Counteracting Identity Fraud in the Information Age: The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act

The advent of the information age has created new challenges to the ability of individuals to protect the privacy and security of their personal information. One such challenge is that of identity theft, which has imposed countless hardships upon its victims. Perpetrators of this fraud use the identities of others to steal money, obtain loans, and generally violate the law. The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 makes the theft of personal information with the intent to commit an unlawful act a federal crime in the United States with penalties of up to 15 years imprisonment and a maximum fine of $250,000. The Act designates the Federal Trade Commission to serve as an advocate for victims of identity fraud. This article first examines the problem of identity fraud and the inadequacy of existing remedies, and then assesses the need for and likely impact of the Act, as well as issues relating to the effectiveness of its future enforcement.     

Beyond the Gaze and Well Beyond Wolfenden: The Practices and Rationalities of Regulating and Policing Sex Work in the Digital Age

Drawing on the largest study of the United Kingdom online market in sexual labour to date, this article examines the legal and regulatory consequences as aspects of sex work increasingly take place within an online environment. Our research shows that while governmental policy has not kept abreast of these changes, the application of current laws (which have, since the 1950s, focused on public nuisance and, more recently, trafficking and modern slavery) are pernicious to sex workers and unsuited to recognizing and responding to the abuses and exploitation in online markets in sexual labour. These injustices are likely to be exacerbated if policies and policing do not better align with the realities of these markets in the twenty‐first century. This demands a more nuanced regulatory approach which recognizes that people may engage in sex work of their own volition, but which also addresses conditions of labour and criminal exploitation.     

Aggressive Policing and the Deterrence of Crime

Recent analyses of the relationship between crime and an aggressive patrol strategy have led to no single conclusion concerning the deterrent power of aggressive policing. This research adds to that debate by exploring the effects of a variety of aggressive patrol tactics on several different crimes. The empirical analysis, based on cross-sectional data from sixty urban neighborhoods, indicates that there appears to be no stable complex of police actions that constitute an aggressive patrol strategy. However, one form of police action usually included under the rubric of aggressive patrol—suspicion stops—may indeed deter certain types of criminal activity.     

Self-Interest and Altruism in the Deterrence of Transnational Bribery

This article explains why states in which bribe payers are located("payor states") criminalize transnational bribery. It suggeststhat these initiatives can enable selfinterested payor statesto improve the terms upon which their nationals obtain the servicesof foreign public officials. Although the legislation in questionis not patently designed to further economic interests, it maybe only partially enforced in a manner consistent with the economicinterests of payor states. This implies that further attentionshould be devoted to analyzing how anti-bribery legislationis enforced.     

Beyond Otonomy, or Beyond the Law of Law's Ear

Can the relationship between law and literature be thought in terms of conversation? Can the law still ‘hear’ the voice of a writing that has come before it, yet outside the frame of the ‘hearing’ and the rules of ‘standing’? And when literature speaks, what does it say? Perhaps what the law has always known …     

Comparative Compliance: Digital Piracy,Deterrence, Social Norms,and Duty in China and the United States

The study of compliance has been predominantly Western, and we do not know whether existing theories and findings also apply elsewhere. As a first venture in developing a comparative view on compliance, this study seeks to gain a comparative understanding of compliance decision making among Chinese and American students. It studies their decisions in response to two scenarios that offer an opportunity to use pirated online content. It tests how their decisions are shaped by subjective deterrence, social norms, and perceived duty to obey the law, comparing a control group with a group who received an explicit deterrence message from a strong campaign targeting the use of pirated digital content. The results indicate that, regardless of the explicit enforcement context, Chinese students' inclination to engage in digital piracy hinges chiefly on the perceived behavior and approval of others. This stands in contrast to US students. Within an explicit enforcement context, both social norms and perceived enforcement affect US students' decision making, whereas when there is no explicit enforcement context, both social norms and perceived duty to obey the law affect decision making. This study thus provides a warning that compliance theories and findings may not generalize well beyond the Western context. This necessitates the development of comparative compliance studies and more cross‐national replication.     

Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues

In Europe a common standard of strict liability has been introduced with the European directive 85/374. The implementation of this Directive has not led to an expansion of product liability cases. Moreover neither the product nor the insurance market has been dislocated as in the United States. Both the fact that most liability cases continue to be discussed under national legislation—even when it is based on liability with fault—and the different price of insurance in Eurpean Countries show that the directive did not reach its harmonisation goals. We discuss the optional provisions that limit strict liability under the directive, but claim that the scarce impact of liability laws—in spite of increasing concerns for product safety—may be due to compensation provided by the Welfare State and to the cost of access to justice in Europe. Compensation by the Welfare State is inadequate with respect to the internalisation of the cost of accidents especially when public institutions do not file claims against liable producers. Product safety regulation should have performed the deterrence function. However we also point out that the threat of reputation losses is a powerful incentive for firms to carefully control product safety, when consumers increasingly care about product quality and accidents are heavily advertised by media.JEL Classification: K13, K41     

分权理论在防止公诉权滥用中的运用

分权作为防止权力滥用的基本方法,同样可运用于防止公诉权滥用。在宪法框架下,公诉权附属于行政权,或成为独立的法律监督权,与其他政治权力分立制衡;在诉讼程序中,公诉权独立于侦查权和审判权;在公诉权内部表现为公诉权主体的多元化,检察一体化下检察官之间的分权,公诉提起权、公诉决定权与支持公诉权的分权。     

