The US withdrawal from Syria

US President Donald Trump's announcement that US troops in northeast Syria would soon be withdrawn has severely disrupted Washington's Middle East policy. The US and its European partners have failed to achieve any of their goals in Syria. Several Arab states are attempting a rapprochement with the Assad regime. Russia has emerged as a regional mediator, and Iran is in a strong position to shape Syria's future.     

Strategic Disorder,the Office of Policy Coordination and the Inauguration of US Political Warfare against the Soviet Bloc, 1948–50

This article examines the inauguration of US political warfare operations against the Soviet bloc, 1948–50. It builds on diplomatic and military historiography of US Cold War foreign policy, and engages with more recent scholarship of the ‘covert’ and unconventional confrontation between east and west. Two key interrelated themes are explored. The failure of Truman's policymakers, particularly the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, to devise a coherent strategy to wage political warfare against communist regimes was fundamental to its ultimate failure. Also, the disordered US government bureaucracy further impaired and strategically dislocated the application and overall success of political warfare operations by the Office of Policy Coordination.     

The 'Preferred Plan': The Anglo-American Working Group Report on Covert Action in Syria, 1957

Taking as its central focus the contents of the September 1957 Anglo-American Working Group Report on Syria, this article examines the background to the covert action plans that were drawn up to topple the incumbent regime in Damascus. By drawing on the contents of the report, it shows how US and British officials hoped to stir up unrest within Syria and instigate border incidents that would provide a pretext for armed intervention by the pro-Western governments of Iraq and Jordan (with possible Turkish support). The article also brings to light the fact that the 'elimination' of named Syrian figures was included as a recommendation in the report. The article concludes by explaining why the report's so-called 'Preferred Plan' was never implemented and reflects on the 'special political action' culture that still prevailed in SIS during the latter 1950s.     

The Doolittle commission of 1954

Many scholars and other writers have dismissed the 1954 Doolittle Commission as an Eisenhower administration tactic to protect CIA covert operations from congressional investigation. Evidence about the commission and its report, however, suggests that this view may be incomplete. Clarification of the commission's precise purpose may serve the wider study of US covert action policy in the 1950s and congressional oversight of the CIA. In particular, the report's recommendations for bold covert action abroad may reveal how administration covert action policy attracted congressional attention to the CIA.     

Prometheus embattled: A post-9/11 report card on the National Security Agency

Five years after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the National Security Agency (NSA) has risen to the position of being the largest and most powerful intelligence agency in the US. Working in close conjunction with its English-speaking partners overseas, NSA is today the most prolific producer of top-quality intelligence information reaching senior US government policymakers and field commanders. But press reports over the past year concerning the Agency's controversial domestic eavesdropping program and problem-plagued modernization effort, have raised serious questions once again about the competency of the Agency's long-troubled management practices, as well as whether NSA, at the behest of the Bush administration, exceeded its legal authority by extending its operations into the US for the first time since the mid-1970s in contravention of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978.     

Techniques of covert propaganda: the British approach in the mid-1960s

In early 2019, the British government declassified a tranche of Information Research Department files. Among them is a candid and concise overview of British thinking about covert propaganda, complete with a list of examples of British forgery operations. This short piece transcribes the briefing note and provides an introduction. The document sheds new light on UK covert action, but also talks to ongoing scholarly debates in Intelligence Studies and International Relations more broadly.     

American Militarism and Blowback: The Costs of Letting the Pentagon Dominate Foreign Policy

"Blowback" is a CIA term first used in March 1954 in a report on the 1953 operation to overthrow the government of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran. It is a metaphor for the unintended consequences of covert operations against foreign nations and governments. The suicidal attacks of September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were instances of blowback from American clandestine operations in Afghanistan. They have greatly accelerated tendencies toward militarism in the United States, which is defined as the phenomenon in which a nation's armed services come to put their institutional preservation ahead of effectiveness in achieving national security or a commitment to the integrity of the governmental structure of which they are a part.     

