Corporate Financial Performance and the Use of Takeover Defenses

This paper tests the hypothesis that the threat of a contested takeover improves corporate performance. This is done by a cross-sectional analysis of listed Danish firms with and without effective takeover defenses. Takeover defenses adopted by Danish firms mainly consist of dual class voting rights often in combination with foundation ownership. Using simultaneous equation estimation to deal with the problem of causation, the results show that unprotected firms do not outperform protected firms. This suggests that management in unprotected firms are disciplined by other corporate governance mechanisms than the market for corporate control, including the legal protection of shareholders.     

Corporate governance and financial development: a study of the French case

This paper belongs to the growing body of the “Law and finance” literature based on time-series study. It carries out an empirical investigation of the role of corporate governance in financial development. We focus on French corporate governance reforms in order to examine whether these reforms are consistent with the reorganization of the French financial system, which took place during the period 1977–2004. This research aims at evaluating one proposition of the legal origin claims based on the idea that there is a strong and stable relationship between legal origin, investor protection and financial system. A key question the study addresses is how corporate governance rules and the French financial development have changed over time. Our study suggests that indicators related to investors’ rights (shareholders, employees, and bondholders) have been increasing over time, despite the specific legal origin of the French system. On the contrary the creditors’ rights have followed a less clear trend. Our econometric investigation is fairly new as the Law and finance literature has not until now provided corporate governance indicators suitable for French legislation. From that perspective, our work undergoes a multiple criteria analysis of corporate governance reforms. Following this approach, we suggest that the causality links between changes in the French legal environment and financial growth in France are more bidirectional than unidirectional.     

Legal Environment,Firm-level Corporate Governance and Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in Asia

Claessens et al. (2000, Journal of Financial Economics 58(1–2), 81–112) show that corporate control is substantially enhanced by using pyramid structures and cross-holdings by firms in nine East Asian countries. Claessens et al. (1999, SSRN Working Paper; 2002, Journal of Finance 57(2), 2741–2771) provide empirical evidence regarding expropriation arising from the separation of cash flow from voting rights in Asian firms. Their analysis suggests a high degree of expropriation in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. We re-examine the problem of expropriation in Asian firms reported by earlier research. We explore firm-level governance-control structure interactions, and control-legal environment interaction for a set of Asian firms for which we are able to obtain relevant data for all the required variables. The major contribution of this paper is that it jointly examines ownership-control structure, firm-level governance and country-level legal protection available to external suppliers of capital. Using post-crisis data, we find a strong country effect in governance. In general, high control firms in countries with weak legal protection have lower firm-level governance scores in general. On the other hand, high control firms, in countries which have a stronger legal protection environment, signal their intention to not expropriate minority shareholders’ wealth by voluntarily adopting measures to strengthen their discipline and responsibility scores. Contrary to earlier findings, we do not find a relationship between control-ownership wedge and firm value. Furthermore, we do not find any relation between firm-level governance and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q.     

公司法人财产权与公司治理

从探讨公司法人财产权和公司治理二者关系角度入手,对中国公司法中"法人财产权"的内涵与性质加以阐释和分析。法人财产权是一种综合性的权利,包括对实物财产享有的所有权和对其他财产享有的完整权利,法人财产权的确立与归属是公司治理的基础与保障,是公司治理权力分化与制衡的出发点及归宿,而科学有效的公司治理结构的建构与确立也维系着法人财产权的地位,是实现法人财产权的组织保证。新《公司法》删除了原《公司法》关于公司中的国有资产所有权属于国家的规定,为建立现代意义上的公司制度与科学合理的公司治理结构奠定了基础。     

Ownership structure, regulation and the market for corporate control in the EU banking sector

This paper analyzes the efficiency of shareholder control and hostile takeovers as corporate governance mechanisms in the EU banking sector against the background of the existing corporate governance regulations and different ownership structures of banks in the EU. The results indicate the there is trade-off in EU corporate governance regulation between better investor protection and a higher efficiency of the market for corporate control. The main problem is differences in the ownership structure of banks in the EU banking sector. This implies that EU corporate governance regulations should be customized to the specific ownership structure of banks and not toward harmonising national regulations.     

