loses access to parental insurance when they age out of the mandate at age 26.     

Child Poverty,the Great Recession,and the Social Safety Net in the United States

In this paper, we comprehensively examine the effects of the Great Recession on child poverty, with particular attention to the role of the social safety net in mitigating the adverse effects of shocks to earnings and income. Using a state panel data model and data for 2000 to 2014, we estimate the relationship between the business cycle and child poverty, and we examine how and to what extent the safety net is providing protection to at‐risk children. We find compelling evidence that the safety net provides protection; that is, the cyclicality of after‐tax‐and‐transfer child poverty is significantly attenuated relative to the cyclicality of private income poverty. We also find that the protective effect of the safety net is not similar across demographic groups, and that children from more disadvantaged backgrounds, such as those living with Hispanic or single heads, or particularly those living with immigrant household heads—or immigrant spouses—experience larger poverty cyclicality than those living with non‐Hispanic white or married heads, or those living with native household heads with native spouses. Our findings hold across a host of choices for how to define poverty. These include measures based on absolute thresholds or more relative thresholds. They also hold for measures of resources that include not only cash and near‐cash transfers net of taxes but also several measures of the value of public medical benefits.     

The transformation of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program

Between 2000 and 2005, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, until recently, the Food Stamp Program) caseload increased by half. As the Great Recession unfolded, the SNAP caseload grew even more rapidly. Further, over the past two decades the composition of the caseload has shifted sharply away from families combining food and cash assistance and toward families receiving food assistance in the absence of any other major, means‐tested income support. By analyzing components of the caseload separately, we provide new and more insightful estimates of the effects of food and cash assistance policies and the economy on both the change in the composition of the caseload and the large caseload swings over the 1990s and 2000s. We find that the economy can explain a portion of caseload changes, but not compositional shifts. Food and cash assistance policies help to explain both changes. In total, the combination of SNAP and welfare policy changes account for about half of the sharp increase since 1994 in the share of SNAP households receiving food, but not cash, assistance. © 2011 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

More, Less, or More of the Same? Trends in State Social Welfare Policy in the 1990s

Major reforms to cash assistance and other welfare programsin the 1990s raise questions about whether states gained newflexibility in setting social policies, and, if so, how theyexercised this flexibility. We extend prior research on statesocial policy by examining trends during the middle to late1990s in five areas of cash or near-cash policy affecting theeconomic security of low-income families. We find evidence ofsubstantial change in the generosity and the availability ofthese benefits between 1994 and 1999, along with evidence ofgreater divergence or cross-state variation in policy choices.By considering several forms of assistance simultaneously, wealso find evidence that states constricted traditional welfare-basedassistance while expanding some forms of non-welfare supportfor the working poor.     

“Being black and feeling blue”: the mental health consequences of racial discrimination

The association between racial discrimination and mental health was examined using Wave 2 (1987–1988) and Wave 3 (1988–1989) panel data from the National Survey of Black Americans (NSBA). Mental health status was assessed by psychological distress and depression. In cross-sectional analyses, the perception of racial discrimination was related to high levels of psychological distress at Waves 2 and 3. Experiencing racial discrimination was marginally related to a high likelihood of depression at Wave 2. In longitudinal analyses, reports of racial discrimination at Wave 2 were associated with high levels of psychological distress at Wave 3. High psychological distress or depression at Wave 2 was not associated with reports of racial discrimination at Wave 3—indicating that poor mental health did not predict subjective reports (perceptions) of discrimination. The Discussion focused on possible directions for a more comprehensive program of research on mental health, stress, and experiences of racially based discrimination.     

Federalism and the Safety Net: Delinkage and Participation Rates

Since the enactment of welfare reform legislation in 1996, thefederal government and the states have emphasized putting theneedy to work and reducing caseloads. Simultaneously, however,national policymakers delinked eligibility for cash assistancefrom eligibility for other safety-net benefits. Contrary tostated policy, though, this delinkage has led to declining participationin the case of Food Stamps and health-insurance programs forlow-income children. We highlight four factors that states mustshape if they are to narrow this gap between policy promiseand program performance by fostering higher participation. Weshow how our focus intersects with enduring questions of Americanfederalism—the level of state commitment to redistributiveprograms, their capacity to implement these programs effectively,and the degree to which states can augment governing capacityby becoming more genuine laboratories of democracy.     