The Kurds’ precarious balancing act in Syria

The Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party’s (PYD) utility to the US-led coalition against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, has bolstered its military capability and territorial position in Syria – despite Turkey's opposition. But if the eventual defeat of ISIS results in a scaling back of US involvement in Syria, the PYD will be weakened and will probably seek a more durable alliance with President Bashar al-Assad's regime and its ally, Russia.     

MI(R), G(R) and British covert operations, 1939–42

The Military Intelligence (Research) department of the British War Office was tasked in 1940 with encouraging and supporting armed resistance in occupied Europe and the Axis-controlled Middle East. The major contention of this paper is that, in doing so, MI(R) performed a key role in British strategy in 1940–42 and in the development of what are now known as covert operations. MI(R) developed an organic, but coherent doctrine for such activity which was influential upon the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and its own sub-branch, G(R), which applied this doctrine in practice in East Africa and the Middle East in 1940–41. It was also here that a number of key figures in the development of covert operations and special forces first cut their teeth, the most notable being Major Generals Colin Gubbins and Orde Wingate.     

Bending the arc of nonprofit leadership toward justice: Impacts of racial representation and organizational publicness on diversifying executive leadership

Nonprofits are critical partners in the delivery of government-funded human services in the US, but there is evidence of a persistent racial leadership gap in the sector, whereby Black and Latino Executive Directors are dramatically under-represented. Why does this gap persist despite increased attention to this issue in recent years? And what organizational and community-level factors do shape the likelihood that nonprofits will hire a Black or Latino Executive Director (ED)? We answer these questions through a mixed-methods sequential design, drawing on survey data from 606 nonprofit organizations across the US, along with interview data from 12 nonprofit executives representing expert informants in the Chicago metro area. Consistent with theories of representation and publicness, we find demographic representation at the board level positively linked to the hiring of a Black or Latino ED, but government funding has inconsistent effects. We further elaborate on these findings through our qualitative data.     

The battle for Mosul

Iraqi government and allied forces are poised to decisively retake Mosul from the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, within the next few months. But the presence of ISIS in Syria will still pose the risk of the group's resurgence in Iraq until the Iraq–Syria border is secure and ISIS has been denied control of Raqqa, its Syrian base and self-declared capital.     

CIA's Leadership and Major Covert Operations: Rogue Elephants or Risk-Averse Bureaucrats?

The Central Intelligence Agency has often been accused of distorting intelligence analysis to encourage covert operations. However, there has been little systematic research done to determine, 1) if this problem actually exists, 2) whether it is better or worse under certain circumstances and, 3) what, if anything, can be done. I start by demonstrating that, in fact, the attitude of CIA leaders towards covert operations does cause them to distort the intelligence they deliver to policymakers. I test three hypotheses which attempt to explain why leaders' concern for promoting the Agency's interests leads them to adopt a particular form of bias at a particular time. Finally, I offer recommendations for mitigating the causes and effects of distorted intelligence.     

From Stockholm to Leiden: the CIA's role in the formation of the International Student Conference

This study contributes to the growing knowledge of CIA covert operations among non-governmental organizations during the Cold War by examining the formation of the International Student Conference (1950) and the creation of its Coordinating Secretariat (COSEC). The ISC objectives were global in scope — to organize the world's national student unions into a network that could deny the pro-Soviet International Union of Students its claim to represent the world student population. The CIA's reach depended heavily on the US National Student Association, which provided both a rationale for funding flows from the United States, and a steady stream of personnel. The structure of the relationship was complex and cumbersome, since the CIA had to work secretly through two organizations (NSA and ISC) whose legitimacy rested on democratic processes. This complexity suggests that issues of power and control require a more nuanced formulation than is usually presented in much Cold War political research.     

The future of US Syria policy

Despite campaign rhetoric suggesting bold changes to US Syria policy, President Trump has few realistic military or political options for major departures from Obama's policy. US policy will probably change only at the margins.     