职代会的定位与功能重塑

职代会制度是我国颇具特色的一项职工参与制度。随着市场经济体制的建立以及企业治理制度的变革，职代会的地位和作用发生了变化，需要重新审视职代会的正当性。目前，有关职工参与的各种理论从不同角度论证了职代会的正当性，职代会对完善公司治理、加强公司监督、维护公司利益也具有积极作用。我国应通过完善职代会设立规则、职权设置，使传统的职代会与市场经济体制下的现代公司治理机制相契合，让职代会成为职工与企业协商沟通的主要平台，在新的体制环境下发挥协商和监督等功能。     

我国国有公司股权结构及其法律改革——以公司治理效率为主要视角

公司治理结构是公司制的核心,而公司治理结构实质上是由股权结构决定的,当前各国公司的股权结构以提高公司治理效率为导向正在向＂相对控股＂趋同。在我国,国有股权高度集中是国有公司股权结构的基本特征,虽然股权集中在某种程度上有其优势,但我国国有股权的过于集中会损害公司治理的效率。因此,在分散化原则的基础上体现适度集中——即＂相对控股＂——同样应当成为我国国有公司股权结构的选择模式。要实现这一目标只能通过国有股的减持,包括国有股绝对量的减持、国有股相对量的减持和国有股限制性减持三种形式。无论哪种形式,在我国当前都需要法律的配套。     

欧陆上市公司关联交易治理机制比较

上市公司关联交易治理重点因股权结构而异,英美等少数股权分散国家为管理层,包括我国在内的多数股权集中国家则为控制股东。鉴于控制股东所主导的关联交易具有利益冲突与经营效率的双重属性,欧陆国家的法律对其采取兴利除弊的治理策略。通过董事会和监事会审批机制确保决策效率,依靠司法任命特别检查人和派生诉讼机制维护少数股东权益,在公司集团中引入特别规则以提升公司价值,实现了公平与效率的动态平衡,值得我国借鉴。     

Ownership Structure as Corporate Governance Mechanism: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

This paper examines the cross-sectional relation between ownership structure and corporate performance of a sample of 434 manufacturing firms listed on the Chinese stock exchange. Following the agency theory and taking other influential factors into account, such as firm size, leverage ratio, variance of sales, growth of sale and firm age, the results suggest that there is a strong relation between ownership concentration and corporate performance, measured by Tobin's Q. A further classification of owners reveals that while shares held by state play a negative role in corporate governance, domestic institutional and managerial shareholdings improve the firms' performance.     

Recent developments in German corporate governance

This paper provides an overview of the German corporate governance system. We review the governance role of large shareholders, creditors, the product market and the supervisory board. We also discuss the importance of mergers and acquisitions, the market in block trades, and the lack of a hostile takeover market. Given that Germany is often referred to as a bank-based economy, we pay particular attention to the role of the universal banks (Hausbanken). We show that the German system is characterised by a market for partial corporate control, large shareholders and bank/creditor monitoring, a two-tier (management and supervisory) board with co-determination between shareholders and employees on the supervisory board, a disciplinary product–market, and corporate governance regulation largely based on EU directives but with deep roots in the German codes and legal doctrine. Another important feature of the German system is its corporate governance efficiency criterion which is focused on the maximisation of stakeholder value rather than shareholder value. However, the German corporate governance system has experienced many important changes over the last decade. First, the relationship between ownership or control concentration and profitability has changed over time. Second, the pay-for-performance relation is influenced by large shareholder control: in firms with controlling blockholders and when a universal bank is simultaneously an equity- and debtholder, the pay-for-performance relation is lower than in widely held firms or blockholder-controlled firms. Third, since 1995 several major regulatory initiatives (including voluntary codes) have increased transparency and accountability.     

Promoting a more efficient corporate governance in Nigeria through the law

Corporate governance reforms have been viewed as one of the formal means of improving the economic and social welfare of emerging economies. There have been efforts by the Nigerian government, through its agencies, to promulgate codes of best practices for companies in the country. These reforms appear to be ineffective and the codes do not compliment and are not complimented by corporate law. The aim of this paper is to identify the problems that hinder effective corporate governance reforms in Nigeria within corporate law. Using the doctrinal approach, the paper analyses features of the Nigerian corporate governance framework and identifies the problems bedeviling this regime. It argues that the problems stem from (amongst others), state ownership and control, board independence, poor minority shareholder protection, ineffective judicial system and Incomplete disclosure. The paper, by linking the apparent weakness of the extant framework to the attempt to reform outside corporate law, suggests a hybrid of legislation including hard laws, soft laws and other policy proposals to promote an effective corporate governance regime in Nigeria.     

The Bonding Effects of Directors' Statutory Wage Liability: An Interactive Corporate Governance Explanation

Canadian corporate directors are personally liable to the corporation's employees for unpaid wages. The dominant rationale is the protection of vulnerable employees. A proposal under consideration to exonerate directors from this liability responds to claims that directors of financially troubled corporations resign prematurely, lessening the realized value potential of the firm. Scholars have also argued that a "liability chill" causes directors to make inefficient, risk‐averse investment decisions while the corporation is solvent. Paradoxically, exoneration may actually decrease the value of the firm because directors' liability for employees' wages increases efficiency in corporate governance by reducing agency costs. It serves as a bond by directors to corporate stakeholders that they will diligently restrain harmful managerial behavior.     