Re-Examining the Functional Form of the Certainty Effect in Deterrence Theory

In this paper we explore the functional form of the risk-certainty effect for deterrence. Using a sample of serious youth offenders, we first estimate a simple linear model of the relationship between the perceived certainty of punishment and self-reported offending. Consistent with previous literature we find evidence of a moderate deterrent effect. We then examined whether, consistent with a linear model, the effect of perceived risk is truly constant at different ranges of the risk continuum. Estimating a nonparametric regression model that makes no a priori assumption about the functional form of the model but allows the data itself to yield the appropriate functional form, we found marked departures from linearity. Our examination showed evidence of both a tipping effect, whereby perceived risk deters only when it reaches a certain threshold (between an estimated risk of .3 and .4) and a substantially accelerated deterrent effect for individuals at the high end of the risk continuum. Perceived sanction threats did, however, have a non-trivial deterrent effect within the mid-range of risk. The implications of our findings for both theory and additional research are discussed.     

Incentivizing Responses to Self-report Questions in Perceptual Deterrence Studies: An Investigation of the Validity of Deterrence Theory Using Bayesian Truth Serum

Objective

Criminological researchers want people to reveal considerable private information when utilizing self-report surveys, such as involvement in crime, subjective attitudes and expectations, and probability judgments. Some of this private information is easily accessible for subjects and all that is required is for individuals to be honest, while other information requires mental effort and cognitive reflection. Though researchers generally provide little or no incentive to be honest and thoughtful, it is generally assumed that subjects do provide honest and accurate information. We assess the accuracy of deterrence measures by employing a scoring rule known as the Bayesian truth serum (BTS)—that incentivizes honesty and thoughtfulness among respondents.

Method

Individuals are asked to report on self-report offending and estimates of risk after being assigned to one of two conditions: (1) a group where there is a financial incentive just for participation, and (2) a BTS financial incentive group where individuals are incentivized to be honest and thoughtful.

Results

We find evidence that there are some important differences in the responses to self-reporting offending items and estimates of the probability of getting arrested between the groups. Individuals in the BTS condition report a greater willingness to offend and lower estimates of perceived risk for drinking and driving and cheating on exams. Moreover, we find that the negative correlation between perceived risk and willingness to offend that is often observed in scenario-based deterrence research does not emerge in conditions where respondents are incentivized to be accurate and thoughtful in their survey responses.

Conclusion

The results raise some questions about the accuracy of survey responses in perceptual deterrence studies, and challenge the statistical relationship between perceived risk and offending behavior. We suggest further exploration within criminology of both BTS and other scoring rules and greater scrutiny of the validity of criminological data.     

违法阻却事由与犯罪构成体系

违法与责任是犯罪的两大支柱,认定犯罪应当从违法到责任;是否存在违法阻却事由,属于是否具有违法性的判断,因此,应当在违法构成要件之后,接着讨论违法阻却事由。在考察全部构成要件之后才讨论违法阻却事由的做法,不利于对违法性的判断,也不利于保障行为人的自由。     

Kant's theory of punishment: Deterrence in its threat,retribution in its execution

Kant's theory of punishment is commonly regarded as purely retributive in nature, and indeed much of his discourse seems to support that interpretation. Still, it leaves one with certain misgivings regarding the internal consistency of his position. Perhaps the problem lies not in Kant's inconsistency nor in the senility sometimes claimed to be apparent in the Metaphysic of Morals, but rather in a superimposed, modern yet monistic view of punishment. Historical considerations tend to show that Kant was discussing not one, but rather two facets of punishment, each independent but nevertheless mutually restrictive. Punishment as a threat was intended to deter crime. It was a tool in the hands of civil society to counteract human drives toward violating another's rights. In its execution, however, the state was limited in its reaction by a retributive theory of justice demanding respect for the individual as an end and not as a means to some further social goal. This interpretation of Kant's theory of punishment maintains consistency from the earliest through the latest of his writings on moral, legal, and political philosophy. It provides a good reason for rejecting current economic analyses of crime and punishment. Most important of all, it credits Kant's theory in its clear recognition of the ideals intrinsic to libertarian government.     

BARGAIN AND BLUFF: Compliance Strategy and Deterrence in the Enforcement of Regulation

A strategy of compliance in which enforcement agents rely on negotiation is identified as a characteristic feature of water pollution control work. The strategy arises from the nature of the conduct and activities subject to regulation and from the need to maintain a continuing relationship with the regulated. In securing compliance regulatory agents shape their enforcement tactics by reference to assumptions held as to why polluters fail to comply. Bargaining is central to compliance strategy, but if a conciliatory approach fails, a more threatening posture will be taken in which a variety of mores, including bluffs about legal sanctions, may be employed. Law enforcement is treated as a matter of compliance as well as compulsion.     

Pitfalls in the Use of Time Series Methods to Study Deterrence and Capital Punishment

Objectives

Evaluate the use of various time series methods to measure the deterrence effect of capital punishment.

Methods

The analysis of the time series approach to deterrence is conducted at two levels. First, the mathematical foundations of time series methods are described and the link between the time series properties of aggregate homicide and execution series and individual decision making is developed. Second, individual studies are examined for logical consistency.

Results

The analysis concludes that time series methods used to study the deterrence effects of capital punishment suffer from fundamental limitations and fail to provide credible evidence. The common limitation of these studies is their lack of attention to identification problems. Suggestions are made as to directions for future work that may be able to mitigate the weaknesses of the current literature.

Conclusions

Time series studies of capital punishment suffer from sufficiently serious identification problems that existing empirical findings are compatible with either the presence or the absence of a deterrent effect.