THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF PRIVATIZATION: THE KNOXVILLE EXPERIENCE

The promoters of privatization promise a lot, most especially cost savings. Upon what are these promises based and t o what degree is actual perfor mance consonant with them? This article investigates this question by first reviewing the privatization literature and specifying what is promised and the basis for these promises. We then proceed to examine the pri vatization of asingle service in Knoxville, Tennessee with regard to what basis promises were made and the innovation pursued. Finally we offer a preliminary analysis of the extent to which the privatization initiative lived up to its promises.     

RESEARCH METHODS EDUCATION FOR PUBLIC SECTOR CAREERS: THE CHALLENGE OF UTILIZATION

As the world rapidly becomes more complex, there is a greater need for tools of research and data analysis to assist the public administrator. While many university programs recognize this need and include several methodology courses in their curriculum, there is little evidence that students are taking this knowledge into the field. In this article, the need for usable methodology courses are stressed. The first section of this article is dedicated to identifying those factors that make methods classes more practical. The remaining portion concentrates on two approaches to teaching that the author asserts will help students to use in the field what they have learned in the classroom.     

MODELING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DECISION-MAKING: THE CASE OF TAX ABATEMENTS

This research note examines two models of economic development policymaking. The literature on economic development and urban politics provides one image of reality regarding the factors associated with economic development policy in cities. When tested empirically, however, this model is found wanting. An alternative model is presented, identifying the complex set of factors associated with a single governmental policy, in this case, tax abatements.     

CIVIL SERVICE REFORM IN THE USA: PROMISE VERSUS REALITY*

Abstract: The 1978 Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) mobilized changes to the basis and structure of the federal service which are the most far-reaching since those installed by the Pendleton Act in 1883. Several of the 1978 provisions were directed toward encouraging a more incentive-oriented approach to personnel matters. Other measures involved the dismantling of the Civil Service Commission, the installation of new mechanisms to handle labour-management relations, the codification of merit principles, and the delegation to individual agency managements of wider personnel responsibilities. This paper raises the question of whether, four years after the passage of CSRA, there are indications that the legislation is living up to its earlier promise. Attention focuses upon the character of the 1978 measures and how well the federal service is coping, or is being allowed to cope, with the private sector-style, rewards-sanctions approach to personnel matters which was embraced by the Carter proposals. To a very significant degree the 1978 Act's provisions in that respect concentrated upon the more senior managerial and supervisory levels. It is less surprising, therefore, that many of the difficulties now associated with CSRA's implementation also are concentrated among those same groups (Senior Executive Service and merit pay). The salary and other incentives available to career executives for outstanding job performance have been eroded by Congress; the sanctions for poor performance remain, however, while worries persist about the possibilities of manipulating the new performance appraisal procedures in order to harass or remove career government officials. Meanwhile, the bulk of the federal service is, in practice, largely unaffected by the new performance appraisal arrangements. Many of the concerns about CSRA have been reinforced by the actions of the Reagan Administration and the 97th Congress. The bonus system for career executives remains under siege, the pay cap remains intact, while there are more general doubts about the Reagan Administration's commitment to civil service reform. The locus of responsibility for overseeing CSRA's implementation remains unclear, while there is evidence in some agencies that Reagan political appointees have attempted deliberately to exclude career executives from the policy process. Thus, despite the probably well-intentioned initiatives enshrined by CSRA, the US federal service still finds itself beset by problems of identity and support. It still feels vulnerable, too, to the types of political abuse from which the 1978 measures were supposed to afford protection.     

UTILIZATION IN THE POLICY CYCLE: DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH*

The study of policy utilization has been unnecessarily confined to one policy stage and to one group of policymakers-high ranking civil servants. This article suggests to broaden research concerns by including the various stages of the policy cycle and the various policymakers. Utilization plays different functions in different stages and the incentives of policymakers in each stage are guided by self-interest and political-bureaucratic efficacy.     

INTENDED AND UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON POVERTY: WHAT RESEARCH TELLS US AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

During the mid‐1960s, the United States adopted a series of cash and in‐kind transfer programs, as well as human capital investment strategies, as part of the War on Poverty. A number of other programs were first proposed as part of this “war” but were not implemented until the mid‐1970s. These programs had noble goals: to increase incomes at the bottom of the income distribution, reduce poverty, and improve nutrition, heath, and human capital. However, various features of the programs also had the potential to produce unintended consequences: for example, means‐tested programs can discourage work. In this paper, we comprehensively evaluate the main War on Poverty programs that were aimed at the low‐income nonelderly population along with several follow‐on programs. We focus on both intended and unintended consequences, drawing on the most compelling causal evidence. We conclude with a series of lessons learned and questions that are outstanding.     

THE MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

One of the minor curiosities of public sector analysis in Australia is that rather little attention has been paid to the tools and instruments that could provide a more effective management of government research and development. Once government R & D is mentioned, we immediately think of the large statutory bodies such as CSIRO or the Atomic Energy Commission, but the subject extends widely beyond these two bodies. The Australian Government, federal and states, provides 70% of all the funds for Australian R & D, and the government itself performs, in its own laboratories and statutory authorities, 54% of the total R & D carried out in Australia Of OECD countries, these percentages of government activity are exceeded only by Iceland, New Zealand, Portugal and Turkey. Virtually every federal department and every department of each state government performs R&D. Apart from the "big two" of CSIRO and Atomic Energy, the Post Office, Defence, Health, Housing, and Minerals and Energy all have research laboratories, and the last major survey of Australian R & D in 1973 listed 22 federal departments and 130 organizations in the State Governments performing R & D. A recent article in this journal correctly noted a shift from "ends to means" in Australian science policy. The present article proposes a specific means of managing this almost unique public involvement in R & D in Australia.     

IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF RESEARCH SYNTHESIS IN PROGRAM EVALUATION

Because research synthesis enables one to determine either the overall effectiveness of different types of treatments, it is becoming increasingly popular as a tool in program evaluation. Numerous methodological problems arise, however, when research synthesis is applied to studies conducted in field settings. The present paper categorlzes and discusses these problems as being threats to either the (1) internal validity (whether one can draw conclusions about cause and effect), (2) statistical conclusion validity (whether one's inferential statistics are capable of detecting cause-and effect relationships, (3) construct validity (whether one's treatments and outcome measures are valid operationalizations of the independent and dependent variables of interest), or (4) external validity (whether one can generalize results to particular populations, settings, or time periods) of research synthesis (see Cook & Campbell, 1979). Specific recommendations are made for minimizing these threats to validity, In order to improve the quality of research synthesis in program evaluation. Finally, the validit framework is applied to an actual synthesis to identify strengths, weaknesses, and potential means of enhancing research quality.     

THE EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES FOR INNOVATION

This article is based on two premises: current innovation polices are based on very limited understanding of how Innovation occurs and the contribution to understanding that available policy research might make is severely limited by its fragmentation. The author cites Nelson's three models of the policy process as an example of the different paradigms that have guided innovation research. But, he argues, new developments suggest that the rigid boundaries are breaking down. Three examples are offered in support, each nominally based in one of the three paradigms but representing a loosening of its strictures.