美国“一股一权”制度的兴衰及其启示

股东控制是美国公司法的基础,而"一股一权"则是该基础的核心。纽约证券交易所在20世纪初迫于政治压力,在上市公司标准中确立了一股一权原则。但在1980年代,纽约证券交易所因美国证券交易所和纳斯达克交易所的竞争压力,放弃了这一上市标准,引起了美国学者对该原则的广泛争议。一股一权原则的合理性尽管经过了学者的多次论证,但大部分国家公司法并没有将这一原则贯彻到底。实证研究表明,股权结构与公司业绩并不存在确定的关系。允许公司按实际情况设计股权结构,可能更有利于公司长远发展,但其前提是健全公司治理制度和投资者保护制度。     

Shareholder Primacy and the Distribution of Wealth

In recent years a growing consensus has emerged in favour of the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation. Increasingly, this model is justified not on the basis of shareholder ownership rights but on efficiency grounds: whoever the immediate and direct beneficiaries of shareholder-orientation, it is argued, it ultimately indirectly benefits everyone by ensuring the maximization of aggregate social wealth. The prevalence of this view has caused the distributional dimensions of corporate governance to be neglected. This paper examines the distribution of share ownership and financial wealth in the US and the UK. Although share ownership has become more widely spread, it argues, it remains very heavily concentrated with the result that shareholder primacy is in reality the primacy of a small privileged elite. After an exploration of the contradictions of working class shareholding and the impact of greater shareholder-orientation on the distribution of wealth, the paper concludes by re-evaluating Hansmann and Kraakman's 'end of corporate history' thesis, arguing that recent developments represent a triumph not for efficiency but for the growing power of the shareholder class.     

英国行业性组织在公司治理中的作用

英国公司治理研究致力于解决因所有权和控制权分离而产生的经典代理问题,理论界和实务界分别提出了两种机制:董事会内部监督机制和"要素市场"外部治理机制来约束监督管理层,降低代理成本。在机构化持股时代,机构投资者越来越积极参与所投资组合公司的治理事务,代表机构投资者的行业性组织在一般性参与方面起着举足轻重的作用,机构监督已成为英国公司治理的新机制。     

Incomplete Contracts, Intellectual Property and Institutional Complementarities

In the New Property Rights model ownership of assets should be assigned to the most capable agents. While, in a world of incomplete contracts, the application of the model to IPRs provides insights on the nature of their second best allocation, suggesting a direction of causation going from technology to property rights, also the opposite direction of causation may arise: owners of IPRs tend to develop more capabilities in the production of new IPRs. For some firms and countries, a virtuous complementarity between the development of IPRs and skills arises. For others, the disincentive effect of the exclusion from intellectual property has more damaging consequences than the lack of access to material capital.     

论银行公司治理制度的构建

在银行中,利益冲突的范围不同于实体经济中一般的工商企业,但是,一直以来银行的公司治理制度并没有给予银行中特别的利益冲突以特别关注。美国2007-2009年的金融危机表明,有必要调整和改革银行的公司治理结构。银行功能的社会公益性以及银行中特殊的利益冲突和其它的特点使得在构建银行的公司治理结构时,不能够简单地适用普通公司的治理模式,而要在股权治理、债权治理和监管治理之中寻求平衡。     

劳动职业伤害的企业社会责任主体分析——以“毒苹果”为例

苹果公司供应商联建科技使用有毒化学原料正己烷导致百名员工中毒的案例引出一个法律难题——间接职业伤害主体的责任问题。本文从"毒苹果"事件提出的法律问题、职业伤害间接责任主体承担企业社会责任的依据,以及间接责任主体承担企业社会责任的途径等方面进行了论述,提出职业伤害间接主体应承担扩大的企业社会责任;间接责任主体承担企业社会责任应从企业自身监督、利益相关者参与治理及政府监管等方面进行。     

Corporatisation and Corporate Governance in China's Economic Transition

China has sought to improve enterprise performance not through privatisation as in other transition economies, but through corporatisation as means of improving corporate governance. Actual governance practices of corporatised Chinese firms are however seriously defective, characterized by excessive power of CEOs, insider control and collusion, lack of safeguards for minority shareholders and weak transparency. These shortcomings are attributable to factors such as cultural and political traditions, uncompetitiveness of markets, poor legal enforcement, weak debt and equity markets, but above all to continued state dominance in ownership and control of the corporate sector and listed companies. Corporatisation, nevertheless, has created a regime conducive to implementing measures for improving corporate governance.