Covert action and the Pentagon

The White House and the Pentagon have designated the military's Special Operations Command as the lead organization in the ‘war on terror’. As the military has become more involved in fighting terrorism since 9/11, special operations forces have become increasingly active in the covert, or unacknowledged, operations that have traditionally been the CIA's bailiwick. This article examines the turf battles caused by the Pentagon's new covert profile, as well as its ramifications for congressional oversight.     

Information Sharing for Infrastructure Risk Management: Barriers and Solutions

There is a public interest in ensuring that infrastructure systems are appropriately protected and prepared for disruptions. While infrastructure protection is usually viewed as a public responsibility, infrastructure risk management actually requires a high degree of cooperation between the public and private sectors, particularly in the sharing of information about risks to infrastructure. Discussions with Chief Security Officers across sectors of the US economy reveal the complexity of the task, as they describe at length the private sector's requirements of multiples types of information about a range of potential threats. While the US government has established many mechanisms for sharing information, barriers remain that inhibit both the private and public partners from obtaining the information needed to protect infrastructure. Overcoming these barriers requires new thinking about the intelligence generation process, the mechanisms and practices upon which the process relies, and the responsibilities of those in the private sector who participate in it.     

Counter-Intelligence for counter-revolutionary warfare: The South African police security branch 1979–1990

In counter-revolutionary warfare strategy, political action forms the overwhelming part; however, also central as an off-shoot of the tenets of counter-revolutionary warfare is the elimination of insurgent structures – generally a euphemism for assassination. In reality, assassination is a subset of covert paramilitary action, implemented as a consequence of counter-intelligence or even counter-terrorism. South Africa's Security Branch presents one of the best recent examples of the use of counter-intelligence techniques for counter-revolutionary warfare. While politico-constitutional intelligence was gathered by the National Intelligence Service to support constitutional efforts to achieve a settlement of the conflict and bring about a new political dispensation in South Africa, the apartheid government relied on the covert operational capabilities of the security forces (especially the Security Branch) to not only halt the ‘Revolutionary Onslaught’ of the liberation movements, but to eliminate them as a viable political and revolutionary force. In attempting to support an unwinnable political objective, the ultimate corruption of the intelligence process and the reliance of individuals overseeing it far and away on the covert operational intelligence capabilities of the state, the apartheid government brought about its own downfall. The Security Branch was at the heart of these efforts.     

Soviet intelligence and the 1957 Syrian crisis

This article assesses a claim by Khrushchev that warnings from the Soviet intelligence services enabled to him to deter a Turkish invasion of Syria in 1957. The article shows that the United States and Turkey did aim to overthrow the Syrian government, with the Turks massing an invasion force on Syria’s border. Soviet intelligence detected this threat and was able to alert Khrushchev, who took diplomatic and military countermeasures. However, while the Soviet intelligence services did provide advance warning, Khrushchev overestimated the extent to which the United States was committed to a Turkish invasion.     

US–Saudi relations: between friction and accommodation

US–Saudi relations have always been transactional, driven by US strategic interests and Saudi threat perceptions. After decades of relative stability, greater US energy independence and differences over the Iran nuclear deal, the Arab Spring and Syria have caused their interests and policies to diverge.     

Bureaucratic institutional design: the case of the Italian NHS

We propose a model where a regional government’s choice of the number of bureaucratic agencies operating in a region depends upon the degree of substitutability and complementarity of the bureaucratic services being demanded. We show that, if the government perceives the citizens’ demand as a demand for substitutable services, it will choose provision by two independent agencies. If the government perceives the citizens’ demand as a demand for complementary services, it will choose provision by a single consolidated agency. Exogenous shocks to the number of citizens amplify these incentives. Evidence from the Italian National Health Service (NHS) supports this hypothesis. Results show a positive effect of proxies of substitutable services on the number of regional local health authorities and a negative effect of proxies of complementary services. The major immigration amnesties, taken as shocks to the number of citizens entitled to the service, magnify these effects.