Intelligence reform: The logic of information sharing

A cornerstone of US intelligence reform is ‘information sharing’ as a means of adapting to contemporary security challenges. It was a central recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, reflected in the wide-ranging ‘Information Sharing Environment’ mandated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Yet the underlying logic of information sharing for intelligence reform has received little attention. Drawing on information and communications theory, this paper critiques the logic by highlighting problems of sense-making and interpretation overlooked amid the scholarly enthusiasm for an intelligence ‘culture of sharing’. With their impersonal, technical, and highly bureaucratic approach, today's reforms may favor the flow of information and its sheer volume at the expense of the context and analytic tradecraft that render it meaningful, actionable intelligence. For effective information sharing, the paper suggests reformers pay more attention to the socio-technical environment of analysis when interpreting ambiguous, uncertain information.     

Favorite INTs: how they develop,why they matter

Collection of important information is a critical part of the intelligence business. Less recognized and studied is the differential use of types of intelligence information based on personal and organizational preferences for, and biases against, specific intelligence collection disciplines, or ‘INTs’. This article presents a framework for assessing the implications of ‘favorite INTs’ for policy-making, policy implementation, and intelligence analysis. The record shows that favorite INTs negatively influence analysts and the use of intelligence by senior political leaders and military commanders. Practitioners can improve intelligence support and scholars can better understand how intelligence influences decision-making by appreciating how and why favorite INTs develop and influence decision-makers and analysts.     

An historical theory of intelligence

This article consists of three parts. First, ‘The past’ defines physical and verbal intelligence and maintains that intelligence, after centuries of insignificance, rose to prominence in modern times as a consequence of the increase in intelligence targets and the growth of verbal intelligence. Second, ‘The present’ explains that the function of intelligence is to optimize resources, that it is but an auxiliary element in war, and that it is necessary to the defense but is only contingent to the offense. Third, ‘The future’ articulates intelligence's two perpetual insoluble problems: foretelling everything and getting leaders to accept information that they do not like.     

Bletchley Park and the Holocaust

A common substantive topic in intelligence studies is the analysis process. The addition of active-learning techniques to reinforce key concepts like competitive analysis, ‘wheat’ versus ‘chaff’, and the different ‘ints’ of intelligence can be an important supplement to existing teaching methods. Moreover, a deeper appreciation of the intelligence analysis process is likely to be best achieved through simulation learning. Drawing on the growing literature that recognizes active learning and simulations as important pedagogical tools, this teaching note presents an original active-learning simulation for the college-level intelligence studies classroom in which students face an analysis challenge that highlights different components of the analysis process. This simulation increases appreciation for intelligence analysis and serves as a student-friendly method for enhancing intelligence studies pedagogy.     

Rethinking ‘Five Eyes’ Security Intelligence Collection Policies and Practice Post Snowden

The Edward Snowden leaks challenge policy makers and the public's understanding and perspectives on the role of security intelligence in liberal democratic states. This article explores the challenges confronting security intelligence collection by the ‘Five Eyes’ countries – particularly those most affected by the leaks. We argue that the debate now needs to move beyond simplistic notions of privacy vs. security to a more detailed understanding of the policy and ethical dilemmas confronting policy makers and intelligence agencies. To that end, we provide a schematic framework (methods, context and target) to promote a better understanding of the practical, policy and ethical problems for security intelligence collection emerging post Snowden. The framework is a first step in identifying common principles that could be used develop an ethically informed set of policy guidelines to help decision makers better navigate between citizen's two basic rights: security and privacy.     

‘Stella polaris’ and the secret code battle in postwar Europe

Much has already been written about the September 1944 evacuation of the Finnish intelligence service to Sweden, which was designated Operation ‘Stella Polaris’. Newly declassified intelligence documents found at the US National Archives provide a fresh perspective on the role of the American wartime foreign intelligence service, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and its successor, the Strategic Services Unit, in ‘Stella Polaris’ and its aftermath. The documents reveal that throughout World War II, the OSS secretly obtained sensitive intelligence information concerning America's wartime ally, the Soviet Union, from agents within the Finnish intelligence service. The OSS Stockholm Station purchased Soviet and other foreign government code and cipher materials from the Finns, not realizing until later that the Finns had sold the same material to other states. The Americans responded by recruiting some well-placed agents within the Finnish ‘Stella Polaris’ organization, who provided detailed information about the intelligence activities of the Finns in Sweden, and the work of Finnish intelligence officers in France after the end of the war. Among the key pieces of intelligence obtained was the fact that the French intelligence service was intercepting American radio traffic.     