Maternal Mental Health during Children's First Year of Life: Association with Receipt of Section 8 Rental Assistance

Prior studies evaluating housing programs have found varied results for the impact of improved housing on maternal mental health. This study evaluated data from 169 families who participated in Hawaii's Healthy Start Program. The study's objective was to determine whether receipt of Section 8 rental assistance in the first year of a child's life decreased the risk of poor maternal mental health. Multivariable logistic regression was used to measure the association of Section 8 housing receipt with poor mental health. Overall, 50% of mothers had poor mental health at baseline, and 32% reported receipt of Section 8 housing at follow-up. Mothers who received Section 8 housing were significantly less likely to have poor maternal mental health at follow-up (adjusted odds ratio = .40; 95% confidence interval, .16–.97; p < .05). Receipt of Section 8 rental assistance in the first year of a child's life may reduce the risk of poor mental health for mothers in housing need.     

Rental Housing Assistance and Health: Evidence From the Survey of Income and Program Participation

Interest in the health impacts of renter housing assistance has grown in the wake of heated national discussions on health care and social welfare spending. Assistance may improve renters’ health by offering (a) low, fixed housing costs; (b) protection against eviction; and (c) access to better homes and neighborhoods. Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation and econometric analysis, I estimate the effect of receiving assistance from the public housing or Section 8 voucher programs on low-income renters’ reported health status and spending. Assisted renters spent less on health care over the year than unassisted low-income renters did, after controlling for other characteristics. This finding suggests that assisted housing leads to health benefits that may reduce low-income renters’ need to purchase health services. Voucher holders’ lower expenditures are influenced by their low, fixed housing costs, but public housing residents’ lower expenditures are not explained by existing theory.     

Public Pensions and Collective Bargaining Rights: Evidence from State and Local Governments

An aging workforce and increasing retirement benefits are ongoing problems for states and municipalities. Unions are often blamed for governments offering too generous pension benefits. This contributes to budgetary pressures in some state and municipal governments. This article analyzes the impact of collective bargaining on pension benefit generosity under different economic conditions. The study finds that the impact of collective bargaining on pension benefits is not consistent over time or across pension plans. Collective bargaining has a positive effect on pension benefits under worsening economic conditions. Additionally, unions indirectly influence pension benefit generosity through campaign donations and unionization intensity. The findings suggest mixed impacts of collective bargaining on different groups of public employees regarding pension contributions. The article concludes with implications for the role of unions in public financial performance and strategic human resource management during fiscal austerity.     

Health insurance coverage of the unemployed: COBRA and the potential effects of Kassebaum-Kennedy.

We use the April 1993 Current Population Survey to examine the health insurance coverage decisions of the unemployed and to simulate the potential effects of the new Kassebaum-Kennedy legislation. After controlling for demographic characteristics, COBRA eligibility raises the probability of health insurance coverage by 0.095, while eligibility for spouse employer insurance increases the likelihood of coverage by 0.318, and eligibility for both increases the likelihood of coverage by 0.341. In our simulations, we find that had Kassebaum-Kennedy been in effect in April 1993, 9.0 percent of the unemployed would be eligible to take up coverage, and the coverage rate of the unemployed would have been increased by 0.85 percent to 1.5 percent from 41.6 percent. Our estimates of the effect of Kassebaum-Kennedy on health insurance coverage are much lower than those reported by the Government Accounting Office prior to the passage of the legislation.     