Integration of strategic and operational intelligence during the Peninsular war

Wellington is well known for his understanding of the importance of intelligence, but so far history has recorded that he presided over a one-man intelligence department, himself being the only analyst of what proved to be a massive quantity of raw information. New research highlighted in this article reveals that this has been an inaccurate interpretation. The British government also acted to establish a civilian network of correspondents and agents communicating with the British ambassadors to Spain and Portugal. Wellington's main priority was to integrate the ‘strategic intelligence’ collected by government agents with his own ‘operational intelligence’. Instead, analysis was conducted more by Wellington's subordinates in the field, applying their personal localized expertise to the information they received. In this way, an early and primitive form of the staff system later developed by the Prussians was created in the Peninsular War.     

Intelligence Analysis

American intelligence analysts have been severely criticized for failing to anticipate the 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks and for the ill-advised invasion of Iraq. The resulting Intelligence Community reorganization, intended to repair these presumed deficiencies, reflects a misunderstanding of what intelligence analysts can do and where responsibility for political and military decisions lie. In fact, the Intelligence Community is far more diversified in its tasks than is generally realized. Where analysis is done and for whom makes a large difference in its effectiveness. Moreover, changing technology is altering how it is done, where, and by whom. The border between what is ‘strategic’ or ‘national’ intelligence and ‘tactical’ intelligence is much diminished. At the same time, intelligence analysts all too often fail to incorporate the growing amounts of open source information, as well as analytic concepts and theories available from academic and scholarly literature.     

Rethinking the training of intelligence analysts

Abstract

Despite intense scrutiny and promised fixes resulting from intelligence ‘transformation’ efforts, erroneous analytic assessments persist and continue to dominate news coverage of the US intelligence community. Existing analytic training teaches analysts about common cognitive biases and then aims to correct them with structured analytic techniques. On its face, this approach is eminently reasonable; on close inspection, incomplete and imbalanced. Current training is anchored in a mid-twentieth century understanding of psychology that focuses on checking over-confidence and rigidity but ignores the problems of under-confidence and excessive volatility. Moreover it has never been validated against objective benchmarks of good judgment. We propose a new approach: (a) adopting scientifically validated content and regularly testing training to avoid institutionalizing new dogmas; (b) incentivizing analysts to view training guidelines as means to the end of improved accuracy, not an end in itself.     

Organizational Culture and US Intelligence Affairs

Both US intelligence officials and intelligence studies scholars claim that ‘organizational culture’ is a cause of ‘intelligence failure’ and the proper locus of post-9/11 intelligence reform efforts. This essay uses a postmodern perspective to demonstrate how the dominant discourse of ‘organizational culture’ shapes stakeholders' understandings of accountability and what constitutes necessary, correct, or effective intelligence reform. By exploring institutional struggles over the meanings of ‘culture’ and ‘accountability’, this essay calls for reconsideration of the ways US intelligence officials and intelligence studies scholars talk about ‘organizational culture’ vis-à-vis post-9/11 intelligence reform.     

Professionalizing Intelligence Analysis: An Expertise and Responsibility Centered Approach

Looking at trends of professionalization of intelligence analysis within the United States Air Force as a subset of the broader US Intelligence Community, this paper calls for a re-evaluation of the professionalization of intelligence analysis away from a bureaucratic ‘corporateness’ approach examining the traits of a profession. Instead, reform of intelligence analysis should focus on the unique expertise and responsibility that define the profession. It identifies the analyst's unique expertise as managing adversary information to reduce a decision maker's uncertainty, and the responsibility in striving to improve capabilities within the profession while ensuring both the strengths and limitations of intelligence analysis are understood by intelligence customers. By focusing on corporateness, the community jeopardizes reform efforts by moving professionalization toward ‘getting the right answer’ and away from a broader understanding of the strengths and limitations inherent in the field of intelligence, where getting the right answer isn't often attainable.     

Early warning versus concept: the case of the Yom Kippur War 1973

This article begins with a definition of the terms ‘early warning’ and ‘surprise’, and examines whether the failure of Israeli Intelligence to warn Israeli decision-makers in 1973 conforms to these definitions. After examining the conventions of Israeli military intelligence regarding anticipating a surprise, and the conceptions on which these were based, the article demonstrates how events in late 1973 indicated a possible Arab attack on Israel, but also the manner in which the Concept used to measure these warnings proved more resilient than the warnings. Discussions in the few days preceding war, when information was accumulating, are subjected to particular attention. The development of a sub-conception, with the original framework allowed and changed the forecast from ‘no war’ to ‘low probability' of war. The persistence of the Concept is attributed to both strategic intelligence and also to the doctrine of deterrence. Like deterrence, intelligence success is hard to measure. One can never be sure that a surprise attack has been prevented as a result of early warning.     

Intelligence expertise in the age of information sharing: public–private ‘collection’ and its challenges to democratic control and accountability

The emergence of a more elusive and uncertain threat environment has transformed the nature of intelligence, increasing its reliance on civil society partners. Once the work of an insular and carefully select few, intelligence production is now a networked, partially open and extensively public–private enterprise. Most poignantly, new practices of public–private ‘collection’ face Western intelligence services with novel questions about control and accountability – questions to which the services have responded with hopes that by standardizing ‘methodologies’, central command may be retained. Suggesting a more complex picture, this article argues that ‘managing uncertainty’ imply forms of interpretation and choices which cannot be pre-empted by rule-regulation: more than Weber’s ideal of the procedural and rule-bound, it may be his (once central, yet largely marginalized) emphasis on institutional and individual capacities for critical ‘judgment’ that is of relevance today.     

‘The importance of being honest’: Switzerland,neutrality and the problems of intelligence collection and liaison

This paper seeks to contribute to a number of debates that have attracted scholarly attention over the last few years. Firstly, by examining the experiences of the Swiss foreign intelligence service, the paper takes issue with what one scholar has dubbed ‘intelligence history snobbery’; a process that has privileged the study of the major powers and overlooked the contribution made to the secret world by the intelligence agencies of small states. Secondly, the paper explores the extent to which a state's engagement in the secret world is affected by its preconceived ideas over its place and standing in the international community. It asks whether the behaviour of a neutral foreign intelligence service is likely to differ from that of any other ‘small’ state, and whether neutrals can be both honest brokers in international affairs, and earnest players in the field of secret intelligence. The final section of the paper looks at the impact of the end of the Cold War and the emerging ‘global war on terror’ on the shape of the Swiss intelligence community.     

Do multilingual androids dream of a better life in Australia? Effectiveness of information technology for government translation to support refugees and migrants in Australia

Without high‐quality translation of online information about government support and services, refugees and migrants from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds in Australia experience a major barrier to improved health, employment, education and social outcomes. Recent advances in the ability of Google Translate, Skype Translator and other forms of machine translation that use artificial intelligence can help translate government information to better support refugees and migrants but they bring the risk of ineffective communication, and exclusion from services that could positively impact on settlement experiences and daily life. Evidence suggests that government agencies are likely to be using human translators for most translation work, but the degree to which any form of information technology is used, how it may be best applied and the associated effects are not known. This study systematically reviewed the peer‐reviewed and grey literature to determine effective ways of using information technology for translating government information to refugees and migrants from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds in Australia. Included studies were analysed to identify techniques and other characteristics of translation, information technology and language support more broadly, and outcomes on education, health, social and other refugee and migrant experiences relating to translated information. Our review found a small evidence base featuring studies with strong evaluation demonstrating effective forms of ‘language support’ for refugees and migrants from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds in Australia in a broad sense. However, there is a major gap in knowledge that is contributing to barriers in the use of online government information in Australia. In particular, there is an absence of evidence demonstrating what is effective in the use of machine translation with artificial intelligence, websites and other kinds of information technology for translating government information with refugees and migrants from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds. The oversight risks further excluding already marginalised groups from services and support. This paper makes a number of suggestions practitioners can take to address the issue and guidelines for future research.     