Local Government and Welfare Generosity: Municipality Spending on Social Welfare

Although it is difficult for local governments to give support for social welfare recipients top political priority, there are huge variations in the support recipients actually receive among Norwegian municipalities. However, local governments representing different party ideologies may prefer to support different dimensions of generosity. Some municipalities could have a liberal attitude to eligibility rules but be strict on time limits and the amount of money provided. Others may be generous regarding time limits or amounts received once one is accepted as a welfare client. Data from the mid 1990s indicate the variation in support is related to different generosity dimensions for different party groups. While the total number of clients seems unrelated to politics and basically correlates with local social problems, the duration and amount of support are related to the political composition of the municipality assembly. Devoid of any large variation, both time limits and the amount of support increase in accordance with socialist leanings, and the total budget used for social welfare support also increases with the proportion of women in the municipality assembly.     

Modeling SSI financial eligibility and simulating the effect of policy options

This article simulates eligibility for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) among the elderly, analyzes factors affecting participation, and looks at the potential effects of various options to modify financial eligibility standards for the federal SSI program. We find that in the estimated noninstitutional elderly population of 30.2 million in the United States in 1991, approximately 2 million individuals aged 65 or older were eligible for SSI (a 6.6 percent rate of eligibility). Our overall estimate of the rate of participation among eligible elderly is approximately 63 percent, suggesting that more than a third of those who are eligible do not participate in the program. The results of our analysis of factors affecting participation among the eligible elderly show that expected SSI benefits and a number of demographic and socioeconomic variables are associated with the probability of participation. We also simulate the effects of various policy options on the poverty rate, poverty gap, annual program cost, the number of participants, and the average estimated benefits among participants. The simulations consider the potential effects of five policy alternatives: Increase the general income exclusion (GIE) from $20 to $80. Increase the earned income exclusion (EIE) from $65 to $260. Increase the federal benefit rate (FBR) by $50 for individuals and $75 for couples and eliminate the GIE. Increase the asset threshold to $3,000 for individuals and $4,500 for couples. Increase the asset threshold to $6,000 for individuals and $9,000 for couples. Using 1991 microdata from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) matched to Social Security Administration administrative records and making adjustments reflecting aggregate program statistics, we present the results of our simulations for December 1999. The results show substantial variation in the simulated effects of the five policy alternatives along the various outcome dimensions considered. The simulated effects on the poverty gap of the elderly population range from a 7.9 percent reduction ("Increase the GIE from $20 to $80") to a 0.1 percent reduction ("Increase the EIE from $65 to $260"). All simulated interventions are expected to increase the rate of SSI participation among the elderly from a high of 20.3 percent ("Increase the GIE from $20 to $80") to a low of 0.5 percent ("Increase the EIE from $65 to $260"). We also find that the interventions that have greater estimated effects in terms of increased participation and reduced poverty tend to cost more. At the high end, we estimate that increasing the GIE from $20 to $80 could raise annual federal SSI cash benefit outlays by about 46 percent, compared with only 0.9 percent for increasing the EIE from $65 to $260. Similar to the EIE intervention, raising the resource thresholds by 50 percent would reduce the overall poverty gap of the elderly by only 0.2 percent, would increase SSI participation only modestly (by 1.3 percent), but would entail slightly higher program costs (by 1.4 percent). Increasing the asset threshold by 200 percent would have higher estimated effects on all three outcomes, but it would still be associated with relatively low increases in both costs and benefits. Finally, the simulated effects on the three key outcomes of increasing the FBR by $50 for individuals and $75 for couples, combined with eliminating the GIE, are relatively large but are clearly less substantial than increasing the GIE from $20 to $80. This work relies on data from the SIPP matched to administrative data on federal SSI benefits that provide a more accurate picture of SSI participation than has been feasible for previous studies. We simulate eligibility for federal SSI benefits by applying the program rules to detailed information on the characteristics of individuals and couples based on the rich array of demographic and socioeconomic data in the SIPP, particularly the comprehensive information SIPP provides on assets and monthly income. A probit model is estimated to analyze factors affecting participation among the eligible elderly. Finally, we conduct the policy simulations using altered program rules represented by the policy alternatives and predicted participation probabilities to estimate outcomes under simulated program rules. We compare those simulated outcomes to observed outcomes under current program rules. The results of our simulations are conditional on the characteristics of participants and eligibles in 1991, but they also reflect aggregate adjustments capturing substantial changes in overall participation and program benefit levels between 1991 and 1999.