Partisan Improprieties: Ministerial Control and Australia's Security Agencies, 1962–72

Partisan behaviour and abuses by intelligence and security agencies have often been attributed to the fact that agencies have become ‘out of control’ or ‘rogue elephants’. But a detailed empirical study of the politicization of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) over ten years shows that the agency was not ‘out of control’ but very much under the control of its minister. The partisan use of security information arose from directives issued through the ‘democratic’ control exercised by a government. On the basis of this study, prevention of abuses by tighter governmental control is unlikely to work. A combination of government control, autonomy of the agency and independent scrutiny by an inspector-general is more likely to succeed.     

Shadowing ‘the exceptional’ behind the ‘ordinary’: mapping a network of intelligence laundering

ABSTRACT

Under the imperative of ‘prevention’, the process of information production for investigatory purposes forms a crossover between intelligence gathering and law enforcement. Digital surveillance programmes collect personal data prior to any probable cause of suspicion, whereas law enforcement activities are concerned with collecting evidence of crimes after the event. When future looking preventative approaches to the prosecution of crimes are forced into the linear, temporal narrative by which criminal investigations unfold, a tension emerges. The article demonstrates the ultimate incompatibility between ‘out of the ordinary’ intelligence activities and ‘ordinary’ criminal investigations by unearthing the procedural character behind evidence laundering.     

Interpreting national security and intelligence in geographic exploration: Explorers and geographers in America's early republic

‘Intelligence’ connotes the collection of information in furtherance of policy and strategic security objectives. Intelligence practitioners tend to look primarily to the histories of battlefield reconnaissance and court intrigue for their profession's discursive precedents. For the Western state, the mastery of territory has also been an important security objective since the Age of Exploration. Specifically, in the American case, territorial expansion and the subduing of new territory long lay at the heart of America's viability as a state. Thus, the intelligence field ought also to recognize geographical exploration as deeply implicated in Western national security discourse and as sharing an epistemological similarity with intelligence gathering. Both intelligence gathering and geographical exploration rely upon ‘Humint’, that is, informants penetrating distant and hidden places and reporting on the features found therein. America's early Republic period offers key examples of this fundamental similarity.     

Missing the Wake-up Call: Why Intelligence Failures Rarely Inspire Improved Performance

After major intelligence failures it is often asked why intelligence and security officials failed to heed the many ‘wake-up calls’ that had been provided by earlier failures and surprises. This article addresses this question by examining intelligence failures as ‘focusing events’, which is a concept used in the literature on government policy making to explain how disasters and crises can stimulate policy change and help organizations and decision-makers learn. It argues that in order for an intelligence failure such as a major terrorist attack to inspire improved intelligence performance – to be a true wake-up call – that failure must not only act as a focusing event to bring more attention to the threat, but it must also lead to increased intelligence collection and greater receptivity toward intelligence on the part of decision-makers.     

Big Data and Strategic Intelligence

This article examines the intersection of Big Data and strategic intelligence from a theoretical-conceptual viewpoint. Adopting Popperian refutation as a starting point, it approaches methodological issues surrounding the incorporation of Big Data into the intelligence cycle, and argues that Big Data analytics is best used to discern long-term developments, generate intelligence hypotheses, and adduce refuting facts. The article then briefly examines the use of Big Data via social media, an increasingly fertile platform for intelligence analysis. Finally, the article argues that despite its potential in filling our epistemic gaps, Big Data should continue to complement traditional subject-matter expertise, supported by game theory, as part of a tripartite analytical framework for strategic intelligence consisting of ‘subtext’, ‘context’ and ‘metatext’. In this respect, Big Data may well become the midwife for more open modes of intelligence management and, ultimately, a more open society.